THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190627. April 19, 2017.]
LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and WILLY TANTONGCO, petitioner,vs. SANTO TOMAS VENTURES & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a ResolutiondatedApril 19, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 190627(La Campana Development Corporation and Willy Tantongco vs. Santo Tomas Ventures & Development Corporation). — Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by La Campana Development Corporation (La Campana) and Willy Tantongco (petitioners), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated August 4, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its Amended Resolution 3 dated November 4, 2009 and Resolution 4 dated December 11, 2009, in CA-G.R. SP No. 108243. HESIcT
The Facts
On March 6, 2009, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction 5 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against Santo Tomas Ventures & Development Corporation (respondent) and Symex Security Services. The petitioners alleged that they own several properties in Quezon City, which were extra-judicially foreclosed. The certificates of title were consolidated in the name of Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which then sold the properties to the respondent by virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale. 6 The petitioners further claimed that the respondent was able to obtain a demolition permit 7 from the office of the City Engineer of Quezon through irregular, illegal and unlawful means. Moreover, the demolition job undertaken by the respondent had caused loss and injury upon the petitioners. 8
On March 12, 2009, the RTC issued an Order 9 granting the TRO, thereby enjoining the respondent and the security agency from implementing the writ of demolition and from committing other acts that would deprive the petitioners of possession of the property. The RTC then issued an Order 10 dated March 30, 2009, granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). The dispositive portion of the order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for the issuance of [WPI] is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a [WPI] issue, upon posting of the requisite bond in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) to answer for whatever damages the defendants would suffer on account of the issuance of the injunction writ, restraining the defendants and all persons acting on their behalf from further implementing the demolition on the subject property and from committing other acts that deprive the plaintiffs of the possession and occupancy of the subject property such as the following:
(a) evicting or removing the plaintiffs, their offices, employees and properties from the subject property without any court order;
(b) padlocking the gates of the subject property and/or controlling its ingress and egress, particularly with respect to the plaintiffs, their employees and all persons acting in behalf of the plaintiffs. For this purpose, this Court authorizes the plaintiff to post their own security guards at the main gates who shall have the duty to determine if the persons seeking entry are duly authorized by the plaintiffs;
(c) interfering in any manner, with the plaintiffs; lawful conduct of business within the premises of the subject property such as, disallowing, interrupting; or delaying the entry and exit of plaintiffs' deliveries, suppliers, clients, customers, and other persons acting under the authority of the plaintiffs, to maintain the status quoante. AcICHD
SO ORDERED. 11
The respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI.
On August 4, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 12 granting the petition and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 30, 2009. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 30 March 2009 issued by the [RTC] of Quezon City, Branch 96 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the prayer for the issuance of a [TRO] and/or [WPI] [has] already become moot and academic by reason of of [sic] the foregoing.
SO ORDERED.13
The CA found that the TRO was issued after an ex-parte hearing, with no summons being served upon the respondent. It held that the general rule is that a restraining order may only be issued upon prior notice or hearing. However, the court may issue ex parte a TRO if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter could be heard on notice. 14 In this case, the CA ruled that the petitioners failed to justify the issuance of a TRO ex parte. As to the injunctive writ, the CA held that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and urgent necessity for the writ. 15
In an Amended Resolution 16 dated November 4, 2009, the CA denied the petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration. On December 11, 2009, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA for having been filed late. 17
Hence, this petition.
Issue
The issues are: (1) whether the CA erred in denying the petitioners' Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration; and (2) whether the petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a WPI.
Ruling of the Court
The Court resolves to deny the petition.
