Magante v. Wellcare Clinics and Lab, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 242498. October 6, 2021.]

JOSEFINA T. MAGANTE AND GRACE M. PEJI, petitioners,vs. WELLCARE CLINICS AND LAB, INC. AND EMMANUEL HERNANDEZ, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 6, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 242498 (Josefina T. Magante and Grace M. Peji v.Wellcare Clinics and Lab, Inc. and Emmanuel Hernandez). — This is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated April 24, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 150989, which denied the Petition for Certiorari 4 under Rule 65 filed by Josefina T. Magante (Magante) and Grace M. Peji (Peji) (collectively petitioners). The CA upheld the Decision 5 dated December 22, 2016 and the Resolution 6 dated February 28, 2017, both rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which found petitioners' dismissal from respondent Wellcare Clinics and Lab, Inc. (WCLI) to be valid, thus reversing the Decision 7 dated April 29, 2016 rendered by the Labor Arbiter (LA). HTcADC

Petitioners contend that they were constructively dismissed when WCLI forced them to take new assignments which were not equivalent to their previously held positions after the closure of the Naic branch and their forced transfer to the Manggahan, General Trias branch of WCLI. 8 The foregoing reassignment constrained them to file a complaint for separation pay before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). 9 According to petitioners, they were justified in not reporting to work while the proceedings before the Office of the Single Entry Approach (SEnA) of the DOLE were ongoing. 10 Further, the decision of WCLI to terminate them amounted to illegal dismissal since there was no proof that the Notice to Explain and the Termination of Employment Notice were served on them. 11

On the other hand, respondents WCLI and Emmanuel Hernandez, WCLI Human Resource Manager (Hernandez) (collectively respondents), counter that petitioners were transferred to the Manggahan Clinic as a management prerogative after WCLI decided to close the Naic branch for financial considerations. 12 Respondents further deny that petitioners were demoted, being transferred to positions of the same rank as those previously held by them and were offered greater salary for the new positions. 13 Accordingly, their refusal to work with the clinic constitutes willful disobedience, which justified their dismissal from WCLI. 14

The issues before this Court are (1) whether the petitioners were demoted and constructively dismissed in August 2014, when they were transferred to work at the Manggahan branch of WCLI; and consequently, (2) whether the refusal of petitioners to work in the Manggahan branch constitutes willful disobedience as a just cause for their termination in December 2014.

Notably, the controversies presented for the Court's resolution involve the evaluation of the factual findings of the lower courts. Generally, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced before the lower tribunals. This rule, however, allows for exceptions. When there is a variance in the factual findings, it is incumbent upon the Court to re-examine the facts once again. 15 Thus, by way of exception, the Court may proceed to probe and resolve factual issues where the factual findings of the CA and NLRC are contrary to the findings of the labor arbiter. 16

A judicious review of the records convinces this Court that the instant petition is bereft of merit. The CA did not commit any error in ruling that the Decision of the NLRC was not tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

The parties do not dispute that Magante was employed as the Operation Head of WCLI's Naic branch with a salary of P12,000.00 per month plus allowance. As evidence of her reassignment, respondents submitted the Letter 17 dated September 25, 2014, which informed Magante that she was being transferred to Manggahan branch to work as Imaging Technical Supervisor for which she would earn P13,033.00 per month, plus allowance. Respondents aver that both the positions of Operation Head and Imaging Technical Supervisor are supervisory and require reporting to the Regional Manager. While Magante only supervised four employees stationed at the Naic Clinic, she was being transferred to the Manggahan Clinic which has at least 25 employees, 18 to be the Technical Supervisor for the Imaging Services Department. 19

Meanwhile, the parties also do not question that Peji was employed as the X-ray Technician of the Naic branch with a basic salary of P8,853.00 per month. Respondents presented the Letter dated September 1, 2014 20 to show that petitioner Peji was informed of her transfer to the Manggahan branch as the Clinical Customer Service Assistant, for which her salary would be increased to P9,230.00 per month. Respondents explained that Peji could not be designated as X-ray Technician in the Manggahan Clinic since she was not a registered radiologic technologist and because the same position was already occupied in the said branch. 21

Aside from the letters explaining the transfer, respondents also presented transfer letters involving all other employees of the Naic Clinic to show that petitioners were not singled out. 22 To establish that its Naic branch, catering only to a few clients, was not performing well financially and thus, had to be closed, respondents submitted a copy of the Financial Statement and Report of the Naic Clinic and a Certification on its closure issued by the government of Naic, Cavite. 23

