THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232809. June 30, 2021.]
LILIOSA A. LISBOS AND PRIMA C. LATRAS, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES ARNULFO AND REMEDIOS CELESTE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 30, 2021, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 232809 (LILIOSA A. LISBOS and PRIMA C. LATRAS, petitioners, v. SPOUSES ARNULFO and REMEDIOS CELESTE, respondents.) — This Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, only questions of law should be raised in Rule 45 petitions.
For this Court's resolution is a Petition challenging the Court of Appeals Decision 1 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision 2 declaring Spouses Arnulfo and Remedios Celeste (Spouses Celeste) as the rightful owners and possessors of a disputed parcel of land.
On March 8, 2000, Spouses Celeste filed a Complaint 3 for recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and attorney's fees against Spouses Liliosa and Severo Lisbos (Spouses Lisbos), and Spouses Rufino and Prima Latras (Spouses Latras). Spouses Celeste claimed to be the registered owners of an 84,083m2 parcel of land located at Canaway, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, 4 as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-8780. 5 Moreover, they alleged that the two couples occupied and cultivated a total area of one and a half hectares of their property without permission. 6
Spouses Celeste then demanded that Spouses Lisbos and Latras vacate the lot. When they refused to do so, Spouses Celeste lodged a complaint with the Barangay Captain sometime in 1986. 7
There were several attempts at settlement between the parties, but no amicable settlement was reached. The Lupon ng Tagapamayapa eventually issued a Certificate to File Action sometime in 1999. 8
Trial commenced, and the Regional Trial Court 9 eventually ruled that Spouses Celeste proved with preponderance of evidence their ownership of the disputed land. 10 In contrast, the Regional Trial Court found the testimony of Spouses Lisbos and Spouses Latras regarding their possession of the property to be "vague and unconvincing," 11 since they failed to explain how they came to possess the parcel of land. 12
The dispositive of the Regional Trial Court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court ruled:
A. That plaintiffs are the declared owners of the disputed parcel of land described under paragraph 4 of the complaint;
B. That defendants are hereby ordered to peacefully vacate and surrender possession of the disputed land, consisting of one and one-half (1 1/2) hectares, described in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
C. To pay the plaintiff the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), as actual damages, representing the produce of the agricultural land;
D. To pay TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00), as litigation expenses;
E. To pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), as attorney's fees;
All other counterclaims of defendants are hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Spouses Lisbos and Spouses Latras appealed the Regional Trial Court Decision with the Court of Appeals, but their appeal was denied, 14 while the Regional Trial Court Decision was affirmed with modification.
The Court of Appeals declared that Spouses Lisbos and Spouses Latras raised for the first time on appeal, the issue of the absence of a government geodetic survey to attest to the metes and bounds of the subject lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-8780. 15 Appeals stated:
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the above-arguments submitted by appellants are being raised for the first time on appeal. Considering that the appellants alleged that it is doubtful that the disputed property fell within the technical metes and bound encompassed in OCT No. P-8780 due to the absence of a "government geodetic survey," the latter should have remedied and settled this matter during trial by themselves commissioning a government geodetic engineer to survey the disputed property in order to substantiate this claim.
Stated otherwise, the appellants, at this juncture of the proceedings cannot simply be allowed to claim that the lot occupied by them is doubtfully included within the appellants' title without having presented any evidence to support the same. It must be recalled that while it is a legal truism that the plaintiff in a civil case bears the burden of proof to establish his case, in the course of trial, however, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. 16
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The 11 September 2014 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Cabadbaran City, in Civil Case No. 2000-05 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: That the awards of actual damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses are hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis in the original)
In their Petition, 18 petitioners continue to assert that respondents failed to prove their claim by preponderance of evidence, since the sketch map they submitted was self-serving. Further, they point out that respondents did not submit a survey plan prepared by a government geodetic engineer; thus, respondents failed to substantiate their claim that the one and a half hectares being tilled by petitioners was part of the property covered by their certificate of title. 19
Petitioners also contend that in their tax declarations, their property is bounded on the south by the property owned by Felix Ansay, the previous owner of the property petitioners allegedly bought. Petitioners state that this supports their argument that their property is adjacent to respondents', and that it does not form part of respondents' property. 20
Finally, petitioners deny that they only raised for the first time on appeal the issue of whether or not the property they are tilling is covered by respondents' certificate of title, since they brought this up in their Memorandum before the Regional Trial Court. 21
In their Comment, 22 respondents maintain that the same factual matters petitioners raise had been threshed out before the trial court, and that petitioners failed to discredit the result of the Cadastral Survey, which proved that respondents' predecessor in interest owned and possessed the subject land. 23
Respondents also state that assuming they fraudulently included in their title the portion that petitioners allegedly purchased from Leona Ajoc, respondents' land title cannot be collaterally assailed by the "mere presentation of a tax declaration." 24 Respondents also stressed that petitioners never undertook to seek the cancellation of the portion of the property they supposedly bought. 25
This Court 26 directed petitioners to submit their reply, but they manifested 27 that they were waiving their right to file a reply and were adopting the arguments in their petition.
