FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198329. August 8, 2016.]
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (DULY SUBSTITUTED BY TORTUGA VALLEY PLANTATION, INC., petitioner, vs. MAMPISING CARP BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 8, 2016, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 198329 — LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (DULY SUBSTITUTED BY TORTUGA VALLEY PLANTATION, INC., Petitioner, v. MAMPISING CARP BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent. — The compliance of Atty. Israelito P. Torreon with the Show Cause Resolution dated January 11, 2016 is DISPENSED WITH.
The petitioner hereby seeks to undo the resolutions promulgated on November 30, 2010 and August 3, 2011, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed its petition for review based on Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on the ground of its supposed failure to comply with the CA's directive to submit documents relevant to the genuineness and authenticity of the agreements entered into between the parties herein, and denied its motion for reconsideration, disposing as follows:
Resolution dated November 30, 2010
In view thereof, and pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides for case dismissal founded on petitioner's failure to comply with any order of the Court, this Court DISMISSES the instant petition. 1
Resolution dated August 3, 2011
ACCORDINGLY, the petitioner's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Compliance dated December 30, 2010 is DENIED. This Court's Resolution of November 30, 2010, dismissing the instant petition, stands. 2
Antecedents
This case originated from the action for the declaration of the nullity of lease agreements and for the recovery of possession initiated by respondent Mampising CARP Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (MCBCI) against petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (Lapanday) in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Tagum City on November 16, 2001. 3
On September 23, 2002, the DARAB Regional Adjudication Board, ruling in favor of Lapanday, 4 dismissed the complaint of MCBCI and upheld the lease agreements. MCBCI appealed to the DARAB Central Office, 5 which, on April 20, 2005, reversed the ruling, and declared the lease agreements null and void. 6 Lapanday moved for reconsideration and for inhibition, 7 but the DARAB Central Office denied the motion of Lapanday on September 28, 2006. 8 Thence, Lapanday appealed to the CA.
While the appeal of Lapanday was pending in the CA, certain events supervened. The CA set forth such supervening events chronologically in the second assailed resolution of August 3, 2011, 9 as follows:
(1) June 11, 2010 — The respective counsels of Lapanday and MCBCI filed a Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case; CAIHTE
(2) July 26, 2010 — The CA received the so-called Manifestation whereby "160 members of Mampising CARP Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc." stated that "they have not approved any Compromise Agreement between their Cooperative and Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation, petitioner, as of this date;"
(3) July 27, 2010 — The CA promulgated its resolution noting the apparent lack of authority in the execution and filing of the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case and its accompanying documents. It thereby directed the submission by Lapanday and MCBCI of the necessary documents that could convince it that the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case and the attached agreements had been duly executed and filed by the duly authorized representatives of the parties to the case;
(4) November 30, 2010 — The CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for review for failure of the parties to comply with the July 27, 2010 resolution;
(5) January 11, 2011 — Lapanday filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Compliance dated December 10, 2010, attaching thereto a secretary's certificate allegedly "showing the approval of the Memorandum of Agreement by the General Assembly of Mampising CARP Beneficiaries Cooperative;" and praying for the reconsideration of the November 30, 2010 resolution and for the granting of the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case.
