Magsaysay-Cuenco v. Oporto

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 11706. February 17, 2021.][Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5480]

MIA CARMELLA MAGSAYSAY-CUENCO, complainant,vs. ATTY. MA. JASMINE S. OPORTO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 17, 2021which reads as follows:

"A.C. No. 11706 [Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5480] (Mia Carmella Magsaysay-Cuenco v. Atty. Ma. Jasmine S. Oporto). — The instant disbarment case 1 was filed by complainant Mia Carmela Magsaysay-Cuenco (Mia) against respondent Atty. Ma. Jasmine S. Oporto (Atty. Oporto) for allegedly violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Facts of the Case

As much as the Court only seeks to resolve the issues raised by complainant in her disbarment complaint, a full narration of the factual circumstances surrounding this case shall be undertaken for its full appreciation.

The Visayan Electric Company, Inc. (VECO), for years, has upheld a policy that all matters relating to employee discipline are covered by management prerogative. Necessarily, this means that such matters are not subject to the grievance machinery procedure provided for under its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the employees' bargaining representative, Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP (VECEU). 2 This was enshrined in Section 13, Article XIV of the CBA 3 which provides:

ARTICLE XIV — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

xxx xxx xxx

Section 12. Application of Company Rules. — The Company agrees that henceforth there shall be a fair and uniform application of its rules and regulations. It is understood that disciplinary actions imposed on employee or laborer shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Company as well as those provided for by existing laws on the matter.4 (Emphasis supplied)

This provision was challenged by VECEU in 2009 (Case 1), 5 arguing that matters regarding employee discipline are subject to the grievance machinery in the CBA by virtue of another provision — Section 4, Article XVII which provides:

ARTICLE XVII — SHOP STEWARD SYSTEM AND ARBITRATION COMMITTEE

xxx xxx xxx

Section 4. Grievance Procedures. — Any difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or complaint arising from Company-Union or Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or regarding any matter affecting Company-Union or Company-Worker relations shall be considered a grievance. x x x 6 (Emphasis supplied)

This same provision continues with an enumeration of the steps to be taken under the grievance machinery:

xxx xxx xxx

THIRD STEP. The creation of the Investigation Board constitutes the third step in the settlement of the grievance. It is composed of two representatives from the Company, and two from the Union. The Investigation Board (IB) shall forthwith furnish the respondent with Complaint of aggrieved party/company, including affidavits of his witnesses. The respondent shall submit his sworn counter statement within ten (10) days from receipt of said complaint. If the IB deems it necessary, it may conduct a clarificatory investigation in the presence of both parties and thereafter shall resolve the case without delay. All the members of the board have to be present and no investigation shall proceed in the absence of any member. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed by agreement of all the members thereof. The resolution of the Board shall be based on the majority opinion of the members thereof.

The main task of the IB is purely fact-finding and its resolution must be submitted to the Legal Officer of the Company within five (5) days from receipt of the same. The Legal Officer of the Company shall write out the decision which thereafter shall be transmitted to the Personnel Officer for implementation. If the aggrieved party does not agree with the decision, he has a period of three (3) days from receipt of said decision to file his appeal to the Arbitration committee, otherwise, it shall be considered settled and executory. 7 (Emphasis supplied)

In 2012, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stating that, between the two seemingly conflicting provisions, it is Section 13, Article XIV that governs matters of employee discipline because it is the more specific one. 8 Aggrieved by this decision, VECEU decided to bring this matter to the Court. 9

During the pendency of the foregoing, Mia was serving as the Assistant Vice President/Human Resources of VECO, while Atty. Oporto was the Chief Legal Officer of Aboitiz Equity Ventures (AEV) which VECO was a part of. In accordance with AEV's inter-group memorandum, 10 all business units, including VECO, were required to refer any dispute to AEV Legal which was headed by Atty. Oporto. 11

