Lansangan v. Allegro Microsystems Philippines, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174043. October 21, 2015.]

LUNESA O. LANSANGAN, petitioner,vs. ALLEGRO MICROSYSTEMS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

[G.R. No. 174216. October 21, 2015.]

ALLEGRO MICROSYSTEMS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,vs. LUNESA O. LANSANGAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 21, 2015 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 174043 — LUNESA O. LANSANGAN, Petitioner, v. ALLEGRO MICROSYSTEMS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 174216 — ALLEGRO MICROSYSTEMS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. LUNESA O. LANSANGAN, Respondent.

On February 9, 1982, Allegro Microsystems Phils., Inc., a manufacturer and seller of high-technology computer components for export, hired Lunesa O. Lansangan, who eventually rose up the ranks to become by March 1991 the production supervisor at Allegro's test center production. On August 18, 1994, the management tasked her to investigate one of its G/S lead scan operators whose output had unusually exceeded machine capacity. Lansangan investigated and filed a written report. 1 On August 22, 1994, Edgardo Ungco 2 (Ungco) required her to resign, but when she refused to do so, the management issued to her a memorandum on October 27, 1994 charging her with violating standard procedure through falsification of documents. 3 According to Allegro, she had made it appear in the Test Finish Lot Traveler (FLT) forms that a number of integrated circuits had passed through the lead scan even if such number could not simply because the machine did not have the capacity. On November 21, 1994, additional charges were brought against Lansangan, namely: gross habitual neglect, disobedience to lawful order of superiors, and deviation from the normal duties and procedures of operations without authorization from supervisors. A further round of charges was made against her, such as willful violation of company procedures, falsification of company documents, and serious breach of trust and confidence. 4 ETHIDa

At the administrative hearing held on December 16, 1994, where the investigating panel consisted of Ungco, as the chairman, and two others, Lansangan sought the exclusion of Ungco from the panel, but her objection went unheeded; hence, she refused to take part in the investigation. At the end of the investigation, Allegro dismissed her on the finding that she had ignored the lead-scan process, and that she had conducted only a visual inspection of the leads of the integrated circuits.

Lansangan then brought her complaint for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC). On its part, Allegro countered that the termination of Lansangan was based on just causes, and after she was afforded her due process of law.

Upon the submission of the required pleadings, the Labor Arbiter invalidated Lansangan's termination through the decision rendered on January 18, 2000, holding that there was no evidence showing that she had prepared, entered or written the Test/Finish Lot Traveler (FLT) forms; that the operators had admitted having committed the acts attributed to her; and that although she had conducted visual inspection of the items, she found nothing irregular considering that the results of such examination yielded above-par results. 5 The Labor Arbiter disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal of complainant Lunesa O. Lansangan as illegal.

Accordingly, respondent Allegro Microsystem Phils., Inc., is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to her position and with full backwages and other benefits from the date of her dismissal up to the actual reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights, the same being tentatively computed by the Computation and Examination Unit of this Branch as of October 28, 1999, as follows:

2/9/82-1/15/95
Rate = P8,504.69/mo
1/5/95-10/28/99 — 57.76 mos.
P8,504.69 x 57.76 mos.	P491,230.89
13th Month Pay
1/12 of P491,230.89	40,935.90
	–––––––––––
TOTAL	P532,166.79
	==========

 

Other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 6

Allegro appealed to the NLRC.

Meanwhile, Allegro filed a surety bond amounting to P532,166.79 to cover the backwages stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision, 7 and advised Lansangan to report to work, but despite their meeting in March 2000, Lansangan was not reinstated. Allegro claimed that Lansangan had turned down the offer of reinstatement because she had already been gainfully employed by another company. 8 She countered that Allegro had refused to reinstate her at an adjusted salary; 9 and that Allegro had maintained that she could only be reinstated to her former position with all the benefits given to her at the time of her dismissal, not on the basis of her adjusted salary.

Eventually, on June 30, 2003, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 10 The NLRC denied Allegro's motion for reconsideration on October 28, 2003. 11

By petition for certiorari, Allegro assailed the NLRC's denial of its appeal as amounting to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In its decision promulgated on June 28, 2004, 12 the CA dismissed Allegro's petition for certiorari, and upheld the finding of illegal termination of Lansangan. It modified the reinstatement aspect of the decision, and instead ordered Allegro to pay Lansangan separation pay due to the impossibility of the reinstatement, but limited the backwages from January 4, 1995 (the date of termination) until June 10, 1995 (the date of her employment by another company, Amkor Anam).

On reconsideration, the CA amended the decretal portion of its decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Private respondent's partial motion for reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court promulgated on June 28, 2004 is accordingly MODIFIED, to instead read, as follows:

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The June 30, 2003 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

a) The award of backwages in favor of private respondent Lunesa O. Lansangan is ordered computed from January 4, 1995 until August 14, 2003, at the time of her refusal to be reinstated;

b) In lieu of reinstatement as directed by the NLRC in its Decision, considering that private respondent is already employed — petitioner is now ordered to pay private respondent separation pay. cSEDTC

SO ORDERED.'

SO ORDERED.13

Both parties, unsatisfied by the outcome, separately appealed to the Court, specifically: Lansangan (docketed as G.R. No. 174043); and Allegro (docketed as G.R. No. 174216).

