FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242646. June 30, 2021.]
LIPA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.TERESITA DIAZ SALAS, MA. CRISTINA SALAS, KARINA TERESA SALAS, & FABRICO CYRIL SALAS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 30, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 242646 (Lipa Agricultural Development Corporation, Petitioner,v. Teresita Diaz Salas, Ma. Cristina Salas, Karina Teresa Salas, & Fabrico Cyril Salas, Respondents.) — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 25 June 2018 and Resolution 3 dated 17 October 2018, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 109700, entitled Lipa Agricultural Development Corporation v. Teresita Diaz Salas, Ma. Cristina Salas, Karina Teresa Salas, and Fabrico Cyril Salas. The CA Decision and Resolution affirmed the Order 4 dated 05 July 2017 issued by Branch 85, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lipa City in a case for Specific Performance and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 2010-0008.
Antecedents
The late Augusto L. Salas, Jr. (Augusto) owned a parcel of land situated in Lipa City, Batangas, consisting of 148.4354 hectares, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2807. A portion of this lot, consisting of 31.7028 hectares, is further covered by TCT No. 67662. When Augusto died, his widow, respondent Teresita Diaz Salas (Teresita), and their children, respondents Ma. Cristina Salas, Karina Teresa Salas, and Fabrico Cyril Salas (respondents, collectively) inherited the property.
On 13 September 1996, Teresita, allegedly in her capacity as the court-appointed Administratrix of Augusto's estate, 5 entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 6 with petitioner Lipa Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO) for the sale of 1.5 hectares from the lot covered by TCT No. 67662 (subject property). The agreement, which purportedly bore the signatures of the other respondents, stated the consideration to be paid by LADECO for subject property at Php15,000,000.00, payable on installment.
After LADECO completed the required initial down payment, Teresita executed a Deed of Conditional Sale 7 on 13 December 1996. This time, however, the deed did not have the signatures of the other respondents. 8 She then allowed LADECO to take possession of the subject property. Soon after, LADECO was able to pay the balance of the purchase price, as well as the fees for the registration of the sale. Nonetheless, Teresita failed to execute the corresponding deed of absolute sale. LADECO later found out that portions of the subject property were encroached upon by lots sold by respondents to other individuals. 9 LADECO thus sent a demand letter to the respondents for them to comply with their obligation, but to no avail. Hence, LADECO filed the complaint for specific performance and damages against respondents in 08 January 2010. 10
While the case was pending, LADECO filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment claiming that respondents were in the process of disposing the subject property in fraud of LADECO. Without resolving the said motion, the RTC set the case for pre-trial. Subsequently, it issued an Order dated 06 April 2017, raising motu proprio the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It held that the settlement of Augusto's estate was necessary before the court could take cognizance of the present action. The RTC thus directed the parties to submit their respective position papers on the matter.
Ruling of the RTC
In an Order 11 dated 05 July 2017, the RTC denied the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. It held that a regular court cannot grant the reliefs prayed for by LADECO since it ultimately required the settlement of Augusto's estate, which should be done in a probate or intestate proceeding, not an ordinary civil action. 12 The RTC likewise stressed that the heirs of a deceased cannot sell a specific portion of the estate absent an appropriate partition, extra-judicial or otherwise. 13
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal.
Ruling of the CA
After due proceedings, the CA issued the now assailed Decision, affirming the dismissal of the complaint by the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The 05 July 2017 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Lipa City, is hereby AFFIRMED. 14
The CA elucidated that while LADECO's complaint may be construed as one incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus within the ambit of the RTC's general jurisdiction, a cursory reading of the allegations therein clearly showed that the same involved a property belonging to Augusto's estate. However, there was yet no proceeding for the settlement of Augusto's estate undertaken prior to the sale thereof. On this score, the CA thus echoed the RTC's findings that the sale of the subject property was not made in the proceedings for the settlement of Augusto's estate, and neither was it done with authorization from the probate court. 15 Instead, Teresita, who was Augusto's widow, merely filed an Action for Presumptive Death. 16
As the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 25 June 2018), 17 LADECO is now before Us through the present petition.