In 2014, two rank-and-file union members of the union were disciplined without going through the grievance machinery. 12 Subsequently, VECEU initiated "STEP ONE" of the grievance machinery as provided for in Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA, arguing again that matters of employee discipline are covered by the grievance machinery. Thereafter, VECEU initiated "STEP TWO" of the grievance machinery. Mia, without consulting AEV's Legal Department nor obtaining VECO's approval, initiated "STEP THREE" of the grievance machinery when she issued a memorandum dated February 16, 2015, convening the Investigation Board. 13

When Atty. Jennifer Maniwang (Atty. Maniwang), VECO's Compliance Officer, discovered what Mia had done, she approached the latter regarding her actions. Mia alleged that she decided to go through the grievance machinery because she was confident that the matter would be resolved in the company's favor. Thereafter, Mia also submitted the issue to voluntary arbitration without once again consulting with AEV Legal nor obtaining VECO's approval to do so. Faced with the matter already pending before the voluntary arbitrator, VECO engaged outside counsel to protect its interests. 14

VECO then issued a memorandum dated April 27, 2015 reprimanding Mia. Speaking through its Chief Operating Officer Sebastian Lacson (Lacson), VECO expressed frustration over the unnecessary risks that the company now has to face due to her actions. Lacson also reiterated the company's unequivocal stand on its labor relations i.e., that these are not matters subject to the grievance machinery. 15

On May 19, 2015, Mia tendered her resignation letter to Lacson via email. Here, Mia thanked Lacson for being a great leader and for the lessons that she has learned from working in VECO. On May 20, 2015 — the very next day after she tendered her resignation — Mia, through her husband, Atty. Jesus Mariano M. Cuenco III (Atty. Cuenco) wrote a notice to VECO withdrawing the former's resignation. She claimed that VECO wanted to dismiss her without following the procedural requirements under the Labor Code. They attempted to serve this letter to Lacson through Atty. Maniwang who initially said that she had no authority to receive it. Mia and Atty. Cuenco responded by allegedly raising their voices at Atty. Maniwang to force her to receive it, and then made negative remarks regarding VECO's owners. 16

On May 22, 2015, VECO, through Lacson, served Mia a Notice of Preventive Suspension where she was suspended for 30 days. A few days after, VECO issued a Notice to Explain regarding the following matters: (a) submission of non-grievable matters to the grievance machinery under the CBA and to voluntary arbitration without proper consultation and authority from VECO; (b) failing to consult with VECO management before submitting VECEU's challenge against the policy concerning employee discipline; (c) for failure to enroll two VECO officers to VECO's Group Accident Insurance Program; and (d) creating an atmosphere of discomfort and aggravation when she, along with Atty. Cuenca, raised their voices at Atty. Maniwang when they demanded her to receive the retraction letter and for speaking negatively against VECO's owners. 17

After due notice and investigation, VECO issued its decision on July 2, 2015, informing Mia that she has been dismissed from her employment due to the acts that she committed. This prompted Mia to file a case with the Labor Arbiter (LA), arguing that she was illegally suspended and dismissed (Case 2). 18

On July 22, 2015, the Court issued the decision for Case 1 in Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP (VECEU) v. Visayan Electric Company, Inc. (VECO), 19 where the Court held that it is Section 13, Article XIV of the CBA that governs matters of employee discipline. 20 The Court explained that "it is within the employer's prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal upon erring employees." 21 In other words, VECO's long standing policy over matters regarding employee discipline — that they are not required to undergo through the grievance machinery found in the CBA — is valid. 22

Sometime in 2016, Mia also filed a criminal charge for slander by deed against Lacson before the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu. However, the Information filed was eventually withdrawn upon a finding that there was no probable cause. 23

