Lao v. Filinvest Land, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 248768. November 11, 2021.]

KATHRYN ANN R. LAO, 1petitioner, vs.FILINVEST LAND, INC./JOSEPHINE G. YAP, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 248768 (Kathryn Ann R. Lao v. Filinvest Land, Inc./Josephine G. Yap). — Before this Court is Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeking the reversal of the Decision 3 dated January 25, 2019 and the Resolution 4 dated July 18, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07274-MIN. The CA Decision affirmed the Resolutions 5 dated August 27, 2015 and November 27, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed the Decision 6 dated May 29, 2015 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) and held that petitioner Kathryn Ann R. Lao (petitioner) was validly placed under preventive suspension and was also validly dismissed from service.

We deny the petition.

First and foremost, it should be noted that petitioner elevated her case before this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 6 of the said rule, petitions for review on certiorari will only be entertained if the questions raised therein are of significant consequence and value. Also, as a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court, as they are specialized to rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction. A relaxation of this rule may be warranted as when the findings of fact of the LA, on the one hand, and the NLRC and CA, on the other hand, are contradictory, as in this case. 7 Thus, there is a need for this Court to exercise its discretionary power of review to ascertain whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it ruled that petitioner was validly dismissed from service.

The preventive suspension was justified

Petitioner first questions respondent Filinvest Land, Inc. and Josephine G. Yap's (respondents) decision to place her under preventive suspension. She insists that respondents' fear that she posed a serious threat was unfounded as there was no showing that she had the tendency and capacity to influence the result of the investigation. Quite the reverse, petitioner claims that she fully cooperated in the conduct of the investigation.

Petitioner's assertions fail to convince.

Sections 8 and 9, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, provide for the rules on when an employee may be placed under preventive suspension and its duration, to wit:

Section 8. Preventive suspension. — The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.

Section 9. Period of suspension. — No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. 8

It has also been clarified that a preventive suspension is not a penalty. The imposition of this disciplinary measure falls within the ambit of the employer's exercise of its management prerogative. For it has been recognized that employers have the right to protect itself, its assets and operations or its other employees from further harm or losses that the erring employee might cause during the pendency of the investigation of any alleged infraction. 9 The exercise of this prerogative, however, is subject to two conditions. First, the duration of the preventive suspension should not exceed 30 days. 10 Second, the imposition of preventive suspension must be done reasonably, in good faith, and in a manner not otherwise intended to defeat or circumvent the rights of the employee under special laws and valid agreements. 11

From the foregoing, this Court finds that the NLRC and CA did not err in ruling that the preventive suspension of petitioner was justified. It would appear from the records that the Inter-Audit Department (IAD) of respondents discussed the need for a preventive suspension while the investigation was still ongoing for the following reasons, to wit:

We are currently preparing our initial report on our review of the FLI bank commissions on refinanced accounts in Davao Region. The initial information we obtained from witnesses (Mr. Joseling Tolentino, Cashier and Ms. Precious Jayson, resigned Operations Group employee) is that the following FLI and Bank personnel are principally involved in the diversion of the income on said transactions:

For FLI

a. Ms. Kotcela Cayonda — Asst. Manager for Operations Team and named as "Mastermind" in FLI side.

b. Ms. Kathryn Ann Borbon — Manager and Branch Operations Head and allegedly in knowledge of the scheme and possibly among the recipient of cash share from Ms. Cayonda.

c. Ms. Ofelia de Guzman — EFSAR Staff and in-charge for Bank Refinancing, along with Ms. Cayonda handles distribution of cash declared as bank gifts to other Operations staff.

For Banks

a. Mr. Vic Ian M. Navales — Manager and Account Officer for Banco de Oro.

b. Mr. Rommel Caturan — Metrobank Officer.

We are still gathering additional information but finding difficulty since the above 3 FLI personnel are still working at the office and Ms. Cayonda, in particular, in some instances is eavesdropping on the conversation of our audit staff when he is doing cash audit in the cashier's office with Mr. Joseling Tolentino. Mr. Tolentino also confided to us that Ms. Cayonda is inquiring the purpose of our audit and on the night of our first day was noted talking with Ms. Jayson in her cellphone. Ms. Jayson later confirmed to us, during our conversation when we invited her, that Ms. Cayonda called her up inquiring if she knows why is Audit in Davao. Ms. Cayonda also inquired the same with Ms. Jane Bayquen, Branch Accounting Head, and we have noticed that she is also very observant on our every move like asking our audit staff where we came from when we went out of the office to talk to Ms. Jayson and the likes. Two other junior staff that confided to Mr. Tolentino, as according to him, that they were on certain occasions also given cash by Ms. Cayonda and are willing to testify but later on backed out when we set a meeting outside the office. We felt that this was also due to pressure and fear of Ms. Cayonda. Mr. Tolentino also called our attention that Mr. Vic Navales of BDO was in the office early during our first day and stayed most of the day with no apparent reasons. We were informed by Ms. Geraldine Gorotiza that she already contacted the Head of the above bank officer requesting for list of takeouts from their banks. This may have been the reason that prompted Mr. Navales to check with us if an investigation is on-going. 12

