Ledesma v. Convergys Philippines, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 252188. November 18, 2020.]

RAYMUND D. LEDESMA AND RUPERTO M. MONTINOLA, 1petitioners, vs.CONVERGYS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 18, 2020which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252188 — RAYMUND D. LEDESMA and RUPERTO M. MONTINOLA, petitioners,versusCONVERGYSPHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

The core issue raised in this Petition 2 for Review on Certiorari is whether the Resolution 3 dated August 28, 2018 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which has already attained finality, can be modified in view of an alleged supervening event.

Raymund D. Ledesma and Ruperto M. Montinola (petitioners) admit that they did not assail the NLRC Resolution through a petition for certiorari because they thought that it is in their best interest to have the monetary award executed, which would not be possible if they elevated the case before the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners recognize that having forgone the opportunity to question the NLRC Resolution, they are now barred from obtaining affirmative relief other than those contained in the said NLRC Resolution. Nevertheless, they argue that "jurisprudence admits of exceptions to this rule, such as when strict adherence thereto shall result in the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties concerned." 4 HEITAD

Petitioners narrate that, while the judgment award was already paid to them, the reinstatement order was only executed on July 5, 2019 through no fault on their part. When they received the report to work notices from respondent 5 on said date, they were already working for new employers. Considering that they have already been regularized, they opted to keep their present employment. They also added that they no longer wish to be reinstated to their former positions with respondent because they no longer enjoy the trust and confidence of the latter. Petitioners argue that their subsequent employment, which transpired after the finality of the NLRC Resolution, renders its execution unjust and inequitable. 6

Petitioners also argue that should the Court find the modification of the NLRC Resolution in order, consequently, (i) the backwages and other benefits due to petitioner Ledesma should be recomputed reckoned from his illegal dismissal until finality of the Court's decision, (ii) interest at the rate of 6% per annum should be added computed from the finality of the Court's decision until full payment, and (iii) "Concentrix" should be held solidarily liable with respondent following the former's acquisition of the latter.

The Court is not convinced.

A judgment that has become final is immutable and unalterable — impervious to any attack, and may not be reviewed either by the tribunal which rendered it or even this Court. 7 This rule, nonetheless, admits of the following exceptions: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 8

Petitioners invoke the fourth exception — supervening events. In Go v. Echavez, 9 the Court elaborated on this exception in the following manner:

Supervening events, on the other hand, are circumstances that transpire after the decision's finality rendering the execution of the judgment unjust and inequitable. It includes matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at the time. In such cases, courts are allowed to suspend execution, admit evidence proving the event or circumstance, and grant relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant.

To successfully stay or stop the execution of a final judgment, the supervening event: (i) must have altered or modified the parties' situation as to render execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair; and (ii) must be established by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. 10

Here, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence — either before the CA or the Court — to substantiate their allegation that they each have secured new employment pending the execution of the reinstatement order. As declared by the Court in the case cited above, the existence of such supervening event must be established as a fact through competent evidence. It bears emphasis that to grant petitioners' prayer will result in material prejudice on the part of respondent because the latter will be required anew to pay petitioners additional amounts. All the more reason that the existence of the supervening event herein needs to be substantiated.

The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error when it denied petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration and prayer to modify the NLRC Resolution.

In view of the foregoing, there is no more reason to discuss the rest of the issues raised by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated June 1, 2020 is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2019 and Resolution dated March 2, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 158457 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The petitioners' manifestation (with leave of court), paying, among others, that after due consideration an order be issued granting their request for leave of Court in the instant case, is NOTED; and the petitioners are hereby required to SUBMIT, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a soft copy in compact disc, USB or e-mail containing the PDF file of the signed manifestation (with leave of court) pursuant to A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC. ATICcS

SO ORDERED." Carandang, J.,on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Also "Ruperto M. Montinola, Jr." in other pleadings and orders.

2.Rollo, pp. 3-32.

3.Id. at 316-319.

4.Id. at 20, citing Century Property, Inc. v. Babiano, G.R. No. 220978, July 5, 2016, 795 SCRA 671.

5. Already "Concentrix" at this time.

6.Rollo, p. 22, citing FGU Insurance Corp. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch66, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 50.

7.National Power Corporation v. Delta P, Inc., G.R. No. 221709, October 16, 2019.

8.Id., citing FGU Insurance Corp. v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, supra note 5 at 56.

9. G.R. No. 174542, August 3, 2015, 764 SCRA 505.

10.Id. at 519-520. Citations omitted.