Locsin v. Austria

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 225042. * October 6, 2021.]

ANDREA B. LOCSIN, AS SUBSTITUTED BY ROSALINA B. LORILLA, petitioner,vs. RAYMUND J. AUSTRIA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court's First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 225042(Andrea B. Locsin, as substituted by Rosalina B. Lorilla, petitioner v. Raymund J. Austria, respondent).

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the January 13, 2016 Decision 2 and June 9, 2016 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101731. 4 In the assailed decision and resolution, the CA overturned the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 195 (RTC), and dismissed the complaint for specific performance to accept payment and return the owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) subject of a deed of real estate mortgage filed by Andrea B. Locsin (Andrea), as substituted by petitioner Rosalina B. Lorilla (Rosalina), against respondent Raymund Austria (Raymund).

Antecedents

To secure her loan in the amount of P215,000.00, Andrea executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (REM)5 in favor of Raymund on August 18, 2006, over a parcel of land she owned in Parañaque City (subject property) registered under TCT No. 117914. In the said document, it was stated that Andrea's loan was payable within a period of one (1) year from the date of the instrument with a monthly interest of five percent (5%). Andrea also undertook to pay the stipulated interest on a monthly basis, starting August 31, 2006 to August 31, 2007, and that the delinquent interest shall be subject to a penalty of one percent (1%) of the principal loan obligation per month. 6 Further, the REM provided that if the mortgagor fails to pay the principal loan within the one (1) year period or fails to pay the monthly interest for a total of three (3) months either consecutive or accumulated within the one (1) year period of the loan, the mortgagee can extrajudicially foreclose the subject property before a notary public or sheriff of Parañaque City. 7

On January 15, 2007, Raymund sent a Letter 8 to Andrea, informing her that her loan obligation was under past due status for failing to pay the monthly amortization since she availed of the loan facility. Thus, Raymund demanded that Andrea pay the total amount of P309,000.00, which covers the principal loan, the interest, and the penalty.

In another Letter 9 dated March 15, 2007, Raymund advised Andrea that her account was still under past due status for her continued failure to pay the monthly amortizations. In the same letter, Raymund informed Andrea that the latter's current balance was now P335,400.00, and gave her 15 days to pay the same in full.

On May 23, 2007, Andrea and Raymund executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 10 wherein the former sold to the latter the subject property for and in consideration of the sum of P915,000.00. Andrea, nevertheless, remained in possession of the subject property and Raymund did not annotate the deed of sale on TCT No. 117914 with the Register of Deeds.

On June 25, 2007, Andrea, through a lawyer, wrote a Letter 11 to Raymund telling the latter that she attempted to pay her obligation inclusive of interest but he had refused to accept her payment. Thus, formal demand was made for Raymund to accept Andrea's payment and to surrender TCT No. 117914; otherwise, Andrea shall consign her payment in court.

Andrea, through another lawyer, sent anew a Letter 12 dated July 6, 2007 to Raymund. In the said letter, Andrea's lawyer explained that in May 2007, Andrea signified to Raymund her readiness to pay in full the loan obligation including the stipulated interest, and asked for the return of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 117914. However, despite Andrea's willingness to pay and repeated efforts to communicate the same to Raymund, the latter continued to refuse to accept the payment and to return the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 117914. Accordingly, Andrea, through her lawyer, demanded Raymund to accept the payment and to return the aforesaid certificate of title; otherwise, Andrea shall be constrained to institute the necessary civil and/or criminal action.

Despite the foregoing, no favorable response was received by Andrea. Hence, the filing of the Complaint for Specific Performance 13 against Raymund, praying that Andrea be allowed to consign the amount of P344,000.00 representing payment of her entire obligation to Raymund under the REM, and that judgment be rendered ordering Raymund to accept the payment and to return to Andrea's possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 117914.

In his Answer, 14 Raymund basically averred that Andrea had already defaulted in the payment of her loan obligation and that she had been informed thereof during the early months of the year 2007. Subsequently, the parties entered into a sale transaction over the subject property which secured the loan through the execution of a deed of absolute sale duly notarized on May 23, 2007, by one Atty. Bonifacio G. Bacani, 15 which he attached in his answer as Annex "3." With the execution of the deed of sale, Raymund claimed that the case against him should not prosper as Andrea had effectively sold, conveyed and transferred the rights, title, and interest over the subject property in his favor.

