FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212135. January 14, 2019.]
ALFREDO LAGO, SR., petitioner, vs.SPOUSES CHARLES A. MAXELL, SR., AND OPHELIA LAGO MAXELL, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 14, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 212135 (Alfredo Lago, Sr. v. Spouses Charles A. Maxell, Sr., and Ophelia Lago Maxell). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Alfredo Lago, Sr. (Alfredo), seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) November 28, 2012 Decision 2 and March 20, 2014 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 01673-MIN. The CA set aside the February 27, 2008 Decision 4 of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, in Civil Case No. 2003-088. The RTC granted respondents spouses Charles A. Maxell, Sr. (Charles) and Ophelia Lago Maxell's (Ophelia) (collectively, spouses/spouses Maxell) action for specific performance against Alfredo.
The dispute involves a partly marshy land with an area of 3,840 square meters (sq.m.) located at Zone 7, Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro City known as Lot No. 41195-A-1-B (property) owned by Alfredo. 5 Alfredo and his son-in-law Charles, an American citizen, executed a Memorandum of Agreement 6 (MOA) dated August 24, 2000, where the latter undertook to fill up the marshy area of the property. In paragraph 6 of the MOA, they stipulated: "[t]hat after the task of filling the land is completed, the FIRST PARTY [Alfredo] shall then effect the transfer of the said property to the SECOND PARTY [Charles]." 7 Charles and his wife Ophelia, who is Alfredo's daughter, remitted to Alfredo $14,400.50 to cover the expenses for the construction of the seawall, filling the property with dirt and other materials, and spouses Maxell's transfer of the property. 8 When the development was completed, the spouses' counsel prepared a deed of sale over the property. Alfredo, however, refused to sign the deed. 9
On March 13, 2003, the spouses Maxell filed a complaint 10 for specific performance against Alfredo, where they sought to transfer and convey Lot No. 41195-A-1-B under their name. In his answer with counterclaim (answer), 11 Alfredo reasoned that he did not sign the deed of sale because the MOA did not reflect the true agreement of the parties. He argued that the agreement to transfer the property comprised of 3,840 sq.m. in the MOA is void, their true agreement being that he will pay the spouses in kind, i.e., one square meter for every P1,000.00 spent on developing the property. He prayed that the area to be transferred be reduced to 1,000 sq.m. which is the equivalent of P1,000,000.00. CAIHTE
After proceedings, the RTC found for spouses Maxell. It held that the mode of transfer in the MOA, albeit vague, is one of sale. 12 However, there is nothing to support the spouses Maxell's claim that the whole property is to be ceded. What was established by Alfredo's own admission is that only a portion of it, or 1,000 sq.m., was to be given to the spouses. 13 It also found no basis in awarding moral and exemplary damages. Thus, the RTC ordered Alfredo to transfer to the spouses Maxell a 1,000 sq.m. portion of the property. 14
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC's Decision. It found that there was no valid sale in the MOA on two grounds. First, the alleged sale in the MOA lacks cause or consideration since there was no mention of any price certain for the property. Moreover, there was neither a basis or measure for ascertaining price, nor any mention of the manner and schedule of its payment. 15Second, the putative buyer is Charles, an American citizen, who is disqualified to own land under the 1987 Constitution. 16 The CA, nevertheless, ruled that, based on the principle of unjust enrichment, the spouses Maxell are entitled to reimbursement for the amount they spent on developing the property. 17 While the spouses Maxell were not able to prove their claim of P1,380,946.50, Alfredo in his answer, admitted having received the amount of P1,000,000.00. 18 Thus, the CA declared paragraph 6 of the MOA void and ordered Alfredo to reimburse the spouses Maxell in the amount of P1,000,000.00. 19
Alfredo moved for reconsideration of the Decision in so far as the amount of reimbursement was concerned. He insisted that, at most, the spouses Maxell were only entitled to P572,770.00 or the equivalent of $14,400.50 they were able to establish based on the receipts submitted. 20 The CA denied reconsideration, holding that Alfredo admitted in his answer that the spouses spent P1,000,000.00 for developing the property. 21
In this petition, Alfredo asserts that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the total amount of reimbursement due to spouses Maxell is P1,000,000.00. He claims that this amount is unsubstantiated since he only meant that he was willing to give 1,000 sq.m. even if the spouses spent P1,000,000.00. He should only reimburse them of the actual amount proven, which is P572,770.00. 22
In their comment, 23 spouses Maxell express that they are accepting the CA's Decision. They aver that the CA already passed upon the issue of the amount of reimbursement and interest in its Resolution. In his reply, 24 Alfredo reiterates that the CA erred in ruling that he admitted in his answer that he received P1,000,000.00.
