Lazo v. Spouses Villas

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 221792. January 30, 2019.]

LAGRIMAS DELA ROSA LAZO, petitioner, vs.SPOUSES ELEUTERIO VILLAS AND CLARITA M. VILLAS AND ROSARIO YAP BAUTISTA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 30, 2019 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 221792 — (Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo v. Spouses Eleuterio Villas and Clarita M. Villas and Rosario Yap Bautista)

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the March 26, 2015 Decision 1 and the November 27, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102234, which affirmed with modification the January 27, 2014 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 99-92659, a complaint for specific performance with temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

The Antecedents

Sometime in March 1991, Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo (petitioner), who was in need of money, offered for sale to Rosario Yap Bautista (Bautista) a parcel of land with an area of two hundred fifty (250) square meters, situated at Amparo Subdivision, Novaliches, Caloocan City, for the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Petitioner represented to Bautista that she was the absolute owner thereof. Bautista acceded but informed petitioner that she would initially pay Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) in cash which petitioner accepted. Thus, on March 6, 1991, petitioner executed a deed of conditional sale over the said property in favor of Bautista. They agreed that petitioner would execute a deed of absolute sale once Bautista completed payment of the purchase price.

After full payment of the purchase price, Bautista asked petitioner to execute a deed of absolute sale over the said property. However, despite several demands, petitioner failed to do so. AScHCD

Bautista subsequently learned that the property sold to her by petitioner was part of a seven hundred seventy-seven (777)-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 56774 registered in the name of Republic Planter's Bank (now Maybank Philippines, Inc.). Apparently, on October 20, 1986, the bank sold the entire property to petitioner. On September 30, 1987, petitioner entered into a transaction concerning a part thereof with Eleuterio Villas (Eleuterio). Petitioner gave the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774 to Eleuterio through a certain Atty. Eden F. Dandal (Atty. Dandal).

Bautista then filed the instant complaint for specific performance against petitioner, Republic Planter's Bank, and Spouses Eleuterio and Clarita Villas (Spouses Villas) for the issuance of a deed of absolute sale in her favor and the surrender of TCT No. 56774.

On April 19, 2002, the complaint against Republic Banker's Bank was dismissed upon the latter's submission of a copy of the deed of absolute sale it executed in favor of petitioner.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the P35,000.00 paid by Bautista was not part of the purchase price but merely an option money to ensure that she would not sell the subject property to other buyers. She also claimed that the other sums of money she received from Bautista were not payments but were financial aid to defray the expenses of transferring the title of the subject property in her name. Petitioner asserted that she earlier apprised Bautista that the entire property was mortgaged to another person and that the title thereof was in the possession of the mortgagee. As a result, she could not execute the deed of absolute sale being demanded from her. 4

On the other hand, Spouses Villas, in their answer with counterclaim and cross-claim against petitioner, averred that petitioner, on September 30, 1987, sold to them five hundred seventy-seven (577) square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 56774. 5 Consequently, petitioner gave to them the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774. The alleged sale to Bautista of a two hundred fifty (250)-square meter portion of the land covered by TCT No. 56774 was an entirely different transaction which cannot affect their ownership over the portion sold to them.

Meanwhile, petitioner disclosed in her answer to the cross-claim that she was in need of money sometime in September 1987. She approached Atty. Dandal and asked if he could help her obtain a loan. Atty. Dandal introduced her to Eleuterio, his friend and co-worker in the Bureau of Customs (Customs Police). On September 30, 1987, Eleuterio, through Atty. Dandal, lent her the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 6 In turn, she sold him five hundred seventy-seven (577) square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 56774. In their written agreement, 7 petitioner and Eleuterio agreed that she had a period of two (2) years to repurchase the subject property. She handed to Atty. Dandal the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774. Atty. Dandal then turned it over to Eleuterio. AcICHD

