THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 228988. June 3, 2019.]
AARON LUZANO y ORTILLA AND ARIEL LUZANO y ORTILLA, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 3, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 228988 (AARON LUZANO y ORTILLA and ARIEL LUZANO y ORTILLA, petitioners v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent). — This Court cannot entertain questions of fact in a Rule 45 Petition unless petitioners can show that their case falls under the exceptions to the Rule. 1
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 filed by brothers Ariel Luzano (Ariel) and Aaron Luzano (Aaron), assailing the June 10, 2016 Decision 3 and December 21, 2016 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the February 11, 2014 Decision 5 of the Regional Trial Court, which found Ariel and Aaron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. 6
In separate Informations, Ariel and Aaron were charged with frustrated murder:
(Crim. Case No. 11-280864)
"That on or about December 13, 2010, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Aaron], 17 years old, a minor and acting with discernment, conspiring and confederating together with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabout[s] are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and use of superior strength, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one JOSEPH ARAM OBISPO y NIEVES, by then and there suddenly boxing the latter using [a] hard object on his face and head for several times, causing multiple injuries on his face and head, and despite his plea for mercy, said accused continuously hit him on his face and head, thereby inflicting upon the said JOSEPH ARAM OBISPO y NIEVES mortal wounds which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident independent of the will of the said accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said JOSEPH ARAM OBISPO y NIEVES, which saved his life. CAIHTE
Contrary to law."
xxx xxx xxx
(Crim. Case No. 12-289965)
"That on or about December 13, 2010, in the City of Manila, Philippines[, t]he said accused [Ariel], conspiring and confederating with others, whose true names, real identities and present whereab[o]uts are still unknown and helping each other, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and t[r]eachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Joseph Aram Obispo y Nieves @ "Joram," by then and there hitting his head with a brass knuckle, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of said accused, that is, the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Joseph Aram Obispo y Nieves @ "Joram," which prevented his death.
Contrary to law." 7
Both Aaron and Ariel pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged during their respective arraignments on March 1, 2011 and September 24, 2012. 8
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) private complainant Joseph Aram N. Obispo (Joseph); (2) Carolyn Cabalu (Cabalu); (3) Michael Santiago; (4) Dr. Andrew Alejandro D. Rebosa (Dr. Rebosa); and (5) Josephine Obispo (Josephine). 9 Their testimonies revealed that:
At around 2 a.m. on December 13, 2010, Joseph and his aunt, Cabalu, were talking and laughing in front of Cabalu's house. Ariel and Aaron, who were drinking with friends nearby, thought that Joseph and Cabalu were laughing at them. Annoyed, Ariel suddenly punched Joseph, but he was pacified by Cabalu. In the heat of the moment, Aaron punched Joseph using brass knuckles. Then, together, the brothers punched Joseph even as he fell on the ground, where they kept mauling him on his face and head, knocking him out of consciousness. 10
Failing to pacify Ariel and Aaron, Cabalu cried for help. A barangay official arrived shortly and chased after the brothers, catching Ariel. Meanwhile, Joseph was rushed to the hospital, where he underwent an operation and was confined in the hospital for nine (9) days. 11
Dr. Rebosa, who treated Joseph's injuries, issued a report on the medico-legal examination he conducted. He declared that although the patient's wounds were not life-threatening, they could have been infected and may result in his death if treatment would be delayed. 12
Joseph's mother, Josephine, paid for hospital expenses in the amount of P281,245.50, presenting several receipts to support her claim. She also stated that she spent P60,000.00 as attorney's fees. 13
In their defense, Ariel and Aaron denied the charges against them. 14 Claiming that he did not know who attacked Joseph, Ariel testified that he was with his child in their house when the alleged mauling happened. He later on learned that Joseph's relatives pointed to his brother Aaron as the perpetrator and that the Barangay Chairman took him into custody. 15
For his part, Aaron, who was 17 years old at the time of his arrest, testified that he knew Joseph only by name and that he did not know who attacked him. Claiming that they had no previous disagreement, he said that he was surprised when Joseph pointed to him as one of his assailants. He added that he could not think of any reason for Joseph to accuse him. 16
Aaron further stated that he was arrested in front of his house while drinking with his friends. He added that he only found out that his brother was also charged with the same offense when he was released from detention. He also claimed that he was mauled during his detainment at the police station. 17 DETACa
In its February 11, 2014 Decision, 18 the Regional Trial Court found that the brothers' defense of denial failed against the prosecution's evidence. 19 It held that since alevosia had not been proven, they were only liable for frustrated homicide. 20 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony of Frustrated Homicide and in conformity with law, they are sentenced to suffer prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day as minimum to six (6) years as maximum each of prision correc[c]ional.
