SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 235821. April 23, 2018.]
RYAN E. MAGNO, petitioner,vs. SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., DEXTER ARQUILLANO, AND FREDERICK AROMIN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated23 April 2018which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 235821 (Ryan E. Magno vs. Sutherland Global Services Philippines, Inc., Dexter Arquillano, and Frederick Aromin). — This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated July 14, 2017, and Resolution 3 dated November 20, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144719, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated November 27, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 11-003086-15 ordering the deletion of backwages awarded by the Labor Arbiter (LA) in favor of petitioner Ryan E. Magno (Magno).
The Antecedents
Respondent Sutherland Global Services Philippines, Inc. (Sutherland) is a business process outsourcing (BPO) company catering to international clients. Co-respondents Dexter Arquillano (Arquillano) and Frederick Aromin (Aromin), are the Human Resource Manager, and Senior Account Manager, respectively, of Sutherland. 5
On July 18, 2011, Sutherland hired Magno as a consultant (call center agent). Thereafter, on August 3, 2012, Magno was promoted as a senior consultant and was assigned as one of the subject matter experts of the AT&T U-Verse Blue Account. Among his functions as a subject matter expert were to take over escalation calls and supervise the team in the absence of the manager. 6
On November 28, 2016, Adryan Mark Cavita (Cavita), a call-center agent under Magno's supervision received a call from an AT&T subscriber, who was complaining about the bills he received from AT&T. Unable to resolve the concerns of the customer, Cavita sought the assistance of Magno. Magno took over the call.
During Magno's conversation with the caller, he informed the latter that the concern may best be addressed to a different department, for which, he will transfer the call. Apparently, this suggestion irritated the customer, who raised his voice and suddenly became furious with Magno.
Magno pacified the caller and explained to him that his concern is being addressed, but insisted that the concern will be best resolved by another department.
Meanwhile, in the middle of the call, Magno had to take breaks from talking with the irate customer, as he had to address the questions and concerns of the other agents under his supervision.
Angered by this, the customer demanded to talk with the manager. Magno explained that there was no manager present at the moment. The caller threatened to file a complaint against Magno with the AT&T President, to which Magno responded saying, "thank you, I'll be more than happy to wait for that."7
On December 4, 2012, Magno received a Memorandum dated December 3, 2012 from Sutherland, indicating that it received a complaint against Magno from a client named Tony Melhelm (Melhelm), thru the Office of the President of AT&T. Melhelm complained that Magno allegedly placed his call on hold for 20 minutes. 8 Consequently, Magno was accused of violating Section 1, Title 3 of the Handbook on Employee Discipline, for "shouting at a customer or uttering invectives, obscene, rude or sarcastic remarks and disrespectful or abrasive comments or consistently interrupting the customer in a rude manner." Magno was thus ordered to submit his written explanation to the complaint. aScITE
In the meantime, Magno was removed from being a supervisor in the AT&T U-Verse account, and was given another administrative task.
On March 6, 2013, Magno received a Notice of Decision stating that he was found guilty of violating the company's code of conduct, as his actions were deemed to be unacceptable. As a result, his services were terminated on even date.
Aggrieved by Sutherland's decision, Magno filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sutherland.
On September 6, 2015, the LA rendered a Decision 9 finding that Magno was illegally dismissed. The LA found that the acts committed by Magno do not constitute a just cause for his dismissal. Thus, the LA ordered Magno's immediate reinstatement and payment of his backwages from the date of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the LA decision reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to immediately reinstate [Magno] to his former position without loss of seniority rights and benefits. And further, to pay him his backwages from the date of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement.
Annex "A" is the computation of the judgment award.
SO ORDERED. 10
Aggrieved, Sutherland filed an appeal before the NLRC.
In a Decision 11 dated November 27, 2015, the NLRC affirmed the LA's ruling with modification by deleting the backwages awarded by the LA in favor of Magno. The NLRC agreed with the LA's findings that the act of Magno does not constitute serious misconduct, which would justify his dismissal from employment. However, the NLRC observed that Magno was not completely faultless. Thus, the NLRC held that the proper award would be reinstatement sans backwages. Likewise, the NLRC dismissed the charges against Arquillano and Aromin, upon finding that there is nothing in the records that would show that they are guilty of bad faith in effecting Magno's dismissal. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 6, 2015 is hereby MODIFIED by DELETING the award of backwages and DROPPING individual respondents [Arquillano] and [Aromin] as party respondents in the instant case.