Petitioner averred that she had already complied with the terms and conditions of the sale with right to repurchase. Petitioner stated that a week prior to the maturity of her loan, she informed Atty. Dandal of her intention to repurchase her property from Eleuterio. Atty. Dandal assured her that he relayed her intention to Eleuterio who, at that time, was already assigned in Mindanao. Petitioner gave Atty. Dandal the sum of Seventy Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Pesos (P70,680.00) as full payment of her loan inclusive of interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. Atty. Dandal informed her that Eleuterio instructed him to turn over the money to his wife, Clarita. However, Clarita, who was in Manila, refused to accept the money or to get involved with the transaction since she knew nothing thereof. Eleuterio, on the other hand, could not be contacted. Petitioner argued that her payment to Atty. Dandal and his acceptance of the same extinguished her obligation. Hence, Spouses Villas should return to her the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774. 8

Petitioner's counsel manifested before the RTC that the Spouses Villas sold the property. 9 Petitioner clarified that a certain Efren Tamayo came to her and requested that she issue a deed of sale for the transfer of the property. This Efren Tamayo is allegedly connected with the Bureau of Lands. 10

The RTC Ruling

In its January 27, 2014 Decision, the RTC held that the 1987 transaction between petitioner and Eleuterio is in the nature of an equitable mortgage and not a sale with right to repurchase. It noted that the purchase price is way below the market value of the property. Further, it stated that there was no showing that the Spouses Villas ever took possession of the subject property prior to the expiration of the two-year period of the loan despite execution of the deed. Lastly, it observed that the deed was executed by reason of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner to Eleuterio, that is, her loan in the amount of P50,000.00 plus interest. The purchase price stated in the deed was also the amount of indebtedness of petitioner to Eleuterio. It concluded that while the deed purported to be a sale with a right to repurchase, it was executed in consideration of the aforesaid loan and/or indebtedness and was, thus, indubitably an equitable mortgage. The true intention of the parties was to secure the payment of petitioner's loan, not to transfer the ownership of the property from one to the other by way of sale.

It further noted that under the equitable mortgage, petitioner bound herself to pay her loan within two (2) years. It held that she was able to discharge this obligation when she remitted to Eleuterio, through Atty. Dandal, the amount of her loan plus the agreed interest prior to the expiration of the said two-year period. It placed great weight on Atty. Dandal's testimony that Eleuterio instructed petitioner to remit her payment through him and that she indeed remitted the amount due. For the RTC, the fact that the payment never reached Eleuterio or Clarita is through no fault of petitioner. It ruled that the fact that Eleuterio went incommunicado shortly before the expiration of the period, and Clarita refused to cooperate prevented petitioner from fulfilling her obligation. Hence, she was deemed to have fulfilled it by virtue of Article 1186 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." Further, it held that the ownership over the subject property never vested on the Spouses Villas.

On the basis of the foregoing, it concluded that the Spouses Villas had no reason to foreclose the mortgage and should immediately return the title of the property to petitioner. The mortgage had long been extinguished when petitioner entered into another contract with Bautista. TAIaHE

As to petitioner's contract with Bautista, it held that the same was in the nature of an absolute sale. However, Bautista was estopped from claiming the absolute character of the sale because she stated that the effectivity of the contract depended on her payment of the balance of the purchase price, a condition which she failed to fulfill as she paid only P89,000.00 of the P100,000.00 purchase price. It ordered petitioner to reimburse Bautista or her heirs or assigns the amount of P89,000.00 she paid.

Aggrieved, Spouses Villas appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its March 26, 2015 Decision, the CA affirmed with modification the January 27, 2014 decision of the RTC. It held that the RTC erred in declaring that petitioner's payment to Atty. Dandal constituted valid payment to Spouses Villas. While Atty. Dandal received petitioner's payment, he failed to give the same or to make any tender of payment to Clarita. In fact, it noted that when Atty. Dandal was unable to contact Eleuterio and report to him Clarita's refusal to accept the payment, Atty. Dandal returned the money to petitioner for safekeeping. It expressly held that even if payment was made to Atty. Dandal who was authorized to receive it, such cannot be considered payment because he never gave it to the Spouses Villas. As a consequence, petitioner failed to exercise her right to repurchase under the agreement and ownership of the five hundred seventy-seven (577)-square meter parcel of land vested in the Spouses Villas. It affirmed the RTC's findings and dispositions as to the transaction between petitioner and Bautista.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this decision, which the CA denied in its November 27, 2015 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

