THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208602. June 23, 2014.]
KRAFT FOODS PHILS., INC. AND MA. VICTORIA TIONGSON, petitioners, vs. DONATO A. CONSTANTINO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 208602 (Kraft Foods Phils., Inc. and Ma. Victoria Tiongson v. Donato A. Constantino). — The Court resolves to:
(1) GRANT petitioners' motion for an extension of ten (10) days or until May 11, 2014 within which to file a reply to respondent's comment on the petition for review certiorari; and
(2) NOTE:
(a) respondent's Manifestation (to Correct a Typographical Error) dated April 5, 2014 stating that in paragraph 56 of page 29 of the comment (on the petition) he inadvertently stated the date August 14, 2004 when it should have been August 14, 2007, and praying this Court that the correction be duly noted; and
(b) said reply.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review the March 8, 2013 Decision 2 and the August 2, 2013 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116792. The CA rulings granted the petition filed by Donato A. Constantino (respondent), in effect, reversing the July 19, 2010 Decision 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the September 30, 2008 Decision 5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA), favoring Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., now known as Mondelez Philippines (petitioner).
The Facts:
Respondent started his employment with the petitioner on April 1, 2003. As embodied in the Letter of Understanding (LOU), dated January 13, 2003, respondent was assigned to Cikarang, Indonesia, as Business Development Manager for PT Nabisco Indonesia for 2 to 3 years beginning February 1, 2003. In the same letter, it was stated that at the end of his overseas assignment, a local position with a rank of at least grade level 12 (SG 12) would be offered by petitioner. His international assignment ended on March 31, 2006.
Despite the expiration of his international assignment, petitioner extended respondent's stay for another year, or from April 1, 2006 until March 31, 2007. Similar terms and conditions were given except that the mobility premium or relocation allowance benefits were removed.
At one time, respondent went back to the Philippines. On October 4, 2006, respondent went to petitioner's Sucat plant to check and synchronize his e-mails. There, he met the Southeast Asia Manufacturing Director who asked him if he was interested in the position of maintenance manager. He, however, rejected the alleged offer on his belief that it was a position with a rank lower than the promised SG 12.
After the expiration of the extended term, petitioner secured another work visa for respondent so he could work for another year starting July 2, 2007. Respondent, at this juncture, served as project manager.
In the process of negotiating for a new letter of understanding, respondent asked for the adoption of an old provision underlining the obligation of petitioner to offer him a position with at least the same grade level as his current position, once the overseas assignment would eventually end.
In an e-mail received on July 30, 2007, petitioner informed respondent that the requested clause from the prior LOU would no longer be included in the new one. SaCDTA
With the expiration of the last extended term on March 31, 2007, respondent was supposed to return to the Philippines. He, however, did not. Upon his failure to do so, petitioner sent him a letter, dated August 14, 2007, informing him that his stint in Indonesia would end on September 14, 2007; that he would be repatriated to Kraft Food Philippines, Inc.; and that upon his return, he would be included in the Involuntary Separation Program due to the unavailability of positions suitable for his rank and need.
On November 17, 2007, respondent signed his clearance and quitclaim stating that for and in consideration of the amount of P3,253,215.40, he was releasing and forever discharging petitioner from any and all manner of action or actions which he might have by reason of his employment with it. This was, however, signed with respondent's handwritten annotation containing the words "Not conforme yet UP 11/17/07, Received Cheque #35134; Pending payment; No Fund B payment: and No pro-rated home leave payment."
Respondent, nevertheless, filed a complaint on December 27, 2007 for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with full backwages, automotive purchase assistance, home housing refurbishing assistance, pro-rated home leave pay, 12% management incentive program of annual based salary, retirement fund B, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
In its decision, dated September 30, 2008, the LA held respondent's termination on the ground of redundancy as valid. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for lack of merit the instant complaint for illegal dismissal.
However, the respondent company is hereby ORDERED to pay the complainant his Retirement Fund B in the amount of P569,117.95 computed as of 30 September 2007.
All other claims of the complainant, and the counterclaim of the respondents, are DENIED for lack of factual and legal bases.
SO ORDERED. 6
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the NLRC, which, on July 19, 2010, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, thereby affirming the findings of the LA. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
Meanwhile, complainant is reminded to claim for the respondents the check of P569,117.95 issued to his favour by the respondents to pay for his Fund B as well as his pro-rated home leave pay.
SO ORDERED.7
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
In its Decision, dated March 8, 2013, the CA reversed the findings of the LA and the NLRC. It was of the view that the conclusions made by the labor tribunals were not supported by the evidence on record.