Issue
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of LADECO's complaint due to lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
Ruling of the Court
LADECO is adamant that the regular court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of its complaint, with the issue apparently not being a claim against the estate of Augusto, but merely the enforcement of its right flowing from its purchase of the subject property from the respondents. 18 Corollarily, LADECO points out that its cause of action is based on contractual rights, not successional rights, since it seeks to compel the respondents to: (1) execute the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale for its purchase of the subject property; (2) deliver the owner's copy of TCT No. 67662; (3) cause the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds for the issuance of a new certificate of title under LADECO's name; and (4) pay damages and attorney's fees. 19
The petition is granted.
The facts show that respondents,no clear proof to establish the
LADECO's complaint is based on its claim of ownership of a specific portion of a lot forming part of Augusto's estate. However, as uniformly found by the RTC and the CA, when Teresita executed the Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of LADECO, there was no prior or pending proceeding for the settlement of Augusto's estate.
Furthermore, while Teresita dealt with LADECO purportedly as the court-appointed administratrix of Augusto's estate, the CA was on point that "evidence is bereft of any indication that she had been granted letters of administration by the probate court," and that "evidence is likewise barren to show that she had been previously granted approval to validate the sale of a portion of the deceased's estate." 20 In fact, no proceeding for the settlement or partition of the estate of Augusto has been commenced. To recall, Teresita merely filed an Action for Presumptive Death, which the CA aptly held to be "no way akin to the proceeding required to settle her late husband's estate." 21
Aside from the foregoing, respondents have not presented any written evidence of an extra-judicial partition among Augusto's heirs. There is also no proof on record that respondents have filed for judicial partition of the properties of Augusto.
The above notwithstanding, the
In Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, 22 the Court had the occasion to elucidate that as a general rule, when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will, or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, the Court further pointed out that an exception to the general rule is found in Section 1, Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. 23
To be sure, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire, for good reasons, to resort to an ordinary action for partition. However, it should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 24
Accordingly, when a decedent died without a will, and left his estate without any pending obligations, his or her heirs are under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, 25 if they so desire.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. 26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs, and legatees or devisees, is deemed to be a partition. Thus, while there was no judicial partition instituted herein, partition can very well take place outside the court. Moreover, even if there is no evidence of an express partition submitted in this case, partition may nevertheless be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption, such that after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. 27 Indeed, it has long been settled that there is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. 28 Consequently, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved, considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. 29
In this case, the Court sees no assertion by the respondents as to the existence of a will by Augusto, indicating that the latter died intestate. There is similarly an absence of an allegation that there are debts due from Augusto's estate. Consequently, the CA erred in echoing the view of the RTC that settlement of Augusto's estate must first be done in a probate or intestate proceeding.
Prior to partition or settlement of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code is explicit that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. This means that title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. 30 Respondents, Augusto's heirs, succeeded to his estate upon his death. However, before the estate is partitioned or settled, the respondents are considered co-owners of the properties 31 comprising the entire estate of Augusto, in accordance with Article 1078 of the Civil Code, 32 which provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. 33
Co-owners may sell or dispose the
The RTC, in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stressed, among other things, that the heirs of a deceased cannot sell a specific portion of the estate absent an appropriate partition, extrajudicial or otherwise. 34
The Court clarifies.
The resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads: 35
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Based on this provision, even if an heir's right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned, and is thus merely inchoate, he or she has the right to exercise acts of ownership. 36 Each co-owner, may, therefore, alienate, assign, or mortgage his or her share except when personal rights are involved. 37 However, while a co-owner is allowed to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership, it is settled that a sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common, and such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-owners. 38
In this respect, that RTC was partly correct insofar as the sale of a specific portion is concerned. 39 Verily, the co-owner may only sell his or her proportionate interest in the co-ownership. 40 Be that as it may, it is not required for a partition or settlement of the estate to first be undertaken for a sale of a pro-indiviso portion of the co-owned property to be valid. Article 1088 of the Civil Code explicitly recognizes the sale of hereditary rights by an heir to a stranger prior to partition subject only to the right of redemption by the other co-owners.