First, petitioner argues that her obligation was extinguished when she paid the amount due to Atty. Dandal. She cites Article 1240 of the Civil Code, which provides that payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor-in-interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Atty. Dandal was authorized by Eleuterio to receive the repayment amount from petitioner. Thereafter, Atty. Dandal should personally deliver the repayment sum to Eleuterio. The existence of this arrangement is uncontested by the Spouses Villas. Thus, she insists that her payment to Atty. Dandal, the person authorized by Eleuterio, extinguished her obligation.

Second, she argues that the RTC correctly ruled that the condition imposed on her under the equitable mortgage, that is to pay her loan within two (2) years, should be considered as fulfilled since Eleuterio and Clarita made it impossible for her to comply with her obligation.

Third, her payment to Atty. Dandal already extinguished the obligation under the equitable mortgage. The fact that Eleuterio subsequently instructed Atty. Dandal to turn over the collection to Clarita, an instruction that petitioner did not approve of, did not revive the obligation. Further, her obligation was not revived by subsequent events such as the refusal of the Spouses Villas to accept the money and the return of the same to her by Atty. Dandal for safekeeping.

Fourth, she insists that, contrary to the position of the Spouses Villas, consignation is no longer available as a mode of extinguishing the loan obligation. This is because her payment to Atty. Dandal already extinguished the same.

In their Comment, 11 dated April 24, 2016, the Spouses Villas argued that while Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides the persons unto whom payment of an obligation shall be made, it does not state that payment to the persons specified is a mode of extinguishing an obligation. They insisted that unless and until actual payment is made to the person in whose favor the obligation is constituted and unless it is established that payment was in fact made to and received by the obligee, no payment or performance of an obligation is effected. In this case, Atty. Dandal failed to deliver the payment to the Spouses Villas. No payment was effected because Atty. Dandal returned the payment back to petitioner. Further, they insisted that while it is true that Clarita refused to accept the payment for having no knowledge of the loan transaction, there is a recourse available to petitioner under Article 1256 of the Civil Code. This is the tender of payment and consignation thereof. However, petitioner failed to avail of this remedy. Since petitioner failed to make payment within the two (2)-year period, the subject property slipped from her grasp. cDHAES

ISSUE

WHETHER THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is partly meritorious. The CA seriously erred in rendering the assailed decision and resolution. Petitioner's payment to Atty. Dandal, the authorized representative of Eleuterio, extinguished the obligation under the equitable mortgage. Atty. Dandal's act of returning the amount paid by petitioner to her did not revive her obligation under the equitable mortgage. Ownership over the subject property never vested in the person of Eleuterio or in the Spouses Villas.

Petitioner and Eleuterio

At the outset, the Court notes that the CA did not discuss the RTC's pronouncement about the nature of the agreement entered into by petitioner and Eleuterio. The RTC characterized the said agreement as an equitable mortgage, not a sale with a right to repurchase. The CA did not state whether or not it agreed with this finding of the lower court. It, however, referred to the said agreement as a "deed of sale with right to repurchase." For purposes of clarity, the Court will discuss the nature of the agreement entered into by petitioner and Eleuterio.

The Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner and Eleuterio entered into an equitable mortgage, not a sale with a right to repurchase.

An equitable mortgage is defined "as one which although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law." 12

Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:

(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;

(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. 13

The presence of even one of the circumstances in Art. 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of equitable mortgage. The express provision of Art. 1602 that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property rights. To stress, the existence of any one of the conditions under Art. 1602, not a concurrence, or an overwhelming number of such circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable mortgage. 14 Further, Art. 1603 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage."