The CA did not commit grave error
In a long line of cases starting with Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Judge Japson, 18 the Court has laid down the following guideline: TAIaHE
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. 19 (Italics in the original deleted)
The general rule is that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA 20 (IRCA) that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA's decision becomes final. Thus, a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of the 15-day period for the computation of a decision's finality. At the end of the period, a CA judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond the Court's power to review. 21
Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final order should be filed within the period for appeal, which is within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from. The 2002 IRCA also states that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA decision becomes final. 22 In this case, the CA noted that the last day to file the motion for reconsideration is on August 26, 2009 as a copy of the Decision dated August 4, 2009 was received by the petitioners on August 11, 2009. Unfortunately, the petitioners filed the said motion only on September 10, 2009. caITAC
The petitioners argue that they are entitled to a relaxation of the rule as the denial of their motion for extension of time was tantamount to a denial of their right to seek reconsideration of the CA decision on mere technical grounds. It must however be stressed that a party may be entitled to a liberal application of a procedural rule only for the "most persuasive of reasons." Unfortunately, the petitioners failed to establish why they should be exempted from the general rule that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. Hence, in denying the motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, the CA merely applied the Rules of Court and its own internal rules.
The petitioners are not entitled to
The issue is whether the petitioners are entitled to the WPI. For this reason, the Court shall deal only with the questioned writ and not with the merits of the case pending before the RTC.
A WPI is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. 23 The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. 24
Under Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for a WPI may be granted if the following grounds are established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Thus, a WPI may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 25 While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. 26
In this case, however, the petitioners' right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The CA noted that the right asserted by the petitioners is still in dispute before another court and has yet to be determined in the pending case between the petitioners and DBP. 27 The petitioners also admitted in their complaint that it was WMC Printing Enterprises (WMC) which is using and occupying the property subject to demolition. 28 In fact, the employees affected by the demolition are employees of WMC, and not the employees of La Campana. 29 In Ong Ching Kian Chuan v Court of Appeals, 30 it was held that in the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the movant, the trial court's order granting the issuance of an injunctive writ will be set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. 31
Furthermore, an injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. 32 The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. 33
The CA correctly held that the damages that the petitioners had suffered or continue to suffer, if there may be, may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. Here, the petitioners had specifically stated in their prayer for damages with application of WPI that they were entitled to damages in the total amount of P500,000.00. Clearly, the perceived damages are susceptible of mathematical computation, and thus, cannot be considered as irreparable injury. ICHDca
In Government Service Insurance System v. Judge Florendo, 34 the Court held that a writ of injunction should never have been issued when an action for damages would adequately compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction rests in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. 35
After a careful consideration of the facts and arguments of the parties, the Court finds that the petitioners did not adequately prove their entitlement to the injunctive writ. Conformably, the CA was correct in setting aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The grant of the WPI by the trial court in favor of the petitioners, despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on their part, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. cDHAES
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 4, 2009, as well as its Amended Resolution dated November 4, 2009 and Resolution dated December 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108243 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 15-74.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring; id. at 77-93.
3.Id. at 94.
4.Id. at 96-97.
5.Id. at 135-147.
6.Id. at 115-119.
7.Id. at 113.
8.Id. at 79-80.
9. Rendered by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal; id. at 191-195.
10.Id. at 208-212.
11.Id. at 211-212.
12.Id. at 77-93.
13.Id. at 92.
14. RULES OF COURT, Rule 58, Section 5, as amended.
15.Rollo, pp. 83-88.
16.Id. at 94.
17.Id. at 96-97.
18. 226 Phil. 144 (1986).
19.Id. at 148.
20. Effective August 22, 2002.
21.Imperial v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 606 Phil. 391, 396-397 (2009).
22. Rule VII of the 2002 IRCA provides:
Sec. 1.Entry of Judgment. Unless a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed or an appeal taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolution of the Court shall be entered upon expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5.Entry of Judgment and Final Resolution. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
23.Atty. Orocio v. Anguluan, et al., 597 Phil. 524, 539 (2009).
24.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Santiago, 548 Phil. 314, 329 (2007).
25.Almeida v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 648, 662-663 (2005).
26.Spouses Borromeo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 573 Phil. 400, 411 (2008).
27.Rollo, pp. 86-87.
28.Id. at 136.
29.Id. at 87.
30. 415 Phil. 365 (2001).
31.Id. at 374-375.
32.Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Judge de los Angeles, 247 Phil. 506, 518-519 (1988).
33.G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation, et al. v. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., et al., 625 Phil. 652, 659 (2010).
34. 258 Phil. 694 (1989).
35.Id. at 705.