(6) March 10, 2011 — The respective counsels of Lapanday and MCBCI submitted a Joint Manifestation with Supplemental Motion, appending thereto a secretary's certificate issued on behalf of MCBCI supposedly showing "the Board Resolution that would attest to the authority of respondent's representatives/directors in signing the Exclusive Option to Purchase Bananas Agreement, and that of its counsel to effect the dismissal of this case;"
(7) March 25, 2011 — The respective counsels of Lapanday and MCBCI filed a Joint Manifestation with Submission, containing the board resolution, the secretary's certificate, the certification issued by MCBCI's election committee, the minutes of MCBCI's 17th and 18th General Assembly, and a copy of MCBCI's By-Laws indicating that MCBCI, through its Board of Directors, had adopted and affirmed the June 24, 2009 Memorandum of Agreement and the June 24, 2009 Exclusive Option to Purchase Bananas Agreement (EOPBA), both agreements being submitted with the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case; DETACa
(8) April 5, 2011 — The respective counsels of Lapanday and MCBCI submitted through their Joint Supplemental Manifestation with Additional Submission the notarized copies of the board resolution and the certification of the election issued by MCBCI;
(9) April 15, 2011 — MCBCI filed a Comment to Petitioner's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Compliance, joining Lapanday's submissions and prayer for relief in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Compliance dated December 10, 2010; and
(10) April 19, 2011 — The Manifestation on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner on the Resolution Dismissing the Petition filed by "160 opposing members of MCB-MPC Mampising CARP Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative," stating that "the former officers of the respondent-cooperative herein have been taking an active participation in the above-entitled case without the knowledge and authority of the general membership of the Cooperative." Attached were documents disclosing that "the steps taken in this case" had "no authority coming from the general membership of the Cooperative." The 160-member group of oppositors urged that it "be allowed to take part in this case and be notified of any proceedings as well as be furnished with pleadings, notices, and orders in the above-entitled case."
In the first assailed resolution of November 30, 2010, the CA specified the reasons for dismissing Lapanday's petition for review, to wit: firstly, MCBCI's General Assembly Resolution No. 4, Series of 2008, which merely approved an unspecified memorandum of agreement "between Greendale Agricultural Development, Inc. and MCBCI," and such approval could not be construed as the specific authority to the Board of Directors to enter into the Memorandum of Agreement dated June 4, 2009 with Greendale Agricultural Development, Inc., TVPI and the Department of Agrarian Reform; 10 secondly, although it appeared in General Assembly Resolution No. 5, Series of 2009, that MCBCI had ratified the execution of the Exclusive Option to Purchase Bananas Agreement (EOPBA) with Unifrutti Grower's Services, Inc. on 14 June 2008, it was observed that the instrument the resolution was supposed to "confirm or ratify" had been executed only a year later, or on June 24, 2009; 11 thirdly, it was suspicious that only secretary's certificates had been issued and filed instead of the actual copies of the resolutions of the Board of Directors expressly authorizing the representatives of MCBCI; and that the secretary's certificates, which had been signed by Efrin Cagumbay and Emily D. Margatinez, merely quoted portions of the supposed resolutions; 12 and, fourthly, MCBCI's Board Resolution No. 18, Series of 2011, issued on March 14, 2011 to adopt the Memorandum of Agreement of June 24, 2009 and the June 24, 2009 EOPBA entered into by MCBCI and Unifrutti Growers Services, only bolstered the finding that the instruments embodying the supposed compromise agreement were executed and submitted to the CA without the authority of MCBCI. aDSIHc
The CA pointed out that the execution of the instruments embodying the supposed compromise agreement had been challenged by 160 members of MCBCI, as borne out by the Manifestations filed on July 26, 2010 and April 19, 2011; that the cause for the challenge, being of a serious nature, could not be disregarded; that the very subject matter of the petition for review was another Memorandum of Agreement that the DARAB Central Office had itself declared as null and void for being contrary to law; that the lease agreements would work to the great disadvantage of the farmers-beneficiaries because they contained legal hermeneutics foreign and unfamiliar to the farmers-beneficiaries; and that the participation in the consummation of the compromise agreement by Atty. Eduardo S. Suaybaguio as the representative of the DAR was inconsequential because Lapanday did not prove that Atty. Suaybaguio had been specifically authorized to sign on behalf of the DAR for that purpose.
As stated, the CA denied Lapanday's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Admission of Compliance through the other assailed resolution of August 3, 2011, and thereby confirmed the denial of Lapanday's appeal based on its declaration that the parties had not complied with its directive under the resolution of July 27, 2010. It observed that at the time of their filing, said instruments had been executed without authority, specifically on the part of MCBCI; and that the filing of the motion had been likewise done without prior authority.
