SECOND DIVISION
[UDK-16694. October 7, 2020.]
DAVID LU, petitioner,vs. KELLY L. LUYM, VICTOR L. LUYM AND PATERNO L. LUYM, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated07 October 2020which reads as follows:
"UDK-16694 (David Lu v. Kelly L. Luym, Victor L. Luym and Paterno L. Luym, Jr.). — After a judicious study of the Petition 1 and its annexes, the Court resolves to DISMISS the same outright for the following reasons: (1) the petition was filed out of time; (2) the docket and other legal fees were paid out of time; and (3) the petition lacks written explanation as to why service of the same was not done personally.
As alleged in the present petition, petitioner David Lu (David) received the assailed Resolution 2 dated 17 February 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying his Motion for Reconsideration on 10 March 2020 to which he originally had 15 days or until 25 March 2020 to file the instant petition for review under Section 2, 3 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In view, however, of the Court's Administrative Circulars extending the deadlines for the submission of pleadings due to COVID-19 community quarantine in affected areas, the latest of which is A.C. No. 39-2020, the filing of the instant petition was extended for 30 calendar days from 1 June 2020 or until 1 July 2020. Yet, the petition, with attached stale 4 postal money orders for the payment of docket and other lawful fees, was only filed on 8 July 2020, which means that the petition and the docket fees were clearly filed and paid, respectively, out of time.
Moreover, the petition lacks written explanation as to why service of the same to the CA and adverse parties were not done personally as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. 5
In any event, there are no reversible errors in the assailed 27 June 2019 Decision 6 and 17 February 2020 Resolution 7 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 05566. As correctly ruled by the CA, the allegations in the Affidavit of David (the basis of annotating the adverse claim) failed to comply with the formal requirements set forth by Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 and related jurisprudence 8 for the annotation of an adverse claim. Worthy of note above them all is the fact that the Affidavit miserably failed to state and establish how and under whom his alleged adverse right or interest over Lot No. 540-A of the Subdivision Plan PSD-895 (subject property) was acquired. It must be stressed that the purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. 9 Hence, Section 70 of PD 1529 provides that for the validity and effectivity of an adverse claim, it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest adverse to the registered owner. 10 In this case, the subject Affidavit did not state a specific adverse claim over the ownership of the subject property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-20514 under the name of LuDo and LuYm Development Corporation (LLDC). David's Affidavit generally requested the Register of Deeds (ROD) to reinstate and respect the notice of lis pendens annotated on all TCTs issued in the name of LLDC in view of the still pending intra-corporate case in SRC Case No. 021-CEB (SRC-021-CEB), without even stating how and why the pendency of the said intra-corporate case constitutes an adverse claim to the registered lot owner, LLDC. At best, the Affidavit sought the reinstatement or annotation of a notice of lis pendens, which was granted by the ROD and annotated on TCT No. T-20514 and carried over to TCT No. 107-2011004008, under the name of respondents Kelly Luym and Paterno Luym, Jr. (Luyms), which is an entirely different remedy from an annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim, which requires the adverse claimant to particularly set forth his adverse claim over a specific property and how he acquired the same.
Even on the presumption that David's Affidavit complied with the formal requirements, the CA is correct in holding that the supposed notice of adverse claim still warrants its cancellation in view of the finality of the Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-34536 where LLDC conveyed, through court-approved compromise agreement, the subject lot to the Luyms. Accordingly, the subject lot does not form part anymore of the properties of LLDC nor of the assets under the custody and control of the management committee created in SRC-021-CEB, in which David, as a shareholder, could benefit from after the liquidation proceedings of said corporation. Thus, David has no more right to assert, either inchoate or actual, over the subject property.
It could have helped the case of David if the judgment based on compromise agreement in Civil Case No. CEB-34536 is annulled or questioned. As it currently stands, however, there is no pending dispute or controversy over the said compromise agreement and decision over the ownership of the subject property, which is now registered in the name of the Luyms under TCT No. 107-2011004008, to allow the annotated notice of adverse of claim to subsist.
SO ORDERED." (Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Emily R. Aliño-Geluz, with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga, concurring; id. at 25-27.
3.Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
4.Rollo, p. 2.
5.Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
6. Penned by Associate Justice Emily R. Aliño-Geluz, with Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga, concurring; rollo, pp. 30-41.
7.Id. at 25-27.
8. See Lozano v. Ballesteros, 273 Phil. 43, 49-55 (1991).
9. See Arrazola v. Bernas, 175 Phil. 452, 456-457 (1978).
10. See Atty. Ferrer v. Sps. Diaz, 633 Phil. 244, 262 (2010).