Magatas v. Dalanon

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198575. * June 14, 2021.]

IMELDA S. MAGATAS, petitioner, vs. MARCIA DALANON, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 198575 (Imelda S. Magatas v. Marcia Dalanon).

We resolve this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 directly filed to this Court, assailing the July 8, 2011 Decision 2 rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC) in Civil Case No. 40510 dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

Imelda S. Magatas (petitioner) claims to be one of the grandchildren and heirs of Pilar M. Samson (Samson), an awardee of a 90-square meter parcel of land located in Barangay Pansol, Quezon City, and covered by TCT No. 71885 under the name of the National Housing Authority (NHA). Samson built a house (subject property) on a 30-square meter portion of the lot and leased it to Marcia Dalanon 3(respondent) at the rate of P800.00 per month. Petitioner claims that respondent stopped paying the monthly rentals after Samson's death in January 1996. 4

In March 1999, petitioner's father Rudy Samson (Rudy) and her uncle Romeo Samson (Romeo), filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Chairman. Petitioner's mother Presentacion Samson (Presentacion), represented Rudy in the proceedings. 5

On April 6, 1999, the parties entered into a Kasunduan6 whereby respondent agreed to purchase the subject property for P150,000.00. Based on the Kasunduan, respondent shall pay the amount within ninety (90) days from signing the agreement, otherwise, she will have to vacate the premises. However, respondent failed to comply with the agreement but continued to occupy the property without paying any rent. A Certification to File Action was issued by the Barangay on July 6, 1999. Consequently, a petition for the execution of ejectment was filed with the MeTC, Branch 41, Quezon City, but it was dismissed for being premature. 7

Sometime in 2003, petitioner's predecessors-in-interest again resorted to barangay conciliation to demand respondent to vacate the premises. On January 31, 2003, respondent however signed a Kapangakuan8 and pledged to pay the balance of P140,000.00 by the end of February 2003. On February 28, 2003, the parties signed another Kasunduan/Kapangakuan, 9 whereby respondent promised to pay the amount on March 28, 2003, otherwise, she would voluntarily vacate the premises on April 15, 2003. However, respondent once more failed to pay her due. On April 21, 2003, respondent signed the Ikatlong Kapangakuan10 and promised to pay the amount at the end of May 2003. She also agreed to leave the premises upon her failure to pay upon demand. Again, respondent defaulted.

When the matter was referred again to the Barangay in 2006, the parties signed the Ikalawang Kasunduan11 declaring that such will be their last agreement and that respondent was to pay P60,000.00 on March 31, 2006. Respondent also agreed to vacate the property upon her failure to pay. On April 4, 2006, the parties met at the Barangay Hall, wherein respondent agreed to leave the premises on April 8, 2006. 12 Again, respondent failed to comply with the agreement. 13

On July 16, 2010, the parties met again before the Barangay wherein Presentacion demanded respondent to vacate by July 31, 2010. However, respondent refused to sign any agreement. 14 Due to the parties' failure to reach an agreement, the Barangay issued a Certification to File Action on July 26, 2010. 15

On December 8, 2010, petitioner filed a Complaint 16 for unlawful detainer.

In her Answer, 17 respondent claimed that she had been a lessee of the subject property since 1979 and that she and Samson had agreed on a monthly rent of P300.00. After Samson died, one of her daughters, Lilian Samson Habitam, offered to sell the house and the 30-square meter lot where it stood, for P150,000.00, payable in monthly installments of P3,000.00. She was able to pay some of the installments. Later, however, Presentacion and Romeo demanded full payment. She offered to pay P50,000.00 but it was rejected. Despite the refusal, respondent continued to pay the P3,000.00 monthly installment from April 2005, which Presentacion accepted. Another confrontation before the Barangay was held wherein petitioner demanded payment of P60,000.00. Respondent was able to raise and offer the said amount, but petitioner refused to accept the same. 18

Respondent argued that the complaint filed against her was not for unlawful detainer because the verbal agreement for lease was converted into a contract to sell. She also posited that the trial court had no jurisdiction because petitioner did not make any written demand for her to pay rentals and to vacate the premises. 19

MeTC Ruling

On July 8, 2011, the MeTC rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court reasoned as follows:

From the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, particularly Nos. 9, 10 and 11 as well [as] No. 13 thereof, it can be deduced therefrom that the present case is neither an action for forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but specific performance or enforcement of a contract to sell. Even the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff, particularly Exhibits "D" to "D-1" and "E" as well as that of defendant's Exhibit "1" apparently showed the agreement of plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest and defendant for the latter to purchase the subject property. However, defendant failed to fully pay the purchase price thereof despite several promises to do so; hence, plaintiff instituted the present complaint. Unfortunately, the instant case is not within the jurisdiction of this court but with the proper Regional Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff's complaint for unlawful detainer against defendant is hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 20

Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review based on the following grounds:

A

THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN DECLARING THE COMPLAINT AS ONE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OR ENFORCEMENT OF A CONTRACT TO SELL;

B

THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION DESPITE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT CONSTITUTING IT TO BE ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 21

Petitioner maintains that the allegations in her complaint are consistent with an action for unlawful detainer. First, the complaint indicated respondent's initial possession of the subject property by virtue of a contract of lease, and that petitioner had merely tolerated her presence thereon despite her refusal to pay rent since 1996. Second, petitioner's cause of action stemmed from respondent's failure to vacate the property upon demand. Third, respondent refused to vacate or pay the corresponding rent despite repeated demands by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest. Fourth, petitioner filed the complaint within the one (1) year prescription period. 22

Furthermore, an unlawful detainer may still be instituted despite a contract to sell. Petitioner argues that her basis for the ejectment case was neither the Kasunduan nor the lease, but respondent's possession of the subject property by mere tolerance. 23 At any rate, the remedy of specific performance cannot apply to the Kasunduan pursuant to the ruling in Keppel Bank Philippines v. Adao24(Keppel), whereby the Court held that in case of failure of the vendee to pay, the proper remedy is that of an action for unlawful detainer. 25 Petitioner also claims that she is entitled to reasonable compensation for the use of the property by respondent; and that remand to the MeTC may be dispensed with because she had successfully proven her cause of action for unlawful detainer. 26

In her Comment, 27 respondent posits that petitioner based her complaint on the failure to comply with the Kasunduan, and not on petitioner's tolerance or respondent's failure to pay rent; that, as vendor, petitioner failed to prove the requisites in bringing an ejectment suit; that both failure to pay installment or adhere to the terms of the contract to sell and to vacate are necessary to make the vendee/respondent deforciant; that petitioner's complaint failed to state that she made demands upon respondent to pay the purchase price; that the subject complaint did not raise the issue of possession, but that of enforcement and/or rescission of the contract which is outside the jurisdiction of the MeTC; that the present petition violates the principle of hierarchy of courts; and, that petitioner's prayer to resolve the case on the merits cannot be done in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where only questions of law may be entertained.

The Court's Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, the instant petition should have been dismissed for violating the hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition. 28 The Court explained the import of this doctrine as a constitutional filtering mechanism in GIOS-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines 29 (GIOS-Samar, Inc.) as follows:

[W]hile this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised. (citations omitted)

In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 30 the Court enumerated the following instances when direct resort to the Court may be allowed: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of first impression; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (5) the time element presented cannot be ignored; (6) the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and (8) the petition includes questions dictated by public policy, or demanded by broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. 31 None of these exceptions avail in petitioner's favor, especially when the remedy of appeal under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is available and appears to be more expedient under the circumstances.

Moreover, GIOS-Samar, Inc. emphasized that "the presence of one or more of the so-called "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of its original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the parties in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct action before us. 32 A plain reading of the instant petition shows that the issues being raised by petitioner were devoid of such compelling nature, thus prompting this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, to avoid further delay in settling the issue presented to Us, and since the records are complete, We will proceed to resolve the same.

To recall, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer based on its findings that the allegations constitute an action for specific performance or enforcement of a contract to sell, and thus, within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner, however, argues that the remedy of specific performance cannot apply to the Kasunduan because the default of respondent rendered the Kasunduan ineffective and without force and effect. Petitioner adds that her complaint was not based on the Kasunduan or the lease, but on respondent's possession of the property by mere tolerance of petitioner.

We agree with petitioner.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,33 this Court had already explained that an action for ejectment may also involve a contract to sell, and may be filed against a person whose right of possession had already expired or terminated, thus:

It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA that an ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is as well available against one who withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules, "a x x x vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs." In such cases, it is sufficient to allege in the plaintiff's complaint that —

1. The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2. Eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession;

3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and

4. Within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 34 (emphases supplied)

After perusal of the complaint, We find the same to have complied with the required allegations for an unlawful detainer case. Petitioner alleged in her complaint that (1) respondent was originally a lessee on the subject property and her possession eventually, was by mere tolerance of petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest; (2) respondent's possession became illegal upon her failure or refusal to pay the purchase price and to vacate; (3) respondent remained in possession of the property and deprived petitioner of enjoyment thereof; and (4) petitioner filed the complaint for unlawful detainer within one (1) year of the last demand to vacate.

