KV Construction and Development Corp. v. Asis

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207743. April 3, 2019.]

KV CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND AGAPITO VILLAMONTE, BOTH REPRESENTED BY CESAR MAGO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME ST. HELENA MEMORIAL GARDEN, petitioners, vs.DONALD E. ASIS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 207743 (KV Construction and Development Corporation and Agapito Villamonte, both represented by Cesar Mago, doing business under the name St. Helena Memorial Garden vs. Donald E. Asis). — This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the January 31, 2013 Decision 2 and June 3, 2013 Resolution 3 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118946, entitled "Donald E. Asis versus Hon. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Fifth Judicial Region, Labo, Camarines Norte."

The Antecedent Facts

The instant case stemmed from a complaint for specific performance 4 filed by St. Helena Memorial Gardens (petitioner) against Donald E. Asis (respondent), administrator of St. Helen's Gate Cemetery. The former essentially sought to enjoin the latter from selling memorial lots and undertaking burial activities. The complaint, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte, was grounded on respondent's alleged lack of appropriate licenses and permits. 5

In response, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint. According to him, the matter was cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Executive Order No. 648. 6

On November 26, 2010, the RTC issued an Order 7 dismissing the case, agreeing with respondent that jurisdiction over the complaint was indeed lodged with the HLURB. The fallo of said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, above-premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by [respondent] Atty. Donald E. Asis is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the [petitioner]. Accordingly, the motion to declare [respondent] in default filed [by] [petitioner] is DENIED for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED. 8

Petitioner then sought reconsideration.

On January 24, 2011, the RTC issued another Order, 9 this time opining that it had jurisdiction over the controversy, as all available administrative remedies before the HLURB had already been exhausted. The decretal portion of the January 24, 2011 Order reads: TIADCc

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION filed by [petitioner] through counsel Atty. Santiago Z. Ceneta is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Consequently and as prayed for, [petitioner] through counsel is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order within which to amend its complaint primarily for the purpose of impleading the real party-in-interest as [petitioner] thereto, furnishing copies thereof to all the [respondents] who are likewise given the same period of time to file its ANSWER on said Amended Complaint.

SO ORDERED. 10

Respondent then assailed the RTC's second order before the CA via a Rule 65 petition, reiterating his position that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.

On January 31, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed decision, granting respondent's appeal. According to the appellate court, the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint. The dispositive portion of the CA's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Order, dated January 24, 2011, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 10-0367 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 11

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied the same through the assailed June 3, 2013 Resolution, which petitioner received on June 13, 2013. 12

On June 27, 2013, petitioner filed before the Court a motion for extension of time, 13 asking for an additional thirty (30) days to file its petition for review on certiorari.

On July 26, 2013, petitioner, anticipating the impossibility of punctual filing despite the extension prayed for, sought another thirty (30)-day period through a second motion for extension of time. 14

Meanwhile, the Court, through a Resolution 15 dated September 11, 2013, granted the petitioner's first motion for extension of time. Petitioner was, thus, given an additional 30 days, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period, within which to file its petition for review on certiorari. However, petitioner's second motion was denied. Consequently, considering that July 28, 2013 fell on a Sunday, petitioner had until July 29, 2013 to file said petition.

On December 5, 2013, the petitioner filed its petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issue:

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT.

The Court's Ruling

The petition must be denied for being filed out of time.

Enshrined is the rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a component of due process. It is but a mere statutory privilege. 16 Accordingly, appeals must be exercised in the manner and within the period provided by law. 17 Corollarily, failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed reglementary period renders the challenged judgment final and executory. 18 Thus, a belatedly filed appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter said judgment. 19 AIDSTE

Pertinently, the rules provide that the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari is fifteen (15) days, counted from receipt of the resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 20

Here, petitioner received the resolution denying its motion for reconsideration on June 13, 2013. Hence, it had until June 28, 2013 to file its petition for review on certiorari. However, instead of doing so, petitioner, on June 27, 2013, filed a motion for extension of time, seeking an additional thirty (30) days within which to file said petition.

The Court granted the aforesaid motion, thus giving petitioner until July 29, 2013 to file its petition for review on certiorari.

Notwithstanding the extended reglementary period, petitioner still failed to file its petition on time. In lieu thereof, petitioner, on July 26, 2013, filed a second motion for extension of time, asking the Court for another 30 days within which to file its petition for review on certiorari.

However, petitioner's second motion was denied on the ground that the rules allow only a single extension of time. 21 Therefore, on July 29, 2013, the CA's January 31, 2013 Decision and June 3, 2013 Resolution became final and executory.

