FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 216593. April 20, 2015.]
ROBERTO O. LOZADA, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 20, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 216593 (Roberto O. Lozada, Jr. v. People of the Philippines). — The petitioner's motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the September 25, 2014 Decision 1 and January 22, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131731 for failure of Roberto O. Lozada, Jr. (petitioner) to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in upholding his conviction for the crime of Direct Assault defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of five (5) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor in its maximum, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional in its minimum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P500.00.
At the outset, the CA did not err when it ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong mode of appeal when he sought a review of his conviction via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 42 of the same Rules, the proper recourse to challenge the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In any case, the CA cannot be said to have dismissed his petition on a mere technicality considering its findings that there was a confluence of all the elements of the second mode of committing the crime of Direct Assault, to wit: (1) the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance; (2) the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent; (3) at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in actual performance of official duties, or (b) he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties; (4) the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; and (5) there is no public uprising. 3 As records are bereft of showing that the CA overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain material facts in affirming the RTC's Decision convicting petitioner of Direct Assault, the Court is therefore not inclined to depart from and overturn the CA's findings and conclusions in this case. cSaATC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 27-35. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales, concurring.
2. Id. at 37-38.
3. Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010, 626 SCRA 48, 54; citation omitted.