Laroco v. Commission on Audit

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 252421. September 28, 2021.]

ARMANDO C. LAROCO AND JESUS M. DIAZ, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedSEPTEMBER 28, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252421 (Armando C. Laroco and Jesus M. Diaz v. Commission on Audit). — This Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court assails the Decision No. 2015-003 2 dated January 28, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated November 25, 2019 of the Commission on Audit (COA) Proper, which affirmed the Decision No. 2012-008 4 dated October 12, 2012 of the COA Regional Office No. 1 (COA-RO1).

FACTS

In 2005, the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) embarked on a project for the construction of the Urdaneta City Water Supply System, which involved pipelaying works, construction of two (2) pump station complexes, and provision for service connections. The project was awarded to R-II Builders, Inc. with its original bid cost of P108,812,800.20. 5 In the course of the project, two (2) Variance Orders for additional costings were issued in 2006 6 and 2007, 7 which came out to the final contract amount of P116,800,970.10. 8

In 2010, the COA's inspection and technical evaluation of the completed project revealed that:

1. Actual volume of excavation/backfilling and compaction is deficient compared with the paid volume because some areas did not meet the minimum depth of pipe cover of 0.76M as required, resulting in a cost difference of [P]453,100.83.

2. Sand bedding was not installed causing a cost difference of [P]13,130,192.01.

3. The Final Progress Payment Report No. 09 (indicating 100% accomplishment), the Certificate of Provisional Acceptance[,] and the Certificate of Final Acceptance were all issued on the same day, September 01, 2006. 9

Based on these findings, Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 10-001-KFW (06) 10 dated February 15, 2008 was issued, suspending the total cost difference of P13,583,292.84 or the amount paid for sand bedding and backfilling works, which were not actually used in the project. Several officers of the Urdaneta City Water District (UCWD), R-II Builders, Inc., and the LWUA, which include petitioners Armando C. Laroco (Laroco) as Resident Engineer and Jesus M. Diaz (Diaz) as Project Manager, were held liable to settle the disallowed amount. Petitioners received the ND on September 9, 2010. 11

On February 24, 2011, petitioners sent separate Letters-Appeals 12 to the COA Audit Team Leader. In a 1st Indorsement 13 dated March 1, 2011, coursed through Federico S. Esteves (Esteves), General Manager of UCWD, petitioners were informed that their Letters-Appeals cannot be acted upon due to their failure to pay the appeal fee in violation of COA Resolution No. 2008-005 dated February 15, 2008. 14

On March 7, 2011, petitioners paid the appeal fee and, through Esteves, forwarded the Letters-Appeals to the COA-RO1, requesting that the same be considered as an appeal to the Regional Director. 15 In these Letters-Appeals, petitioners argued that the disallowed amount pertaining to the deficiency in sand bedding was erroneously based on Division 19 16 — Special Provisions of the Bidding Documents, which conflicts with the provisions of Division 3 17 — Bid Form and Division 4 18 — Breakdown of Prices of the Contract Documents. Division 7 19 of the Contract Documents was then invoked, stating that the provisions of the Bid Form together with the Breakdown of Unit Prices should prevail over the Special Provisions in case of conflict. 20

Specifically, petitioners claimed that the provisions of Division 3 imply that sand bedding was not an integral part of the pipelaying works as it was to be implemented only if required by the Resident Engineer. As such, petitioners contended that the sand bedding cost is not part of the bid and is separate from the pipelaying cost item. Since Laroco admitted that he did not require sand bedding on areas where the excavated trench has sandy and silty formation, i.e., most of the areas covered by the pipelaying, petitioners maintained that there is no basis to apply the provision in Division 19, stating that the sand bedding cost should be deducted from the pipelaying cost. Concerning the deficiency in the excavation and backfilling works, petitioners argued that the method used by the COA Technical Audit Specialist was not accurate as it assumed that potholes on the laid pipelines have constant depth when in reality, the depth of the trench excavations in the pipelaying works vary depending on the actual field conditions. 21

