THIRD DIVISION
[OCA IPI No. 16-4633-RTJ. April 4, 2018.]
ENRIQUE G. LOCSIN, complainant,vs. PRESIDING JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS-CORPUZ, BRANCH 160, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 205, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MUNTINLUPA CITY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 4, 2018, which reads as follows:
"OCA IPI No. 16-4633-RTJ (Enrique G. Locsin v. Presiding Judge Amelia A. Fabros-Corpuz, Branch 160, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Branch 205, Regional Trial Court, Muntinlupa City) — The Court NOTES the Report dated January 26, 2018 of the Office of the Court Administrator on the administrative complaint against Hon. Amelia A. Fabros-Corpuz, Presiding Judge, Branch 160, RTC, Pasig City, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Branch 205, RTC, Muntinlupa City, for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Order, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct, and Grave Abuse of Discretion, relative to Criminal Case No. 05-1091, entitled People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Dela Paz, for Theft.
The present verified Affidavit-Complaint dated October 24, 2016, filed by Enrique G. Locsin (complainant), charges Judge Amelia A. Fabros-Corpuz (Judge Fabros-Corpuz), the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 160, for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated April 27, 2016 1 and August 18, 2016, 2 in the criminal case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Dela Paz," docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-1091, charging Aurelio Dela Paz (Dela Paz) of qualified theft. The assailed orders were issued by Judge Fabros-Corpuz in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205. The orders denied the Omnibus Motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by complainant praying for the (1) voiding of Dela Paz's bail; (2) issuance of warrant of arrest on Dela Paz; (3) issuance of a hold departure order; and (4) revocation of Dela Paz's permission to travel.
The Antecedent
On the basis of a complaint initiated by herein complainant, an Information for qualified theft was filed against Dela Paz that was raffled to the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206. After a review, the presiding judge of Branch 206, Judge Patria Manalastas-De Leon (Judge Manalastas-De Leon), determined that Dela Paz should only be charged of simple theft. 3 Accordingly, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City amended the information and filed an information for simple theft. However, complainant vehemently objected to the said order. After complainant filed a motion for inhibition on December 2, 2005, Judge Manalastas-De Leon inhibited from the case. Complainant also filed an administrative case against Judge De Leon docketed as Administrative Matter OCA-IPI No. 05-2404, which case was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution dated June 28, 2006.
The case was then re-raffled to the sala of Judge Norma Perello (Judge Perello) of Branch 276. After Judge Perello denied complainant's motion for inhibition, complainant filed an administrative case against the former, which case was likewise dismissed.
After Judge Perello's retirement, she was replaced by Judge Antonietta Medina (Judge Medina), who denied complainant's motion to amend the information to qualified theft. Again, complainant moved to inhibit Judge Medina from hearing the case, which Judge Medina granted in an Order dated January 20, 2015.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to Judge Juanita T. Guerrero (Judge Guerrero) of Branch 204, who voluntarily recused herself from hearing the case on the ground that she had established familiarity with the counsel of Dela Paz.
The case was then re-raffled to Branch 205, handled by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Bunyi-Medina), who ordered the amendment of the information from simple theft to qualified theft.
When Dela Paz was granted to post bail and permitted to travel abroad, the private prosecutor, on November 9, 2015, filed an Omnibus Motion 4 praying for the Court to do the following:
1. declare void Dela Paz's bail;
2. issue a warrant of arrest against Dela Paz;
3. issue a Hold Departure Order on Dela Paz; and
4. revoke Dela Paz's permit to travel.
Pending resolution of the omnibus motion, Judge Amelia A. Fabros-Corpuz (Judge Fabros-Corpuz), herein respondent, replaced Judge Bunyi-Medina.
On April 27, 2016, Judge Fabros-Corpuz issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the omnibus motion. Aggrieved, complainant moved for reconsideration, but it was also denied in an Order dated August 18, 2016.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the present complaint assailing the actions of Judge Fabros-Corpuz for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion for issuing the orders dated April 27, 2016 and August 18, 2016.
By issuing the aforesaid orders, complainant argued that Judge Fabros-Corpuz was selective in the application of the law, thereby depriving him and the people of due process. According to complainant, Judge Fabros-Corpuz was unwilling to conduct her own judicial probe on the veracity of the prosecution's stance in its motions, which amounted to a veritable act of negligence and a violation of Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which states, "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to the law and justice." Instead of relying on the pronouncements of the previous judges who handled the case, complainant claimed that Judge Fabros-Corpuz should have made an independent determination on the issues raised in his omnibus motion and motion for reconsideration.