Additionally, respondents showed that the Manggahan Clinic is only 15 kilometers away from the Naic Clinic, 20 kilometers away from Magante's residence in Indang Cavite, and 15 kilometers away from Peji's residence in Tanza, Cavite. 24 Similar to Naic Clinic, Manggahan Clinic is located within the province of Cavite and is accessible by public and private transportation. 25 aScITE

In Automatic Appliances, Inc. v. Deguidoy, 26 this Court had the occasion to explain that under the doctrine of management prerogative, employers enjoy a wide sphere of authority to regulate its own business, subject to limitations imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity and substantial justice. Thus, an employer may determine work assignments and corollarily, transfer or reassign employees around various areas of its business operation according to its sound judgment, provided that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, prejudicial, or involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges:

Labor laws are not one-sided. Although the law bends over backwards to accommodate the needs of the working class, not every labor dispute shall be decided in favor of labor. Indeed, the Constitutional provisions on social justice as well as labor laws guarantee the protection of the employees' tenurial security. However, this tenurial security shall not grant the employees a vested right to their desired position. Rather, management possesses the right to regulate all aspects of employment relating to the employees' work assignment and working methods.

Particularly, under the doctrine of management prerogative, an employer possesses the inherent right to regulate, according to its "own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees." This wide sphere of authority to regulate its own business may only be curbed by the limitations imposed by labor laws and the principles of equity and substantial justice. The importance of discouraging interference is necessary to ensure that the employer may in turn expect good performance, satisfactory work, diligence, good conduct and loyalty from its employees.

Accordingly, the employer may determine, in accordance with its sound business judgment, its employees' work assignments. This discretion to impose work assignments, or corollarily, transfer the employees shall be based on the employer's assessment of the "qualifications, aptitudes and competence of its employees." The employer is allowed to move them around various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company. After all, the employer is in the best position to determine where its employees will thrive for the good of the company.

It is imperative, however, to strike a balance between the employees' tenurial security on the one hand, and the employer's management prerogative, on the other. In Rural Bank of Cantilan, Inc. v. Julve, and Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corporation, et al., the Court laid down guidelines to ensure that both rights are protected:

Concerning the transfer of employees, these are the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) a transfer is a movement from one position to another of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in the service or a lateral movement from one position to another of equivalent rank or salary; (b) the employer has the inherent right to transfer or reassign an employee for legitimate business purposes; (c) a transfer becomes unlawful where it is motivated by discrimination or bad faith or is effected as a form of punishment or is a demotion without sufficient cause; (d) the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the Court respects the right of the employer to re-assign its employees to other stations, provided that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, prejudicial, or involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges. For as long as said conditions are met, the employee may not complain that the transfer amounts to a constructive dismissal.

xxx xxx xxx

Jurisprudence holds that the management's decision to transfer an employee shall not be assailed as a form of constructive dismissal in the absence of proof that the re-assignment involves a demotion in rank, diminution in pay, or was an act of discrimination or disdain. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the freedom of the employer to exercise management prerogatives, the case of Unirock Corp. v. Court of Appeals andEduardo Pajarito, 28 warns that the managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must not be exercised with grave abuse of discretion, or be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker:

In a number of cases, this Court has recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary, benefits and other privileges. This is a privilege inherent in the employer's right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. Even as the law is solicitous of the employees' welfare, it cannot ignore the right of the employer to exercise what are clearly and obviously management prerogatives. The freedom of management to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.

But like all other rights, there are limits. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right must be exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. Nor when the real reason is to penalize an employee for his/her union activities and thereby defeat his/her right to self-organization. To establish the validity of the transfer of employees, the employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the displaced employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his/her salaries, privileges and other benefits. 29 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable mind that the transfer of petitioners to the Manggahan Clinic is a valid exercise of its management prerogative rather than a mere subterfuge to rid of the petitioners from the employ of WCLI. The reassignment of petitioners together with other WCLI employees from the Naic Clinic to the Manggahan Clinic, which is still in Cavite, was shown to be necessitated by the closure of the smaller Naic branch due to financial losses. There is nothing in the records which indicates that the transfer was unreasonable, inconvenient nor prejudicial to the petitioners under the circumstances. Moreover, the evidence presented reveal that the reassignments did not lead to a demotion in rank or a diminution of salaries and benefits considering that petitioners were even offered higher salaries in view of their transfer to the Manggahan branch. HEITAD

