Macaya v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 230209. June 30, 2021.]

MARVIN G. MACAYA, petitioner, vs.MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, C.S.C.S. INTERNATIONAL NV, AND MARLON R. ROÑO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 30, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 230209 (MARVIN G. MACAYA, petitioner, v. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, C.S.C.S. INTERNATIONAL NV, AND MARLON R. ROÑO, respondents). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 16, 2017 filed by petitioner Marvin G. Macaya (Macaya) praying for the reversal of the Decision 2 dated December 9, 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated February 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, C.S.C.S. International NV, and Marlon R. Roño vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Marvin G. Macaya," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 145776.

The Factual Antecedents

Macaya was employed by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, C.S.C.S. International NV, and Marlon R. Roño (respondents) as a waiter starting in March 2003. 4 In Macaya's last employment contract, which commenced on March 28, 2014, Macaya was employed as a waiter to work onboard the vessel Costa Luminosa, a cruise ship, for a period of eight months. 5

Sometime in September 2014, Macaya, while on the job, figured into an accident, and hit his back. Because of the pain he suffered on his right leg, he sought for medical assistance, and was seen by a physician in Barcelona, Spain. He was then diagnosed with "right lumbago" (acute or chronic pain in the lower back) for which he was prescribed medication. 6 SDAaTC

On September 24, 2014, Macaya was medically repatriated. Upon his arrival in the Philippines on September 25, 2014, he was brought to Cardinal Santos Medical Center to be examined and treated by the respondents' company-designated physicians, led by Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim). 7 The medical examination of Macaya revealed the following:

Impression:

1. Lumbar spondylosis, as described. The worst level of involvement is at L4-g, where there is an inferiorly-directed central, right paracentral and right lateral recess disc extrusion, compressing the traversing right L5 nerve root and the right ventral thecal sac. Mild bilateral facet and ligamentum flavum hypertrophy is also seen at this level, causing spinal canal narrowing.

2. Anterior wedging of the T12, L1 and L2 vertebral bodies, with no associated marrow edema, probably presenting mild chronic compression fractures. 8

Macaya was likewise examined and treated by Dr. Esther G. Go (Dr. Go), one of the company-designated physicians of the Marine Medical Services, for several months. 9 On January 8, 2015, the company-designated physicians issued their medical findings and concluded that Macaya was suffering from a disability Grade 8 — 2/3 loss of lifting power of the trunk. 10

Thereafter, but unknown to the respondents, Macaya sought independent medical opinions and consulted with Dr. Manuel Jacinto, Jr. (Dr. Jacinto), who examined and treated Macaya from February 21, 2015 to February 24, 2015. 11 Dr. Jacinto concluded that Macaya was "physically unfit to go back to work as a seafarer" and that his disability is "total and permanent." 12 Notably, nowhere in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Jacinto did it state that Macaya was suffering from a Grade 1 disability.

Proceedings before the Labor Tribunals

On March 24, 2015, Macaya filed a Complaint against the respondents before the Labor Arbiter. In the Complaint, which was grounded on the findings of Dr. Jacinto, Macaya argued that he is entitled to the permanent and total disability compensation in the amount of US$60,000.00, considering that from the time he was repatriated on September 24, 2014, more than 240 days have lapsed, and he is still unfit to return to his duties as a seafarer. 13

On the other hand, respondents argued that in determining the type of disability, the disability gradings provided by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) should be controlling. 14

Notably, it was only during the filing of Position Papers before the Labor Arbiter did Macaya present the medical assessment made by Dr. Jacinto that his disability is total and permanent. 15

The Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dated July 27, 2015, which gave credence to the findings of Dr. Jacinto that Macaya is already physically unfit to go back to work as a seafarer totally and permanently. 16 Thus, the Labor Arbiter declared that Macaya is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to pay jointly and severally complainant the amount of USD$60,000.00 as his permanent disability compensation pursuant to the Italian Employees Trade Union Organization CBA and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award. acEHCD

SO ORDERED. 17

Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 18 However, in its Resolution dated December 29, 2015, the NLRC found no reason to disturb the findings of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 27, 2015 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 19

The respondents moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC's Resolution dated December 29, 2015, but the same was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated April 22, 2016.