COA-RO1 RULING

In Decision No. 2012-008 22 dated October 12, 2012, the Regional Director found no conflict in the provisions of Division 19 on one hand, and Divisions 3 and 4 on the other. There was nothing in Division 3, invoked by petitioners, which states that sand bedding works were not part of the bid price or pipelaying works. The truth of the matter is, both Division 19 and Division 3 provide that sand bedding materials shall be sourced from borrowed areas, unless otherwise specified; while Division 4 includes as an integral part of the price of the pipelaying works the costs of excavation, backfill, and sand bedding. It is undisputed that Laroco did not require sand bedding works in most part of the project as those areas have sandy and silty formation when excavated, meaning the materials in the area were sufficient for bedding purposes. Since the bedding used was admittedly borrowed materials, their cost should necessarily be deducted from the pipelaying cost as provided in Division 19. As regards the deficiency in excavation and backfilling works, petitioners' allegations were not supported by any evidence, hence, considered mere statements without probative value. COA-RO1 disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no cogent reason to warrant the reversal of the decision of the Auditor, the instant appeal is hereby denied for lack of merit. [ND] No. 10-001-KFW (06) in the amount of [P]13,583,292.84 is hereby AFFIRMED. 23

Petitioners received the COA-RO1 Decision on December 6, 2012. 24 On December 11, 2012, they filed a petition for review to the COA Proper. 25

COA PROPER RULING

In its assailed Decision No. 2015-003 26 dated January 28, 2015, petitioners' appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time as follows:

The appeal of [p]etitioners before the [Regional Director] was deemed filed only upon the payment of the filing fee on March 7, 2011 and not on February 24, 2011, the date the [Audit Team Leader] received the [L]etter-[A]ppeals. This is because the payment of the required filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement in accordance with Section 2, Rule V of the [2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA] RRPC, in relation to COA Resolution No. 2008-005, which provides that appeals from ND must be accompanied by proof of payment of the filing fee. The Supreme Court explained in the case of Zamora vs. Commission on Elections and Bartolome Bastasa, that the payment of the filing fee is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance is a valid basis for the dismissal of the case. Thus, consistent with the said precept, COA Resolution No. 2008-005 requires that a copy of the official receipt evidencing the payment of the filing fees shall be attached to the pleading, otherwise, the adjudicating bodies/offices shall not take action thereon.

The contention of Mr. Diaz and Mr. Laroco that it was only Mr. Malicdem [LWUA Senior Deputy Administrator; also charged liable in the ND] who received a copy of the decision of the [Regional Director] cannot be appreciated. The decision was mailed to LWUA in Quezon City where [p]etitioners were assigned, and was received by said agency on November 23, 2012 as per Registry Return Receipt, and not on November 26, 2012 as averred by [p]etitioners. More significantly, Mr. Diaz and Mr. Laroco admitted that Mr. Malicdem furnished them a copy on December 6, 2012 or thirteen (13) days after Mr. Malicdem received the decision on November 23, 2012. Nonetheless, even assuming that Mr. Diaz and Mr. Laroco received a copy of the decision only on December 6, 2012, the instant petition was filed beyond the prescribed six-month period under the RRPC.

Indubitably, the assailed decision [of the Regional Director] became final and executory for failure to appeal within the reglementary period as provided under Section 22.1 of the Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts (RRSA) and Section 51 of Presidential Decree [PD] No. 1445.

xxx xxx xxx

As such, the assailed decision can no longer be altered or modified in any respect. x x x.