On May 24, 2017, Mia filed a complaint-affidavit 24 dated May 17, 2017 against Atty. Oporto before the Court. In her complaint, she alleged that Atty. Oporto should be sanctioned for violating Canon 1, and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 25First, Mia argues that her dismissal from employment was due to Atty. Oporto's "impulsion and concocted schemes." 26 According to Mia, her act of convening an Investigation Board was done in accordance with the CBA and with the Constitutional policy towards the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling employment-related disputes. She vehemently insists that Atty. Oporto merely formulated the policy concerning matters of employee discipline, with the arrogant belief that she is above the law. 27 In other words, Mia believes that this formulated policy is illegal, and that Atty. Oporto should be punished for implementing it. 28Second, she holds that the submission of her resignation letter was caused by the machinations of Lacson. Allegedly, Lacson promised her transfer to another company and that her resignation will facilitate the process. However, once she tendered her resignation, Lacson never fulfilled his promise and Mia contends that Atty. Oporto was behind this as well. Lastly, Mia states that she was furnished with the Notice of Preventive Suspension in a humiliating manner since it was done in front of other employees during a busy time. On July 12, 2017, the Court referred her complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 29

On June 16, 2017, the Court of Appeals, where Case 2 was pending at that time, upheld the LA and the NLRC's decision that: (a) Mia voluntarily resigned from VECO; 30 (b) that her suspension was valid; 31 and (c) that her termination was also valid on the ground of breach of trust and confidence. 32 It was explained by the Court that submitting VECEU's dispute to the grievance machinery put in jeopardy VECO's management prerogative to discipline its own employees. Moreover, the Court also found that VECO validly complied with the two-notice rule. 33 Undeterred, Mia appealed the case to this Court.

On January 29, 2018, Atty. Oporto filed her Answer 34 where she denied all of Mia's allegations. She argued that the complaint was nothing more than an act of vengeance and desperation. First, Atty. Oporto argued that she was fully aware of the company's policy that all legal matters must be referred to AEV Legal and that matters of employee discipline are not covered by the grievance machinery. And, despite such knowledge and awareness, Mia not only submitted VECEU's challenge to the grievance machinery, but she did so without consulting with AEV Legal. 35Second, Atty. Oporto argues that the disputed policy cannot be solely attributable to her because it was adopted by the company itself. In any case, she cites the Supreme Court's decision in VECEU v. VECO which settles once and for all the legality of the policy regarding matters of employee discipline. 36Third, that Mia's claims regarding her suspension and dismissal were irrelevant in the disbarment proceedings; and, that they are the same labor issues in Case 2 which was decided against her. Lastly, even assuming arguendo that she was illegally suspended and dismissed, Atty. Oporto had nothing to do therein. 37

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation 38 dated June 28, 2019, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) dismissed Mia's complaint for several reasons. The IBP-CBD cited the case of VECEU v. VECO to once again emphasize the legality of VECO's policy regarding matters of employee discipline. Therefore, even assuming that Atty. Oporto formulated this policy, there can be no finding that she violated the law in doing so. As for the other matters alleged, the IBP-CBD decided to not discuss them anymore because: (a) Mia no longer raised them in her position paper during the proceedings in the IBP; and (b) that these are matters which should be ventilated in Mia's labor complaint and not in the disciplinary proceedings. 39

Meanwhile on June 11, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution regarding Case 2, denying Mia's petition and affirming the Court of Appeals' decision. This became final and executory on November 19, 2018. 40

Afterwards, on September 5, 2019, Mia and Atty. Oporto, through their respective counsels, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss. 41 Mia states herein that she "has come to realize now that she has no basis to pray for the disbarment of the Respondent" i.e., Atty. Oporto. 42

Issue

The issue before Us is whether Atty. Oporto should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of Mia in her complaint.

Ruling of the Court

After a perusal of the records of the case, the Court finds the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Board of Governors proper under the circumstances. Clearly, Mia's complaint is bereft of both factual and legal bases — a reality which Mia even admits in the joint motion to dismiss that she filed with Atty. Oporto.