While it was Kotcela Cayonda (Cayonda), who was named as the mastermind of the scheme and was the one who was poking her head while the members of the IAD were conducting its investigation, it should be pointed out that petitioner was also named as part of the scheme and was actually the superior officer of Cayonda. Specifically, petitioner was then the head of respondents' Operations Department for its Davao branch and had contact with the banks involved. As such, petitioner could easily take the reins of implementing their scheme from Cayonda, if it was only the latter who would be preventively suspended. There also exists the likelihood that petitioner could either impede or disrupt the conduct of the investigation. Evidently, respondents were justified in placing petitioner under preventive suspension during the pendency of the investigation.

Petitioner was validly

Petitioner next assails the validity of her termination. She insists that there was no just cause for her termination.

We disagree.

It was uncontroverted that petitioner was a regular employee of the respondents. Under Article 297 13 of the Labor Code 14 provides for the just causes where a regular employee may be validly terminated from employment, are the following:

Article 297. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In the oft-cited case of Maula v. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., 15 this Court elaborated on the nature serious misconduct to be considered as a just cause to dismiss an employee, to wit:

Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. 16

From the foregoing, a regular employee may only be terminated on the ground of serious misconduct if the following elements are present: "(a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent." 17

In the case at bar, the respondents were able to prove by substantial evidence that petitioner committed a serious misconduct, which warranted her immediate dismissal. It would appear from the records that petitioner used her position as the Branch Operations Head to lend credibility to a Certification, 18 which bore respondents' logo, stating that Ofelia de Guzman, who was her subordinate in the Operations Department, was an accredited sales agent of the respondents for its Davao branch. Petitioner issued the said Certification to Metrobank, which is one of respondents' bank clients, on December 10, 2012. With her Certification, their group was able to deal directly with the clients of respondents and was able to sequester the bank commissions that respondents were supposed to receive from the refinanced accounts in the Davao region. Going by the date of the said Certification, it would appear that petitioner's crooked scheme with her two other cohorts has been going on for almost two years before it was discovered by the respondents.

While it was uncontroverted that petitioner only received paltry sums of money, it should be pointed out that this was not the first time that this Court has upheld the dismissal of an employee for committing pilferage. It has been held that pilferage committed by an employee is considered as a serious offense that could be used as a valid ground for his or her dismissal. 19 Regardless of whether respondents are entitled to the bank commissions or not, this Court is still left with the conclusion that petitioner committed an infraction. Neither will an acquittal in a criminal case absolve an erring employee in a labor case as these are separate and distinct proceedings. 20

Petitioner further maintains her innocence of the charge against her claiming that she had no knowledge that the sums that she received were actually for respondents. She insists that her Assistant Manager, Cayonda, was solely responsible for the pilferage.

Petitioner's claims of innocence are unpersuasive.

It would appear from the records that petitioner graduated from one of the prestigious schools in the country. 21 She even received above average rating every semester. 22 Evidently, petitioner could hardly be considered as simple-minded. Further, it should be pointed out that petitioner has been with the respondents for 13 years, which should have enabled her to gain knowledge of the inner workings of the company. Furthermore, the purported mastermind of the scheme was her direct subordinate. Thus, it is highly inconceivable that petitioner would not have any knowledge of the irregularity of the small sums of money that she was receiving from her subordinate.

Petitioner was validly

In invoking the ground of breach of trust and confidence, the employer is essentially penalizing the erring employee for betraying the trust reposed upon him or her. Said trust and confidence stems from the fact that the erring employee holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is expected. 23 This Court elaborated on the nature of this just cause in the case of Mabeza v. NLRC24 as follows:

Loss of confidence as a just cause for dismissal was never intended to provide employers with a blank check for terminating their employees. Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in mind, loss of confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property.