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the x x x petition for review of Mr. Emmanuel B. Malicdem, Mr. Armando C. Laroco[,] and Mr. Jesus M. Diaz is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time. Accordingly, [COA-RO1] Decision No. 2012-008 dated October 12, 2012, which affirmed [ND] No. 10-001-KFW (06) dated February 15, 2008, on the deficiencies in the implementation of the Urdaneta City Water District KFW-PTWSP I & II, in the total amount of [P]13,583,292.84, is final and executory. 27 (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners received a copy of the COA Proper Decision on April 22, 2015. 28 They filed a Motion for Reconsideration 29 on May 2, 2016, 30 but the COA Proper En Banc denied it for being filed out of time as reflected in Notice No. 2020-009 31 dated February 12, 2020. Petitioners received the notice of denial on March 9, 2020. 32 Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners insist that they filed their appeal on the ND on February 24, 2011, when the Audit Team Leader received their Letters-Appeals, not on March 7, 2011 when the Letters-Appeals were forwarded to the COA-RO1 with paid appeal fees. They blamed the Audit Team Leader for not informing them about the required filing fees, and that the appeal should be filed before the Regional Director. They thus plead for liberality in the application of procedural rules. 33 Petitioners then reiterated their arguments on the substantive matters, adding that the contract between the LWUA and R-II Builders was a lump-sum contract, and as such, there should be no decrease in the cost if there is a reduction in the materials actually used compared to that indicated in the bid. 34 Petitioners also argue that, in any case, they should not be held liable for the disallowed amount as there was no proof that they caused the overpayment or that they benefitted from it. 35

In its Comment, 36 the COA Proper maintains that it did not commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for being filed late as it was merely acting in accordance with established rules. On the merits, the COA Proper stands by the COA-RO1 ruling, and counters petitioners' argument on the lump-sum nature of the contract by citing Division 19, which provides that in case the selected bedding material from the trench is suitable, the corresponding cost shall be deducted from the pipelaying cost. Petitioners' adjudged liability on the disallowance was likewise in accordance with the law and settled rules on the personal liability of public officials who are directly responsible for the illegal expenditure of public funds. 37

ISSUE

Whether the COA Proper gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' petition for review for being filed out of time.

RULING

The petition lacks merit.

The procedures to appeal the ND, the

The RRPC, as amended, 38 clearly laid down the procedure for appealing the ND as follows:

RULE IV

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SEC. 8. Finality of the Auditor's Decision. — Unless an appeal to the Director is taken, the decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months from the date of receipt thereof.

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RULE V

SEC. 1. Who May Appeal. — An aggrieved party may appeal from the decision of the Auditor to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.

SEC. 2. How Appeal Taken. — The appeal to the Director shall be taken by filing an Appeal Memorandum with the Director, copy furnished the Auditor. Proof of service of a copy to the Auditor shall be attached to the Appeal Memorandum. Proof of Payment of the filing fee prescribed under these Rules shall likewise be attached to the Appeal Memorandum.

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SEC. 4. When Appeal Taken. — An Appeal must be filed within six (6) months after receipt of the decision appealed from.

SEC. 5. Interruption of Time to Appeal. — The receipt by the Director of the Appeal Memorandum shall stop the running of the period to appeal which shall resume to run upon receipt by the appellant of the Director's decision.

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RULE VII

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SEC. 2. How Appeal Taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a Petition for Review in five (5) legible copies, with the Commission Secretariat, a copy of which shall be served on the Director x x x who rendered the decision. Proof of service thereof shall be attached to the petition together with the proof of payment of the filing fee prescribed under these Rules.

SEC. 3. Period to Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within the time remaining of the six (6) months period under Section 4, Rule V, taking into account the suspension of the running thereof under Section 5 of the same Rule in case of appeals from the Director's decision, x x x.

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RULE X

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SEC. 9. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. — A decision or resolution of the Commission upon any matter within its jurisdiction shall become final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from notice of the decision or resolution.

The filing of the petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order sought to be reviewed, unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

SEC. 10. Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion for reconsideration may be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the decision or resolution, on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or that the said decision of the Commission is contrary to law. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Commission shall be entertained. (Emphases supplied.)

After exhaustion of these administrative remedies, judicial review of the COA's actions may be elevated to this Court in accordance with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court: 39

SEC. 2. Mode of review. — A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (Emphases supplied.)

These rules were patently disregarded. Petitioners committed Procedural Blunders — some attempts were justified by excuses, too flimsy and unacceptable to be given consideration, while some were not even explained. As will be discussed, these lapses rendered the COA-RO1's and the COA Proper's Decisions final and immutable, warranting the dismissal of the Petition.