Lapanday is now before us on appeal, raising the following issues for resolution, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS LEGALLY CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE CASE PURSUANT TO RULE 17 SECTION 3 OF THE RULES OF COURT
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PARTIES DESPITE THE PRIOR AUTHORIZATION/RATIFICATION GIVEN BY THE PARTIES TO THEIR OFFICERS IN SIGNING THE MOA/EOPBA AND IN NITPICKING AS TO THE EXECUTION OF THE MOA AND EOPBA
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN IT GAVE COGNIZANCE ON THE MANIFESTATION ALLEGEDLY SUBMITTED BY 160 MEMBERS OF MCBCI WHEN SAID MANIFESTATIONS WHERE UNVERIFIED, CONTAIN NO PRAYER FOR THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE JOINT MOTION FILED BY THE PARTIES, SIGNED BY ALLEGED PERSONS WHO HAVE NO PROOF OF THEIR IDENTITY, AND WITHOUT COPIES OF WHICH BEING FURNISHED TO THE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER NOR HAVE THE LATTER BEEN REQUIRED TO COMMENT ON THE SAME.
Lapanday submits that the parties had eventually complied with the resolution of July 27, 2010; and that the CA acted on their several subsequent manifestations on their additional submissions in compliance with the resolution of July 27, 2010. ETHIDa
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petition for review on certiorari.
We consider the justifications of the CA for the denial of Lapanday's petition for review to be apt and warranted. It is apparent from the tenor of the resolution of July 27, 2010 that the CA sought to ascertain from the parties themselves whether or not the instruments (i.e., the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA, both dated June 24, 2009) attached to their Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case had been executed and filed by their respective duly authorized representatives. The CA was prompted to do so by the Manifestation made on July 26, 2010 by 160 members of the MCBCI informing the CA that they had not approved the compromise agreement, which, if true, could not be taken lightly because the subject of the petition for review was precisely the validity of the earlier Memorandum of Agreement subject of the DARAB's decision.
It is noted that the earlier Memorandum of Agreement had been declared null and void by the DARAB Central Office for having been attended by inconsistencies and legal hermeneutics with which the farmer beneficiaries who would ultimately be benefitted or prejudiced by such instruments were unfamiliar. Interestingly, the now assailed Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA were among the supervening events during the pendency of the appeal. Having received the letter dated July 26, 2010 from the 160 members of MCBCI, therefore, the CA considered it fitting, if not also necessary, to require the parties through the resolution of July 27, 2010 to submit further documents to fully convince it on the genuineness and authenticity of their actual representation, more particularly vis-à-vis the compromise agreement. However, the CA remained unconvinced despite their submission of various other documents in compliance with the resolution. In the end, the CA held it as the better course of action to simply dismiss Lapanday's appeal on the basis of Section 3, 13 Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Although Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is a rule that warranted the dismissal of an original action should the plaintiff not comply with an order of the court, among other causes, the CA expressly relied on it as basis for its adverse action. It did so ostensibly to highlight that the submissions of the parties were not compliant with its directive for them to submit further documents to satisfy itself about the valid execution of the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA. The procedural inaccuracy of the CA is forgivable, however, because its objective was plainly to compel obedience to its orders in order to ensure that justice be done, which compulsion has been undeniably within the inherent powers of all courts as recognized under Section 5, 14 Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
Even so, there were other good and legitimate grounds or reasons why the CA acted as it did. In denying the petition for review, the CA pointed out that the Joint Motion to Admit the Compromise Agreement had been filed earlier on June 11, 2010 despite the authority or basis for its filing having been "confirmed and/or ratified" only via the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors held on October 9, 2010, or close to four months thereafter. Moreover, it pointed out that GA Resolution No. 4, Series of 2008, which sought to approve an unspecified Memorandum of Agreement, could not be construed as specific authority to enter into the disputed agreements. Similarly, Resolution No. 5, Series of 2009, which supposedly ratified the execution of the EOPBA, could not be construed as authority to enter into said agreements. Indeed, the CA declared that GA Resolution No. 4, Series of 2008, and Resolution No. 5, Series of 2009, the latter being supposedly executed on June 14, 2008, were both issued a year earlier than the actions they were supposedly approving or ratifying. On the other hand, Board Resolution No. 18, Series of 2011, 15 was of no consequence to the compliance by the parties with the directive to show if they were really the duly authorized representatives of the parties. The CA posited that the mere fact that such resolution had been executed on March 14, 2011 indicated that the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA had been entered into without the authority of MCBCI.