This Court resolves the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding respondents' ownership over the disputed parcel of land.
The Rules of Court categorically state that only questions of law and not questions of fact should be raised in a Rule 45 petition, 28 as this Court is not a trier of facts. Pascual v. Burgos29 defines a question of fact:
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. This review includes assessment of the "probative value of the evidence presented." There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. 30 (Citations omitted)
Factual findings of the appellate courts, when supported by substantial evidence, 31 are "conclusive[,] and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court."
Nonetheless, these rules recognized exceptions which are listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: 32
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. 33 (Citations omitted)
The appeal must fail.
Petitioners ask this Court to review the facts of the case, yet they failed to aver any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that only questions of law should be raised in a Rule 45 appeal.
Further, a review of the lower courts' Decisions convinces this Court that their factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, which is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 34
The Regional Trial Court found that respondents proved their claim of ownership with the required preponderance of evidence as they "clearly established the history of the ownership of the disputed portion of the real estate" 35 claimed by petitioners. Further, Original Certificate of Title No. P-8780 36 was issued to respondent Arnulfo Celeste on January 3, 1975; thus, the Regional Trial Court stated:
As a matter of law a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property including possession subject only to limits by law. 37 (Citation omitted)
The Court of Appeals then concurred with the trial court, echoing that respondents proved their claim with preponderance of evidence:
In this case, appellees presented a deed of sale dated [sic] executed by Felix Ansay in their favor dated 17 June 1973, and OCT No. P-8780 which was issued in their name on 3 January 1975 to support their claim of ownership and right to possession. In addition thereto, appellees presented Exhibit "N" and Exhibit "O-3", a sketch map of the property which clearly identified the 1 1/2-Hectare property in dispute as being encompassed in OCT No. P-8780. More importantly, in the face of the above key pieces of evidence vis-à-vis that [sic] presented by the appellants, the Court has no reason to deviate from the astute observation by the RTC, recalling the fundamental principle in the Torrens system of land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Relevantly, the issue of OCT No. P-8780 in appellees' name is the best proof of ownership of the disputed parcel of land. This reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been well-settled in our jurisdiction. 38 (Citations omitted)
Clearly, the assailed judgments are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2833)
By authority of the Court:
MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 19-27. The June 8, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03896-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A Camello and Rafael Antonio M. Santos of the Twenty-Second Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
2.Id. at 87-110. The September 11, 2014 Decision in Civil Case No. 2000-05 was penned by Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. of Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Cabadbaran City.
3.Id. at 28-33.
4.Id. at 87.
5.Id. at 28 and 34-36.
6.Id. at 87.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 29-30.
9.Id. at 87-110.
10.Id. at 104.
11.Id. at 107.
12.Id. at 109.
13.Id. at 109-110.
14.Id. at 19-27.
15.Id. at 23-24.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 26.
18.Id. at 3-15.
19.Id. at 10-11.
20.Id. at 11, 12.
21.Id. at 12.
22.Id. at 138-143.
23.Id. at 139-140.
24.Id. at 141.
25.Id. at 140.
26.Id. at 151-152.
27.Id. at 153-154.
28. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
29. 776 Phil. 167 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
30.Id. at 183.
31.Siasat v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 139, 145 (2002) [Per J. Pardo, First Division]; Tabaco v. Court of Appeals, 309 Phil. 442 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]; and Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 241 Phil. 776, 781 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
32. 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
33.Id. at 232.
34.Spouses Boyboy v. Yabut, 449 Phil. 664, 670 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
35.Rollo, p. 104.
36.Id. at 34, 36.
37.Id. at 107.
38.Id. at 24-25.