As the spouses Maxell did not appeal the CA's Decision, the finding that the property's transfer is void is already binding on the parties. Similarly, while Alfredo does not question that the spouses are entitled to reimbursement on the principle of unjust enrichment, he asserts that they are only entitled to P572,770.00. 25 Thus, the sole issue here is the proper amount of reimbursement due to the spouses Maxell.
We deny the petition.
The CA based its order of reimbursement on the principle of unjust enrichment, the main objective of which is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. 26 Here, while the transfer of the property is void, Alfredo's obligation to return arose: (1) when he benefited from the development of his property; (2) at the expense of the spouses Maxell. 27 Thus, the spouses Maxell are entitled to recover the amount they spent on the property based on the evidence presented or on the other party's admissions.
In civil cases, the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence. 28 With respect to payment, the one who pleads has the burden of proving it. 29 On the other hand, a verbal or written admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. 30 These are referred to as judicial admissions, which a party may make in (a) the pleadings, (b) during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. 31 As we held in Alfelor v. Halasan: 32 HEITAD
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 33 (Citations omitted.)
The admitter, who is the party himself, cannot contradict his own judicial admissions; he binds himself absent any showing that it was made thru palpable mistake, and no amount of rationalization can offset it. 34
In this case, the CA considered the following portion in Alfredo's answer:
3. That Defendant admits into signing a Memorandum of Agreement (Annex "B" of Complaint) but DENIES the provisions contained in paragraphs (3) thereof which states: x x x; and (6) which further states: That after the task of filling the land is completed, the FIRST PARTY [Alfredo] shall then effect the transfer of the said property to the SECOND PARTY; the truth being that the Defendant, an illiterate, only agreed to reimburse plaintiff with an equivalent portion of the land computed at P1,000.00 per square meter on whatever amount that might be spent by the plaintiff in developing the area;
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, answering defendant respectfully prays to the Honorable Court to render judgment as follows:
1. [B]y reducing the area covered by the Memorandum of Agreement to only one thousand square meters which is the only area to which plaintiffs are entitled by virtue of their true agreement and which is the equivalent area for P1,000,000.00 at P1,000.00 per square meter[.] 35 (Emphasis and italics omitted.)
We agree with the CA that these statements are judicial admissions of petitioner's receipt of the amount of P1,000,000.00 from the spouses Maxell. To recall, Alfredo's claim was that the stipulation on the transfer of the whole property consisting of 3,840 sq.m. is void. He thereafter claimed that the true agreement of the parties is for him to reimburse the spouses in kind, and that is, one square meter for every P1,000.00 the spouses may have spent on developing the property. Subsequently, he prayed that the area be reduced to 1,000 sq.m. as the equivalent area for the amount of P1,000,000.00. In effect, he denies that the spouses are entitled to 3,840 sq.m., but merely to 1,000 sq.m. as per their agreement. This denial is a negative pregnant — a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading, 36 which in this case, is the admission of the receipt of P1,000,000.00 as the equivalent exchange for the 1,000 sq.m. he concedes that the spouses are entitled to based on their true agreement.
Moreover, this finding is consistent with his testimony before the RTC. There, he categorically admitted that he was able to develop the property through (1) the P572,000.00 remitted to him by the spouses, and (2) a separate amount that his son, Jessie Lago, also received from the spouses. 37 Thus, based on the foregoing, no error can be attributed to the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 28, 2012 and Resolution dated March 20, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 01673-MIN are AFFIRMED. ATICcS
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-21.