Petition before the Court of Appeals

Unsatisfied with the adverse rulings of the NLRC, respondents assailed the NLRC's Resolutions before the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 20

In their Petition for Certiorari, the respondents alleged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it awarded Macaya permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and attorney's fees, considering that: (1) the company-designated physicians found that Macaya was only suffering from Grade 8 Disability in accordance with the guidelines of the POEA, which has a corresponding disability compensation of US$16,795.00; and (2) Macaya did not inform the respondents of the contrary findings of his personal choice of physician, and likewise did not request for further submission of the matter to a third doctor. 21

On December 9, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions dated 29 December 2015 and 22 April 2016 rendered by the NLRC, Second Division in LAC OFW (M) 12-000946-15, NCR OFW (M) 03-03571-15 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay Private Respondent disability benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00 or its peso equivalent at the prevailing exchange rate on the date of actual payment.

SO ORDERED. 22

In reversing the Resolutions of the NLRC, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the respondents' argument that disability gradings do not depend on the number of days of treatment. In fact, the Court of Appeals highlighted that under the 2010 amendments to the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (2010 POEA-SEC) which governs the case, permanent total or partial disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of the same, and shall not depend or determined by the number of days the seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid. 23 The Court of Appeals likewise stated that even assuming that the number of days is controlling in determining the disability of a seafarer, the company-designated physicians were able to assess and conclude that Macaya was suffering from a disability Grade 8 on January 8, 2015, or after the lapse of 105 days, which is within the 120-day period. 24

Further, the Court of Appeals gave more evidentiary weight to the findings and assessments of Dr. Lim and Dr. Go, the company-designated physicians, since they examined and treated Macaya for several months, as compared to Dr. Jacinto who treated Macaya only from February 21, 2015 to February 24, 2015. 25 SDHTEC

Finally, the Court of Appeals opined that Macaya's claim for full disability benefits cannot prosper considering that the procedure laid out in Section 20-A (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which is mandatory in nature, was not complied with. 26 Thus, the Court of Appeals applied the rulings of Nonay v. Bahiya Shipping Services, Inc., 27 and Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag, 28 which state that the findings of the company-designated physician prevail in cases where the seafarer did not observe the third-doctor referral provision in the 2010 POEA-SEC. 29

Aggrieved, Macaya filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 28, 2016. In his Motion for Reconsideration, Macaya argued the following: (1) the Petition for Certiorari is moot because the parties have entered into a conditional settlement during the execution proceedings before the Labor Arbiter; (2) the findings of Macaya's physician of choice should prevail; and (3) Macaya has been willing to refer the conflicting medical findings to a third doctor for a binding decision. 30

The Court of Appeals denied Macaya's Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds:

First, Macaya has never been able to produce any document which reveals that an amicable settlement has indeed been entered into by the parties. 31

Second, there is no factual basis to support the total permanent disability finding made by Macaya's physician of choice, Dr. Jacinto. In fact, as borne by the records, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Jacinto is a pro-forma, and failed to mention the tests, procedures, and treatments performed. 32

Third, Macaya failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure outlined in the 2010 POEA-SEC, and other than his bare claims, no evidence was shown that Macaya indeed made request to discuss the appointment of a third doctor to harmonize the conflicting medical assessments of Dr. Jacinto and the company-designated physicians. 33

Thus, on February 24, 2017, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, which reads:

Based on the foregoing, We find that Private Respondent did not raise any cogent or meritorious grounds which would justify a departure from the Decision sought to be reconsidered.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 34

The Instant Petition

In view of the adverse rulings of the Court of Appeals, Macaya came before this Court by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 35 where Macaya raised the following assignment of errors:

I. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD COMMITTED PALPABLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION AND CONCLUSION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER A QUO THAT WAS JUDICIOUSLY AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE NLRC.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD COMMITTED PALPABLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT SWALLOWED HOOK, LINE AND SINKER THE DOWNGRADED AND INACCURATE DISABILITY ASSESSMENT OF GRADE 8 MADE BY RESPONDENTS' COMPANY[-]DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN[S].

III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD COMMITTED PALPABLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAULTED PETITIONER FOR NOT AVAILING OF THE SERVICES OF A THIRD DOCTOR ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE AT THE LEVEL OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER A QUO PETITIONER HAD EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO BE REFERRED TO A THIRD DOCTOR, HOWEVER RESPONDENTS HAD REFUSED TO REFER PETITIONER TO A THIRD DOCTOR FOR OBVIOUS REASON.

