Lodovice y Gerona v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 256508. November 23, 2021.]

BENJIE LODOVICE y GERONA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 23, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 256508 — BENJIE LODOVICE y GERONA,petitioner,versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

Upon an exhaustive review of the instant case, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari (Petition) and AFFIRMS the Decision 1 dated October 9, 2020 (assailed Decision) and Resolution 2 dated March 23, 2021 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41729 which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated April 20, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98 of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-12351-CR, convicting petitioner Benjie Lodovice y Gerona (Lodovice) with violation of Section 28 (a) in relation to 28 (e), Article V of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10591, 5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act." The sentence is, however, MODIFIED to the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

Lodovice presents the following issues for resolution of the Court: (1) whether there was valid warrantless arrest; (2) whether there was valid warrantless seizure of the subject firearm; and (3) whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense charged. 6

The Petition must be denied.

Lodovice assails the legality of his supposed warrantless arrest as well as the warrantless search and seizure of the subject firearm from his person. However, as found by the courts a quo and supported by the records, Lodovice was not arrested nor was the subject firearm searched and then seized from his person. Rather, he voluntarily surrendered his person and said firearm.

Specifically, the events unfolded in this manner: The police authorities responded to a report of a shooting incident. Upon their arrival at the reported crime scene, private complainants told them that Lodovice was the assailant. Hence, the police officers tracked Lodovice's whereabouts with the assistance of barangay officials. They found him at his home, talked to him and his relatives, and was successful in persuading him to surrender, after which he "voluntarily surrendered together with the firearm [containing one live ammunition which] he used to shoot [at] the complainants." 7

From these established facts, no arrest was made. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. 8 It is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 9 On the other hand, voluntary surrender means that the offender yielded or surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent, without having been actually arrested, and that the surrender was voluntary. 10 Arrest and voluntary surrender are both modes of placing a person in the custody of law 11 but, based on the foregoing, they differ in that the latter requires voluntariness, which is absent in arrest.

In People v. Marcos12(Marcos), the voluntary surrender was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance where the accused "voluntarily and unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the authorities" who had responded to a report that he had hacked the victim, thus:

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present: (a) that the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary. The circumstances of the surrender must show that it was made spontaneously and in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.

In the case at bar, appellant testified that he did not resist when the police brought him to the police station but instead voluntarily and unconditionally placed himself at the disposal of the authorities. The fact that appellant voluntarily surrendered is further buttressed by the certification issued by the police to that effect. This was never refuted by the prosecution. In one case, it was held that where the accused testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police and the prosecution did not dispute such claim, then the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor. 13 CAIHTE

Similar to Marcos, Lodovice voluntarily placed himself at the disposal of the authorities who responded to private complainants' reports anent a shooting incident, after said authorities and barangay officials convinced him, in the presence of his relatives, to surrender.

There being no arrest but only voluntary surrender, the conditions for lawful warrantless arrests under Section 5, 14 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court need not obtain.

Thus, too, as the subject firearm was voluntarily yielded to the authorities, without Lodovice's person having been priorly searched, there is no occasion to invoke the requisites for warrantless reasonable searches and seizures. As the CA correctly appreciated, the seizure's validity is not anchored on the exception of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. 15 Additionally, as held in Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 16 voluntary surrender of a firearm to the police amounts to a waiver of one's right against illegal search and seizure. 17

In any case, assuming that Lodovice's submission to the custody of the police authorities can be considered an arrest, the same was a lawful warrantless inflagrante delicto arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 which requires two elements: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 18 Here, Lodovice was in possession of the subject firearm without a license therefor in the presence of the arresting officers when he was brought into custody. The Court quotes with approval the findings of the CA to this effect:

x x x At this point, it is well to emphasize that the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law, and in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of [the] subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it, and its corpus delicti is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. The accused-appellant in this case was arrested inflagrante delicto for being in possession of an unregistered firearm. 19

Finally, the prosecution was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, Lodovice's guilt for the offense charged — violation of Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) of R.A. 10591, which provides:

SEC. 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. — The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows: aScITE

(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;

xxx xxx xxx

(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this section shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any or combination of the following conditions:

(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;

xxx xxx xxx

The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms are: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. 20

Here, records show that Lodovice surrendered himself and the subject firearm to the police authorities or, otherwise, was caught inflagrante delicto in possession of said article. A Certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National Headquarters to the effect that he is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber per verification from the PNP records. 21 Moreover, the offense is qualified by the fact that the subject firearm was loaded with one 12-gauge shotgun live ammunition.

All told, Lodovice's conviction for the crime charged must be upheld as the findings of the courts a quo are supported by the evidence on record and the applicable law.

However, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The penalty for violation of Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) of R.A. 10591 is one degree higher than prision mayor in its medium period, hence prision mayor in its maximum period. As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be appreciated. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 22 the Court modifies the sentence imposed by the courts a quo23 to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the assailed Decision dated October 9, 2020 and assailed Resolution dated March 23, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41729, finding petitioner Benjie Lodovice y Gerona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 28 (a) and (e), Article V of Republic Act No. 10591. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J.,on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 33-44. Penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.

2.Id. at 46-47.

3. Second Division and Former Second Division, respectively.

4.Rollo, pp. 66-73. Penned by Presiding Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang, MNSA.

5. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, May 29, 2013.

6.Seerollo, pp. 15-16.

7.Id. at 40.

8. REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 113, Sec. 1.

9.Id., Sec. 2.

10.See People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 132392, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 537, 544.

11.Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, August 28, 1995, 247 SCRA 741, 750.

12.Supra note 10.

13.Id. at 544.

14. SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

15.Rollo, p. 40.

16. G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402.

17.Id. at 420.

18.Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017, 826 SCRA 382, 400.

19.Rollo, pp. 41-42.

20.Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015, 754 SCRA 98, 106.

21.Rollo, p. 72.

22.Act No. 4103.

23.Fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years, 2 months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (rollo, p. 83).