Complainant also added that Judge Fabros-Corpuz has undue bias in favor of Dela Paz. This bias became more evident when she contravened the prevailing guidelines and jurisprudence and allowed Dela Paz to travel abroad. Based on the aforesaid acts, complainant inferred that Judge Fabros-Corpuz would likely acquit Dela Paz for the crime charged.
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report dated January 26, 2018, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint should be dismissed for raising issues that were judicial in nature and for lack of merit. The OCA opined that the administrative charges against Judge Fabros-Corpuz were anchored on the performance of the latter's judicial functions, which involved the determination of the judiciousness of the assailed orders, which was beyond its authority because it involved the calibration of facts and evidence and the interpretation of law, which undeniably belonged to the regular courts.
The OCA further explained that it was unnecessary and premature to determine the liability of Judge Fabros-Corpuz, if any. It noted that complainant did not avail of any judicial recourse under the Rules of Court to challenge the said orders.
As regards complainant's allegation that Judge Fabros-Corpuz castigated and humiliated complainant's private counsel in open court, the OCA determined that the same was not established by substantial evidence. Neither did complainant execute an affidavit to prove his allegations nor attach to the complaint the transcript of stenographic notes of the purported actions of Judge Fabros-Corpuz during open court.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Time and time again, the Court has reiterated the principle that while it has supervision over all courts and court personnel, it cannot, in exercising its supervisory powers in administrative proceedings, disturb the judges' evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case and the interpretation of applicable laws, unless the actions of the latter are administratively actionable. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies. 5 Even if the judge committed an error in the performance of his duties, such error does not render him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or had deliberate intent to do an injustice. 6
In the case at bench, complainant challenged the orders of Judge Fabros-Corpuz dated April 27, 2016 and August 18, 2016 denying his omnibus motion and motion for reconsideration. Clearly, these orders were issued by Judge Fabros-Corpuz in the exercise of her judicial function, thus, not subject to disciplinary action.
As aptly pointed in the OCA Report:
More significantly, at this point, it is unnecessary and even premature to dwell on whether respondent Judge Fabros-Corpuz can be administratively sanctioned for issuing the Orders dated 27 April 2016, 18 August 2015 and 29 November 2016. Evidently, complainant Locsin did not avail of any judicial recourse under the Rules of Court to challenge said orders, such as filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to determine whether the assailed orders of respondent Judge Fabros-Corpuz are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It bears stressing that it is only after these judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality that the door to an inquiry into a judge's criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. The rationale for this is that if subsequent developments prove the respondent judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him after all. As held in Del Mar-Schuchman vs. Cacatian:
If complainant felt prejudiced by the orders issued by respondent judge, the proper recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and correction. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. x x x
It is for these reasons that the Court has invariably ruled that the errors attributed to judges pertaining to the exercise of their adjudicative functions should be assailed in a judicial proceeding instead of through an administrative complaint. Thus, until and unless there is an authoritative pronouncement that the questioned orders were tainted with regularity, there would be no ground to prosecute respondent Judge Fabros-Corpuz, either administratively or criminally. 7
Assuming arguendo that the assailed orders were incorrect, still, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy to question the same. As this Court has repeatedly ruled, litigants must first exhaust judicial remedies before they resort to the administrative functions of this Court. 8 Litigants cannot, in an attempt to challenge a ruling, file frivolous administrative complaints that involve the calibration of facts and evidence and the interpretation of the law — the review of findings of fact and law is beyond the province of an administrative complaint.
One final note. The Court observes that complainant has a penchant for filing administrative cases against the judges who rendered adverse rulings in the criminal case from where this administrative case is rooted. Indeed, while the Court exercises supervision over courts and court personnel, "it will not hesitate to reject unfounded and baseless suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice." 9
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 22-25.
2.Id. at 18-21.
3.Id. at 26-28.
4.Rollo, pp. 121-144.
5.Cruz v. Judge Iturralde, 450 Phil. 77, 85 (2003).
6.Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, Jr., 664 Phil. 1, 8-9 (2011), citing Balsamo v. Judge Suan, 458 Phil. 11 (2003).
7.Rollo, pp. 336-337.
8. See Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, Jr., supra note 6 at 13.
9.Rollo, p. 337.