In particular, the CA stated that the requisites for the valid exercise of the power to terminate on the basis of redundancy were not met. It cited Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation,8 where the Court held that it was not enough for a company to merely declare that it had become overmanned but that the company must produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the affected employees. Applying this to respondent's case, the CA ruled that no evidence was presented by petitioner to substantiate its claim that no other position was available at the Sucat plant with a grade level of 12 except by mere assertion. It further wrote that the alleged refusal of respondent to assume the position of maintenance manager did not justify the dismissal simply because the said position was never formally offered, but was merely suggested by a certain company officer.
The CA also found that petitioner failed to comply with the other requirements for the valid implementation of the redundancy program. It stated that only the requirements of a written notice to the employee and payment of separation pay were complied with, but none as to the rest.
Lastly, the CA held that despite the execution of a quitclaim, the employee's claims may still be given due course as respondent manifested his non-conformity to it by the words "not conforme" which he wrote down on the quitclaim with his signature. The CA, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 19 July 2010 and the Order dated 30 September 2010 of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ['COMMISSION], Fourth Division in NLRC LAC No. 11-003934-08 [are] hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent, KRAFT FOODS (PHILS.) INC. is hereby ORDERED to reinstate complainant DONATO A. CONSTANTINO without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay him the following:
1. Full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and his other benefits computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him or 14 September 2007, up to the time of his actual reinstatement less the amount of P1,055,561.87 he received as separation pay.
2. Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. Retirement Fund B in the amount of P569,117.95;
5. Automobile Assistance in the amount of $5,000.00; and
6. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total judgment award.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration. In a Resolution, dated August 2, 2013, the CA denied it.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari filed before it by respondent notwithstanding the fact that it only raised factual and evidentiary grounds. aTEAHc
2. Whether the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the LA and the NLRC which upheld the legality of the termination of respondent on the alleged ground of redundancy.
The Court's Disposition
The Court denies the petition.
On a preliminary matter, petitioner would have this Court rule that the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that only questions pertaining to grave abuse of discretion should have been the subject of a Rule 65 petition to the exclusion of other factual and evidentiary matters on which respondent's claim were based. In other words, petitioner believes that the CA had no authority to review the factual and evidentiary findings of the NLRC and the LA following the rule that findings of fact of the labor tribunals are entitled to and accorded great respect and even finality.
The Court, however, disagrees.
In Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 10 the Court had the occasion to explain the extent of judicial review by certiorari of decisions or resolutions of the NLRC as exercised previously by the CA. There, it was written:
The rule is settled that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision of respondent NLRC (or Executive Labor Arbiter as in this case) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is thus incumbent upon petitioner to satisfactorily establish that respondent Commission or executive labor arbiter acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.
Following the above pronouncement, the CA can act on a petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or decisive of the controversy. Settled is the rule that the CA can even grant a petition for certiorari when the factual findings complained of are not in accord with the evidence on record 11 especially when it is necessary to prevent substantial injustice and when required to arrive at a just determination of the case.
In the case before it, the CA needed to look and inquire into the factual matters to determine whether the conclusions of the NLRC were in conformity with the evidence on record. The CA remained faithful to the facts and reviewed them accordingly, except that, in the CA's assessment, a different consequence as to the legal characterization of the dismissal was in order. In doing so, there was no error on the part of the CA when it reviewed the factual findings as it was necessary to justly determine the case.
Turning now to the main issue, which is whether there was a valid cause for respondent's termination, the Court answers in the negative for the reasons discussed hereinafter.
Redundancy exists when the service of an employee is in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the business. 12 A redundant position is one rendered superfluos by any number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of a service activity formerly undertaken by the enterprise. 13
For a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant position; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant. 14
Here, it appears that no written notice was given to the DOLE at least a month prior to the intended date of termination. Petitioner's mere assertion that compliance with the said requirement was made was insufficient. Assertions can never be proof by themselves. By this failure alone, the CA correctly ruled that the ground of redundancy relied upon by petitioner could not stand.
Likewise, the Court is unable to agree with petitioner that good faith attended its refusal to reinstate respondent on the alleged ground of redundancy. Note that petitioner's justification in declaring respondent's position redundant consisted mainly of two parts: First is the unavailability of the position suitable for respondent and second is the repeated refusal of the respondent to assume the position of maintenance manager which was allegedly offered to him even before the expiration of his assignment in Indonesia.
