Lukban v. Sandiganbayan-Seventh Division

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 254312-15. March 2, 2022.]

MANSUE NERY LUKBAN, petitioner,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN-SEVENTH DIVISION, REPRESENTED BY JUSTICES MA. THERESA DOLORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA, ZALDY V. TRESPESES and GEORGINA D. HIDALGO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 02 March 2022 which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 254312-15 (Mansue Nery Lukban v. Sandiganbayan-Seventh Division, represented by Justices Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta, Zaldy V. Trespeses and Georgina D. Hidalgo). —

While the general rude remains to be that administrative and criminal liabilities are distinct and separate from one another, and that the dismissal of a criminal case does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the related administrative case and vice-versa, this Court recognizes that when an administrative case has been dismissed by a court on the ground that the act or omission which serves as the basis for administrative liability does not exist or such act or omission cannot be considered as unlawful or wrongful, and no additional evidence was presented in the criminal case, then the findings in the administrative case can be used as basis for the dismissal of the criminal case for as long as both cases are based on the same facts and circumstances.

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari (With an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the twin Resolutions dated 18 September 2020 1 and 22 October 2020 2 promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0164 to 0167. The twin Resolutions denied the Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) filed by petitioner Mansue Nery Lukban (petitioner), praying that the criminal charges be dismissed, as well as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Antecedents

Petitioner alleges that the controversy arose from the procurement of three (3) Light Police Operational Helicopters (LPOH) units by the Philippine National Police (PNP) in 2009 where the units delivered by the winning supplier, Manila Aerospace Products and Trading (MAPTRA), were later found to be not compliant with the minimum standard specifications originally required by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found probable cause for violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as well as Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Falsification of a Public Document. Criminal cases were filed and are currently pending before the Sandiganbayan-Seventh Division. CAIHTE

Petitioner, as the Chief of Management Division of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, was one of those charged in the Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged therein that petitioner was one of the accused who committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 by conspiring and confederating with one another and with Jose Miguel "Mike" Arroyo, who owned two units of standard Robinson R44 Raven I Helicopters with Serial Numbers 1372 and 1374, Hilario "Larry" De Vera and MAPTRA through the commission of numerous irregular and illegal related acts pertaining to the negotiated procurement by the PNP of the two units standard Robinson R44 Raven I Helicopter and one unit of fully-equipped Robinson R22 Raven II Helicopter.

The Informations also state that MAPTRA was awarded the Sales/Supply Contract dated 23 July 2009 for a total contract price of P104,985,000.00 despite the fact that MAPTRA did not possess the technical and financial eligibility required under RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, and the two units of the standard helicopters were not brand new and/or compliant with NAPOLCOM issuances as to endurance and ventilating system, and had expired engine warranties. The foregoing allegedly caused indue injury to the PNP and the Government in the amount of at least P34,632,187.50 representing the overpriced amount paid by PNP to MAPTRA which were passed off, and paid for, as brand new by accused.

Petitioner was also among the accused charged with falsification of a public document when they allegedly falsified Inspection Report dated 13 November 2009 by stating that the two units standard LPOH delivered to PNP, upon inspection, conformed with the specifications set by the NAPOLCOM despite being absolutely false.

The Administrative Case Against

The OMB likewise found petitioner administratively liable for dishonest and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. Petitioner's liability was based on his alleged act of noting and signing an Inspection Report Form, particularly, that he was supposedly remiss in verifying the accuracy of the contents thereof.

Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) and argued the OMB committed serious misapprehension of facts as to the nature of his functions and the import of his signature. Allegedly, the OMB failed to appreciate the fact that petitioner was never a part of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee (IAC), the ad hoc technical body that conducted the inspection and acceptance of the delivered LPOH units. Thus, he could not be charged with knowledge of the LPOH qualification to such extent that he could personally flag the irregularities in the Inspection Report Form which he signed.

According to petitioner, he never conducted any inspections considering the nature of his function — as head of the Management Division — allowed him to rely on the findings stated in the inspection reports submitted to him by the property inspectors tasked to do the job. He also claimed that his functions purely related to finance and budget, being under the Directorate for Comptrollership. Apparently, the OMB muddled the distinction between the technical inspection conducted by the IAC and the inspection conducted by the property inspectors of the Management Division, which relates to sheer verification of conformity of the purchase orders and heavily relies on the findings of the IAC.