It was further qualified that it must be clearly established that the employee concerned committed a transgression related to his or her work and as such has willfully breached the trust reposed upon him or her to render him or her unfit to continue working for his or her employer. The transgression would only be deemed willful only if it was committed intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse. 25

Thus, to terminate a regular employee on the ground of breach of trust and confidence, the employer must establish the following by substantial evidence: (1) the erring employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be an act committed by said employee which justified the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates to the said employee's performance of his or her duties. 26

Generally, employers are given a wider latitude of discretion in dismissing employees who were holding positions of trust and confidence. They would be deemed justified in terminating them upon a mere showing that there was basis for believing that they breached said trust and confidence. 27 All the same, the employer must observe the following guidelines, to wit:

a) loss of confidence should not be simulated; b) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; c) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. 28

With the foregoing, jurisprudence has delineated two classes of employees who hold positions of trust and confidence. These are the managerial employees and the fiduciary rank-and-file employees, to wit:

Managerial employees are defined as those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. They refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff. Officers and members of the managerial staff perform work directly related to management policies of their employer and customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.

The second class or fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence. 29

In this case, it was uncontroverted that petitioner was then holding a managerial position. It can be gleaned from the facts of the case that as the Branch Operations Head for respondents' Davao Branch, petitioner is authorized to act on behalf of the respondents on its transactions with its bank partners. Petitioner was entrusted with such authorization with the implied understanding that she would protect the interests of the respondents and would not perform any act that would put them in a bad light.

Unfortunately, petitioner willfully breached the trust reposed upon her by the respondents when she issued the Certification 30 certifying her subordinate, Ofelia de Guzman to be an accredited sales agent for the respondents. With this Certification, their group was able to receive the commissions directly from the banks, which were intended for the respondents. Such act of the petitioner was clearly work related. It is clearly within her power to delegate to her subordinates some of the authority bestowed upon her by the respondents. Hence, by signing the aforesaid Certification, petitioner assured the bank partners that her subordinate, Ofelia de Guzman, has the limited authority to act on behalf of the respondents on sales matters. Taking into consideration the number of years that petitioner has been with the respondents coupled with the amount of money that she misappropriated from them, this Court held in the case of Herma Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Cordero31 that "theft of invaluable company property, demonstrates the highest degree of ingratitude to an institution that has been the source of his livelihood for 24 years, constitutive of disloyalty and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed upon him," thus: aScITE

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. 32

Petitioner was accorded with

Petitioner argues on the main that she was not accorded with procedural due process because she was not given a copy of the Certification, 33 which she allegedly signed on December 10, 2012. Neither was it presented during the administrative hearing held on September 30, 2014.

Petitioner's allegations fail to hold water.

For one thing, it is clear from the facts of this case that respondents complied with Article 277 (b) 34 of the Labor Code when it terminated petitioner. Rule XIII, Book V, Sec. 2 (I) (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code also provides for the standards of the procedural due process and requirements of the written notices, to wit:

SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice. — In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

From the foregoing, it is a rule that the employee must be served with written notice which should provide the specific provision in the company rules that was violated and/or the ground under Article 277 of the Labor Code that was being charged against him or her. In support thereof, the written notice should also contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances. 35 It has been clarified that Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code and Rule XIII, Book V, Sec. 2 (I) (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code also do not require a formal "trial-type" of hearing. It is enough that the employee is given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. 36

Here, petitioner received an inter-office memorandum 37 dated September 30, 2014 from the respondents. Respondents should not be faulted for not attaching a copy of the contested Certification to the first written notice seeing that respondents themselves were not able to immediately secure a copy of the same. 38 All the same, respondents gave a detailed narration of the findings of the IAD, which brought about the controversy. Specific provisions of the Filinvest Land, Inc. Code of Discipline that were violated by the petitioner were also included in the said memorandum. Petitioner was likewise given a period of five working days within which to submit a written explanation. 39 Respondents also gave petitioner another opportunity to defend herself during the administrative hearing. 40 Thereafter, respondents gave another written notice to petitioner that they were terminating her enumerating the grounds therefor. 41 Quite obviously, the requisites of procedural due process were substantially complied with.

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the CA did not err in ruling that the NLRC did not exercise its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. Neither was there an evasion of positive duty nor virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law when it rule that the preventive suspension was justified and that petitioner was validly terminated.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 25, 2019 and the Resolution dated July 18, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07274-MIN are AFFIRMED. Kathryn Ann R. Lao was validly dismissed from service.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Also appears as "Kathryn Ann L. Borbon" in some parts of the rollo.

2.Rollo, pp. 3-21.

3.Id. at 22-32.

4.Id. at 33-35.

5.Id. at 91-103; 112-113.

6.Id. at 41-49.