Petitioners' Procedural Blunder started when they sent separate Letters-Appeals on February 24, 2011 to the Audit Team Leader instead of questioning the ND before the Director who has jurisdiction over their agency in accordance with Section 1, Rule V of the RRPC above-cited. Worse, petitioners failed to pay filing fees for their appeal. It was only on March 7, 2011, that they paid the required appeal fees, and forwarded the Letters-Appeals to the COA-RO1. The RRPC is clear in requiring the proof of payment of the filing fee to be attached in the appeal to the Director. 40 Section 5, Rule IX of the RRPC expressly requires payment of a filing fee for every appeal from audit disallowance, and "[a]ny appeal/petition without the required filing fee will be returned to the party concerned for compliance with such requirement." COA Resolution No. 2008-005 dated February 15, 2008, also explicitly provides that "[a] copy of the official receipt [of the paid filing fee] shall be attached to the pleading, otherwise, the adjudicating bodies/offices shall not take action thereon." 41 Needless to say, the COA promulgated these rules in the exercise of its rule-making power, 42 sanctioned by no less than the Constitution. 43 We have declared in The Department of Foreign Affairs v. The Commission on Audit44 that "[t]he payment of filing fees in a judicial and quasi-judicial set up has always been recognized as essential in our jurisdiction, and has always been recognized as an allowable limitation to the right to appeal." 45 Hence, the COA-RO1, as affirmed by the COA Proper, acted within its jurisdiction in considering petitioners to have filed an appeal from the ND only on March 7, 2011, when their Letters-Appeals were forwarded to the Regional Director, accompanied by the proof of payment of the filing fee.

Since the ND was received on September 9, 2010, and the appeals were filed before the COA-RO1 on March 7, 2011 or the 179th day of the 180-day reglementary period, petitioners were left with one (1) day to question the adverse Decision of the COA-RO1 before the COA Proper. Petitioners admitted that they were furnished a copy of the COA-RO1's Decision on December 6, 2012, and therefore, had the following day to appeal. However, the Petition for Review was filed on December 11, 2012, which was four (4) days beyond the remaining one day of the 180-day period. At this point, Decision No. 2012-008 of the COA-RO1 had already attained finality. In the recent case of Paguio v. Commission on Audit, 46 we sustained the COA Proper's dismissal of a belatedly filed Petition for Review, consistent with Section 51 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445 47 or the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," which states that "[a] decision of the Commission or of any auditor upon any matter within its or his jurisdiction, if not appealed [in accordance with the COA's rules of procedure,] shall be final and executory." Section 22.1 of COA Circular No. 2009-06 similarly states that "[a] decision of the x x x Director or Auditor upon any matter within their respective jurisdiction, if not appealed as [provided in its rules of procedure], shall become final and executory."

Petitioners' unjustified procedural errors did not end there. As shown by the records, petitioners received the COA Proper's Decision on April 22, 2015. 48 Without any explanation, however, they sought reconsideration only on May 2, 2016, or 375 days after their receipt of the COA Proper's adverse Decision. Section 10, Rule X of the RRPC, as amended, is clear: a Motion for Reconsideration should be filed within 30 days from Notice of the assailed Decision. Section 9 of the same Rule expressly states that a Decision or Resolution of the COA shall become final and executory after the lapse of 30 days from Notice of the Decision or Resolution. Thus, Decision No. 2015-003 of the COA Proper had also attained finality long before the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, the COA Proper did not commit Grave Abuse of Discretion when it dismissed petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time.