The CA affirmed the decision of the OMB and found that petitioner examined the documents appended to the Inspection Report Form. Thus, tell-tale signs of irregularities should have caught his attention and prompted him to probe the matter further or otherwise cause him to refrain from affixing his signature in the said Report. For his failure to conduct a thorough evaluation of the veracity of the form's contents, petitioner concealed facts and committed serious lapse in judgment sufficient to pin him for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Petitioner questioned the ruling of the CA to the Supreme Court. In Lukban v. Carpio-Morales, 3 the First Division of this Court exculpated petitioner from administrative charges on the ground of his lack of involvement. It was ruled that no substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner administratively liable for gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the service. The First Division considered that petitioner's official duties revolve only around accounting and fund or resource management. It was also ruled that Petitioner's claim that the function of verifying the LPOH specifications belonged to different departments of the PNP is already recognized by jurisprudence. 4 As such, it was the IAC which vouched that the LPOHs conformed to the NAPOLCOM specifications and passed the acceptance criteria of the Weapons, Tactics and Communications Division (WTCD), and further recommended the acceptance of the units. It was also ruled that even granting that the Inspection Report Form, which was "Noted by" Petitioner, declared that the LPOH units were in good condition and conformed with NAPOLCOM specifications, this was issued on the basis of the IAC Resolution, along with the WTCD Report, which confirmed the findings of the technical inspection conducted on the LPOH units.

The Court gave credence to petitioner's claim that he merely relied on the IAC Resolution as regards the compliance of the LPOH units with the NAPOLCOM specifications when he affixed his signature on the Inspection Report Form under the portion of "Noted by," thus: DETACa

[I]t is the considered view of the Court that Lukban cannot be held liable for serious dishonesty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. To reiterate, dishonesty — like bad faith — is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a question of intention. Lukban's acts do not show any disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, nor any intent to violate the truth. Moreover, Lukban's reliance on the findings of the IAC and the property inspectors within his division negates any dishonest intent.

Petitioner was ordered reinstated to his former rank as Police Senior Superintendent without loss of seniority rights and with payment of back salaries and all benefits which would have accrued as if he had not been illegally dismissed.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On the basis of the decision of the First Division in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales, 5 petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 01 September 2020 before the Sandiganbayan, maintaining that the factual findings of this Court regarding the nature of his functions and his lack of involvement in the alleged conspiracy are authoritative — and should thus form basis for his acquittal or at least accorded great weight by the Sandiganbayan in the determination of his culpability for the criminal acts charged.

In its Resolution dated 18 September 2020, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Manifestation and Motion by ruling that there are factual gaps in the findings of the Court regarding petitioner's functions that makes it difficult for the Sandiganbayan to exculpate him from the charges filed. Despite the extensive pronouncement of the First Division of this Court regarding the extent of petitioner's functions and his lack of involvement in the actual inspection of the units, petitioner's signature appears in the Inspection Report Form. Further, the functions and duties rendered by each accused determine their complicity or non-complicity to the conspiracy charged.

The Sandiganbayan also stated that the trial for the defense is yet to unfold and the functions and duties of each accused are yet to be stated. It noted that there is no categorical ruling in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales that one or more of the essential elements of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 or of falsification did not exist. Neither was there an express finding that petitioner acted in good faith like in the case of Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan. 6

As for the falsification charges, the Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the existence of colorable truth in the purported falsified statement in the Inspection Report Form, i.e., that the LPOH units confirmed to NAPOLCOM specifications, is yet to be made out by petitioner and his co-accused as the case progresses.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 September 2020. However, this was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 22 October 2020. Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

The Petition before the Court

In the instant petition, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) failed to dismiss the criminal case against him contrary to the tenor of established jurisprudence; (2) refused to adhere to the ruling of this Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales; and (3) appeared to have shifted unto petitioner the burden to prove his innocence in violation of the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence.

By Resolution dated 12 January 2021, this Court issued a temporary restraining order in favor of petitioner.

