FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230096. January 17, 2023.]
THE LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE RENE GABOL, REPRESENTED BY HIS WIFE, ELEANOR L. GABOL, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BW SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., BW MARITIME PRIVATE LTD. SINGAPORE, AND ROSALINDA CRUZ, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 17, 2023which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 230096 (The Legal Heirs of the Late Rene Gabol, represented by his wife, Eleanor L. Gabol v. The Court of Appeals, The National Labor Relations Commission, BW Shipping Philippines, Inc., BW Maritime Private Ltd. Singapore, and Rosalinda Cruz). — This Petition for Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 21 July 2016 and the Resolution 3 dated 29 December 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140839, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners, the Heirs of Rene Gabol (petitioners).
Antecedents
On 29 August 2012, respondent BW Shipping Philippines, Inc., (respondent) entered into a contract of employment with Rene Gabol (Rene) on behalf of its foreign principal, BW Maritime Private Ltd. Singapore (collectively, respondents), as Second Officer. Rene was to be deployed in one of its vessels for seven months, with a basic monthly salary of USD1,150.00. 4 Rene boarded the ship on 17 September 2012. Towards the end of his third month on the vessel, Rene felt pain in the right side of his stomach. Later on, he also had a fever and felt pain in his left shoulder. He complained to the vessel's captain but was advised to endure the pain. It was only when they reached the Bahamas that Rene was brought to a government hospital where he was diagnosed with acute tuberculosis. After weeks of hospital confinement, he was discharged and medically repatriated. 5
Upon his return to the country on 24 January 2013, Rene was referred to NGC Medical Specialist Clinic, Inc. After a series of medical examinations, he was diagnosed with adenocarcinoma of the lungs. On 12 May 2013, Rene died. His cause of death was "Disseminated Metastasis secondary to Lung CA Stage III with Pancreatic, Mesenteric, Small Intestinal and Hepatic Mets." 6
Petitioners, as Rene's heirs, sought to claim death benefits from his employer. Their claim was refused. Subsequently, they filed a Complaint for death benefits, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents as well as Rosalinda Cruz, an officer of the company before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners averred that Rene's illness was compensable for being work-related, as he was exposed to hazardous elements and other factors that contributed to the development of his disease. 7 Respondents countered that Rene died due to an illness unrelated to his work and after his employment was terminated. 8
Ruling of the LA
In a Decision 9 dated 17 December 2014, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners were entitled to death benefits in the amount of USD60,000.00 under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). The provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement on death compensation were not applicable in the case since Rene died after the termination of his seven-month employment contract. 10
The LA ratiocinated that "since the cause of complainant's lung cancer cannot be known with certainty, it is not for this Office to belabor on whether complainant's illness is work-related or not. Neither should this Office be concerned of the causal connection between complainant's illness and the work for which he had been contracted since there is doubt on the real cause of his cancer. x x x Not being conclusive, therefore, the risk factors cited by respondents do not rule out the possibility that complainant's cancer may have been caused or even aggravated by factors attendant at his jobsite." 11
Aggrieved, both parties filed their respective appeals 12 with the NLRC.
Ruling of the NLRC
In its Decision 13 dated 31 March 2015, the NLRC granted the appeal of respondents. They were, however, ordered to pay petitioners P200,000.00 as financial assistance. 14 Petitioners' appeal, on the other hand, was dismissed for lack of merit.
The NLRC ruled that petitioners were not entitled to death benefits since Rene's illness was not proved to be work-related or work- aggravated. 15 Petitioners, thereafter, sought recourse to the CA by filing a petition for certiorari. 16
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 17 dated 21 July 2016, the CA dismissed the petition for the following reasons: (a) petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision; 18 and (b) petitioners failed to justify their claim that Rene's illness was compensable. 19
Petitioners subsequently moved for reconsideration, 20 but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution 21 dated 29 December 2016. Hence, the filing of the instant petition before this Court.
Issues
The issues this case presents are:
(1) Whether the instant case falls within the exceptions on the requisite for filing a motion for reconsideration prior to filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and
(2) Whether or not the death of Rene is compensable.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Petitioners resorted to a wrong
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders, or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which in essence is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 22
A special civil action under Rule 65, on the other hand, is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. It is an independent action that lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court a quo acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45. 23
This Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review. 24 In this case, however, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule.
Petitioners received the CA Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on 18 January 2017. 25 Instead of filing a petition for review with this Court within 15 days from receipt thereof, or until 02 February 2017, they filed a petition for certiorari on 14 March 2017 26 or 55 days from receipt of the said Resolution. In other words, the period to file a petition for review had lapsed. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. Where the rules prescribe a particular remedy for the vindication of rights, the aggrieved party should make use of such remedy. Accordingly, adoption of an improper remedy already warrants outright dismissal of this Petition. 27
The filing of a motion for
It is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to well-recognized exceptions. 28 However, petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. They aver that it "will be futile considering that the questions to be raised in this case are the same issues raised and passed upon by the Labor Arbiter and the Commission and that these issues were imbued with public interest." 29 But it is not for petitioners to determine whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be dispensed with. 30
In Sim v. National Labor Relations Commission, 31 the Court clarified:
It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it on time are not mere technicalities of procedure. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements with which parties must be strictly comply. Hence, failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC before availing oneself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity. 32
Petitioners are not entitled to
Be that as it may, the Court finds no merit in petitioners' claim for death benefits. Section 20 (B) of the 2010 POEA SEC provides:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
xxx xxx xxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise for disposition of seafarer's remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
From the foregoing, it is clear that for the seafarer's beneficiaries to be entitled to death compensation from the employer, it must be proven that the death of the seafarer (1) is work-related; and (2) occurred during the term of his contract. 33
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Rene died on 12 May 2013, or more than three months after his return to the Philippines. Under Section 18 (B) (1) 34 of the POEA-SEC, the employment of the seafarer is terminated when he arrives at the point of hire and signs off, and is disembarked for medical reasons. 35 Hence, upon Rene's arrival in the country after being medically repatriated, his contract of employment with respondents was effectively terminated.