IV. THAT PETITIONER IS INDEED ALREADY RENDERED TOTALLY UNFIT FOR WORK AS HIS INJURIES [HAVE] ALREADY SEVERELY DETERIORATED DESPITE PROPER MEDICAL TREATMENT AND HE HAS BEEN UNFIT FOR WORK FOR MORE THAN 240 DAYS ALREADY AS HE IS STILL UNFIT FOR WORK UP TO NOW.36

Thus, in the instant Petition, Macaya principally argued the following:

First, heavily relying on jurisprudence where this Court has held that medical findings of company-designated physicians may be deemed biased, unreliable, and self-serving, Macaya contended that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it gave more evidentiary weight to the medical findings of the company-designated physicians. 37

Second, Macaya argued that the referral to a third doctor, in accordance with the 2010 POEA-SEC, is merely optional in character, and thus, no fault can be attributed to Macaya for his failure to do so. 38

Third, Macaya alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it did not give credence to the medical findings made by Dr. Jacinto, solely on the basis that the medical certificate prepared by Dr. Jacinto is in a standard format. 39

Fourth, citing numerous cases where this Court has declared that permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, Macaya argued that his disability is permanent and total, considering that he is still unfit for work for more than 240 days. 40

On June 13, 2017, respondents filed their Comment (on the Petition for Review on Certiorari), where the respondents highlighted the following: HESIcT

First, the 2010 POEA-SEC states that disability compensation is based solely on the disability gradings provided therein, and the same should not be measured by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment. 41

Second, the medical findings of the company-designated physicians are more credible since the same are based on extensive and thorough examinations over the course of four months from September 21, 2014 until January 8, 2015. 42

Third, the Court of Appeals correctly struck down the findings of Macaya's physician of choice, Dr. Jacinto, considering that the same is vague, and failed to support his assessment with tests. In fact, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Jacinto was only made known to the respondents after Macaya lodged his Complaint before the Labor Arbiter. 43

Fourth, because of Macaya's belated presentation of Dr. Jacinto's medical certificate, the former failed to comply with the conflict resolution procedure under the 2010 POEA-SEC, and thus, the findings of the company-designated physicians must prevail. 44

On December 5, 2017, Macaya filed his Reply where he stated that in view of his incapacity to comply with the requirements of the POEA to be deployed, it is clear that he is already totally unfit for work as he has already been considered totally disqualified on account of his physical condition to resume any seafaring duties abroad. 45

Our Ruling

Upon review of the submissions filed before this Court, it appears that the main issue to be resolved is whether Macaya's disability is considered permanent and total for him to be entitled to the full compensation for permanent and total disability.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. 46 However, such rule may be relaxed when, as in the present case, the findings of the Court of Appeals differ with that of the NLRC. 47 However, while there are no procedural obstacles for this Court to conduct this review, We still find that the instant Petition is devoid of merit.

The Court of Appeals Has

For his first assignment of error, Macaya contended that the Court of Appeals cannot overturn the factual findings of the labor tribunals, considering that the findings of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired unique expertise and competence, deserve great respect and even finality on appeal. 48

While this Court recognizes the settled doctrine that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies such as those of the NLRC must be accorded great respect when supported by substantial evidence, 49 such doctrine cannot strip the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction to review labor cases brought before it via a Rule 65 petition, when grave abuse of discretion exists.

This Court, in Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Gallo, 50 ruled that when there is an arbitrary disregard of the evidence on record, or when the labor tribunals have misappreciated the evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated, the factual findings of the labor tribunals may be set aside.

Such ruling is reiterated in Colegio De San Juan De Letran-Calamba v. Villas, 51 where We concluded that the factual findings of the labor tribunals may be overturned when there is an arbitrary and whimsical disregard of the evidence on record: caITAC

Likewise, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. 52 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it modified and set aside the factual findings made by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as the respondents were able to demonstrate the grave abuse of discretion committed by the NLRC.

We now go into the merits of the present case.

In Disability Compensation,

As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the POEA-SEC is deemed incorporated in every contract of employment between a seafarer and his or her employer, and since Macaya was engaged by the respondents on March 28, 2014, the 2010 POEA-SEC governs the instant case. 53

Under Section 20 (A) (3), a seafarer who suffers from a work-related disability must submit himself or herself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon repatriation:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

xxx xxx xxx

3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month. TAIaHE

xxx xxx xxx

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.54

Notably, in Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, 55 this Court explained the above-cited provision and categorically ruled that the disability of a seafarer can only be assessed by a company-designated physician:

These provisions clearly illustrate that respondent's disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician. If the company-designated physician declares him fit to work, then the seaman is bound by such declaration.