The accused are ordered to jointly and severally pay the victim the amount[s] of:
(a) P281,245.50 as actual damages;
(b) P40,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 21
On that same day, Ariel and Aaron both applied for probation. 22
The private prosecutor later moved for reconsideration of the February 11, 2014 Decision, praying that the penalty imposed be modified to "six months and one (1) day to six years of prision correccional as the minimum term to eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor in the medium period, as the maximum term[.]" 23 The private prosecutor also prayed that the applications for probation be denied. 24
In its March 4, 2014 Order, the Regional Trial Court modified Ariel's and Aaron's penalty of imprisonment to "four (4) years and two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as the minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as the maximum." 25 The trial court likewise ordered that the applications for probation be recalled "because the sentence imposed is not within the coverage of the Probation Law." 26
Ariel and Aaron moved for reconsideration of the March 4, 2014 Order, but their Motion was denied by the trial court on June 2, 2014. 27
Thus, Ariel and Aaron appealed 28 before the Court of Appeals on May 4, 2015. They argued that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish their intent to kill. Hence, they were only liable for physical injuries. 29
In its June 10, 2016 Decision, 30 the Court of Appeals denied Ariel and Aaron's appeal. It found that the element of intent to kill was proven:
Judging by the means used, location of where [Ariel and Aaron] aimed their punches, the number of wounds sustained by [Joseph], the fact that [Joseph] lost consciousness, and the conduct of both [Ariel and Aaron] at the time of the incident, We cannot deny that their actions distinctly exhibit their intent to kill [Joseph], and not only to inflict physical harm on him. 31
Despite the medico-legal report stating that Joseph's wounds were not mortal, the Court of Appeals still held Ariel and Aaron liable for frustrated homicide. 32 This was due to the evidence showing that Joseph's wounds "would be fatal and cause his death if not medically attended to." 33
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses for being "consistent and cohesive with the records" 34 than Ariel's and Aaron's denials. 35
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals considered Aaron's minority in modifying the penalty imposed:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 11 February 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Accused-Appellant Ariel Luzano shall suffer the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant Aaron Luzano shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. Both accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for PhP281,245.50 as actual damages, PhP40,000.00 as moral damages and PhP40,000.00 as exemplary damages. aDSIHc
SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)
Ariel and Aaron moved for reconsideration, 37 but their Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its December 21, 2016 Resolution. 38
Thus, Ariel and Aaron filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 39
Petitioners maintain that they were not Joseph's assailants. Even if they were, they argue that the prosecution had nonetheless failed to prove the elements of frustrated homicide. They claim that the brass knuckles that petitioner Aaron allegedly used on Joseph cannot be considered deadly per se since death is not the ordinary result when it is used. Moreover, although Joseph was hit by brass knuckles, they assert that Joseph's injuries were not enough to kill him. Even Dr. Rebosa testified that his injuries were not fatal. 40
Petitioners also point out that Joseph's statement was riddled with inconsistencies, such as when he stated on direct examination that Ariel attacked him first; yet, on cross-examination, he said it was Aaron. Petitioners argue that the person who attacked Joseph, and the manner by which he was attacked, were material details since they show petitioners' motive. If Joseph was indeed mauled by petitioners, they point out that he could not have forgotten such significant details. 41
Additionally, petitioners assert that their defense of alibi should have been given more weight by the Court of Appeals. 42
Petitioners admit that they raise questions of fact before this Court. Nonetheless, they assert that the Court of Appeals' factual findings were "so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion [.]" 43
In its Comment, 44 respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, avers that the Court of Appeals made no error in affirming the trial court Decision. 45 It argues that the prosecution has sufficiently established petitioners' intention to kill Joseph "through the means used in assaulting [him]; their conduct before, during, and after the crime; and the nature, location, and number of [his] wounds." 46 As such, it claims that: (1) brass knuckles are deadly weapons; (2) petitioners continued punching Joseph even after the latter fell and pleaded them to stop; 47 and (3) Joseph's injuries were fatal:
As a result [of] petitioners' punches, [Joseph] sustained fractures on his head, a vital part of the body, and even lost consciousness. The lacerations, bruises and swelling of the nasal area sustained by [Joseph] were caused by a hard blunt object that hit his face which was the brass knuckle used by petitioner Aaron. The impact of the punches on [Joseph]'s face resulted not only to (sic) its swelling and bruising but also to (sic) the fracture of the nasal bone and maxillary area on the right side of the face for which he had to undergo surgery. Said injuries were proven to be fatal if not for the timely medical attention administered to [Joseph]. 48
Respondent maintains that Joseph's testimony is consistent and credible. Even if there were inconsistencies, it points out that they are minor and will not affect Joseph's credibility, as he clearly testified that petitioners kept punching him on his head and face even when he fell on the ground. 49
Finally, respondent contends that the Court of Appeals was correct in disregarding petitioners' defense of alibi. 50
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioners Ariel and Aaron Luzano are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide.