The finding of the [LA] of illegal dismissal and the order of immediate reinstatement of complainant by [Sutherland] are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 12
Aggrieved by the NLRC ruling, which deleted the award of backwages, Magno filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the CA.
Meanwhile, in a Manifestation filed on April 13, 2016, Sutherland notified the CA that Magno had been reinstated. 13
On July 14, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 14 dismissing the petition. The CA affirmed the deletion of backwages ratiocinating that Magno was not entirely blameless. Based on the minutes of the administrative hearing, it was found that Magno did not properly handle the call, and that the matter could have been better handled. Even Magno admitted that he could have handled the call better. Likewise, the CA affirmed the dropping of charges against Sutherland's officers Arquillano and Aromin, finding that they are not guilty of bad faith, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 27, 2015, and the Resolution dated January 20, 2016, issued by the [NLRC] in NLRC LAC No. 11-003086-15, are AFFIRMED. 15
The Issue
The main issue raised before the Court is whether or not the CA erred in deleting the award of backwages in favor of Magno. HEITAD
In support of his petition, Magno insists that he is entitled to an award of backwages. He claims that even assuming arguendo that he was indeed guilty of some sort of misconduct, it was merely simple negligence. It did not amount to gross negligence that would have warranted the deletion of backwages in his favor. 16
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only to reviewing errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts. 17 The Court finds that none of the mentioned circumstances are present to warrant a review of the factual findings of the case. At any rate, the CA did not commit any reversible error that would warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Remarkably, it is an elementary principle in labor law that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement and payment of full backwages. 18 However, in certain cases, "the Court has carved out an exception to the foregoing rule and thereby ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages on account of the following: (i) the fact that the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh of a penalty; and (ii) that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee." 19 In Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 20 the Court stressed that the ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if the employee is reinstated but without backwages in view of the employer's good faith. 21 Accordingly, in cases where the employee was found guilty of having committed a transgression against the employer, but the former's dismissal would be too harsh of a penalty, the Court has ruled that the proper sanction to be meted on the errant employee shall be reinstatement sans backwages.
Notably, in Palteng v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 22 therein petitioner Elizabeth Palteng (Palteng), the Senior Assistant Manager/Branch Operations Officer of United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), granted Bills Purchased (BP) accommodation against a client's personal checks beyond and outside her authority, and in violation of the bank's strict rule on granting a BP accommodation against personal checks. Palteng admitted that she committed "an honest mistake." 23 In turn, UCPB terminated Palteng's employment. The Court found that the dismissal of Palteng was too harsh, and thus awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. However, recognizing that Palteng "was not faultless in regard to the offenses imputed against her," 24 the Court deleted the award of backwages. 25
Likewise, in Holcim Philippines, Inc. v. Obra, 26 therein respondent Renante Obra (Obra), a packhouse operator at the Holcim Philippines, Inc. (Holcim) La Union plant, was apprehended while he was attempting to take out a piece of scrap electrical wire. As a result, Holcim dismissed Obra. The Court ruled that Obra's transgression is "not so gross as to deserve the penalty of dismissal from service." 27 However, the Court likewise recognized that Obra "was not entirely faultless and therefore, should not profit from a wrongdoing." 28 Consequently, the Court ordered Obra's reinstatement, but as a penalty for his transgression, deleted the award of backwages.
Furthermore, in Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. v. Pionilla, 29 therein respondent Adonis Pionilla (Pionilla) was found to have lent his company identification card, and escorted a lady to board the company shuttle bus at the Alabang Terminal, to allow the latter to ride the employee shuttle bus for free. As a result of his misconduct, Pionilla was dismissed. Again, the Court considered the penalty of dismissal as too severe for the infraction committed, and thus ordered Pionilla to be reinstated without backwages. ATICcS
The Court finds that the facts in the aforementioned cases are on all fours with the instant case to warrant the application of the rules enunciated therein.
In the case at bar, the NLRC and the CA were correct in finding that Magno was not entirely faultless for uttering the sarcastic remark "thank you, I'll be more than happy to wait for that;"30 and in placing an on-going call on hold for a lengthy period of time. In fact, Magno did not deny committing such acts, albeit offering the defense that the statement was innocuous, and that he placed the call on hold for less than 20 minutes.