The OMB, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed its Comment dated 26 March 2021 on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It maintained that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioner's Manifestation and Motion as petitioner failed to prove that said rulings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. In addition, the OSP insisted that the exoneration of petitioner in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice-versa. The ruling of the Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales was summary in nature compared to the criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan where a full-blown trial is being undertaken, and where the prosecution presented witnesses and offered documentary evidence.

Issue

The primordial issue for resolution of the Court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases against him in light of the finding of the Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales.

Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

It is settled that administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal liability 7 and civil liability. 8 As to the effect of the dismissal of an administrative case on a related criminal case, it has been ruled in Paredes v. Sandiganbayan9 the determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no way conclusive as to lack of criminal liability. The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

Another oft-cited case on this matter is Tecson v. Sandiganbayan. 10 The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision in the said case convicting petitioner therein despite the dismissal of the administrative charge by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. In upholding the Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and it has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Likewise, double jeopardy does not apply since the case first resolved was an administrative case and not a criminal case. The Court also laid down principles as to the separate and distinct nature of administrative liability from criminal and civil liabilities arising from the same or similar acts, thus: aDSIHc

[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

Tecson was reiterated in a long line of cases. 11 The same principles in Tecson were likewise applied to deny the claim for the dismissal of administrative case on the basis of the dismissal of a criminal case.

The general rule, however, is not without any exceptions.

In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 12 the Court ruled in favor of the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner therein after having been absolved in a related administrative case. Petitioner in the said case insisted that the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrer to evidence because of the decision of the Court in the related administrative case where the accused was absolved from administrative liability. In ruling in favor of the dismissal of the criminal cases, the Court held:

In the case of Nicolas, he was exonerated of administrative liability in G.R. No. 154668 by this Court. In said case, the Court noted that while he requested the release of the cargo, he did so in good faith as he relied on the records before him and the recommendation of Arriola. And it noted that there was nothing to indicate that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity about the cargo. Thus Nicolas was absolved of having acted with gross neglect of duty, viz.:

Arias v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 81563 & 82512, December 19, 1989, 180 SCRA 309] ruled that heads of office could rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own negligence. While Arriola might have been negligent in accepting the spurious documents, such fact does not automatically imply that Nicolas was also. As a matter of course, the latter relied on the former's recommendation. Petitioner [Nicolas] is not mandated or even expected to verify personally from the Bureau of Customs — or from wherever else it originated — each receipt or document that appears on its face to have been regularly issued or executed.

This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. The applicability of these rulings, however, must be distinguished in the present cases.

In Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman and the other cases cited by the prosecution in its Consolidated Comment, it was the dismissal of the criminal cases that was pleaded to abate the administrative cases filed against the therein petitioners.

More importantly, the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions. To this effect was the ruling in Ocampo:

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then, too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusion in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where, as in this case, the administrative complaint was dismissed for failing to satisfy the degree of proof which is merely substantial evidence, a fortiori the criminal case based on the same facts and evidence cannot but falter and fall against the highest quantum of proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Further, in People v. Sandiganbayan13 the Court also recognized that a dismissal in an administrative charge may be used to dismiss the criminal case if founded on the same facts, thus:

Although the dismissal of the criminal case cannot be pleaded to abate the administrative proceedings primarily on the ground that the quantum of proof required to sustain administrative charges is significantly lower than that necessary for criminal actions, the same does not hold true if it were the other way around, that is, the dismissal of the administrative case is being invoked to abate the criminal case. The reason is that the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal case. The prosecution is certainly not precluded from adducing additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases. However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.14

It appears from Nicolas and People that the dismissal of the criminal case was allowed because of a prior dismissal of the related administrative case based on the following requisites: (1) the existence of a criminal case and an administrative case against a public officer based on the same facts; (2) the administrative case has been dismissed with finality; (3) the administrative case was dismissed on the grounds that the acts complained of did not exist, or that there is nothing unlawful or irregular in the acts or omissions of the public officer; and (4) the criminal case is based on the same facts and evidence passed upon in the administrative case, and no additional evidence was presented by the prosecution.

In this case, this Court rules that the exception, rather than the general rule, applies. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to apply the exception despite the concurrence of facts and evidence, and the presence established jurisprudential requisites supporting the same.