On a related matter, it is not lost to Us that in Cabrera v. Ysaac (Cabrera), 41 a case decided by a division of this Court, it was declared that a contract of sale, which purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land, is null and void ab initio. The Court ratiocinated in this wise:
The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. If the seller is not the owner, the seller must be authorized by the owner to sell the object.
Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract. Sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-owners. However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership.
These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.
If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property. As summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, "[i]f he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."
The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten co-owners, the undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare. The definite portion of that interest is usually determined during judicial or extrajudicial partition. After partition, a definite portion of the property held in common is allocated to a specific co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved and, in effect, each of the former co-owners is free to exercise autonomously the rights attached to his or her ownership over the definite portion of the land. It is crucial that the co-owners agree to which portion of the land goes to whom.
Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition. 42
Going further, the Cabrera ruling discussed at length the CA's supposed erroneous application of Pamplona v. Moreto43 in ruling in favor of the validity of a contract of sale involving a definite portion of a co-owned property, thus:
x x x The ruling in Pamplona should be read and applied only in situations similar to the context of that case.
Pamplona involved the Spouses Moreto who owned three (3) parcels of land with a total area of 2,346 square meters. The spouses had six (6) children. After the wife had died, the husband sold one of the parcels to the Pamplona family, even if the conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated. The parcel sold measured 781 square meters, which was less than the ideal share of the husband in the estate. This court allowed the sale to prosper because of the tolerance from the husband's co-heirs. This court ruled:
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. (Emphasis supplied)
In Pamplona, the co-heirs of Flaviano Moreto only questioned the sale to the Pamplona family nine (9) years after the sale. By then, the Pamplona family had exercised several acts of ownership over the land. That is why this court considered it acquiescence or tolerance on the part of the co-heirs when they allowed the Pamplonas to take possession and build upon the land sold, and only questioned these acts several years later.
The ruling in Pamplona does not apply to petitioner. There was no evidence adduced during the trial that respondent's co-owners acquiesced or tolerated the sale to petitioner. The co-owners tolerated petitioner's possession of a portion of their land because petitioner was a lessee over a 95-square-meter portion of the property, not the buyer of the 321-square meter portion.
There was also no evidence of consent to sell from the co-owners. When petitioner approached respondent in 1995 to enforce the contract of sale, respondent referred him to Franklin Ysaac, the administrator over the entire property. Respondent's act suggests the absence of consent from the co-owners. Petitioner did not show that he sought Franklin Ysaac's consent as administrator and the consent of the other co-owners. Without the consent of the co-owners, no partial partition operated in favor of the sale to petitioner.
As it is, however, Cabrera does not find much support from the other decisions of the Court, which has ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 44Sps. Del Campo v. Hon. Court of Appeals (Sps. Del Campo)45 is apropos:
In resolving petitioners' appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying petitioners' right and title over the disputed area? x x x
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad.
The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et al. which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
. . . The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor's undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. 46
The Court made similar pronouncements prior and subsequent to Sps. Del Campo. In the 1982 case of Carvajal v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 47 it was likewise acknowledged that an individual co-owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree, but, at the same time, it was spelled out that a sale made before the partition of the property among the coheirs does not annul or invalidate the deed of sale. The sale is valid, albeit the interests thereby acquired by the vendee are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to him or her upon the partition of the estate. The ruling in the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, 48 cited in Sps. Del Campo, is of similar import.
In Acabal v. Acabal, 49 where a co-owner sold the entire co-owned property without the consent of the other co-owners, similarly gave validity to the disposition insofar as it affected the pro-indiviso share of the vendor while stressing that the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Therein, the Court emphasized once more the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Meanwhile, in Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 50 which was notably decided a few days after Cabrera, the Court echoed the ruling in Sps. Del Campo, as it validated the sale of a co-owned property by one of the co-owners. There are a plethora of other cases in jurisprudence on the matter that contradicts the pertinent ruling in Cabrera, such as would lead Us to conclude that the pronouncement therein voiding entirely the sale of a co-owned property without the consent of other co-owners is more of an outlier than the norm.
