Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Flores

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 221090. September 14, 2021.]

MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., and/or A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LTD., petitioner, vs. RAMON JOEL R. FLORES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 14, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 221090 (Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., and/or A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Ramon Joel R. Flores)

We deny the petition.

Preliminarily, the Court emphasizes that only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, however, allows for exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the factual findings of the trial court, or of the quasi-judicial agencies concerned, are conflicting or contradictory to those of the Court of Appeals. When there is a variance in the factual findings, as here, it is incumbent upon the Court to re-examine the facts once again. 1 This is exactly what the Court will do in this case.

The claim of respondent is not barred

Petitioners argue that respondent is already barred from claiming disability benefits for failure to undergo medical examination within three (3) days from his repatriation, citing Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

1) The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the ship;

2) If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical, and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3) In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.

The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines prescribed by the company-designated physician. In case treatment of the seafarer is on an out-patient basis as determined by the company-designated physician, the company shall approve the appropriate mode of transportation and accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual traveling expenses and/or accommodation shall be paid subject to liquidation and submission of official receipts and/or proof of expenses.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Here, respondent immediately reported to Maersk's office upon repatriation on July 2, 2011. It is undisputed, however, that respondent did not undergo post-employment medical examination. 2 cSEDTC

The Court nevertheless finds that Section 20 of the POEA-SEC does not operate to bar respondent from filing his disability claim.

Section 20 is meant to cover cases where the seafarer is medically repatriated. It does not apply when the seafarer repatriated following the completion of his or her contract, as here.

In cases where a seafarer is repatriated on ground of contract completion, Section 19 of the POEA-SEC governs:

SECTION 19. REPATRIATION

xxx xxx xxx

H. The seafarer shall report to the manning agency within 72 hours upon arrival at point of hire.

Notably, Section 19 (H) prescribes a similar seventy-two (72) hour period from repatriation within which to report to the manning agency. As compared to Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC, however, Section 19 does not require the seafarer to undergo post-medical examination. All it requires is for the seafarer to report within seventy two (72) hours which respondent did.

To reiterate, respondent was repatriated due to the completion of his contract on July 2, 2011. On even date, he immediately reported to Maersk's office before going home to his province. Clearly, his action was in accordance with the requirements under Section 19 (H) of the 2010 POEA SEC. He could not be faulted for his failure to undergo post-employment medical examination for he was simply not required to do so.

In Magat v. Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., 3 petitioner suffered shortness of breath and chest pains after inhaling the residues and vapors coming from the paint and thinner he used in painting the ship's pump room. He reported his condition to the Chief Mate, only to be told to just rest. When his condition improved, petitioner continued to perform his duties until he was able to complete his contract. Upon his repatriation, petitioner immediately reported to respondent company but he did not undergo post-employment medical examination. Subsequently, he underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) for purposes of redeployment but discovered that he had hypertension, dilated cardiomyopathy, and renal parenchymal calcification. Hence, he was no longer redeployed. The Court ultimately held that the absence of a medical assessment from the company physician within three (3) days from repatriation did not bar petitioner's claim, and proceeded to award petitioner total and permanent disability benefits.

Applying Magat, the Court similarly held in Caraan v. Grieg Philippines4 that the three (3)-day period filtering mechanism is not a bright line test. It is not an all-or-nothing requirement that non-compliance automatically means disqualification.

At any rate, we keep stock of the rationale for immediately requiring medical examination under Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC, thus:

The rationale for the rule is that reporting the illness or injury within three days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove difficult. To ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimants illness because of the passage of time. The employer would then have no protection against unrelated disability claims. 5 (emphasis added)

Verily, the purpose is to make it easier to determine whether a seafarer's injury or illness is indeed work-related. Here, there was only a gap of one (1) month between respondent's repatriation on July 2, 2011 and his submission for PEME on August 2, 2011. Bearing in mind this short period, it cannot be said that the passage of time rendered it difficult to trace whether respondent's condition was work-related. SDAaTC

It is also erroneous to assume that respondent intentionally delayed his submission for medical examination just to secure unjustified claims. If that were the case, he would not have reported to Maersk at all until he was sure that he would fail his PEME. On the contrary, his act of immediately reporting to Maersk's office once he got called for re-deployment is a clear manifestation of good faith.

All told, we do not agree with petitioners that respondent is barred from claiming disability benefits for his supposed failure to comply with Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC. To stress, said provision is inapplicable since respondent was not medically repatriated. There may have been an ambiguity on whether Section 19 or Section 20 of the POEA-SEC should govern respondent's case, but a more thorough reading of these provisions reveal that they govern two different situations, depending on the cause of repatriation.