Moreover, this petition was also filed beyond the reglementary period, warranting its outright dismissal. 49 Petitioners erroneously believed that they had a fresh 30-day period upon receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration on March 9, 2020, to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court, invoking the first sentence of Section 3, Rule 64. They, however, failed to consider the rest of the provision, in conjunction with Sections 9 and 10, Rule X of the RRPC, as amended. 50 Taken together, the rules essentially state that the 30-day period should be reckoned from the COA Proper's assailed Decision, not from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. The filing of the Motion for Reconsideration merely interrupts the running of the 30-day period; and upon its denial, the aggrieved party only has the remainder of the 30-day period, not less than five (5) days, to file a petition for Certiorari before the Court. The application of the proviso "which should not be less than five (5) days" under Section 3 of Rule 64 cannot be expanded to mean "extra five (5) days" for parties who have exhausted more than 30 days of the reglementary period. The lapse of 375 days from receipt of the COA Proper's Decision before they filed their Motion for Reconsideration undeniably shows that petitioners do not have the remaining period contemplated under Rule 64. As a consequence, petitioners lost their remedy before the Court due to their series of Procedural Blunders. Well-established is the rule that the Special Civil Action of Certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. One of the requisites of Certiorari is that there be no available appeal or plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. When an appeal was available and not properly availed of like in this case, Certiorari will not prosper, even if Grave Abuse of Discretion is alleged. 51

The COA-RO1 and COA Proper's

The final and executory Decisions of the COA-RO1 and COA Proper had long become immutable and unalterable, precluding modification in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. 52 It is settled, a party to an original action who fails to question an adverse judgment or decision by not filing the proper remedy in the manner and within the period prescribed by law, loses the right to do so, and the judgment or decision, as to him or her, becomes final and binding. 53 This time-honored principle is dictated by considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. 54 To be sure, the Court is aware of the jurisprudentially-recognized exceptions 55 to the Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment, but none of them applies to this case. Neither is there any compelling reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. As discussed, petitioners failed to proffer acceptable explanations for the Court to consider excusing their recurring nonobservance of the established rules. It is settled, every plea for a liberal construction of the rules must be accompanied by a justification for the requested liberality. 56 No Grave Abuse of Discretion can, therefore, be imputed against the COA Proper in dismissing petitioners' Petition for Review for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

The petition has no substantive merit.

Even on its merits, the Petition is dismissible. Let it be emphasized that the scope of the Court's review under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is limited only to matters involving public respondent's jurisdiction, i.e., confined to determining whether the COA Proper acted arbitrarily or whimsically in issuing the assailed Decision and Resolution. 57 Issues on factual matters, which were not addressed by the COA Proper are beyond the scope of our judicial review. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially on purely factual and technical matters as in this case, not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also because of their presumed expertise in the laws that they are entrusted to enforce. 58 Thus, absent any semblance of Grave Abuse of Discretion, and also for lack of sufficient evidence on record for the Court to make judicious factual determinations, We accord not only respect but also finality, to these findings, viz.:

After careful review and evaluation, this Office finds [petitioners'] arguments untenable. Section III, Division 19.03.02(e.3), Special Provisions of the Bidding Documents, Volume I, provides:

Sand bedding unless otherwise specified shall be borrowed material, the cost of which is included in the unit cost of pipelaying and with minimum characteristics specified herein. In case selected bedding material from trench is suitable, corresponding cost shall be deducted from the cost of pipelaying.

On the other hand, Section I, Division 3 — Bid Form, Part IV(B.II.2.10), Miscellaneous [P]rovisions thereof provides:

The Contractor shall furnish and install sand bedding/backfill from borrowed area, crushed rock bedding, reinforced concrete encasement and concrete thrust blocks/concrete anchor block as needed or instructed by the Engineer and shall be paid for as indicated in the corresponding pay item. Rock excavation and limestone/coral excavation, shall be paid in accordance to [sic] the pay item shown herein. x x x

While Section I, Division 4, Table B — Breakdown of Price of the Contract Documents, Work Item II — Pipelines and Related Works, specifically includes the costs of excavation, backfill[,] and sand bedding as an integral part of the laying of pipes.

Upon careful scrutiny of the above-quoted provisions, this Office finds no conflict between the provisions of Division 19 as basis for the disallowance and the provisions of Divisions 3 and 4 of the Contract Documents, as argued by [petitioners]. In the above-quoted provisions under Division 19 and Division 3, it clearly provides that sand bedding/backfill materials shall be sourced from borrowed area; while Division 4 includes as an integral part of the price of the pipelaying works the costs of excavation, backfill[,] and sand bedding.