In an Order 16 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC allowed Andrea to consign the amount of P344,000.00.

On September 25, 2007, Andrea passed away. Consequently, in the RTC Order dated February 19, 2008, Rosalina was allowed to substitute for Andrea as plaintiff in the case. 17

On November 6, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering defendant to:

1. Accept the amount of [Php344,000.00], in full payment of plaintiff's obligation to him, that was consigned to this court; and

2. Return to Rosalina B. Lorilla, who substituted as party plaintiff upon the death of plaintiff on September 25, 2007, the TCT No. 117914, covering the subject property.

SO ORDERED. 19

In arriving at the aforementioned ruling, the RTC noted that the REM stated that Andrea's loan shall be payable within one (1) year from the date of its execution. Since the REM was executed on August 18, 2006, the RTC stressed that the one year period should have ended on August 18, 2007. Considering that Andrea's offer to pay in the early part of year 2007, and her filing of the case on July 20, 2007, were made before the end of the one year period, the RTC found no valid reason for Raymund not to accept the same and to return the owner's copy of TCT No. 117914. As regards Raymund's defense that Andrea had already sold the subject property to him, the RTC did not give credence to such claim. It opined that the execution of the deed of sale does not necessarily mean that it pushed through or that it was consummated. In this case, the RTC held that Raymund failed to present clear and concrete evidence that he had already paid Andrea the purchase price of P915,000.00. 20

Aggrieved, Raymund appealed the RTC decision before the CA.

On January 13, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, 21 reversing the RTC decision and dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0220 dated November 6, 2013 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint. Accordingly, the RTC is ORDERED to release to plaintiff-appellee Rosalina B. Lorilla the consigned amount of [P]344,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 22

In overturning the decision of the RTC, the CA underscored the requirements in consignation that the debt must already be due and that the refusal to accept payment is not justified. In this case, the CA pointed out that Andrea's obligation was payable from August 31, 2006 to August 31, 2007. Thus, when Andrea filed the complaint on July 20, 2007, and the motion for leave to allow consignation of payment on August 7, 2007, the same were made before the stipulated period of maturity of the obligation. Accordingly, the CA ruled that Raymund could not be compelled to receive the amount of P344,000.00 as full settlement of Andrea's loan because her obligation was not yet due and demandable when she filed the complaint and the motion for consignation. To support its position, the CA highlighted the ruling in Sarmiento v. Javellana23 and Nicolas v. Matias24 that when a period is designated for the performance or fulfillment of an obligation, it is presumed to have been established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor as provided under Article 1128 (now Article 1196) of the Civil Code. Consequently, the creditor cannot demand the performance of the obligation before the expiration of the designated period; neither can the debtor perform the obligation before the expiration of such period. The CA also held that Raymund was justified in refusing to accept payment for additional reasons, to wit: the amount of P344,000.00 does not represent the full amount that Andrea must pay to release and discharge the subject property from the REM; and Andrea had already executed the deed of sale over the subject property in favor of Raymund. 25

Rosalina moved for reconsideration of the CA decision but the same was denied in the June 9, 2016 Resolution. 26 Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Essentially, the issue in this case is whether the CA erred in ruling that there was no valid consignation made by Andrea and that Raymund may not be compelled to accept payment and to return the owner's copy of TCT No. 117914.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Andrea's complaint for specific performance is closely intertwined with her consignation of the amount of P344,000.00 as full payment of her entire obligation to Raymund under the REM. If Andrea's consignation is found to be warranted and valid, then the same would effectively discharge and release the subject property from the REM and Raymund must surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 117914 to Rosalina who substituted for the deceased Andrea as plaintiff in the complaint. Thus, it is important to determine in this case whether the consignation made by Andrea is warranted and valid in the light of the facts of this case as well as of the law, jurisprudence, and the stipulations agreed upon in the REM.

Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment, and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. 27 In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must show that: (1) there was a debt due; (2) the consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due or because the title to the obligation has been lost; (3) previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of the obligation; (4) the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) after the consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof. Failure in any of these requirements is enough ground to render a consignation ineffective. 28

In this case, the Court finds that the first requisite in a valid consignation is absent.

Foremost, and to put things into proper perspective, the Court finds it important to emphasize that the CA erred in ruling that Andrea's debt had not yet become due and demandable at the time of the filing of the complaint for specific performance on July 20, 2007, or consignation on August 7, 2007, respectively. The CA noticeably overlooked the fact that as early as January 15, 2007, Raymund had already sent a letter to Andrea demanding full payment of the outstanding loan together with the unpaid and past due monthly interest, after Andrea failed to pay the monthly amortizations from the time she availed of the loan facility in August 2006 or for more than three (3) consecutive months. He also wrote another letter dated March 15, 2007, demanding payment of Andrea's current loan on the same ground that she failed to pay the monthly amortizations from the time of the effectivity of the contract. It is worthy to note that in writing the aforesaid demand letters, Raymund, as a mortgagee, was exercising his right under the REM which stipulates an acceleration clause that "if the [m]ortgagor fails to pay the monthly interest for a total of three (3) months either consecutive or accumulated within one (1) year period of the loan, the [m]ortgagor hereby agrees that the [m]ortgagee can enforce her rights [in the REM]." In effect, by demanding payment of the outstanding balance of Andrea's loan, Raymund had taken the position that the entire loan obligation had become due and demandable. Concomitantly, there was no point for the CA in discussing and applying in this case the rules anent the payment of an obligation before its maturity or before it becomes due.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the first requisite for a valid consignation is still wanting in this case, for the simple reason that there was no existing debt at the time of the filing of the complaint and motion for consignation. It may be recalled that on May 23, 2007, or subsequent to the sending of demand letters after the loan obligation became due, Andrea and Raymund executed another and separate contract, the deed of sale, wherein the former sold to the latter the subject property for and in consideration of the sum of P915,000.00. As explained by Raymund, Andrea could no longer pay her debt, 29 thus, she sold the subject property so that she would be relieved from paying her obligation as evidenced by the deed of sale. 30 Otherwise stated, Raymund and Andrea had actually entered into a dación en pago transaction. In dación en pago, property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money. 31Dación en pago or dation in payment is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. 32 It is a mode of extinguishing an existing obligation 33 and partakes in the nature of sale as the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be charged against the debtor's debt. 34 As a mode of payment, dación en pago extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement — express or implied, or by their silence — consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation[;] in which case the obligation is totally extinguished. 35 In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dación en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. 36

Consequently, as it stood at the time of the filing of the complaint and the motion for consignation, there was no existing debt anymore to be paid. The fact is that the loan obligation had been settled already when Andrea and Raymund entered into a dación en pago transaction through the execution of a separate contract, which is the deed of sale. On this point, it is not far-fetched to say that Andrea was deemed to have exercised her rights as owner of the subject property in selling the same at a higher price of P915,000.00 and offset her loan obligation which is of lesser amount. In the same vein, the execution of the deed of sale supervened and novated the agreements contained in the REM. Thus, there is no point for Andrea, as substituted by Rosalina, to insist on the provisions in the REM anent the payment of the loan and release of the subject property from the mortgage or the return of TCT No. 117914. Therefore, as correctly ruled by the CA, Raymund was justified in refusing to accept the consigned amount and to surrender return TCT No. 117914 on account of the existence of the deed of sale.

In connection with the above discussion, the Court finds it necessary to address two issues surrounding the aforementioned deed of sale.

First. The Court disagrees with the RTC that the said document has no bearing in this case, reasoning that Raymund was not able to prove that he had paid the purchase price so as to give credence to the claim that Andrea had sold the property to him.