7.Multinational Ship Management, Inc. v. Briones, G.R. No. 239793, January 27, 2020 citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino, 755 Phil. 108, 121-122 (2015). Ting Trucking v. Makilan, 787 Phil. 651, 660 (2016) citing Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero, 713 Phil. 392, 399-400 (2013).

8. Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.

9.Lafuente v. Davao Central Warehouse Club, Inc., G.R. No. 247410, March 17, 2021 citing Gatbonton v. National Labor Relations Commission, 515 Phil. 387, 393 (2006) and Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v. Esteban, 731 Phil. 502, 513-514 (2014). Every Nation Language Institute v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 225100, February 19, 2020 also citing Gatbonton v. National Labor Relations Commission, 515 Phil. 387, 398 (2006). Consolidated Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Asprec, Jr., 832 Phil. 630, 651 (2018) citing Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Rule XIV, Section 3. Mamaril v. Red System Co., Inc., 835 Phil. 781, 800-801 (2018) also citing Bluer than Blue Joint Ventures Company v. Esteban, 731 Phil. 502, 513-514 (2014).

10. Section 9, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

11.Lafuente v. Davao Central Warehouse Club, Inc., supra note 9 citing PJ Lhuillier, Inc. v. Camacho, 806 Phil. 413, 425 (2017). East Cam Tech Corp. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 222289, June 8, 2020 citing Aliling v. Feliciano, 686 Phil. 889, 911 (2012). Mariano v. Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc., 784 Phil. 523, 532 (2016) citing Union Carbide Labor Union v. Union Carbide Phils., Inc., 290 Phil. 31, 35 (1992).

12.Rollo, p. 193.

13. Formerly Article 282. Renumbered pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Advisory No. 1, series of 2015.

14. Presidential Decree No. 442 of 1974, as amended and renumbered.

15. 804 Phil. 365 (2017).

16.Id. at 378-379.

17.Ting Trucking v. Makilan, 787 Phil. 651, 662 (2016) citing Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Ablay, 783 Phil. 512, 521 (2016).

18.Rollo, p. 228.

19.Falco v. Mercury Freight International, Inc., 530 Phil. 42, 47 (2006) citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 345 Phil. 57, 68-69 (1997).

20. See St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Sanchez, 755 Phil. 910, 924 (2015).

21.Rollo, p. 191.

22.Id. at 192.

23.Panaligan v. Phyvita Enterprises Corp., 811 Phil. 465, 477 (2017) citing Cocoplans, Inc. v. Villapando, 785 Phil. 734, 748 (2016). Philippine Auto Components, Inc. v. Jumadla, 801 Phil. 170, 182 (2016) citing Jumuad v. Hi-Flyer Food, Inc., 672 Phil. 730, 743 (2011).

24.Mabeza v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 386, 395 (1997).

25.Panaligan v. Phyvita Enterprises Corp., supra note 23 citing Venzon v. ZAMECO II Electric Cooperative, Inc., 799 Phil. 342, 367 (2016). Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 228765, March 20, 2019 citing Casco v. NLRC, 826 Phil. 284, 299 (2018) and Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v. Esteban, 731 Phil. 502, 513 (2014).

26.Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 228765, March 20, 2019, citing Central Azucarera De Ba is v. Heirs of Zuelo Apostol, 828 Phil. 211, 228 (2018).

27.Id., citing Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, 594 Phil. 620, 631 (2008).

28.Panaligan v. Phyvita Enterprises Corp., supra note 23 citing Continental Micronesia, Inc. v. Basso, 770 Phil. 201, 225 (2015). Bibiana Farms and Mills, Inc. vs. Lado, 625 Phil. 142, 156 (2010) citing Fungo v. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong, 555 Phil. 225, 232 (2007).

29.Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26 citing Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Baban, 594 Phil. 620, 629-630 (2008), Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Reyes, 740 Phil. 297, 311 (2014) citing M+W Zander Phils., Inc. v. Enriquez, 606 Phil. 591, 607 (2009).

30.Rollo, p. 228.

31. G.R. Nos. 244144 & 244210, January 27, 2020 citing Duque III v. Veloso, 688 Phil. 318, 326 (2012).

32.Herma Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Cordero, id., citing Manila Water Company v. del Rosario, 725 Phil. 513, 524-525 (2014).

33.Rollo, p. 228.

34. Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code reads as follows:

Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions. — x x x (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.

35. 663 Phil. 121, 124-125 (2011).

36.Cadavas v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26 citing Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 560, 565 (1997).

37.Rollo, pp. 223-224.

38.Id. at 95.

39.Id. at 223-224.

40.Id. at 226-227.

41.Id. at 231-233.