THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212361. April 17, 2017.]
DR. FERDINAND LABUTONG Y BUGARIN, accused-appellant, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 17, 2017, which reads as follows: ICHDca
"G.R. No. 212361 (Dr. Ferdinand Labutong y Bugarin v. People of the Philippines). — Accused-appellant Dr. Ferdinand Labutong y Bugarin (Ferdinand) challenges in this petition the Decision 1 dated November 29, 2013 and the Resolution 2 dated April 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34452, which affirmed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 07-125, finding him guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, 5 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Dr. Lorna Edeza Labutong (Lorna), the private complainant, testified that on July 15, 2006, at around 11:30 a.m., Ferdinand was having lunch at their dining room when she asked him for his salary for the month which is meant for the tuition fees of their four children. She was asking for Ferdinand's salary as she had no income because she was still recovering from her fractured left arm. Ferdinand got angry and replied that he must first pay his debt in the sum of PhP30,000 to his mother. A heated argument between them arose and Ferdinand threatened her saying that if she would not stop talking, he would slap her. Regrettably, Ferdinand approached her and slapped her on her left cheek. After that, Lorna left their house and had herself physically examined at the Camiling District Hospital. Lorna's Medico-Legal Certificate revealed that she suffered a contusion on her left cheek with a recovery period of not less than five days but not more than seven days. Lorna reported the said incident to the authorities and executed an affidavit thereto.
Lorna also alleged that she was persistent in obtaining Ferdinand's salary because the latter's extra-marital affair had left her only with a small amount of money for their family.
For his defense, Ferdinand testified that on July 15, 2006, he was having lunch when Lorna asked for his salary. He then explained to Lorna that he had to pay his mother, Julita Labutong, the loaned amount of PhP30,000, as he promised to return the same. He said that Lorna did not want to listen and said, "Tatahi-tahimik ka dyan, akin na ang sweldo mo." Since he wanted to end their conversation, he stood up and told Lorna to stop talking or else he would slap her. However, Lorna approached him and challenged him to slap her. He said that he was forced to lightly slap Lorna but he stressed that it was the first and last time that he had done such an act. He also said that the allegation of having extra-marital affairs was not true. cDHAES
Julita, Ferdinand's mother, corroborated her son's testimony that the latter owed her money amounting to PhP30,000.
On June 23, 2011, the RTC rendered a judgment convicting Ferdinand of the offense charged and sentencing him to a straight penalty of three months of arresto mayor and a fine of PhP100,000. The RTC also directed Ferdinand to undergo mandatory psychological counseling.
Ferdinand filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in its entirety. Ferdinand sought reconsideration thereto but it was also denied, hence, he appealed to this Court for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law. A question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower tribunals or bodies is beyond the scope of this Court's power of review and generally justifies the dismissal of the petition. 6
In this case, the factual findings of the trial court and their evaluation concerning the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence particularly the credibility of the witnesses clearly involves a factual issue which is outside the purview of Rule 45. But even if this Court were to be exceptionally liberal and allow a review of factual issues, still, the instant petition would be susceptible to denial.
In attempting to escape liability, Ferdinand claimed that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He argued that the single slapping incident is not physical abuse contemplated under Section 5 (a) of RA 9262. He said that Lorna provoked him to slap her. He claimed that physical violence under RA 9262 should constitute repetitive acts to qualify the same to be abusive in character and in order to be punishable under the said law.
However, the Court is not persuaded. Contrary to Ferdinand's contentions, Section 3 (a) 7 of RA 9262 is clear and unambiguous. Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman. The conjunctive word "or" indicates that a single act of harassment, which translated to violence, would be sufficient. It did not mean that physical violence must be repeatedly done in order to be punishable under RA 9262. TCAScE
The prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The record of the case clearly showed that he slapped his wife on the cheek evidenced by his own admission. It is also undisputed that it was Ferdinand who first threatened his wife with physical harm. The fact that he was merely provoked by his wife will not exonerate him from liability. The provocation and nagging of his wife did not give him the right to inflict physical violence on her as he could have resorted to other actions to deal with his wife's demeanor.
In sum, considering all the above-mentioned facts, the Court finds no reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. Thus, Ferdinand's conviction for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 must stand.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated November 29, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34452, affirming in toto the Decision dated June 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 07-125, finding accused-appellant Dr. Ferdinand Labutong y Bugarin GUILTY of violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 is AFFIRMED. (Jardeleza, J., no part, due to his prior action as Solicitor General; Leonen, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 27, 2017.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Danton Q. Bueser; Rollo, pp. 18-27.
2. CA Rollo, p. 29.
3.Id., pp. 43-47.
4. SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
5. AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
6.Ernesto L. Natividad v. Fernando Mariano, Andres Mariano and Doroteo Garcia, G.R. No. 179643, June 3, 2013.
7. SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.