First, the policy regarding matters of employee discipline was adopted by all business units of the AEV group of companies, including VECO. Moreover, Mia was unable to prove that Atty. Oporto is solely responsible for this policy. Aside from Mia's generous citing of Labor Code and Constitutional provisions, she never addressed the fact that this policy has already been declared to be legal by the Court. Necessarily, this declaration by the highest Court of the land is a testament to the legality of Atty. Oporto's insistence that Mia should not have submitted VECEU's dispute to the grievance machinery.

Second, there is also no basis to hold Atty. Oporto liable for her statement that Mia should have at least consulted AEV Legal regarding the submission of the dispute to the grievance machinery. In Case 2, the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, held that Mia's failure to consult AEV Legal serves as a sufficient basis for her dismissal. 43 This decision was again confirmed by this Court in a Resolution dated June 11, 2018. 44 In other words, this policy of requiring consultation with AEV Legal regarding legal matters is not only proper but is actually commonsensical — obviously, lawyers are hired to give advice when legal problems arise. Furthermore, as with the issue on employee discipline, the adoption of such policy, even if assumed to be illegal, cannot even be solely attributed to Atty. Oporto.

Third, Mia's allegations in respect of her resignation, suspension, and dismissal are not only irrelevant — they have been rendered moot and academic by this Court's Resolution dated June 11, 2018 upholding the legality of her dismissal. Moreover, the case of Tria-Samonte v. Obias45 holds that disbarment cases are "only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability." 46 Assuming arguendo that these matters are still proper to be the subject of dispute, Mia was unable to prove that it was Atty. Oporto who caused it. Atty. Oporto was merely the Chief Legal Officer of AEV and not Mia's employer. The policies and protocols which Mia disobeyed were those of VECO and not Atty. Oporto's. In calling Mia's attention to her violations, Atty. Oporto was merely exercising the functions of her position and this does not show any intent to prejudice nor injure her.

Fourth, Mia's own allegations and evidence concretely prove that Atty. Oporto had no participation in Mia's resignation and dismissal. In her allegations of the "schemes" to dismiss her, Mia introduced in evidence the acts of other people to prove them. In the Notice of Decision, 47 Notice of Preventive Suspension, 48 and alleged promises to transfer her to the company, Mia named Lacson as the person behind them, and nowhere therein can Atty. Oporto's name be seen. In any case, Mia's allegations were already struck down by this Court for being unmeritorious in the Resolution dated June 11, 2018.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Ma. Jasmine S. Oporto for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 1-11.

2.Id. at 23-24.

3. Note that the first challenge regarding these provisions came in 2009 while they basis of complainant Mia's petition is the 2012 CBA. However, the disputed provisions are exactly the same in both versions.

4.Rollo, p. 142.

5.VECEU v. VECO, 764 Phil. 608 (2015).

6.Rollo, p. 144.

7.Id. at 144-145.

8.Supra note 5 at 615.

9.Id.

10.Rollo, pp. 32-35.

11.Id. at 33-34.

12.Id. at 98.

13.Id. at 491.

14.Id. at 492.

15.Id. at 493.

16.Id. at 494-495.

17.Id. at 495-496.

18.Id. at 503.

19.Supra note 5.

20.Id. at 621.

21.Id.

22.Id.

23.Rollo, pp. 110-111.

24.Id. at 1-11.

25.Id. at 1-2.

26.Id. at 3.

27.Id. at 3-4.

28.Id. at 5.

29.Id. at 8-10.

30.Id. at 344.

31.Id. at 347.

32.Id. at 345-346.

33.Id. at 346-347.

34.Id. at 81-131.

35.Id. at 115-118.

36.Id. at 113-115.

37.Id. at 121-122.

38.Id. at 781-786.

39.Id. at 784-786.

40.Id. at 772-773.

41.Id. at 688-689.

42.Id. at 689.

43.Id. at 345-347.

44.Id. at 772-773.

45.Tria-Samonte v. Obias, 719 Phil. 70 (2013).

46.Id. at 81.

47.Rollo, pp. 41-48.

48.Id. at 54.