Issues

In G.R. No. 174043, Lansangan posits the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the payment of separation pay in lieu of her reinstatement. 14

In G.R. No. 174216, two issues are presented. The first dwells on the validity of the termination of Lansangan. The second is whether or not Lansangan is entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. 15

Ruling of the Court

The Court AFFIRMS the CA except on the period of backwages.

Allegro claims that there was substantial evidence to support the valid dismissal of Lansangan. However, in passing upon the evidence relied upon by Allegro, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC declared in unison that such evidence did not warrant her termination from employment. Not being a trier of facts, the Court cannot re-examine the record and re-assess the evidence considering that an appeal on certiorari under Rule 45 is confined only to questions of law. Indeed, it is not the function of the Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again. 16

Moreover, we are precluded from the review of the factual findings of the CA by the long-settled rule that the factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. 17 Although we have from time to time recognized exceptions from the operation of this principle, 18 the Court should respect the factual findings of the labor tribunals

Pursuant to Article 279 19 of the Labor Code, Lansangan was entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her actual reinstatement. Should the reinstatement be no longer practicable or feasible, separation pay could be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. 20

Allegro submits that the CA expanded the coverage of the payment of backwages, arguing that the backwages of Lansangan should be limited to the period from January 4, 1995 (when she was terminated) until June 10, 1995 (when she was hired by Amkor Anam), and should not extend until August 14, 2003 (when Allegro informed the NLRC of Lansangan's refusal to be reinstated).

The argument of Allegro is untenable. In Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 the Court re-established the rule that illegally terminated employees are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Full backwages necessarily means that the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal should not be deducted. To accept the argument of Allegro would defeat the concept of full backwages. Backwages are granted regardless of whether or not the terminated employee has found work elsewhere because the employee must still earn a living to support herself and her family while litigating the legality or illegality of her dismissal. Full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty it has to pay for illegally dismissing its employee. Thus, the CA was correct to extend the coverage of backwages to the time of her refusal to be reinstated.

The Court notes, however, that the CA erred in fixing the date of Lansangan's refusal. As admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the date of refusal was in the last week of March 2000, not on August 14, 2003. Hence, the backwages should be reckoned from January 5, 1995 until the end of March 2000.

Both parties assail the propriety of separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement. On its part, Allegro contends that Lansangan should not be given separation pay by virtue of her having been legally terminated. In contrast, Lansangan states that she was no longer connected with Amkor Anam since February 19, 2004; hence, nothing prevented her being reinstated by Allegro. She justified her initial refusal to be reinstated in March 2000 by citing the unjustified refusal of Allegro to pay her the adjusted salary rate because she had to be paid her rate of salary at the time of her termination.

The arguments of both parties do not persuade.

Although the parties have given different explanations why Lansangan was not reinstated, with Lasangan alleging that her refusal to be reinstated was because of the insistence by Allegro to pay her a much lower rate of salary, which was that existing at the time of her termination, we consider that of Allegro as correct under the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. It has been held that the employee should be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority rights. 22 Indeed, the person reinstated assumes the position he occupied prior to his dismissal, 23 because reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one was removed or separated.

On the other hand, it is basic that rights may be waived, either explicitly or impliedly, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 24 Under the established circumstances of the case, Lansangan effectively waived her right to be reinstated; hence, the payment of separation pay was proper.

In order to make her demands reasonable as to justify her refusal to be reinstated, Lansangan must prove either that the adjusted salary was part of her seniority rights, or that the salary increases were part of the terms and conditions of employment existing at the time of her termination. But she did not do so. Nonetheless, because reinstatement was no longer feasible in view of her waiver of the right to be reinstated, Allegro should give her separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. There is no question that separation pay becomes proper should the employee decide not to be reinstated. 25 Hence, the end of her employment service is reckoned in the last week of March 2000. SDAaTC

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81592 with the MODIFICATION that the backwages should be computed from January 5, 1995 until the last week of March, 2000; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."PEREZ, J., on official business; VELASCO, JR., J., acting member per S.O. No. 2253 dated October 14, 2015.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Rollo (G.R. No. 174043), pp. 248-249.

2. "Eduardo" in some parts of the records.

3. Rollo (G.R. No. 174043), p. 249.

4. Id. at 250-251.

5. Rollo (G.R. No. 174216), pp. 278-293.

6. Id. at 292-293.

7. Id. at 344.

8. Id. at 360-361.

9. Rollo (G.R. No. 174043), p. 297.

10. Rollo (G.R. No. 174216), pp. 367-383.

11. Id. at 412-413.

12. Id. at 58-63; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and concurred in by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

13. Id. at 68.

14. Rollo (G.R. No. 174043), p. 19.

15. Rollo (G.R. No. 174216), p. 13.

16. Co v. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 451, 458.

17. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 676, 684.

18. In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149281, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 227, the Court has recognized the following exceptional situations in which it may review the records and re-assess the evidence, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

19. Art. 294 of Republic Act No. 10151, as amended.

20. Nissan North Edsa Balintawak, Quezon City v. Serrano, Jr., G.R. No. 162538, June 4, 2009, 558 SCRA 238, 247.

21. G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996, 265 SCRA 61, 66.

22. Ram v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115759, June 21, 1996, 257 SCRA 546, 550.

23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 135, 146.

24. Article 6, Civil Code.

25. Dreamland Hotel Resort v. Johnson, G.R. No. 191455, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 29, 48, citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 283; Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero, G.R. No. 188711, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 583, 596.