[Petitioners] in their letter appeal pointed out that the Resident Engineer did not require sand bedding in areas where the excavated trench is under normal condition, sandy, and silty; and that the excavated material is suitable for backfilling works; and that almost all of the areas where pipelaying works were undertaken have sandy and silty formation when excavated and did not need sand bedding.

Considering that the bedding material used was taken from the trench as pointed out by herein [petitioners], necessarily the cost thereof should be deducted from the cost of the pipelaying works as provided in Section III, Division 19.03.02(e.3), Special Provisions of the Bidding Documents; and therefore[,] should be disallowed.

On the disallowed amount x x x pertaining to the deficiencies in the excavation and backfilling works per COA Technical Inspection Report, [petitioners] contended that as pointed out by their Resident Engineer, the method used by the COA Technical Audit Specialist in conducting the evaluation and inspection of the Pipelines and Related Works is not accurate as it assumed that no point in the total length of the trench under consideration is deeper than the two potholes and could not represent the actual depth of the pipelines. [Petitioners] further contended that the depth of trench excavation in the project sites varies depending on the actual field conditions such as in culvert crossing and in interconnection works to existing pipelines. And that for pipelines laid along the main highway, the depth of the pipes laid on shoulder decrease due to ground scraping activities during the road-widening project of the DPWH; and that the pipelaying activities were undertaken prior to the implementation of the road-widening project of the DPWH. However, [petitioners] did not submit any evidence in support of their argument thus the same are considered mere statements without probative value. 59 (Emphases supplied.)

Indeed, the COA-RO1 was correct in harmonizing the provisions of the contract instead of pitting one against the other. It is improper for petitioners to cite fragmentary provisions of the contract to argue that the sand bedding cost was not part of the bid amount or the pipelaying cost. Basic is the rule that in interpreting a contract, its provisions should not be read in isolation, but in relation to each other and in their entirety, so as to render them effective, having in mind the intention of the parties and the purpose to be achieved. Various contract stipulations shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 60

As regards the deficiency in excavation and backfilling works, petitioners' allegations remain unsubstantiated, deserving scant consideration. The COA Technical Audit Specialist's findings, as affirmed by the COA-RO1, must stand.

Therefore, petitioners cannot now validly claim that the contract was on a lump-sum basis, and to that the contract price should be paid despite fewer volumes of sand bedding or backfilling being used in the project. As found by the COA-RO1 through the pertinent contract provisions, in case sand bedding is not required as the bedding material in the excavated trench is suitable, its corresponding cost is deductible from the cost of the pipelaying works. 61

There was no grave abuse of

We reiterate that the COA-RO1 Decision, as well as the COA Proper's Decision, had long attained finality and immutability. Hence, any discussion on their alleged good faith is immaterial. 62 As Resident Engineer and Project Manager, certifying and approving the final progress payment report as true and accurate despite such deficiencies negate the presumption of good faith and prudence on their part. In Madera v. Commission on Audit, 63 we entrenched the rule that approving and certifying officers of disallowed transactions incur solidary liability to settle the disallowed amount upon a finding of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of their official duties.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Accordingly, Decision No. 2015-003 dated January 28, 2015 and Resolution dated November 25, 2019 of the Commission on Audit Proper, which affirmed Decision No. 2012-008 dated October 12, 2012 of the COA Regional Office No. 1, are AFFIRMED." (72)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-20.

2.Id. at 21-25. Signed by Chairperson Ma. Gracia M. Pulido Tan with Commissioners Heidi L. Mendoza and Jose A. Fabia.

3. See Notice No. 2020-009 dated February 12, 2020; id. at 26.

4.Id. at 52-54. Penned by Regional Director Delfin P. Aguilar.

5.Id. at 6.

6. See LWUA Board Resolution No. 181, Series of 2006; id. at 93.

7. See LWUA Board Resolution No. 109, Series of 2007; id. at 93-94.

8.Id. at 94.

9.Id. at 6-7.

10.Id. at 27-28.

11.Id. at 7.