Although the petitioner has taken the CA to task for not recognizing the extrajudicial settlement of the parties' dispute, we hold that it would have been ill-advised on the part of the CA to quickly agree with the petitioner thereon despite the grave doubts being then raised against the compromise agreement. Until the doubts were properly resolved, the CA should withhold its approval. In that regard, there was definitely the need for a hearing to first clear the doubts attending the compromise agreement submitted by Lapanday to the CA. Not only will such hearing lay to rest the festering issues, but it will also resolve the fundamental concerns of the intervening 160 members of MCBCI.
Verily, after the parties had submitted for consideration their Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case seeking the approval of their compromise agreement by way of the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA attached thereto, it behooved the CA to first determine the genuineness and authenticity of the agreements. It could not do otherwise, for, on the one hand, if the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA were established to have been genuine and authentic, the appeal would be thereby mooted because such agreements, being in themselves with the effect and authority of res judicata, 16 would effectively terminate the dispute, while, on the other, should such agreements turn out to be false and involuntary, Lapanday would still lose its appeal because such finding would validate the assailed decision of the DARAB Central Office. In either case, the denial of the petition for review of Lapanday was correct. AIDSTE
The foregoing notwithstanding, the ascertainment of whether or not the agreements (i.e., the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA submitted with the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case) were genuine and authentic still remains to be done. This task is not casual or directory, but obligatory because there was the visible need to serve the policy of the law to put an end to a litigation already commenced. 17 Indeed, all courts are obliged under Article 2029 of the Civil Code to "endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise." Such obligation cannot be ignored.
Accordingly, the Court remands the matter for a fact-finding hearing in which the parties shall be represented in order to settle whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement and the EOPBA had been genuine and authentic. For this purpose, the proper Regional Adjudication Board has the capacity to conduct the hearing to receive evidence and make the determination.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on November 30, 2010 and August 3, 2011; REMANDS this case to the Regional Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform with jurisdiction over Compostela Valley FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, including conducting a hearing to receive evidence and determine whether or not the issues raised by the 160 members-beneficiaries of respondent Mampising CARP Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. against the Memorandum of Agreement and the Exclusive Option to Purchase Bananas Agreement entered into by the parties and submitted with the Joint Omnibus Motion to Admit and Approve Compromise Agreement (By Way of a Memorandum of Agreement) and to Dismiss the Case) were genuine and authentic, and FOR RENDERING ITS RULING THEREON thereafter as the established facts and the pertinent laws shall warrant.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 50-52; penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. (retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren concurring.
2. Id. at 125-134.
3. Id. at 137-142.
4. Id. at 262-267.
5. Id. at 268.
6. Id. at 315-326.
7. Id. at 330-349.
8. Id. at 351-354.
9. Supra note 2.
10. Rollo, p. 131.
11. Id. at 132.
12. Id.
13. Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
14. Section 5. Inherent powers of courts. — Every court shall have power:
(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(c) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the lawful orders of a judge out of court, in a case pending therein;
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;
(e) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;
(f) To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice;
(h) To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and proceedings.
15. Rollo, p. 73.
16. The Civil Code provides:
Article 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. (1816)
17. Article 2028, Civil Code.