THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 245279. December 6, 2021.]
CLINT LEBIOS y RANARIO, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated December 6, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 245279 (Clint Lebios y Ranario, Petitioner, v. People of the Philippines, Respondent.) — This is a Petition 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the Decision 2 dated 27 June 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01635-MIN, affirming the Decision 3 dated 06 December 2016 of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, in Criminal Case No. 14805. The RTC found petitioner guilty of violating Section 5, 4 Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 5 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Php500,000.00.
Antecedents
On 10 March 2011, an Information was filed against petitioner Clint Lebios y Ranario (petitioner) as follows —
That on or about 6:30 P.M. of February 16, 2011 at Villanueva Street, Barangay Limaha, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer for a consideration of P500.00 marked money, one (1) sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, weighing more or less zero point zero three two zero (0.0320) grams [sic].
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165) 6
Although a warrant for petitioner's arrest was issued on 21 March 2011, it was only on 15 October 2014 that petitioner was apprehended by the police in Tagaloan, Misamis Oriental. 7 Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. Pre-trial and trial followed. 8
Version of the Prosecution
In the morning of 15 February 2011, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office XIII received reports that a certain Clint Lebios and two (2) other men were actively engaged in selling illegal drugs. After verifying this information, PDEA Agent and Deputy-in-Charge Christy Silvan (Agent Silvan) ordered the formation of a team to conduct a possible buy-bust operation. IO2 Donesa Frisnito Janito (IO2 Janito), who was designated to act as poseur-buyer, prepared a Php500.00 bill to be used as boodle money, marked it with the date "2-16-2011" and photocopied it as reference. 9
The following day, at around 6:30 in the evening, team leader Agent Daguman, arresting officer Agent Majorie Veso, and IO2 Janito, accompanied by their confidential informant (CI), proceeded to the target area in Barangay Limaha. IO2 Janito and the CI went to the house of a certain Macky Plaza where they found petitioner sitting at the balcony. After they were introduced, petitioner allegedly asked IO2 Janito if she was really buying shabu from him. When she replied in the affirmative, he handed her a plastic sachet. After confirming that the white crystalline substance contained inside was shabu, IO2 Janito handed the Php500.00 marked money over to petitioner and thereafter used her phone to signal the consummation of the transaction to the rest of the team. They rushed to the location to arrest petitioner but the latter ran towards the back portion of the house and escaped. 10 ICHDca
The team then went back to the PDEA office where they conducted the inventory in the presence of representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ). IO2 Janito marked the sachet acquired from petitioner with "DJ 0206" while Agent Veso took pictures of the specimen and the Certificate of Inventory. 11
IO2 Janito brought the specimen and a Request for Laboratory Examination to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory where it was received by a certain PO1 Osano. Forensic Chemical Officer PSI Joel P. Signar conducted a forensic examination and found that the drug specimen recovered was positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. His findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-022-2011. 12
After laboratory examination, the drug specimen was handed to the evidence custodian, PO1 Migullas, who was in custody of the specimen until it was brought to court. 13
Version of the Defense
Petitioner waived his right to present evidence. 14
Ruling of the RTC
On 06 December 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Clint Lebios y Ranario, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (Selling), of Article II of Republic Act 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and hereby sentenced to undergo imprisonment of a Life sentence and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Braulio F. Dujali, Davao del Norte.
He shall be entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence with his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The sachet of shabu is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED. 15
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense charged. It held that the testimony of poseur-buyer IO2 Janito clearly and vividly showed that there was an actual exchange of the prohibited drug and buy-bust money between her and petitioner. 16 The RTC further declared that there was compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 17 and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug specimen used against petitioner remained uncompromised. 18
Petitioner filed a motion seeking a reconsideration of the RTC's Decision on the ground that the prosecution failed to present the marked buy-bust money as evidence. His motion was denied by the court a quo in a Resolution dated 03 February 2017. 19 It held that although the marked money was never recovered (as petitioner was able to evade arrest during the operation), presentation of the same is not indispensable for purposes of conviction since the prosecution was able to provide other evidence to establish the fact of sale between petitioner and IO2 Janito. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. 20
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction. 21 It agreed with the trial court that all the elements for the commission of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were established by the prosecution. Like the trial court, the CA gave great weight to the testimony of IO2 Janito, the designated poseur-buyer:
IO2 Janito was clear and convincing in testifying on the events that transpired prior to, during, and after the buy-bust operation. x x x The testimony of the poseur-buyer was a firsthand account of what transpired during the buy-bust, and the trial court had no reason to discredit her testimony. 22
The CA also rejected petitioner's claim that the presentation of the marked money was necessary to establish the fact of illegal sale:
Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in a buy-bust operation. Failure to mark the money or to present it in evidence is not material, since failure to do so will not necessarily disprove the sale. If at all, the marked money merely serves as corroborative evidence in proving [petitioner]'s guilt. Stated differently, in prosecuting a case for the sale of dangerous drugs, the failure to present marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.