Further, it should be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits arose from the stipulations in the standard format contract of employment pursuant to a circular of the POEA. Such circular was intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them. Thus, the parties are both bound by the provisions of the POEA Contract which declares that the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated physician. 56 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

With the foregoing, it is evident that the task of determining a seafarer's disability principally falls upon the company-designated physician.

However, it must be stressed that the 2010 POEA-SEC does not prohibit, and actually recognizes a seafarer's prerogative to consult with his or her doctor of choice. 57

In Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., 58 We clarified that the assessment made by the company-designated physician is not automatically final or binding, since a seafarer has the prerogative to consult with a doctor of his or her choice:

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. It is his findings and evaluations which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim. His assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts, as its inherent merits would still have to be weighed and duly considered. The seafarer may dispute such assessment by seasonably exercising his prerogative to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. x x x. 59 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the present case and as recited above, Macaya submitted himself to be examined by the company-designated physicians upon his return to the Philippines on September 24, 2014. He was then examined and treated by respondents' company-designated physicians who issued their medical findings on January 8, 2015, well-within the 120-day period of entitlement to sickness allowance, and found that Macaya is merely suffering from Grade 8 Disability, which is not considered as total and permanent disability.

Unsatisfied with the findings of the company-designated physicians, Macaya exercised his prerogative to consult with his doctor of choice, Dr. Jacinto, who found that his disability is considered total and permanent. Pertinently, the pro-forma medical certificate issued by Dr. Jacinto, which to reiterate, was only presented during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, merely stated that Macaya's disability is total and permanent.

In this regard, Macaya urges this Court to give more credence to the findings of his doctor of choice, simply because the findings of the company-designated physicians are supposedly biased, unreliable, and self-serving. 60 While this Court has had the occasion to rule that the medical findings of company-designated physicians tend to be biased in favor of the employer, this Court only disregards the certification of these company-designated physicians if they are incomplete, doubtful, and not supported by medical records. 61

In the present case, We are more inclined to believe the medical findings of the company-designated physicians as it cannot be assumed that their medical evaluation is incomplete, doubtful, or not supported by medical records. In fact, as borne by the records, the company-designated physicians examined and treated Macaya for several months. Clearly, the company-designated physicians are in the best position to determine and assess Macaya's fitness or disability since their findings were based on a number of tests and medical evaluation. On the contrary, Macaya's doctor of choice, Dr. Jacinto, merely examined Macaya for three days. In fact, the pro-forma medical certificate issued by Dr. Jacinto failed to explain the tests conducted, and merely stated that Macaya was unfit for work, without categorically stating that Macaya is suffering from a Grade 1 Disability, in accordance with the 2010 POEA-SEC. TCAScE

Nonetheless, in instances when the medical findings of the company-designated physician differ from the assessment of the seafarer's doctor of choice, the 2010 POEA-SEC provides for a conflict resolution procedure:

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. 62

The Conflict Resolution

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the conflict resolution procedure provided in the 2010 POEA-SEC is mandatory in nature. 63 Simply put, if the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice differ, the parties must refer the same to a third doctor, whose findings will be final and binding on both parties. Notably, non-compliance with this mandatory requirement is tantamount to a violation of the 2010 POEA-SEC, and the findings of the company-designated physician prevails over the medical assessment of the seafarer's doctor of choice:

When there is conflict between the findings of the company-designated doctor and the doctor chosen by the seafarer, the latter is bound to initiate the process of referring the findings to a third-party physician by informing his employer. The referral to a third doctor has been held by the Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor's assessment should prevail in case of non-observance of the third-doctor referral provision in the contract.

Failure to comply with the requirement of referral to a third-party physician is tantamount to violation of the terms under the POEA-SEC, and without a binding third-party opinion, the findings of the company-designated physician shall prevail over the assessment made by the seafarer's doctor. 64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Such ruling is reiterated in Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., 65 where We held:

This referral to a third doctor has been held by the Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor's assessment should prevail in case of non-observance of the third doctor referral provision in the contract. Stated otherwise, the company can insist on its disability rating even against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by asking for a referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties.

As recited above, the dispute between the findings of the company-designated physicians and Macaya's doctor of choice was not referred to a third doctor. On this score alone, the findings of the company-designated physicians that Macaya was suffering from a Grade 8 Disability should prevail.