Indeed, these acts do not constitute a just cause for dismissal. However, being a senior consultant of a call center office, Magno was expected to exercise utmost courteousness and civility. Although the statements may seem harmless and innocuous, it must be remembered that for a customer service company like Sutherland, its agents are expected to be as polite and as courteous as they can be. Call center offices pride on the "excellent customer service of call center agents," which is the very lifeblood of a BPO industry. 31 Agents are expected to exert utmost patience and temperance in responding to calls, and exert their best effort in resolving their customers' problems and concerns. In fact, more was expected of Magno, who was not just an ordinary agent, but a senior consultant. His acts would not only reflect badly on the company, but would likewise serve as a poor example to other agents.
Thus, applying the aforementioned jurisprudential tenets to the case at bar, the Court finds that the penalty of dismissal was too severe a penalty for Magno's rude actuations, but at the same time, Magno was not entirely blameless. Thus, Sutherland was in good faith when it dismissed Magno for violating its company policy. These concurring circumstances trigger the application of the exception to the rule on backwages as enunciated in the above-cited cases. Consequently, the Court finds it proper to accord the same disposition and thus directs the deletion of backwages in favor of Magno.
The Court is not unmindful of its ruling in other cases, such as Dolores v. NLRC, 32 and Procter and Gamble v. Bondesto, 33 where the Court awarded limited backwages. It must be noted that the same cases are not completely on all fours with the facts of the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the employees were dismissed by their employers due to their failure to report for work for a considerable length of time. The Court ordered their reinstatement, with limited backwages equivalent to one to two years.
The case at bar is more in consonance with the cases of Holcim, 34Integrated Microelectronics35 and Palteng, 36 where the employee's commission of a form of misconduct, warranted the complete deletion of backwages.
Verily, in illegal dismissal cases, Courts are tasked to ensure that an employee shall not be dismissed except for just or authorized causes. Care should be exercised by employers in imposing the ultimate penalty of dismissal on its erring employees. The punishment meted against an errant employee should be commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to him. 37 At the same time however, this protection shall not equate to coddling a wayward employee. Should an employee be likewise found guilty of some form of misconduct or transgression, the appropriate penalty shall likewise be meted to correct the wrongs committed.
All told, in labor cases, the Court is tasked with the delicate act of balancing the employee's right to security of tenure vis-à-vis the employer's right to freely exercise its management prerogatives. To preserve such balance, the instant case warrants a departure from the general rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin reliefs of reinstatement and backwages. Considering that Magno was not entirely faultless, as he uttered sarcastic and rude remarks and ignored the caller, Sutherland may be deemed to have acted in good faith in effecting his dismissal. Accordingly, the award of backwages in favor of Magno must be deleted. After all, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer. 38 Rather, "the constitutional and legal protections equally recognize the employer's right and prerogative to manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play." 39 TIADCc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 14, 2017, and Resolution dated November 20, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144719, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED." (Peralta, J., no part as his spouse concurred in the assailed CA decision and resolution; Jardeleza, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated Jan. 8, 2018.)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 28-52.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Jane Aurora C. Lantion, concurring; id. at 53-66.
3.Id. at 67-68.
4. Rendered by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez, with Commissioners Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and Cecilio Alejandro C. Villanueva concurring; id. at 76-85.
5.Id. at 54.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 79.
8.Id. at 34.
9. Rendered by LA Edgar B. Bisana; id. at 69-74.
10.Id. at 74.
11.Id. at 76-85.
12.Id. at 84.
13.Id. at 59.
14.Id. at 53-66.
15.Id. at 65.
16.Id. at 42.
17.Tenazas, et al. v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, et al., 731 Phil. 217, 228 (2014), citing "J" Marketing Corporation v. Taran, 607 Phil. 414, 424-425 (2009).
18.Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. v. Pionilla, 716 Phil. 818, 823-824 (2013).
19.Id. at 824.
20. 202 Phil. 850 (1982).
21.Id. at 856.
22. 599 Phil. 504 (2009).
23.Id. at 506.
24.Id. at 509.
25.Id. at 510.
26. G.R. No. 220998, August 8, 2016, 799 SCRA 607.
27.Id. at 614.
28.Id. at 623.
29. 716 Phil. 818 (2013).
30.Rollo, p. 79.
31. Id. at 82.
32. 282 Phil. 360 (1992).
33. 468 Phil. 932 (2004).
34. Supra note 26.
35. Supra note 29.
36. Supra note 22.
37. Holcim Philippines, Inc. v. Obra, supra note 26, at 616-617, citing Sagales v. Rustan's Commercial Corporation, 592 Phil. 468, 482 (2008).
38. Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation v. Alcon, et al., 746 Phil. 172, 179 (2014).
39. Id.