Here, the testimony of IO2 Janito, as corroborated by the photocopy of the marked money and the certified true copy of the PDEA blotter are sufficient to establish the existence of the marked money which was never recovered because it was in the [petitioner]'s possession when he escaped from the PDEA operatives. 23
Furthermore, the CA did not take issue with the fact that the marking and inventory of the item allegedly bought from petitioner were made at the PDEA Office, instead of at the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted. It held that "there was no non-compliance to speak of" because Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 allows the conduct of the inventory at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. 24 It likewise found no gap in the chain of custody over the confiscated drug: TCAScE
As gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witness, IO2 Janito had the exclusive and continuous material in custody of the seized sachet of shabu from the crime scene, up to the delivery of the item to the Crime Laboratory. It was received by the PO1 Osano who was the receiving officer at that time. The item was then given to the forensic chemical officer, PSIO Joel Signar, for the conduct of laboratory examination. After PSI Joel Signar completed the examination, he turned it over to PO1 Migullas who was the evidence custodian. The seized drug was later retrieved from the evidence custodian to offer it in evidence during trial. 25
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision thus reads:
FOR THESE REASONS, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Branch 4 Decision dated December 6, 2016 and Resolution dated February 3, 2017 are AFFIRMED. 26
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision. His mother, Juliet R. Labios, also filed a letter requesting benevolence and reconsideration of her son's conviction in view of the new guidelines on plea bargaining in drug cases. 27
In its assailed Resolution dated 11 January 2019, the CA denied petitioner's motion, as there was no new and compelling ground raised to warrant the reversal of its earlier ruling. It also held that it was already too late into the proceedings for petitioner to avail of plea bargaining. 28
Issue
We resolve whether the CA correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under RA 9165.
Ruling of the Court
We GRANT the petition and ACQUIT petitioner on reasonable doubt.
Indeed, questions of fact are not proper in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such actions being limited to pure questions of law. Findings of fact of the CA are generally final, conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. 29 This rule, however, is not without exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. 30
Furthermore, an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review. Thus, the appellate court has the competence to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 31
Here, and for reasons to be stated hereunder, We find the assailed decision of the CA (and the RTC) to be based on a misapprehension of facts; the supposed factual findings did not point to any specific evidence on which they were based; and certain facts set forth in the petition as well as in petitioner's main and reply briefs were not disputed by respondents. 32
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 33 Otherwise stated, there must be evidence showing that the items offered in evidence are those actually recovered from the accused; otherwise, the prosecution for sale of illegal drugs under RA 9165 cannot succeed. 34
Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of the illegal sale due to its failure to present the marked money used during the buy-bust operation. 35 While the CA was correct when it held that non-presentation of the buy-bust money in court does not, by itself, disprove the fact of sale, we disagree that the totality of the evidence sufficiently proved that a sale of shabu did in fact take place and that it was petitioner who sold it.
We note that the only evidence presented to establish the fact that the illegal sale took place and that it was petitioner who sold the confiscated shabu was the testimony of the poseur-buyer, IO2 Janito. Petitioner, for his part, points to the following inconsistency in IO2 Janito's testimony regarding the custody over the marked money which he claims detracts from her credibility as a witness: cTDaEH
PROS. GO: (continuing)
Q: Where is the original marked money, madam Witness?
A: It was kept by the evidence custodian at our office.
Q: Why (sic) you (sic) can exactly tell the Honorable Court that this is the photocopy of the original P500.00 bill?
A: Because I was the one who prepared the buy bust money and have it photocopied.
Q: Are you going to present the original P500.00 bill for purpose[s] of evidence?