However, Macaya insists that he should not be faulted for non-compliance with the mandatory conflict resolution procedure, since he supposedly requested that their dispute be referred to a third doctor, and it was respondents who refused the same. 66 On this note, it must be stressed that the burden to refer any controversy between the findings of a company-designated physician and the doctor of choice of a seafarer rests on the shipowner and not on the seafarer.

In Formerly INC Shipmanagement, Incorporated (now INC Navigation Co. Philippines, Inc.) v. Rosales, 67 this Court clarified how conflicting findings between a company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice should be handled: cTDaEH

To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctor's assessment based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarer's own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties. x x x. 68 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, upon Macaya's notification to the respondents that he is disputing the assessment made by the company-designated physicians, it was incumbent upon the respondents to refer the controversy to a third doctor.

However, it must be recalled that in the present case, the respondents were not promptly notified that Macaya consulted with an independent doctor, whose findings were contrary to that of the company-designated physicians. In fact, it is undisputed that Macaya first informed the respondents of the conflicting assessments only when they filed their Position Papers before the Labor Arbiter, and after Macaya filed his Complaint. As such, while the duty to refer the dispute to a third doctor rests upon the respondents, they cannot be faulted since they were unaware that Macaya consulted with an independent doctor, whose findings contradict the findings of the company-designated physicians. In such a case, this Court has already ruled that the filing of a complaint before the labor tribunals is premature because the diagnosis of the company-designated physician was not questioned in accordance with the provisions of the 2010 POEA-SEC. In fact, the case of Phil. Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag, 69 is instructive:

"Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued her fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. The petitioners could not have possibly caused the non-referral to a third doctor because they were not aware that Dumadag secured separate independent opinions regarding his disability. Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands, pursuant to the POEA-SEC and the CBA. x x x." 70 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the seafarer must properly inform the shipowner that he or she consulted with an independent doctor whose findings differ from the medical evaluation of the company-designated physician, and that such seafarer is contesting the same. Only after notifying the shipowner of the seafarer's intent to question the findings of the company-designated physician can the shipowner refer the dispute to a third doctor.

In fine, it is clear that Macaya failed to observe the mandatory conflict resolution procedure provided in the 2010 POEA-SEC, and as such, the findings of the company-designated physicians, whose findings are complete and credible, must prevail. cSaATC

Disability, Whether Total or

While it has been resolved that the findings of the company-designated physicians prevail over the medical assessment made by Macaya's doctor of choice, we deem it essential to likewise clarify how to determine whether a seafarer's disability is total or partial, to definitively resolve Macaya's entitlement to disability benefits.

The 2010 POEA-SEC, in no uncertain terms, states that disability, whether permanent total or partial, is based solely on the disability gradings outlined therein, and not on the number of days in which a seafarer is under treatment:

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid. 71 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the instant case, and as stated above, the company-designated physicians thoroughly examined and treated Macaya and concluded that he is suffering from a Grade 8 Disability — moderate rigidity or two-thirds loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk, in accordance with Section 32 of the 2010 POEA-SEC. Relevantly, the 2010 POEA-SEC states that any disability which is not classified under Grade 1 Disability is not considered permanent and total. 72

However, despite the clear language of the 2010 POEA-SEC, Macaya insists that his disability is permanent and total, as concluded by his doctor of choice, Dr. Jacinto, since he has been incapacitated to work for more than 240 days.

On this note, it bears stressing that We have already clarified that while in disability compensation, it is the incapacity to work that is compensated, the disability, whether total or partial, is determined by the disability grading made by a physician, in accordance with the 2010 POEA-SEC. In Formerly INC Shipmanagement, Incorporated (now INC Navigation Co. Philippines, Inc.) v. Rosales, 73 this Court explained:

In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

Thus, while Rosales was entitled to temporary total disability benefits during his treatment period (because he could not totally work during this whole period), it does not follow that he should likewise be entitled to permanent total disability benefits when his disability was assessed by the company-designated physician after his treatment. He may be recognized to have permanent disability because of the period he was out of work and could not work [in this case, more than one hundred twenty (120) days], but the extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages. cHDAIS

It is the doctor's findings that should prevail as he/she is equipped with the proper discernment, knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or partial disability. His declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14. Notably, this is a serious consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment lapsed days.