2.Id. at 22-36; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Oscar V. Badelles.
3.Id. at 44-46.
4.Id. at 83-91; rendered by Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendant is ordered to transfer to plaintiff the area of 1,000 sq.m. under Lot No. 41195-A-1-B.
SO ORDERED.
5.Id. at 62.
6.Id. at 68-69. The salient portions of the MOA reads:
That I, ALFREDO LAGO, SR., Filipino, of legal age, married and residing at Zone 5, Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro City, referred to herein as the FIRST PARTY,
AND
MR. CHARLES A. MAXELL, SR., American Citizen, married to OPHELIA LAGO, and the Son-in-Law of the FIRST PARTY, referred to herein as the SECOND PARTY, have agreed and covenant that:
The First Party is the lawful and actual possessor of that parcel of land designated as Lot No. 41195-A-1-B, being a portion of Lot No. 41195, Cad 237, Cagayan Cadastry, containing an area of 3,840 square meters more or less situated at Zone 7, Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro City;
That the FIRST PARTY agrees and allows the SECOND PARTY to improve the area of the said land by introducing filling materials to the land;
That the FIRST PARTY as a consequence of this agreement binds himself not to dispose of, alienate, mortgage, or do similar acts of disposition over this property without the expressed and written consent of the SECOND PARTY;
That the SECOND PARTY obliges himself to shoulder and finance the improvements of this land thru filling the land with filling materials;
That the FIRST PARTY undertake to manage the filling of this land using the money from the SECOND PARTY and to submit to the SECOND PARTY, list of expenses incurred in filling this property;
That after the task of filling the land is completed, the FIRST PARTY shall then effect the transfer of the said property to the SECOND PARTY;
That the SECOND PARTY shall shoulder all the necessary expenses in the execution of the required document to effect the transfer of this property to the SECOND PARTY. (Emphasis in the original.)
7.Id. at 68.
8.Id. at 70-72. Receipt for Money Remittance dated March 20, 1999; Letter from Charles and Ophelia dated March 1, 1999.
9.Id. at 23.
10.Id. at 62-66.
11.Id. at 79-82.
12.Id. at 89.
13.Id. at 90.
14.Id. at 91.
15.Id. at 30-32.
16.Id. at 32-33.
17.Id. at 33-34.
18.Id. at 34-35.
19.Id. at 35-36. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the February 27, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch No. 21, Cagayan de Oro City in Civil Case No. 2003-088 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1) Declaring paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 24, 2000, which purports to be a contract of sale, void ab initio; and
2) Ordering the appellee Alfredo Lago, Sr. to reimburse the appellants Sps. Charles and Ophelia Maxell the amount of P1,000,000.00 with 6% interest per annum from the finality of the Decision.
SO ORDERED.
20. Id. at 41.
21. Id. at 45-46.
22. Id. at 11-12.
23. Id. at 192-194.
24. Id. at 224-231.
25. Id. at 11 & 14-15.
26. Abella v. Heirs of Francisco C. San Juan, G.R. No. 182629, February 24, 2016, 784 SCRA 642, 656-657, citing Flores v. Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 772.
27. CIVIL CODE, Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him; See also Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016, 783 SCRA 87, 98.
28. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law; See also RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. x x x.
29. Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016, 783 SCRA 87, 97.
30. RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
31. Id.
32. G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451.
33. Id. at 459-460.
34. Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 49, 54.
35. Rollo, pp. 45, 79 & 81.
36. Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 34, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, 406 SCRA 190, 236.
37. Rollo, pp. 55-56; TSN dated March 28, 2006, pp. 9-10:
Q — After that, how much your daughter gave you aside from the P550,000.00 [referring to the P572,000.00]?
A — That was the amount given to me.
Q — Who spent for the filling of the lot?
A — It was my other son who did it.
Q — Who is that son?
A — Jessie.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — You said that it was Jessie Lago who was responsible for the filling of the land, can you tell us whose money was used by Jessie Lago in filling soil to the land?
A — From Ofelia, the elder sister, the plaintiff in this case.
Q — That money was coursed direct to Jessie Lago?
A — Yes sir.