It must first be clarified that failure to pay the purchase price can only amount to a breach of obligation with rescission as the proper remedy; it results in a right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract. 37 Hence, failure to pay the purchase price alone can never be a ground to question the validity of a contract of sale. However, if the failure to pay the purchase price is proven to support that the contract lacks a consideration, i.e., simulated price, then the same prevents the existence of a valid contract. Such situation obtains when the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid. 38

Now, in the subject deed of sale, Andrea had categorically acknowledged the receipt of the full payment of the consideration, to wit:

WHEREAS, for and in consideration of the sum of Nine H[u]ndred Fifteen Thou[sand] ([P]915,000.00), Philippine currency, receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledge by the VENDORS (sic) to their full and complete satisfaction, the VENDORS (sic) hereby SELL, TRANSFER AND CONVEY in a manner absolute and irrevocable unto the VENDEE, her heirs, successors and assigns, the above-described property, together with all the improvements thereon. 39

Remarkably, Andrea never raised in her pleadings before the RTC the issue on whether the stated-as-paid purchase price was actually paid by Raymund; or any other issue, for that matter, that affected the validity of or altered the terms of the written agreement. Apropos thereto, Section 9 (now Sec. 10) of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the rule as regard written agreements, thus:

SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphases supplied)

The above provision is referred to as the "parol evidence rule" which forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which, to all purposes, would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. 40

Pursuant to the above rule, since Andrea never put in issue in her pleadings before the RTC any of the exceptions enumerated above, her acknowledgment in the deed of sale that she had received the full payment of the consideration should be taken on its face value. As it is, it was erroneous for the trial court to touch on the issue of payment of the stated-as-paid purchase price and, in effect, to conclude that there was no valid and consummated sale. More so that Andrea never presented an unobjected evidence — to the effect that the purchase price stated as paid in the deed of sale had, in fact, never been paid — so as to say that Raymund had waived the protection of the parol evidence rule and for the RTC to consider such evidence. The general rule should stand. The agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties, and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement between the parties and their successors in interest. 41 Further, a contract is the law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so long as it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Otherwise, courts would be interfering with the freedom of contract of the parties. Simply put, courts cannot stipulate for the parties or amend the latter's agreement, for to do so would be to alter the real intention of the contracting parties when the contrary function of courts is to give force and effect to the intention of the parties. 42

Second. The genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale is deemed admitted in this case. Relatedly, the Court also cannot entertain Rosalina's argument in the present petition that the subject deed of sale is in the nature of an equitable mortgage.

Pertinent to the present case is the rule on contesting an actionable document found in Sec. 8, 43 Rule 8, of the Rules of Court which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.

Here, it is noteworthy that Andrea failed to specifically deny under oath the due genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale and to set forth in her pleadings what she claimed to be the facts.

To recall, Andrea's cause of action is anchored on the alleged unjust refusal of Raymund to accept her payment of the loan obligation secured by the REM and to return TCT No. 117914. Likewise, the consignation she made in the amount of P344,000.00, was for the purpose of paying the obligation secured by the REM. Andrea's complaint never made mention of the deed of sale. It was Raymund who mentioned the existence of the deed of sale when he set forth the substance of the said actionable document and attached a copy thereof in his answer to the complaint. Andrea, on the other hand, did not file a reply, much less a verified one, to deny such new matter. Clearly, the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale were deemed admitted by Andrea under the parameters of Sec. 8, Rule 8, of the Rules. Rosalina, therefore, cannot anymore deny the due execution of the deed of sale during trial or on appeal by saying that she, as one of witnesses to the instrument, did not sign the same. To this, case law enlightens that "[t]he admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized." 44

Likewise, Rosalina cannot now argue before the Court that the subject deed of sale is in the nature of an equitable mortgage. As mentioned, Andrea's cause of action concerns the REM and not the deed of sale. Her case theory is straightforward in that her obligation which was secured by the REM over the subject property had already become due and that her payment was unjustly refused by Raymund. She never pointed out in her complaint that there was an existing deed of sale covering the subject property. While she ineffectively denied due execution thereof, she never argued that the said document was in the nature of an equitable mortgage. It is only in the present petition that Rosalina, who substituted for Andrea as complainant, profusely discusses the argument that the deed of sale is one of an equitable mortgage; even attaching evidence for the first time in this petition. Indeed, Rosalina is advancing a new theory involving a separate contract, the deed of sale, and invoking a new cause of action, to declare said deed as an equitable mortgage. Certainly, Rosalina cannot do that. For the Court to rule on said issue now would be unfair on the part of Raymund who was not given an opportunity to present further evidence and to defend his case before the trial court with regard to the new issue. Basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process dictate that arguments, issues, points of law, and theories not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 45 To allow a litigant to raise an issue at a later stage would result in the violation of the adverse party's right to due process who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which he could have defended had he been aware of such theory at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 46