As to the first, it must be remembered that mere declaration of being overmanned is not enough to substantiate redundancy. 15 The employer must present evidence such as, but not limited to, the new staffing pattern, feasibility studies/proposal, on the viability of the newly created positions, job description and the approval by the management of the restructuring. 16 Nothing in the records, however, shows that these requirements for substantiation were presented by petitioner. Clearly, petitioner failed to demonstrate how it arrived at a conclusion that the position sought by him had become unavailable, which could have supported the claim that the said position had become redundant or superfluous.
As to the second, the Court notes that although there was a purported offer made by petitioner, it appears that respondent cannot be faulted for believing that the position "offered" did not correspond to what he was entitled to under the promises made to him. To put this in a better perspective, the said offer was not even made formally. If at all, the offer was merely a suggestion of a company official whose capacity to deal with respondent's employment concerns had not been identified. It would, therefore, be against the natural state of things for the Court to expect respondent to clearly understand the nature of the offer or to reasonably appreciate the same as no specifications were clearly provided to guide him in intelligently deciding on the matter. CEDHTa
In any case, even if the Court assumes that respondent had been unjustifiably stubborn in refusing to accept the "offered" position, petitioner cannot simply use the same to justify the termination as the ground relied upon from the very start was limited only to redundancy. The alleged acts of refusal were not even passed upon by the CA, the NLRC and the LA. In fact, petitioner even admitted that it elected to terminate respondent on the basis of redundancy, not disobedience, saying that the same was made as an expression of goodwill to prevent respondent from not receiving any cent. Being the case, the allegation of disobedience as a matter of claim is utterly irrelevant in the disposition of this case.
Proceeding to another matter, petitioner submits that it can no longer be bound to offer any position since its obligation to respondent has lapsed with the expiration of the contract governing the assignment in Indonesia on March 31, 2007. Petitioner believes that no contract remained governing their relationship and the obligations and duties attached with it. In essence, petitioner simply asserts that beyond March 31, 2007, it ceased to have any relation with respondent, thus, without any obligation to reinstate him.
The Court again disagrees.
Granted that no contract of foreign assignment governed the parties at the time the most recent LOU expired, it cannot be denied that respondent remained employed by petitioner even beyond March 31, 2007. What is striking is the fact that petitioner tries to limit its relationship with respondent on mere contracts of assignments not taking into account the fact that their relationship is first and foremost governed by labor laws. A temporary assignment does not mean severance of employer-employee relationship. In fact, as expressed by petitioner in the LOU, it is quite clear that it agreed to remain as the employer of respondent despite the fact that he was assigned in a foreign land.
As an employee, respondent's rights provided for under the Labor Code demand to be respected. Among which is respondent's entitlement to be reinstated and repatriated in the employment with petitioner upon the expiration of the contract of assignment.
As a matter of last resort, petitioner argues that the CA erred in ruling that the quitclaim should not be given full force and effect. It contends that the respondent executed the quitclaim voluntarily and so it must be effected and recognized.
The Court is not swayed.
The quitclaim executed by respondent clearly bears certain words indicative of his reservations in signing the same. The words — "Not conforme" attest to the fact that he was all along reluctant in accepting cold cash in exchange for the waiver. In his attempt to safeguard his rights to claims that he felt was not given to him, respondent made himself clear by writing down those words that would clearly convey the message that he was not totally amenable to it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. (Peralta, J., designated Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 1707; Reyes, J., designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1704, both dated June 17, 2014, in view of the official trip of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., to Nairobi, Kenya to attend the Global Symposium on Environment Rule of Law; and Villarama, Jr., J., designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special Order No. 1691, dated May 22, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 26-73.
2. Id. at 10-22. Penned by Associate Justice Leonica Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Marlene Gonzales-Sizon, concurring.
3. Id. at 23-24.
4. Rollo (Volume II), pp. 976-991.
5. Rollo, (Volume I, Annex "I"), pp. 236-262.
6. Rollo, pp. 261-262.
7. Id. at 353.
8. 469 Phil. 237 (2004).
9. Rollo, pp. 91-92.
10. 331 Phil. 278 (1996).
11. Faeldonia v. Tong Yak Groceries, G.R. No. 182499, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 677, 684.
12. Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA 532, 542.
13. Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 82249, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 665; Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 364 Phil. 912 (1999).
14. Lowe, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 164813 and 174590, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 140.
15. Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 156658, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 271.
16. Panlilio v. National Labor Relations Commission, 346 Phil. 30 (1997).