The Court is convinced that the subject transaction entered into by petitioner and Eleuterio is one of equitable mortgage on the basis of paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 of Art. 1602. ASEcHI

First, the purchase price of the supposed sale is unusually inadequate. The object of the transaction is five hundred seventy-seven (577) square meters of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 56774. The price agreed upon is Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). As aptly observed by the RTC, this amount appears to be inadequate for the sale of this property.

Second, it is undisputed that petitioner remained in possession of the subject property. The RTC held that there is no showing that the Spouses Villas ever took possession of the subject property prior to the expiration of the two-year period. The Spouses Villas did not contest this finding in its pleadings before the Court despite petitioner referring to the "equitable mortgage" finding in its petition. 15

Third, it is evident that the parties entered into the subject transaction solely in consideration of the loan extended by Eleuterio to petitioner. The underlying cause of the subject transaction is the loan. In fact, the amount of the loan is the amount of the purchase price for the supposed sale of the subject property to Eleuterio. The RTC is correct in its observation that the parties' true intention is to secure the payment of the loan, not to transfer ownership of the subject property from petitioner to Eleuterio.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties entered into an equitable mortgage. In an equitable mortgage, nonpayment of the debt when due gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the loan obligation. 16

Did petitioner's payment to Atty. Dandal extinguish the equitable mortgage?

Petitioner's payment to Atty.

Obligations are extinguished by, among others, payment or performance. 17 Art. 1240 of the Civil Code provides that "[p]ayment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor-in-interest, or any person authorized to receive it."

In general, payment must be made to the proper person in order to discharge an obligation. Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment. 18 By express provision of law, payment made by the debtor to the person of the creditor or to one authorized by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes the obligation. 19

There is no merit to the Spouses Villas' contention that only payment to the person in whose favor the obligation was constituted extinguishes an obligation. The Civil Code is unequivocal that payment itself extinguishes an obligation. Payment may be made to the person in whose favor the obligation was constituted, his successor-in-interest, or to any person authorized to receive it. Thus, when an obligee makes payment to any of the persons enumerated in Art. 1240 of the Civil Code, his/her obligation is extinguished in accordance with Art. 1231 of the Civil Code. To rule otherwise would be to nullify the express provisions of the Civil Code.

In the instant case, petitioner asseverates that her obligation under the equitable mortgage was extinguished when she made payment to Atty. Dandal, the authorized representative of Eleuterio, before the expiration of the two-year period. In turn, the Spouses Villas contend that no valid payment was made because they did not actually receive the money paid. In fact, Atty. Dandal and petitioner admitted that the amount paid was returned by Atty. Dandal to petitioner.

Curiously, the Spouses Villas do not dispute Atty. Dandal's authority to receive the payment on behalf of Eleuterio. They did not refute the testimonies of Atty. Dandal and petitioner concerning the arrangement. They both testified that the arrangement between petitioner and Eleuterio was that all communications and payments shall be coursed through Atty. Dandal.

It is admitted, however, that Eleuterio subsequently instructed Atty. Dandal to have his wife, Clarita, receive the money from Atty. Dandal. 20 To quote, Atty. Dandal testified as follows: ITAaHc

Q: No, my question is, according to you, there was an instruction from Mr. Villas for the wife[,] for her[,] to accept the payment?

A: No, not to accept the payment, for me to give the payment to Mrs. Villas. Not to accept the payment. 21

Eleuterio's instruction did not change — Atty. Dandal was to accept the payment from petitioner on his behalf. However, instead of giving the money to Eleuterio, Atty. Dandal was to give the same to Clarita. The matter of whom Atty. Dandal shall give the money to after payment was effected by petitioner, is not the concern of the latter and has no relation with her obligation under the equitable mortgage. It is a matter internal to Atty. Dandal and Eleuterio.

Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner's obligation under the equitable mortgage has been extinguished. She validly made payment to Atty. Dandal, Eleuterio's authorized representative, within the two-year period. This payment was sufficient to extinguish her obligation under the equitable mortgage. The fact that Atty. Dandal was instructed by Eleuterio to give the payment he received to Clarita and that he failed to do so because of Clarita's refusal to accept it is irrelevant in determining whether petitioner complied with her obligation under the equitable mortgage so as to extinguish the same. Petitioner's obligation was to make payment to Eleuterio through Atty. Dandal within the prescribed two-year period, which she did. Hence, she discharged her obligation and the equitable mortgage was accordingly extinguished.

Similarly, it is incorrect to state that petitioner's obligation under the equitable mortgage is deemed fulfilled because Eleuterio and Clarita voluntarily prevented its fulfillment. Again, petitioner's obligation under the equitable mortgage was to make payment to Eleuterio through Atty. Dandal before the expiration of the two-year period given. She discharged this obligation. Since she complied with the obligation, it is, in fact, fulfilled and not merely deemed fulfilled by operation of law.

At this juncture, the Court would also like to point out that even if petitioner was adjudged to have failed to comply with her obligation under the equitable mortgage it would not have resulted to ownership of the subject property being automatically vested in Spouses Villas or in Eleuterio.

Contrary to the CA's finding, ownership over the subject property would not have automatically vested in Spouses Villas or in Eleuterio upon petitioner's failure to repay her loan within the period fixed. Jurisprudence is clear that, under an equitable mortgage, nonpayment of the debt when due only gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the loan obligation. 22 It does not give the mortgagee, or Eleuterio in this case, the right to automatically wrest ownership of the subject property from petitioner and vest it unto himself. This would be tantamount to pactum commissorium, a situation where the mortgagee is enabled to acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without need of any foreclosure proceedings. This is a nullity and is frowned upon, being contrary to the provisions of Art. 2088 of the Civil Code. 23 As stated, petitioner's failure to pay the loan would have only given Eleuterio the right to foreclose on the mortgage, sell the property and then apply the proceeds thereof towards the loan. It would not have vested ownership over the property in his person.

With regard the Spouses Villas' contention that petitioner should have made use of the provisions in the Civil Code concerning tender of payment and consignation, suffice to say that these provisions only apply to situations where the creditor refuses without just cause to accept the tender of payment. Herein, no refusal of the tender of payment occurred because Eleuterio's authorized representative, Atty. Dandal, accepted petitioner's tender of payment. Clearly, the Civil Code provisions on tender of payment and consignation do not apply.

Atty. Dandal's return of the

As previously discussed, petitioner's payment to Atty. Dandal, Eleuterio's authorized representative, extinguished her obligation under the equitable mortgage. Since Clarita refused to receive the money from Atty. Dandal and Eleuterio could not be found, he returned the money to petitioner. What effect did the return of the money to petitioner have on the equitable mortgage? Did it work to revive the same?

Atty. Dandal's return of the money to petitioner did not revive the original obligation under the equitable mortgage. CHTAIc

Since the original obligation was extinguished by virtue of petitioner's payment, any revival or renewal thereof would be in the form of a new contract entered into by the parties. In such case, all requisites for a valid contract must be present.

Art. 1318 of the Civil Code provides the essential requisites of a contract, to wit:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Consent of the contracting parties is essential for the existence of a contract. In the instant case, neither petitioner nor Eleuterio consented to the revival or renewal of the equitable mortgage. There is no indication in the records that petitioner knew, much less agreed, that her acceptance of the returned money from Atty. Dandal would mean a renewal of the equitable mortgage. It also appears that Eleuterio, being incommunicado, had no prior knowledge of Atty. Dandal's actions. Atty. Dandal was not authorized by Eleuterio to enter into another equitable mortgage on his behalf. Atty. Dandal's act of returning the payment to petitioner, specifically for the purpose of safekeeping, 24 could not bind Eleuterio to a new contract because Eleuterio did not give him authority to do so. The equitable mortgage was extinguished and was not renewed or revived by Atty. Dandal's return of the payment to petitioner.