In light of these distinctions, to confuse the concepts of permanent and total disability is to trigger a situation where disability would be determined by simply counting the duration of the seafarer's illness. This system would inevitably induce the unscrupulous to delay treatment for more than one hundred twenty (120) days to avail of the more favorable award of permanent total disability benefits. 74 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, it is clear that a seafarer's disability, whether total or partial, depends on the disability grading made by the company-designated physician, and not merely on the number of days which have lapsed.

In other words, and as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, determining Macaya's disability, and consequently, his entitlement to disability benefits, must be based on the disability grading provided for in the 2010 POEA-SEC, as properly assessed by respondents' company-designated physicians, considering that it is already well-settled that a disability, whether total or partial, cannot merely depend on the number of days which Macaya was under treatment or entitled to sickness allowance.

Thus, Macaya is only entitled to US$16,795.00 as provided for in the 2010 POEA-SEC for Grade 8 disabilities.

All said, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Macaya is not entitled to the full amount of disability compensation for total and permanent disability and found that: (1) Macaya failed to comply with the mandatory conflict resolution procedure under the 2010 POEA-SEC, and his failure to do so means that the findings of the company-designated physicians prevail; (2) Macaya's disability cannot be considered as permanent and total considering that a seafarer's disability, whether partial or total, depends on the disability gradings under the 2010 POEA SEC; and (3) the medical assessment made by the company-designated physicians is more believable since these company-designated physicians were in the best position to determine Macaya's disability grading considering the thorough and extensive medical treatments and examinations conducted over the course of several months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 16, 2017 filed by petitioner Marvin G. Macaya is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2016 and the Resolution dated February 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, C.S.C.S. International NV, and Marlon R. Roño vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Marvin G. Macaya," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 145776, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Petitioner Marvin G. Macaya is likewise ordered to RETURN the excess amount he received during the execution proceedings. ISHCcT

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-36.

2.Id. at 38-48; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.

3.Id. at 50-53.

4.Id. at 4, 9.

5.Id. at 9, 39.

6.Id. at 39.

7.Id. at 39-40, 56.

8.Id. at 9-10.

9.Id. at 40.

10.Id. at 44.

11.Id. at 40.

12.Id.

13.Id.

14.Id. at 41.

15.Id. at 58-59.

16.Id. at 41.

17.Id.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 39.

20.Id. at 42.

21.Id. at 43.

22.Id. at 47.

23.Id. at 43-44.

24.Id. at 44.

25.Id.

26.Id. at 46.

27. 781 Phil. 197, 228 (2016).

28. 712 Phil. 507 (2013).

29.Rollo, p. 46.

30.Id. at 51.

31.Id.

32.Id. at 51-52.

33.Id. at 52.

34.Id.

35.Id. at 3-36.

36.Id. at 12.

37.Id. at 17-23.

38.Id. at 23.

39.Id. at 24.

40.Id. at 25-26.

41.Id. at 56-57.

42.Id. at 57.

43.Id. at 56-59.

44.Id. at 59.

45.Id. at 72.

46.Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino, 755 Phil. 108, 121 (2015), citing Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Spouses Abay-Abay, 687 Phil. 584, 590 (2012).

47.Aldaba v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., 811 Phil. 486, 494-495 (2017).

48.Rollo, pp. 13-15.

49.Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, 311 Phil. 744, 755-756 (1995); Castillo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 605, 615 (1999); Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, 554 Phil. 524, 541 (2007).

50. 299 Phil. 699, 710 (1994).

51. 447 Phil. 692 (2003).

52.Id. at 700.

53.Rollo, p. 43.

54. 2010 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (A) (3).

55. 591 Phil. 839 (2008).

56.Id. at 849.

57. 2010 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (A) (3).

58. 698 Phil. 170 (2012).

59.Id. at 182.

60.Rollo, pp. 17-23.

61.Magsaysay Mitsui Osk Marine, Inc. v. Buenaventura, 823 Phil. 245, 256 (2018); C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Mallare, G.R. No. 210461, January 21, 2019; Toquero v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 213482, June 26, 2019.

62. 2010 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (A) (3).

63.Rollo, p. 46.

64.Dionio v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 217362, November 19, 2018.

65. 834 Phil. 693, 705 (2018).

66.Rollo, p. 23.

67. 744 Phil. 774 (2014).

68.Id. at 788.

69.Supra note 28.

70.Id. at 520-521.

71. 2010 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (A) (6).

72.Id., Section 32.

73.Supra note 67.

74.Id. at 785-786.