While there have been instances when the Court has relaxed the rules governing reglementary periods, it has done so only in exceptional cases and for the most compelling reasons. 22

On this score, petitioner, in its second motion for extension of time, stated that its counsel, Atty. Santiago Ceneta (Atty. Ceneta), suffered a stroke, rendering half of his body nearly paralyzed. In addition, it was mentioned that Atty. Ceneta had to prepare numerous pleadings for cases of equal importance. 23 These, according to petitioner, constituted compelling reasons that should justify a relaxation of the rules.

The contention fails to impress.

Anent Atty. Ceneta's physical condition, it bears noting that petitioner had already proffered the same as an excuse in its first motion for extension of time. Thus, since petitioner had already known that Atty. Ceneta's ability to handle the case was greatly impaired by the stroke he suffered, it had ample time to secure the services of a new lawyer, which in fact it did, albeit belatedly. In this regard, Atty. Edmundo Deveza II, on December 5, 2013, entered his appearance 24 as Atty. Ceneta's collaborating counsel. At the time, however, more than four (4) months had elapsed since the finality of the CA's decision.

Failing to timely secure the services of another counsel, petitioner was clearly remiss in its duty to exercise the diligence that the Court expects of litigants.

Anent the other pleadings that Atty. Ceneta had to prepare, the Court finds it apt to reiterate the well-settled rule that heavy pressure of work is not considered enough a compelling reason to justify an extension of time. 25 Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. 26 Lawyers, after all, should only accept as many cases as they can efficiently handle. 27 Therefore, petitioner cannot invoke Atty. Ceneta's heavy workload to secure an additional period within which it could have filed its petition for review on certiorari.

Moreover, the Court cannot help but notice that the instant petition was filed more than four months after the lapse of the extended reglementary period. Therefore, even if petitioner was granted another thirty (30)-day extension, its petition for review on certiorari would still have been filed out of time. While it may be true that the rules on reglementary periods are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is equally true that such rules "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business." 28 Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so too does the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. 29 AaCTcI

On this score alone, the petition's dismissal is in order.

Nevertheless, even if the Court were to entertain the merits of the instant appeal, the same result would obtain.

In Geronimo, et al. v. Sps. Calderon, 30 it was held that:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. We have ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved, and the parties. 31

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957 vested the National Housing Authority (NHA) with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business. To further empower the NHA, PD No. 1344 expanded its jurisdiction to include the following: 32

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. 33

These functions were then transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission in 1981, 34 which was later renamed the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 35

Under its charter, the HLURB has the power to issue orders for the cessation or closure of any use or activity that is determined to have violated or failed to comply with any of the laws and rules it is charged with implementing. 36

A perusal of petitioner's complaint, particularly the relief sought, reveals that this case should have been filed with the HLURB, not the RTC. By instituting the instant case, petitioner ultimately sought to enjoin respondent from operating St. Helen's Gate Cemetery for want of legal authority to sell memorial lots. Since the sale of said lots invariably involves dealings in real estate, there is no question that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC should have dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. EcTCAD

SO ORDERED." (CARANDANG, J., additional Member per S.O. No. 2624, dated November 29, 2018).

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 23-59.

2.Id. at 156-165. Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.

3.Id. at 168-169.

4.Id. at 63-70.

5.Id. at 157-158.

6.Id. at 159.

7.Id. at 249-250.

8.Id. at 250.

9.Id. at 257-258.

10.Id. at 258.

11.Id. at 164.

12.Id. at 24.

13.Id. at 4-5.

14.Id. at 13-15.

15.Id. at 17.

16.Sibayan v. Costales, 789 Phil. 1, 9 (2016).

17. Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 691 Phil. 335, 341-342 (2012).

18. ABS-CBN Publishing, Inc. v. Director of the Bureau of Trademarks, G.R. No. 217916, June 20, 2018.

19. Bañez v. Social Security System, 739 Phil. 148, 155-156 (2014).

20. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.

21. Id.

22. Supra note 18.

23. Rollo, p. 14.

24. Id. at 19-22.

25. Heirs of Ramon B. Gayares v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp., et al., 691 Phil. 46, 50 (2012).

26. Id. at 54.

27. Miwa v. Atty. Medina, 458 Phil. 920, 928 (2003).

28. Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, Dr. Emelita Q. Firmacion, Marietta Mendoza, Aurora Agustin, Nora Aguilar, Ma. Theresa M. Befetel, and Myrna Nisay vs. Dr. Glory V. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017.

29. PEÑA v. GSIS, 533 Phil. 670, 683 (2006).

30. 749 Phil. 871 (2014).

31. Id. at 880.

32. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. v. Sunnyside Heights Homeowners Association, Inc., 778 Phil. 254, 262 (2016).

33. Presidential Decree No. 1344, Sec. 1.

34. Executive Order No. 648.

35. Executive Order No. 90.

36. Executive Order No. 648, Sec. 5 (p).