Clearly, the MeTC made an erroneous conclusion that the subject complaint was one for specific performance or enforcement of the contract to sell. To reiterate, an action for ejectment is not only limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The action is also available in a contract to sell in the event that the vendee fails to pay the purchase price. 35 Petitioner had correctly relied on Keppel36 that when the vendee in a contract to sell defaults payment, the vendor can avail of the remedy of ejectment. We explained:

[T]he contract to sell does not by itself give respondent the right to possess the property. Unlike in a contract of sale, here in a contract to sell, there is yet no actual sale nor any transfer of title, until and unless, full payment is made. The payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Respondent must have fully paid the price to acquire title over the property and the right to retain possession thereof. In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the remedy of ejectment since he retains ownership of the property. 37 (citation omitted)

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc., 38 We similarly held that the right of the buyer to possess the property is extinguished when the contract to sell fails to materialize. The buyer's act of withholding the installment payments rendered the contract ineffective and without force and effect, and ultimately deprived itself of the right to continue possession of the subject realty.

Here, respondent's failure to pay the purchase price under the Kasunduan and the succeeding agreements resulted in the forfeiture of her right to remain in possession of the subject property. Evidently, her continued possession thereof was by mere tolerance of petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest.

Respondent, however, argues that both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the terms of the contract to sell and to vacate, are required before petitioner may validly institute an action for ejectment. The subject complaint merely alleged that respondent violated the terms of the contract to sell, and failed to state that demands were made upon her to comply therewith. As such, the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. 39

We are not convinced.

Prior demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be instituted. 40 However, a demand to pay prior to filing of the ejectment case is not required in the case at bar because respondent agreed to voluntarily vacate the premises upon nonpayment on the scheduled date. At any rate, the full payment of the purchase price in a contract to sell is a positive suspensive condition whose nonfulfillment is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser; in other words, the nonpayment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. 41 Herein respondent had lost her right to continue with the possession of the subject property when she failed to pay the purchase price. As such, demand is no longer a requirement because she had no right to possess the property.

Moreover, respondent cannot deny the several demands made upon her to pay or to comply with the Kasunduan and the succeeding agreements by vacating the subject property. A simple perusal of the complaint reveals that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest had constantly referred the matter to the Barangay for petitioner to vacate the premises in 1999, 2003, 2006, and 2010. Furthermore, the minutes of the Barangay conciliation meeting on July 16, 2010, indicate that Presentacion had given respondent until July 31, 2010 to leave the premises. However, respondent flatly refused to heed the demand and manifested that she would not sign any agreement. 42 Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the demands made upon her to vacate the property, which she had previously, on several occasions, vowed to voluntarily do upon her failure to pay the purchase price.

In sum, respondent's failure to vacate the premises gave rise to petitioner's right to file an action for ejectment. Since her possession of the house and lot owned by Samson was merely by virtue of petitioner's tolerance, she has no other option but to immediately vacate the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 8, 2011 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 40510 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent Marcia Dalanon and/or her heirs or successors-in-interest are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY VACATE the subject property.

The case is REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 40510 to determine with dispatch the amount of rentals, attorney's fees, and costs, if any, and interest due to petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.

1.Rollo, pp. 15-31.

2.Id. at 34-38; penned by Presiding Judge Edgardo B. Bellosillo.

3. Referred to as "Marsha" in other court documents.

4. Records, pp. 3-4.

5.Id. at 4.

6.Id. at 15.

7.Id. at 4.

8.Id. at 200.

9.Id. at 201.

10.Id. at 202.

11.Id. at 205.

12.Id. at 206.

13.Id. at 5.

14.Id. at 148.

15.Id. at 20.

16.Id. at 3-9.

17.Id. at 43-49.

18.Rollo, pp. 56-58.

19.Id. at 58-59.

20.Id. at 49-50.

21.Id. at 20.

22.Id. at 21-24.

23.Id. at 24.

24. 510 Phil. 158 (2005).

25.Rollo, p. 26.

26.Id. at 27-28.

27.Id. at 119-131.

28.De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019; citing GIOS-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019, 896 SCRA 213, 271.

29.Supra.

30. The exceptions are: The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301 (2015).

31.Id. at 331-335.

32.Supra note 28 at 281.

33. 789 Phil. 56 (2016).

34.Id. at 67-68.

35.Union Bank of the Philippines v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., supra note 33.

36.Supra note 24.

37.Id. at 166.

38. 692 Phil. 667 (2012).

39.Rollo, pp. 125-126.

40.Cruz v. Spouses Christensen, 819 Phil. 379, 391 (2017).

41.Union Bank of the Philippines v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., supra note 33 at 68.

42. Exhibit "F-1" for the plaintiff; Records, p. 148.