As Rene was no longer in respondents' employ when he died, petitioners are, therefore, precluded from claiming death benefits under Section 20 (B) of the POEA-SEC. 36 However, the heirs of a seafarer who died after the termination of his employment contract, such as in the instant case, are not without recourse. As the Court explained in Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar: 37
Unlike Section 20 (A), 38 Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
It is then incumbent upon petitioners to prove work-relatedness of Rene's illness because it is "the claimants of death benefits, and not the employers, who carry the burden of proof." 39 In labor cases, the degree of proof required is substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent. As in any other claim, the claimant is burdened to establish his entitlement to the benefits provided by law. 40
Petitioners, however, failed to discharge their burden to definitively show that Rene's illness was work-connected. Their claim that Rene was exposed to hazardous elements was unsubstantiated. They did not narrate in detail the nature of his work as a Second Officer or describe his working conditions. In sum, there was no showing of a reasonable connection between Rene's lung cancer and the nature of his work. As correctly observed by the NLRC:
Lung cancer is a disease in which malignant (cancer) cells form in the tissues of the lung. Its main cause is tobacco use, including smoking cigarettes, cigars, or pipes, now or in the past. While there are indeed other risk factors for lung cancer, their effect, even if said factors are taken together, is very small compared to the effect of tobacco smoking.
Here, while it is unclear whether seafarer Gabol was a cigarette or tobacco smoker, still, all that complainant has in bolstering her cause is the general allegation that: seafarer Gabol's illness was the result of his exposure to "hazardous elements or such other factors necessary to contract the disease."
In short, all that complainant was able to present to support the claim that seafarer Gabol's exposure to "hazardous elements" onboard brought about the latter's lung cancer are no more than bare allegations. In fact, complainant even failed to present any concrete proof or medical expert opinion to support the conclusion that seafarer Gabol had in fact been exposed to cancer-causing elements and that the same had actually or probably caused his lung cancer. Complainant, thus, merely forwarded, as her basis for monetary claims, remote and conjectural possibilities.
Hence, in posing empty suppositions and possibilities, complainant clearly was not able to present the needed proof to show a reasonable connection between the seafarer's work as 2nd Officer and his lung cancer. 41
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court finds that the CA did not err in dismissing the Petition.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 21 July 2016 and Resolution dated 29 December 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 140839 are hereby AFFIRMED. CAIHTE
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-29.
2. Id. at 35-42; Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (a retired Member of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
3. Id. at 30-34; Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (a retired Member of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
4. Id. at 114.
5. Id. at 35-36.
6. Id. at 36, 118.
7. Id. at 36-37.
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id. at 67-73; Penned by Labor Arbiter Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzalez.
10. Id. at 71 and 73.
11. Id. at 72-73.
12. Id. at 247-256 and 258-277.
13. Id. at 76-88 and 95-97; Penned by Presiding Commissioner Grace E. Maniquiz-Tan and concurred in by Commissioners Dolores M. Peralta-Beley and Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap.
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 88.
16. Id. at 43-66.
17. Id. at 35-42.
18. Id. at 39.
19. Id. at 40.
20. Id. at 464-477.
21. Id. at 30-34.
22. Albor v. Court of Appeals, 823 Phil. 901, 909 (2018).
23. Id.
24. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Continental Watchman Agency, Inc., 465 Phil. 607, 616 (2004).
25. Rollo, p. 5.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Supra at note 22.
28. Seagull Shipmanagement & Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, 912 (2000).
29. Rollo, p. 44.
30. Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc., 682 Phil. 186, 195 (2012).
31. 560 Phil. 762, 769 (2007). Citations omitted.
32. Supra at note 30.
33. Menez v. Status Maritime Corp., 839 Phil. 360, 368 (2018).
34. SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxx xxx xxx
B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated effective upon arrival at the point of hire for any of the following reasons:
1. When the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to Section 20 (A) [5] of this Contract.
35. Covita v. SSM Maritime Services, Inc., 802 Phil. 598, 614 (2016).
36. Albarracin v. Philippine Transworld Shipping, 843 Phil. 375, 386 (2018).
37. 716 Phil. 693, 705 (2013). Emphasis supplied.
38. Now Section 20 (B).
39. Supra at note 36.
40. Razonable, Jr. v. Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 241620, 07 July 2020.
41. Rollo, p. 88; Emphasis, underscoring and italics removed.