Frustrated homicide exists when the following are present:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code exist. 51 (Citation omitted) ETHIDa
Here, the intent to kill Joseph was apparent when petitioners Ariel and Aaron, who was using brass knuckles, kept punching Joseph on the face and head even after he fell and passed out. Neither of them heeded Joseph's and Cabalu's pleas to stop, and they would have continued mauling Joseph in the vital parts of his body had the barangay official not arrived. Their punches resulted in Joseph's open wounds, which would have caused his death had he not been rushed to the hospital. Nonetheless, there was neither treachery nor evident premeditation proven that could have qualified petitioners' acts as murder.
This Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb both the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' findings that petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. In Cirera v. People: 52
This court held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court," which is in the best position to observe the witnesses' demeanor while being examined in court. This court gives more weight to such findings if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The exception to the rule is when the trial court misconstrued facts which if properly appreciated could alter the outcome of the case. 53 (Citations omitted)
However, the penalty imposed upon petitioner Aaron, who was a minor when he committed the crime, should be modified.
The crime of consummated homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In comparison, the penalty of a frustrated felony is lower by one (1) degree under Article 50 of the same Code. Thus, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor.
Since there was no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proven, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner Ariel should be prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is anywhere within prision correccional, which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. The Court of Appeals, then, correctly imposed the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
On the other hand, petitioner Aaron, who was only 17 years old then, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which will further lower his imposable penalty by one (1) degree 54 to prision correccional. Thus, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner Aaron should be prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proven. The range of prision correccional in its medium period is two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is anywhere within arresto mayor, which ranges from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Accordingly, this Court modifies petitioner Aaron's sentence and imposes the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Aside from the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, petitioner Aaron is also entitled to the benefit under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which provides:
SECTION 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Moreover, since petitioner Aaron was sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of less than six (6) years, he may also apply for probation under Republic Act No. 10707 55 if he does not possess any ground for disqualification under Section 9 of the same law. 56
Lastly, in accordance with People v. Jugueta, 57 this Court orders both petitioners to jointly and severally pay Joseph: (1) P281,245.50 as actual damages; (2) P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (3) P30,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is deleted. 58 A legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all monetary awards from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 59 cSEDTC
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals June 10, 2016 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 36849 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioners Ariel Luzano y Ortilla and Aaron Luzano y Ortilla are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide.
Petitioner Ariel Luzano y Ortilla is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioner Aaron Luzano y Ortilla is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
On account of petitioner Aaron Luzano y Ortilla's minority when he came in conflict with the law, he may either apply for probation or serve his sentence in an agricultural camp or training facility in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Both petitioners are further DIRECTED to jointly and severally pay Joseph Aram Obispo y Nieves: (1) Two Hundred Eighty-One Thousand Two Hundred Forty-Five Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P281,245.50) as actual damages; (2) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity; and (3) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Quintos v. People, 742 Phil. 759, 768-769 (2014) [Per Acting C.J. Carpio, Second Division].
2.Rollo, pp. 12-36.
3.Id. at 81-90. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Special Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 99-100. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Former Special Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5.Id. at 56-65. The Decision was penned by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo of Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
6.Id. at 65.
7.Id. at 56-57.
8.Id. at 57-58.
9.Id. at 58-61.
10.Id. at 58-60.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 60.
13.Id. at 60-61.
14.Id. at 61-63.
15.Id. at 61.
16.Id. at 61-62.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 56-65.
19.Id. at 65.
20.Id.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 84.
23.Id. at 85.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id. at 37-55.
29.Id. at 46-53 and 86.
30.Id. at 81-90.
31.Id. at 87.
32.Id. at 87-88.
33.Id. at 88.
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.Id. at 89.
37.Id. at 91-96.
38.Id. at 99-100.
39.Id. at 12-36.
40.Id. at 22-23.
41.Id. at 24-25.
42.Id. at 25.
43.Id. at 21.
44.Id. at 113-129.
45.Id. at 119-123.
46.Id. at 121.
47.Id.
48.Id. at 122.
49.Id. at 124.
50.Id. at 125-126.
51.Olarte v. People, 763 Phil. 70, 78 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
52.739 Phil. 25 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
53.Id. at 40-41.
54.REV. PEN. CODE, art. 68 provides:
ARTICLE 68. Penalty to be Imposed Upon a Person under Eighteen Years of Age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
55.An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, Otherwise Known as the "Probation Law of 1976," as amended.
56.Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended by Rep. Act No. 10707 (2015), sec. 9, provides:
SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of not more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
57.783 Phil. 806, 852-853 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]. This Court held:
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
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1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity — P30,000.00
ii. Moral damages — P30,000.00
xxx xxx xxx
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; P30,000.00 for frustrated; and P20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded. (Citations omitted)
58.Id.
59.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].