The complaint was properly
Having settled that the foregoing issues, the next question is whether or not the regular court has jurisdiction over the subject complaint filed by LADECO.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 51 Indubitably, a case for specific performance is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. 52 Consequently, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction when the complaint was, in fact, properly lodged by LADECO with the RTC. Thus, the complaint must be reinstated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 25 June 2018 and Resolution dated 17 October 2018 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109700 are VACATED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 05 July 2017 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Lipa City in Civil Case No. 2010-0008 is likewise SET ASIDE and the complaint filed by petitioner Lipa Agricultural Development Corporation is REINSTATED.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and the trial court is DIRECTED to decide the case with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 25-41.
2.Id. at 42-52, Annex "A"; penned by CA Presiding Justice Romeo F. Barza, and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court).
3.Id. at 8-10 and 53-55, Annex "B."
4.Id. at 16; a copy of the Order is not attached to the Petition.
5.Id. at 63.
6.Id. at 63-66, Annex "E."
7.Id. at 69-72, Annex "K."
8.Id. at 71; see p. 3 of the Deed of Conditional Sale.
9.Id. at 14.
10.Id. at 15.
11.Id. at 16; a copy of the Order not attached to the petition.
12.Id. at 16-18.
13.Id. at 17.
14.Id. at 22.
15.Id. at 20.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 57-62, Annex "D."
18.Id. at 37-38.
19.Id. at 33.
20.Id. at 21.
21.Id. at 20.
22. G.R. No. 187524, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
23. See Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
24. See Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 255 Phil. 863 (1989), G.R. No. 81147, 20 June 1989 [Per J. Gancayco].
25. See Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
26. See Spouses Marcos v. Heirs of Bangi, 745 Phil. 494 (2014), G.R. No. 185745, 15 October 2014 [Per J. Reyes].
27.Id.
28. See Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 276 Phil. 706 (1991), G.R. No. 92436, 26 July 1991 [Per J. Davide, Jr.].
29. See Espinas-Lanuza v. Luna, Jr., G.R. No. 229775, 11 March 2019 [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr.].
30. See Heirs of Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 747 Phil. 427 (2014), G.R. No. 193551, 19 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen].
31.Id.
32. See Arado Heirs v. Alcoran, 763 Phil. 205 (2015), G.R. No. 163362, 08 July 2015 [Per J. Bersamin].
33.Alejandrino v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 851 (1998), G.R. No. 114151, 17 September 1998 [Per J. Romero].
34.Rollo, p. 17.
35. See Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 734 Phil. 623 (2014), G.R. No. 182839, 02 June 2014 [Per J. Brion].
36. See Quijano v. Amante, 745 Phil. 40 (2014), G.R. No. 164277, 08 October 2014 [Per J. Bersamin].
37. See Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 734 Phil. 623 (2014), G.R. No. 182839, 02 June 2014 [Per J. Brion].
38. See Cabrera v. Ysaac, 747 Phil. 187 (2014), G.R. No. 166790, 19 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen].
39.Rollo, p. 17.
40. See Cabrera v. Ysaac, 747 Phil. 187 (2014), G.R. No. 166790, 19 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen].
41. 747 Phil. 187 (2014), G.R. No. 166790, 19 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen].
42.Id.; citations omitted.
43. 185 Phil. 556 (1980), G.R. No. L-33187, 31 March 1980 [Per J. Guerrero].
44. See Sps. Del Campo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 706 (2001), G.R. No. 108228, 01 February 2001 [Per J. Quisumbing].
45. 403 Phil. 706 (2001), G.R. No. 108228, 01 February 2001 [Per J. Quisumbing].
46.Id.; citations omitted.
47. G.R. No. L-44426, 25 February 1982 [Per J. Teehankee].
48. 74 Phil. 601 (1944), G.R. No. L-46079, 24 March 1944 [Per J. Bocobo].
49. 494 Phil. 528 (2005), G.R. No. 148376, 31 March 2005 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
50. 748 Phil. 587 (2014), G.R. No. 187987, 26 November 2014 [Per J. Perez].
51. See Spouses Villafria v. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
52. See Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, 10 March 2014 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].