12.Id. at 32-34; and 44-46.

13.Id. at 47.

14.Id.

15.Id. at 7.

16. Sand bedding unless otherwise specified shall be borrowed material, the cost of which is included in the unit cost of pipelaying and with minimum characteristics specified herein. In case selected bedding material from trench is suitable, corresponding cost shall be deducted from the cost of pipelaying.

17. A.1 For pipelaying works without sand bedding, payments were made using unit prices for the following subcomponents of Item IIA — Pipelines:

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A.2 In areas where sand bedding is required, the volume of sand bedding placed is computed separately and paid based on the unit price for Miscellaneous Item IIH.5 — Sand Bedding; id. at 13.

18. Table B — Breakdown of Prices, II. Pipeline and Related Works:

IIA.1. TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION PIPES. Includes earthworks (excavation on common soil, backfill, bedding) x x x.

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IIH.5. Sand bedding/backfill from borrowed area to be furnished and installed when ordered by the Engineer x x x.; id. at 35, 38.

19. 7.01. Specifications, Drawings and Discrepancies

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d. In case of conflict or discrepancies between the Bill of Quantities, the Specifications and the Drawings, the following priorities will be applied in descending order:

- The Basic Contract

- The Bill of Quantities (Bid Form) together with Annex I — Breakdown of Unit

- Price

- The Special Provisions of the Contract

- The Technical Provisions of the Contract

- The Drawings

- The General Conditions; id. at 43-44.

20.Id. at 32-34; and 44-46.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 52-54.

23.Id. at 91.

24.Id. at 22.

25.Id. at 8.

26.Id. at 21-25.

27.Id. at 22-24.

28.Id. at 4.

29.Id. at 126-131.

30.Id. at 4.

31.Id. at 26.

32.Id. at 4.

33.Id. at 9-12.

34.Id. at 12-15.

35.Id. at 15-16.

36.Id. at 166-191.

37.Id. at 184-185.

38. COA RESOLUTION NO. 2011-006, RESOLUTION MODIFYING SECTIONS 9 AND 10, RULE X OF THE 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT dated August 17, 2011.

39. 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Rule XII, SEC. 1. Petition for Certiorari. — Any decision order or resolution of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. x x x.

40. 2009 REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Rule V, SEC. 2., in-text.

41. See The Department of Foreign Affairs v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194530, July 7, 2020.

42. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article IX-D, SEC. 2 (2). The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

43. See The Department of Foreign Affairs v. The Commission on Audit, supra note 41.

44.Id.

45.Id.

46. G.R. No. 223547, April 27, 2021.

47. Entitled "ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 11, 1978.

48.Rollo, p. 4.

49. See Abpi v. Commision on Audit, G.R. No. 252367, July 14, 2020.

50. See Abrenica v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218185, September 14, 2021.

51. See Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768, 782-783 (2004).

52. See Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222710, September 10, 2019; Orlina v. Ventura, G.R. No. 227033, December 3, 2018; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222838, September 4, 2018; and Republic v. Heirs of Cirilo Gotengco, 824 Phil. 568, 578 (2018).

53.Ocampo v. Court of Appeals (Former 2nd Division), 601 Phil. 43, 49 (2009).

54.Team Pacific Corporation v. Daza, 690 Phil. 427, 441 (2012).

55. "(1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable," Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222710, September 10, 2019; "We have also allowed the relaxation of the rule in order to serve substantial justice in considering: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby," as cited in Estalilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217448, September 10, 2019; See Torres v. Aruego, 818 Phil. 524, 535 (2017).

56.Binga Hydroelectric Plant, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 836 Phil. 46, 54 (2018).

57.Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 235832, November 3, 2020.

58.Ablong v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 233308, August 18, 2020.

59.Rollo, pp. 90-91.

60.UCPB General Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hughes Electronics Corporation, 800 Phil. 67 (2016).

61. See Section III, Division 19.03.02 (e.3), id. at 90; and NEW CIVIL CODE, ART. 1374. Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. x x x.

62.Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213425, April 27, 2021.

63. G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020.