The Court is mindful that there are exceptions to the rule that no issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. In Del Rosario v. Bonga, 47 the Court explained that there are instances that issues raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained, viz.:

Indeed, there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy. 48

Notably, none of the abovementioned exceptions is present in this case.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that the deed of sale is not in the nature of an equitable mortgage. The Court simply refuses to rule on the said issue for the reasons discussed herein. Apparently, the parties are not prohibited from raising the said matter in another proceeding for the ultimate purpose of determining the true nature of the deed of sale.

In sum, the Court upholds the ruling of the CA that, in view of the existence of the deed of sale covering the subject property executed by Andrea in favor of Raymund on May 23, 2007, the latter cannot be compelled to accept the consigned payment or to return the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 117914. Accordingly, the present appeal must be denied and the dismissal of the complaint for specific performance must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The January 13, 2016 Decision and June 9, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101731 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.

1.Rollo, pp. 3-18.

2.Id. at 21-29; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla with Justices Normandie B. Pizzaro and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of the Court), concurring.

3.Id. at 30-32.

4. Entitled "Andrea B. Locsin, as substituted by Rosalina B. Lorilla v. Raymund J. Austria."

5.Rollo, pp. 35-37.

6.Id. at 36.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 38.

9.Id. at 39.

10.Id. at 40-42.

11.Id. at 43-44.

12.Id. at 45-46.

13.Id. at 47-51.

14.Id. at 61-65.

15.Id. at 63.

16.Id. at 60.

17.Id. at 70.

18.Id. at 69-73; penned by Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal.

19.Id. at 73.

20.Id. at 72-73.

21.Id. at 21-29.

22.Id. at 29.

23. 43 Phil. 880 (1922).

24. 89 Phil. 126 (1951).

25.Rollo, pp. 25-29.

26.Id. at 30-32.

27.Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank v. Diaz, 526 Phil. 222, 234 (2006).

28. See Soco v. Militante, 208 Phil. 151, 160 (1983), citing Ponce de Leon v. Santiago Syjuco, Inc., 90 Phil. 311, 317-318 (1951); Civil Code of the Philippines, Articles 1256-1258.

29.Rollo, p. 71.

30.Id. at 81 and 102.

31.Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. v. Social Security System, 829 Phil. 341, 357 (2018).

32.Aquintey v. Sps. Tibong, 540 Phil. 422, 446 (2006), citing Vda. de Jayme v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 192, 210 (2002).

33.Dao Heng Bank, Inc. v. Spouses Laigo, 592 Phil. 172, 181 (2008).

34.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 565 Phil. 588, 596 (2007).

35.Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. v. Social Security System, supra note 31.

36.Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Philippine Acetylene, Co., Inc., 197 Phil. 394, 403 (1982).

37. See San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Huang, 391 Phil. 636, 645 (2000), citing Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 308 Phil. 624 (1994).

38. See Spouses Lequin v. Spouses Vizconde, 618 Phil. 409, 426 (2009).

39.Rollo, p. 41.

40.Norton Resources and Development Corp. v. All Asia Bank Corp., 620 Phil. 381 (2009).

41.Id. at 391, citing Gamboa, Rodriguez, Rivera & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil. 399, 406 (2005).

42.Id. at 391-392, citing Heirs of San Andres v. Rodriguez, 388 Phil. 571, 586 (2000).

43.Section 8.How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

44.Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 762 Phil. 89, 99 (2015), citing Permanent Savings & Loan Bank v. Velarde, 482 Phil. 193, 202-203 (2004).

45.Fernandez v. Amagna, 617 Phil. 121, 134 (2009).

46.Id. at 135.

47. 402 Phil. 949 (2001).

48.Id. at 960.