First, on the basis of the same allegations against petitioner, administrative and criminal cases were filed against him.

Second, the administrative case was dismissed with finality by no less than the Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales. ETHIDa

Third, it is undisputed that in dismissing the administrative charges against herein petitioner, the First Division of this Court found that the latter merely relied on the IAC Resolution as regards the compliance of the LPOH units with the NAPOLCOM specifications when he affixed his signature on the Inspection Report Form under the portion of "Noted by." It was also emphasized therein that it was the IAC who has the responsibility of inspecting the deliveries to make sure that they conform to the quantity and the approved technical specifications in the contract, and to accept or reject the same. There is likewise a sheer dearth of evidence on petitioner's participation in the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government. Thus, it was also declared that petitioner's acts do not show any disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, nor any intent to violate the truth, and his reliance on the findings of IAC and the property inspections within his division negates any dishonest intent.

To this Court's mind, this only shows that petitioner acted in good faith and his acts cannot be considered unlawful or wrongful under the circumstances. Consequently, since the violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and the crime of falsification of public documents are mala in se and would thus require criminal intent,15the Court's declaration also negates any crime attributable to petitioner. It will also be highly illogical to allow the criminal case to proceed on the basis of the same facts and evidence where the Court has already ruled out administrative liability.

Lastly, it should also be emphasized that the prosecution in the criminal case did not provide additional compelling evidence to prove petitioner's culpability other than those presented in the administrative case. In fact, the OSP, in its Comment, did not point to any additional evidence that has been presented against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan which could change the conclusions of the Court in Lukban v. Carpio-Morales.

The Sandiganbayan also stated that it is actually entertaining the idea that the defense will provide evidence as to the duties and functions of the accused which can be used against petitioner. 16 This only confirms the lack of the required quantum of evidence to support the conviction of petitioner. In any case, the same cannot be countenanced as it goes against the settled dictum that the evidence for the prosecution is the yardstick for determining the sufficiency of proof necessary to convict, and that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not the weakness of the defense. 17

Lest it be forgotten, nipping an untenable case as soon as its baselessness is discernible is a crucial dimension of dispensing justice that courts cannot neglect without cost. For it not only frees up the court's resource, but perhaps, and more significantly, affords the parties to the case with the dignity of knowing better than to devote their own finite years, money, and energy to a futile exercise of a failed cause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated 18 September 2020 and Resolution dated 22 October 2020 promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0164 to 0167 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to DISMISS the criminal cases insofar as petitioner Mansue Nery Lukban is concerned.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 47-54. Penned by Associate Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta and concurred in by Associate Justices Zaldy V. Trespeses and Georgina D. Hidalgo.

2. Id. at pp. 55-60. Penned by Associate Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta and concurred in by Associate Justices Zaldy V. Trespeses and Georgina D. Hidalgo.

3. G.R. No. 238563, 12 February 2020 [Per J. Caguioa].

4. Field Investigation Office v. Piano, 820 Phil. 1031 (2017).

5. Supra at note 3.

6. 568 Phil. 297 (2008).

7. Police Commission v. Lood, 185 Phil. 595 (1980); Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 265 Phil. 536 (1990); Ordoñez v. Spouses Pestaño, G.R. No. 212704, 14 May 2021; Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group v. Villafuerte, 840 Phil. 243 (2018).

8. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 201069, June 16, 2021 [Per J. Gaerlan].

9. 322 Phil. 709 (1996).

10. 376 Phil. 191 (1999).

11. Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 567 Phil. 46 (2008); Apolinario v. Flores, 541 Phil. 108 (2007); Badiola v. Court of Appeals, 575 Phil. 514 (2008); Office of the President v. Cataquiz, 673 Phil. 318 (2011); Melendres v. Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, 692 Phil. 546 (2012).

12. 568 Phil. 297 (2008).

13. 637 Phil. 147 (2010).

14. Emphasis supplied.

15. See Beradio v. Court of Appeals, 191 Phil. 153 (1981).

16. Rollo, p. 51.

17. Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, 568 Phil. 297 (2008).

18. n   Buencamino v. People, G.R. Nos. 216745-46, 10 November 2020 [Per J. Caguioa].

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document. Missing Footnote Reference.