Finally, the Court is guided by the principle that as a labor contract, the POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest. Accordingly, its provisions must be construed fairly, reasonably, and liberally in favor of the seafarer in the pursuit of his employment on board ocean-going vessels. After all, the constitutional policy, which we here uphold and emphasize, accords and guarantees full protection to labor, both local and overseas. 6

The illness of respondent is work-related

Respondent was found to be suffering from Coronary Artery Disease. This was established through his abnormal Electrocardiogram, Stress Test, and 2d Echo/Doppler Test results. Dr. Christopher Asido confirmed the diagnosis and even recommended for him to undergo angioplasty. 7

Coronary Artery Disease is a form of Cardiovascular Disease, a generic term for all diseases of the heart and its great vessels. 8 Under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, Cardiovascular Diseases are deemed compensable work-related illnesses when the following requisites concur:

SECTION 32 — A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such factors necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

The following diseases are considered as occupational when contracted under working conditions involving the risks described herein:

 

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT

11. x x x Cardio-vascular events — to include heart attack, chest pain (angina), heart failure or sudden death. Any of the following conditions must be met: c. x x x If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

a. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. xxx xxx xxx

 

Here, it is indubitable that respondent's work involved risks. Bro Alma was a chemical/oil tanker type of vessel. Meanwhile, respondent, as an A/B, was assigned to perform tank-cleaning/gas-free cleaning operations therein. This included the cleanup of Jet A1 Fuel, a toxic cargo. Despite being provided with masks for tank-cleaning/gas-free cleaning operations, however, respondent still got to inhale toxic fumes. Certainly, his exposure to chemicals and toxic substances are veritable proof of the risk involved in his work.

Consequent to his tank-cleaning/gas-free cleaning tasks, respondent manifested symptoms of cardiac injury. For the duration of his contract, he started to experience episodes of chest pains. He diligently reported his condition to his superiors but instead of referring him to a physician for medical examination, they merely provided him with Alaxan to ease the pain.

In other words, there was no negligence on the part of respondent. If anything, it was Maersk who was at fault. Had it referred respondent's medical complaint to a physician while he was still on duty, he would have been able to discover his condition beforehand. He would have been medically repatriated and subjected to post-employment medical examination pursuant to Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA-SEC. But for all his sufferings, all he got was Alaxan.

To stress, it has only been barely a month from his repatriation when he learned of his condition. Under such circumstance, it is not difficult to conclude that his Coronary Artery Disease was contracted or otherwise aggravated while on board Bro Alma. More so, when his symptoms manifested during his employment, and especially when we consider his working conditions.

In Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. v. Balasta, 9 petitioners hired respondent as Able Seaman. In the performance of his duties he got exposed to various injurious and harmful chemicals, dust, fumes/emissions, and other irritant agents. Consequently, he experienced chest pains, fatigue, and shortness of breath. Upon his repatriation, petitioners' company-designated physician diagnosed him with severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease. The Court ruled that respondent's illness was work-related, hence, compensable. acEHCD

In sum, on the issue of whether respondent's Coronary Artery Disease is work-related, we rule in the affirmative.

Respondent is entitled to total and

The report of petitioners' own company-designated clinic PDS declaring respondent as unfit for sea duty is sufficient proof that he suffered total and permanent disability. To be sure, petitioners do not even contest that respondent may no longer gain employment as an A/B given his condition. They only rely on his supposed failure to undergo medical examination upon repatriation and establish that his condition was work-related. But as discussed, their arguments failed to persuade.

Back to Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Balasta was declared unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity after he got diagnosed with Coronary Artery Disease. The company-designated physician even recommended him to undergo immediate coronary artery bypass graft surgery. There, the Court also ruled that his condition constituted total and permanent disability.

Thus, the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in favor of respondent should be upheld.

Too, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent is entitled to attorney's fees. Article 2208 10 of the New Civil Code states that such award may be granted in actions for indemnity under the workmens compensation and employer's liability laws. It is also recoverable when the employer's act or omission has compelled the employee to incur expenses to protect his or her interest, as here. 11

Finally, these monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum in accordance with Nacar v. Gallery Frames. 12

So must it be.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 23, 2014 and Resolution dated October 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 134888 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Petitioners Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. and A.P. Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. are jointly and severally liable to pay respondent Ramon Joel Flores total and permanent disability benefits of USD60,000.00 plus ten percent (10%) attorney's fees. These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.General Milling Corp. v. Viajar, 702 Phil. 532, 540 (2013).

2.Rollo, p. 243.

3. 829 Phil. 570, 574 (2018).

4. G.R. No. 252199, May 5, 2021.

5.Ceriola v. Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc., 758, Phil. 321, 344 (2015).

6.Late Alberto Javier v. Phil. Transmarine Carriers, et al., 738 Phil. 374, 298 (2014).

7.Rollo, pp. 368-369.

8.GSIS v. Corrales, 578 Phil. 784, 791 (2008).

9. 728 Phil. 297, 304 (2014).

10.Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

xxx xxx xxx

11.Teodoro v. Teekay Shipping, G.R. No. 244721, February 5, 2020.

12. 716, Phil. 267, 311 (2013).