A: Yes, sir. 36
As it turns out, the buy-bust money was never recovered as the seller (allegedly petitioner) escaped before the police operatives could arrest him. 37 It does not help that no one else was presented to corroborate IO2 Janito's testimony as to the alleged transaction with petitioner. The arresting officer, IO2 Veso, admitted on cross-examination that while she stayed in viewing distance of about 50 to 100 meters, she did not personally see petitioner nor witness the actual transaction take place because it was already dark: 38
Q: And you can also see the poseur-buyer and the accused?
A: No, sir, since it[']s dark.
Q: And how did you know that the accused ran?
A: The first persons are the male agents, sir, they're the first also who saw the accused running towards the house of Macky Plaza. In going to the house of Macky Plaza, our male agents were also the first responders, sir. 39
While it is true that the credible and positive testimony of a single prosecution witness is sufficient to warrant a conviction, 40 this "mistake" in IO2 Janito's testimony does not inspire much confidence in terms of the reliability and accuracy of her recollection of the events.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the prosecution was able to prove that the transaction took place and that it was petitioner who sold the drug to IO2 Janito, We still do not find that evidence of the corpus delicti was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 sets forth the procedure to be followed by police officers in the handling of seized drugs to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 41 This provision was amended by RA 10640, 42 which was approved on 15 July 2014. As the offense charged in this case was allegedly committed on 11 February 2011, the prescribed procedure under RA 9165, prior to amendment by RA 10640, applies.
Thus, and following the chain of custody rule, the apprehending team is mandated, immediately after seizure and confiscation, to conduct a physical inventory and photography of the seized items immediately after seizure and confiscation. If the immediate physical inventory and photographing are not practicable, the buy-bust team should conduct the same as soon as it reaches the nearest police station, or the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team. The inventory must be done in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. 43
While the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 44 Compliance is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law." This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment." 45
In this case, it is not disputed that the seized drug was marked, inventoried, and photographed not at the crime scene immediately after the buy-bust operation, but only later on at the PDEA Office, and in the presence of only two of the three required representatives.
When asked why the marking and inventory were conducted at the PDEA Office instead of immediately after the buy-bust operation, prosecution witness IO2 Janito only offered the following explanation:
"PROS. GO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mean to say you marked the buy-bust shabu at the office already?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Why did you not mark it at the crime scene, Madam Witness?
A: As per instruction, Sir, that we will do the inventory and the marking at the office.46
No other justification was given as to why the marking was done at the PDEA Office and not where the buy-bust operation was conducted. Worse, it was not even shown that the PDEA Office was the nearest practicable place to conduct the marking and inventory. 47
There was also no justifiable reason put forth to explain why the required witnesses were not with the team when the latter conducted the buy-bust operation, whether earnest efforts were exerted to secure their presence thereat, and why the presence of the elected public official was dispensed with during the conduct of the inventory. 48 cSaATC
In People v. Addin, We held that "in the event that the presence of the essential witnesses was not obtained, the prosecution must establish not only the reasons for their absence, but also the fact that serious and sincere efforts were exerted in securing their presence. Failure to disclose the justification for non-compliance with the requirements and the lack of evidence of serious attempts to secure the presence of the necessary witnesses result in a substantial gap in the chain of custody of evidence that shall adversely affect the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented in court." 49
The presence of the three witnesses is required at the time of the apprehension of the accused or immediately thereafter, a requirement that the buy-bust team can easily comply with because a buy-bust operation, by its nature, is a planned activity. This means that the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them, or immediately after the buy-bust operation, the said witnesses. 50 This lapse on the part of the apprehending team is significant as the presence of the witnesses could have insulated the inventory from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. 51
Even granting that there was justifiable ground for the absence of the elected public official in this case, there is still insufficient proof to support a view that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
For a successful prosecution of a case involving illegal drugs, there must be testimony as to how the subject drug specimen was handled in every link of the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This is indispensable because the prosecution must satisfy the court that every person who had custody of the exhibit took the necessary precaution to preserve the integrity of the said evidence as well as to ensure that no opportunity would be afforded to any other person to contaminate the same. 52
A stricter adherence to the chain of custody rule is, in fact, required in cases involving miniscule quantities of illegal drugs, as in this case where only 0.0320 grams of shabu is involved. This is an extremely small amount highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence. 53
Again, there is no question that the marking and inventory of the drug allegedly sold by petitioner were performed at the PDEA Office, instead of immediately after the buy-bust operation, at or near the location of the transaction. This already casts doubt on the prosecution's evidence. 54 Moreover, the Request for Laboratory Examination shows that the seized items were received by a certain PO1 Osana of the PNP Crime Laboratory from IO2 Janito. PO1 Osana, however, was not presented to identify the evidence PO1 Osana received from IO2 Janito or testify as to PO1 Osana's manner of handling said evidence prior to its transmittal to forensic chemist PSI Signar for examination. These gaps in the links of the chain of custody militate against a funding that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item procured from petitioner were properly preserved.