Meanwhile, petitioners argue that despite the increase in salary, there is a clear disparity in the functions and responsibilities of their formerly held positions and their new assignments, leading to their demotion. 30 However, without presenting anything to support such allegation, the petition fails to persuade this Court. Agreeing with the factual findings of the NLRC and the CA, this Court notes that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their bare allegations. Petitioners did not even specify the perceived difference in the functions of their former positions to the new ones being offered to them, nor did they elaborate on the supposed disproportionality of their new salaries to their previous pay. 31 Since they failed to rebut the evidence of WCLI to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial, the validity of petitioners' transfer to Manggahan Clinic remains uncontroverted.

This Court is thus inclined to agree with the CA that there was no constructive dismissal nor any basis for the award of separation pay in favor of petitioners.

Petitioners were validly dismissed

Petitioners further argue that WCLI was determined to dismiss them from service from the time they were reassigned to the Manggahan Clinic. Hence, they were illegally terminated for refusing to transfer to the Manggahan branch in the guise of insubordination. 32

It is a well-established rule that in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. 33 Accordingly, WCLI as the employer, has to prove by substantial evidence that petitioners' termination is due to a just cause, or specifically willful disobedience as they posit, 34 which is based on Article 297 (b) of the Labor Code.

It is likewise settled that for willful disobedience to be considered as a just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he or she had been engaged to discharge. For disobedience to be willful, it must be characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. 35

As borne by the evidence previously discussed, WCLI's decision to reassign petitioners to its Manggahan branch was exercised in good faith and amounted to a lawful order. The order to report to the Manggahan Clinic starting October 2014 was also unequivocally made known to petitioners through the transfer letters, 36 Notice to Explain served on Magante 37 and Peji 38 and the Minutes of the SEnA Conference 39 dated October 17, 2014. Furthermore, respondents presented the Sworn Statement of Regional Manager Nelieta T. Ambon (Ambon), who attested that Magante herself promised WCLI to report back to work. 40

On the other hand, the adamant refusal of petitioners to work at the Manggahan Clinic despite repeated orders from WCLI, clearly shows willfulness in their conduct. This Court is mindful of the fact that WCLI reached out to the petitioners several times to inquire as to their whereabouts and intention. 41 In fact, on October 4, 2014, Hernandez, together with Ambon, even went to the house of Magante after the latter failed to give notice as to her whereabouts. 42 Not only did petitioners defy the orders to report to work, they likewise ignored repeated requests from WCLI to provide an explanation for their actions. 43 Thus, WCLI was constrained to suspend them for fifteen days as shown in the Suspension Memorandum, 44 and eventually, dismiss them as evidenced by the Termination of Employment Notice. 45

In light of the foregoing documentary evidence, petitioners question the proper service of the Notice to Explain, Suspension Memorandum, and Termination of Employment Notice upon them. 46 They bring to the Court's attention the lack of registry receipt and certification from the postal office that the notices were indeed sent to them, and the bias of WCLI Messenger and Liaison Officer Arturo R. Loren (Loren) who, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, 47 narrated that petitioners refused to receive the said notices upon service on them. 48

This Court finds no basis to overturn the sound findings of the NLRC and the CA. This Court thus concurs with the CA 49 in giving credence to the statements made by Loren under oath, absent any basis to discredit his testimony apart from his mere employment with WCLI.

In any event, a violation of the twin requirements of notice and hearing does not automatically result in the illegality of one's dismissal from work. An employee's removal for just or authorized cause but without complying with the proper procedure, does not invalidate the dismissal. Instead, it obligates the erring employer to pay nominal damages to the employee, as penalty for not complying with the procedural requirements of due process. 50 ATICcS

In the instant case, the LA, 51 the NLRC 52 and the CA 53 uniformly ruled that WCLI failed to observe procedural due process in dismissing the petitioners. To recall, the only notice given to the petitioners in relation to their termination is the Termination of Employment Notice, which already informs petitioners of their dismissal from service. The Notice to Explain earlier served on them only pertains to acts of insubordination resulting in their suspension. There was therefore no first written notice served on the employees which contained the specific causes or grounds for termination against them after their suspension, nor a directive to submit their written explanation as to the said causes or grounds within a reasonable period. 54 Nevertheless, WCLI's foregoing violation of procedural due process does not invalidate petitioners' dismissal for willful disobedience.