The Court finds, however, that petitioner is obligated to return to Eleuterio the money she received from Atty. Dandal on the basis of the principle of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." 25 There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. 26

Here, petitioner would be unjustly benefited at the expense of Eleuterio if she were to keep the money. Thus, she should be ordered to return the same to Eleuterio or his heirs or assigns.

With regard the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774, Clarita testified before the RTC on October 27, 2010 that the same is in their home. 27 However, on May 9, 2013, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Eduardo J. Marino, manifested that they have learned that the Spouses Villas sold the property. Petitioner, on the same date, testified that a certain Efren Tamayo came to her and requested that she issue a deed of sale for the transfer of the property. Considering that a third party buyer appears to have intervened, the Court cannot validly order the return of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 56774 to petitioner. Such order would depend on whether the third party buyer is in good faith or not. Since the third party buyer was not impleaded in the present proceedings, no disposition on the matter may be had.

The Court reiterates that petitioner's payment to Atty. Dandal, the authorized representative of Eleuterio, discharged her obligation under the equitable mortgage. The equitable mortgage was extinguished by virtue of the said payment. Since the equitable mortgage was extinguished, Eleuterio's right to foreclose on the property did not arise. The ownership thereof was never vested in him, or his wife or the two of them as spouses. The money in the possession of petitioner due to Atty. Dandal's return of the same should be returned by her to Eleuterio, or his heirs or assigns, on the basis of the principle of unjust enrichment. This resolution is without prejudice to any right that the alleged third party buyer may have over the subject property, as may be adjudged by a court of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 26, 2015 Decision and the November 27, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102234 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 27, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, is REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATIONS, as follows: EATCcI

1. The cross-claim filed by defendants Eleuterio and Clarita Villas against Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo is DISMISSED as the deed of sale with repurchase executed by the parties on September 30, 1987 had been extinguished by the full payment of the loan made by petitioner Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo;

2. Petitioner Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo is ORDERED to return to Eleuterio Villas, or his heirs or assigns, as the case may be, the sum of Seventy Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty Pesos (P70,860.00) by virtue of the Principle of unjust enrichment;

3. The conditional deed of sale executed between respondent Rosario Yap Bautista and petitioner Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo is ineffectual as the condition stated therein had not been fulfilled;

4. Petitioner Lagrimas Dela Rosa Lazo is DIRECTED to reimburse respondent Rosario Yap Bautista or her heirs and assigns, the amount of Eighty-Nine Thousand Pesos (P89,000.00), representing the aggregate amount the latter has advanced to her, with damages by way of interests, at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to be reckoned from November 4, 2000.

All amounts granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision. ISHCcT

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 37-51; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan and Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of this Court), concurring.

2.Id. at 53-55.

3.Id. at 98-108; penned by Presiding Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar.

4.Id. at 40.

5. Records (Vol. II), pp. 5, 7, and 9.

6.Rollo, p. 41.

7.Id. at 79.

8.Id. at 42; Records (Vol. III), p. 490.

9. TSN, May 10, 2013, p. 36.

10.Id. at 37.

11.Rollo, pp. 168-172.

12.Spouses Lumayag v. Heirs of Nemeño, 553 Phil. 293, 303 (2007).

13. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1602.

14.Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, et al., 380 Phil. 736, 742 (2000).

15.Rollo, p. 104.

16.Spouses Alvaro v. Spouses Ternida, et al., 515 Phil. 267, 272 (2006).

17. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1231.

18.Cembrano, et al. v. City of Butuan, et al., 533 Phil. 773, 790-791 (2006).

19.Id. at 790.

20. TSN, July 12, 2013, p. 10.

21. Id.

22. Spouses Alvaro v. Spouses Ternida, et al., supra note 16.

23. Spouses Lumayag v. Heirs of Nemeño, supra note 12, at 306.

24. Judicial Affidavit of Atty. Dandal dated July 8, 2013, p. 3; rollo, p. 94.

25. Filinvest Land, Inc., et al. v. Backy, et al., 697 Phil. 403, 412 (2012).

26. Id.

27. TSN, October 27, 2010, p. 14.