In sum, this Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence does not convincingly prove the fact of the illegal transaction or that petitioner participated in it. The prosecution was also unable to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. Nor did it convincingly show that the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have not been seriously compromised. Perforce, petitioner must be acquitted. 55
We stress that, in order to convict, the evidence proving the guilt of the accused must always be beyond reasonable doubt. It matters not that petitioner did not present any evidence to prove his innocence. As the Court held in People v. Ordiz, an accused need not present a single piece of evidence in his/her defense if the State has not discharged its onus; he/she can simply rely on his/her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. 56 A conviction must stand on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness (or in this case, absence) of an accused's defense. If the evidence of guilt falls short of the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of his/her liberty. Acquittal should come as a matter of course. 57
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 27 June 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01635-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner CLINT LEBIOS y RANARIO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his IMMEDIATERELEASE, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action he has taken. cHDAIS
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-15.
2. Id. at 21-35; Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Perpetua T. Atal-Paño and Walter S. Ong of the Twenty-Second (22nd) Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.
3. Id. at 160-171; penned by RTC Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr.
4. Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
5. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on 23 January 2002.
6. Rollo, pp. 65-66.
7. Id. at 22.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 22-23.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 23.
12. Id. at 23-24.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Id. at 166-168.
17. Id. at 169-170.
18. Id. at 170.
19. Id. at 63-64.
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 26-30.
22. Id. at 26.
23. Id. at 26-27.
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id. at 29-30.
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. at 37-44.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Heirs of Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-Dagupan Branch, 720 Phil. 414 (2013), G.R. No. 184369, 23 October 2013 [Per J. Sereno].
30. Medina v. Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990), G.R. No. 75450, 08 November 1990 [Per J. Bidin] as cited in Ganancial v. Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348, 06 July 2020 [Per J. Hernando]; Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted.
31. People of the Philippines v. De Chavez, G.R. No. 239779 (Notice), 14 May 2021 [First Division].
32. See Agbayani y Dacones v. People, G.R. No. 251232 (Notice), 23 June 2021 [Second Division].
33. People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 229053, 17 July 2019 [Per J. Leonen].
34. People of the Philippines v. Macaumbang, G.R. No. 208836, 01 April 2019 [Per J. Gesmundo].
35. Rollo, pp. 7-15.
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id. at 162.
38. Id. at 165.
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. People of the Philippines v. Angeles, 833 Phil. 822 (2018), G.R. No. 218947, 20 June 2018 [Per J. Martires].
41. Ramos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233572, 30 July 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
42. An Act to Further Strengthen the Anti-Drug Campaign of the Government, Amending for the Purpose Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
43. People of the Philippines v. Labini, G.R. No. 229212, 04 September 2019 [Per J. Carpio].
44. People of the Philippines v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342 (2015), G.R. No. 212160, 04 February 2015 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
45. Matabilas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243615, 11 November 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
46. Rollo, pp. 168-169; Emphasis supplied.
47. People of the Philippines v. Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767, 11 September 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
48. People of the Philippines v. Sipin, 833 Phil. 67 (2018), G.R. No. 224290, 11 June 2018 [Per J. Peralta].
49. G.R. No. 223682, 09 October 2019 [Per J. Hernando].
50. Supra at note 41.
51. People of the Philippines v. Cadungog, G.R. No. 229926, 03 April 2019 [Per J. Carpio].
52. People of the Philippines v. Ubungen, 836 Phil. 888 (2018), G.R. No. 225497, 23 July 2018 [Per J. Martires].
53. People of the Philippines v. Oliva, G.R. No. 234156, 07 January 2019 [Per J. Peralta]; People of the Philippines v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 238519, 26 June 2019 [Per J. Peralta].
54. Rollo, p. 23.
55. People of the Philippines v. Dumanjug, G.R. No. 235468, 01 July 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
56. G.R. No. 206767, 11 September 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
57. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 686 Phil. 137 (2012), G.R. No. 180177, April 18, 2012 [Per J. Bersamin]; People of the Philippines v. Bartolini, 791 Phil. 626 (2016), G.R. No. 215192, 27 July 2016 [Per J. Carpio].