THIRD DIVISION
[OCA IPI No. 17-4675-RTJ. January 15, 2018.]
LA UNION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (LUELCO), REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN N. DY, complainant,vs. HON. ROMEO M. ATILLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 31, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGOO, LA UNION, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 15, 2018, which reads as follows: HESIcT
"OCA IPI No. 17-4675-RTJ — La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LUELCO), represented by Benjamin N. Dy v. Hon. Romeo M. Atillo, Jr., Presiding Judge, Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, Agoo, La Union. — In a verified Administrative Complaint, 1 dated January 28, 2017, complainant La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. (complainant cooperative), through Benjamin N. Dy (complainant), charged Presiding Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 (RTC), with grave abuse of authority, obvious partiality and gross ignorance of the law relative to criminal cases for qualified theft filed by the complainant against one Cecilia Olarte (Olarte).
Antecedents
Complainant's Version
Complainant averred that respondent issued warrants of arrest against Olarte, who evaded the warrants until she was apprehended by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Olarte was arraigned in all the thirty-one (31) counts of qualified theft, each of which was non-bailable. Preliminary conference, pre-trial and presentation of evidence then ensued.
Later, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) moved for the withdrawal of the informations for qualified theft against Olarte upon the direct order of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Complainant cooperative, through its counsels, alleged to have not received a copy of the motion to withdraw before the scheduled hearing on April 8, 2016. Rather, the counsels were given fifteen (15) minutes by the respondent on said date to go over the motion, which they received only in the afternoon.
Complainant cooperative objected to the motion to withdraw because its grant would make the court subservient to the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. The court had already arraigned Olarte, conducted a preliminary conference, pre-trial and heard the prosecution's first witness who submitted her judicial affidavit for purposes of cross-examination.
On April 11, 2016, respondent issued an order withdrawing all cases of qualified theft and directed the immediate release of Olarte. Complainant opined that, considering the voluminous records of the cases, it was impossible for the respondent to review everything before the issuance of the order which was made only three (3) days after the hearing. Thus, respondent exhibited grave abuse of authority, obvious bias and partiality in favor of Olarte.
Complainant also alleged that Olarte received special treatment during her confinement and that the special treatment even extended to respondent's court, being the executive judge.
Respondent's Version
In his Comment, 2 respondent stated that complainant, who was merely the Vice-President of the complainant cooperative, had no authority to file the complaint because Director Max Ordoño, the cooperative's President/Presiding Officer, was the one duly authorized to do so.
Respondent denied issuing the order without studying the case. He stated that he had been reviewing said case from the time he inherited the same in January 2014 because of the several motions filed by the parties which needed resolution. Although admitting that the order was issued in just three (3) days in favor of Olarte, who, at that time, was a detention prisoner for almost a year, respondent argued that his order cited supporting jurisprudence to justify Olarte's release.
Respondent likewise denied irregularities in the order of release and maintained that there was no longer any valid legal ground to detain Olarte. He argued that although he issued warrants of arrest against Olarte after finding probable cause, the proceeding was different when he examined the same records for the purpose of resolving the motion of the provincial prosecutor to withdraw the cases. After the issuance of his order, the respondent inhibited from resolving the motion for reconsideration. Judge Ethelwolda Jaravata (Judge Jaravata) of Branch 32 subsequently took over and resolved the motion, reversing the respondent's order and reinstating the dismissed cases. However, Judge Jaravata also inhibited from resolving the motion for reconsideration. The motion was then resolved by Judge Ferdinand Fe, who eventually sustained respondent's position, thus, dismissing the reinstated cases against Olarte and the warrants of arrest on the ground of double jeopardy.
Lastly, respondent denied extending special treatment to Olarte and argued that complainant's claim was unfounded and refuted by Olarte's co-detainees.
OCA's Recommendation
After evaluation of the complaint and respondent's comment, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit. caITAC
The OCA opined that to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Bias and partiality, to be administrative grounds, must be glaringly tilted in favor of the other party with no basis to support the resolution. 3 However, respondent's order was supported by facts. Jurisprudence on the matter was cited and discussed to justify the issuance of the order. The respondent's order recalling the informations is an exercise of judicial prerogative which the OCA cannot pass upon and modify. 4
Further, the OCA noted that complainant, as the Vice-President, was not the authorized person stated in the Board Resolution 5 dated June 2, 2016 to represent the electric cooperative relative to the filing of the instant administrative complaint. 6
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
In Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, 7 the Court ruled that:
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent's bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 8
Similarly in this case, complainant's claims are devoid of merit because he failed to establish the respondent's malice in the issuance of the assailed order. Deliberate intent to do an injustice on the part of the respondent was not clearly shown. The fact that the order was issued in only three (3) days despite the voluminous records is not sufficient to make a conclusion that respondent exercised his judicial functions in an arbitrary manner.
Further, complainant's claims are merely speculative and grounded on opinion and surmises. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and the rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 9
Moreover, the grant of the motion to withdraw by respondent did not automatically amount to subservience to the Secretary of Justice but, rather, it was in faithful exercise of his judicial prerogative after having reviewed the case records and making his own independent assessment.
Finally, the OCA correctly noted that complainant is not the authorized person stated in the board resolution who could file the instant administrative complaint.
It must be stressed that a judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations. 10
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Presiding Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2.Rollo, pp. 12-17.
3.Rollo, at p. 64.
4.Id., p. 64.
5.Id., at pp. 7-8.
6.Id.
7. 731 Phil. 82 (2014).
8.Id., at p. 96.
9.Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, 731 Phil. 82, 97 (2014).
10.Monticalbo vs. Judge Maraya, Jr., 664 Phil. 1, 13 (2011).