Finally, anent petitioners' contention that their defiance of the orders to report to work was justified by the ongoing SEnA proceedings for constructive dismissal where they questioned the legality of their transfer, 55 the same is likewise untenable. To reiterate, the reassignment of petitioners to the Manggahan Clinic is not unreasonable, inconvenient nor prejudicial to them, but is a valid exercise of management prerogative that did not lead to constructive dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court has previously ruled that continuing to report for work does not rule out constructive dismissal, nor does it operate as a waiver thereof. 56 In The Orchard Golf and Country Clubv. Francisco, 57 this Court stated:

Constructive dismissal occurs not when the employee ceases to report for work, but when the unwarranted acts of the employer are committed to the end that the employee's continued employment shall become so intolerable. In these difficult times, an employee may be left with no choice but to continue with his employment despite abuses committed against him by the employer, and even during the pendency of a labor dispute between them. 58

Thus, petitioners were not prevented from reporting to the Manggahan Clinic by the pendency of the SEnA proceedings.

There being no reversible error in the rulings of the CA, this Court upholds the award of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each of the petitioners, considering that they were not given the opportunity to explain the causes or grounds for termination against them after their suspension, thus violating their right to due process. This monetary award shall earn six percent (6%) interest perannum in accordance with this Court's ruling in Nacar v. GalleryFrames. 59

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated April 24, 2018 and the Resolution dated October 5, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 150989 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Wellcare Clinics and Lab, Inc. is liable to pay petitioners Josefina T. Magante and Grace M. Peji Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each as nominal damages, plus six percent (6%) legal interest per annum computed from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 20-36.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (retired Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin concurring; id. at 361-377.

3.Id. at 442-443.

4.Id. at 304-326.

5. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Grace M. Venus, with Commissioner Bernardino B. Julve, concurring and Commissioner Leonard Vinz O. Ignacio, dissenting; id. at 225-241.

6.Id. at 295-303.

7.Id. at 116-123; penned by Labor Arbiter Generoso V. Santos.

8.Id. at 27-33.

9.Id. at 26-27.

10.Id. at 31-37.

11.Id. at 30-35.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 477.

14.Id. at 476.

15.Moll v. Convergys Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 253715, April 28, 2021.

16.Resty S. Caampued v. Next Wave Maritime Management, Inc., MTM Ship ManagementPte Ltd. and Arnold Marquez, G.R. No. 253756, May 12, 2021.

17.Rollo, pp. 80-81.

18.Id. at 129.

19.Id. at 477.

20.Id. at 78-79.

21.Id. at 477.

22.Id. at 130.

23.Id. at 128-129.

24.Id. at 137; 345.

25.Id.

26. G.R. No. 228088, December 4, 2019.

27.Id.

28. G.R. No. 192113, September 7, 2020.

29.Id.

30.Rollo, pp. 104-105.

31.Id. at 25.

32.Id. at 32-33.

33.Remegio Burnea v. Security Trading Corporation Nonpareil International Freight and Cargo Services, Inc., G.R. No. 231038, April 26, 2021.

34.Rollo, pp. 483-484.

35.Malcaba v. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., 832 Phil. 460, 491 (2018).

36.Rollo, pp. 78-81.

37.Id. at 83.

38.Id. at 82.

39.Id. at 84.

40.Id. at 130.

41.Id. at 264-265.

42.Id. at 265.

43.Id. at 264-267.

44.Id. at 85-86.

45.Id. at 132.

46.Id. at 32.

47.Id. at 87.

48.Id. at 32.

49.Id. at 373-374.

50.Clemente, Jr. v. ESO-Nice Transport Corp., G.R. No. 228231, August 28, 2019.

51.Rollo, p. 120.

52.Id. at 235-236.

53.Id. at 375-376.

54. See Clemente, Jr. v. ESO-Nice Transport Corp., supra note 50.

55.Rollo, pp. 29-31.

56.Allan Regala v. Manila Hotel Corporation, G.R. No. 204684, October 5, 2020.

57. 706 Phil. 479 (2013).

58.Id. at 481; 499.

59. 761 Phil. 267 (2013).