SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 256821. March 30, 2022.]
KAUNLARAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER COOPERATIVE (KAPCO) and GARY CHENG, petitioners,vs. RODERICK M. VERDERA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 30 March 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 256821(Kaunlaran Agricultural Producer Cooperative (KAPCO) and Gary Cheng vs. Roderick M. Verdera). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 23 July 2021 under Rule 45 (Petition) 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 07 July 2020 and Resolution 3 dated 26 May 2021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 153603. The CA granted respondent Roderick M. Verdera's (respondent)'s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and set aside the Resolution 4 dated 30 June 2017 and Resolution 5 dated 31 August 2017 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 05-001659-17 (4), which affirmed the Decision 6 dated 21 March 2017 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-08-01034-15-Q. The LA dismissed respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal but directed petitioners Kaunlaran Agricultural Producer Cooperative (KAPCO) and Gary Cheng (Cheng; collectively, petitioners) to pay respondent 13th month pay and separation pay. 7
After a judicious review of the case, this Court resolves to DENY the Petition for failure of petitioners to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA.
At the outset, it must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law as factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. The Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to evaluate the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. However, since the findings of the labor tribunals and the CA are conflicting, the present case falls under jurisprudential exemptions. Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court is compelled to re-evaluate the factual issues and re-examine the questioned findings. 8
In deciding petitions under Rule 45 assailing the CA's decision from a petition under Rule 65, the CA's decision must be examined from the context of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC, rather than deciding whether the NLRC decision was correct on the case's merits. In labor disputes, there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not grounded on substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might sufficiently accept to justify a conclusion. Guided by the following considerations, We find that the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that respondent abandoned his employment and was not constructively dismissed. 9
Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise. There is cessation of work in constructive dismissal because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. To be considered as such, an act must be a display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of the employer so intense that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his employment. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer. 10
Petitioners' refusal to give respondent driving assignments and his transfer from being a trailer driver to a helper-mechanic amounted to a constructive dismissal. As aptly pointed out by the CA, his new assignment as part-time helper-mechanic is evidently a demotion. A part-time helper-mechanic does not have the same status and importance as a trailer truck driver, which requires a different skill set and whose duties include responsibility for valuable equipment and cargo. Moreover, respondent's assignment as helper-mechanic evidently resulted in substantial diminution of pay. As helper-mechanic, respondent was paid P350.00 per actual day worked, or about P8,400.00 per month. This is about one-third (1/3) of respondent's average monthly income of P24,000.00 as a trailer truck driver. From the time respondent worked as a helper-mechanic on 28 April 2015 until 10 August 2015 when he filed the complaint, KAPCO did not assign him to drive a trailer truck. Instead, KAPCO assumed respondent had gone AWOL, disregarded his explanation that he was driving a tricycle only to supplement his income while waiting for a driving assignment, and posted a public notice that respondent had resigned. 11 CAIHTE
In addition, prior to the change in his work assignment, respondent was being assigned to drive trucks requiring more maintenance than others. The work environment had already turned difficult for respondent with the departure of his former immediate supervisor, Juniel Yu (Yu). Respondent was often in conflict with Yu's replacement, a certain Engr. Puno, whom he claims poorly handled the maintenance and repair of KAPCO's trucks. In fact, Puno ordered him to contribute to the repair costs of one of the trucks, leaving respondent with no choice but to accept the position of helper-mechanic instead of driver so he would not pay for the repairs. 12 To avoid responsibility, petitioners claim that respondent was negligent and blamed him for the breakdown of the trucks assigned to him. However, as pointed out by the LA, it was petitioners' responsibility to ensure that the trucks are in good condition. 13 Based on these facts, the inevitable conclusion is that respondent had been constructively dismissed.
The CA also correctly found that the respondent did not abandon his employment. Abandonment, as a just cause for termination, requires a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or her work. The following elements must therefore concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. 14
There is no showing that respondent intended to sever his employment with KAPCO. On the contrary, there is strong indication that respondent wanted to resume work. Even when respondent asked permission to drive his tricycle to add to his earnings, he promised to be available when given a driving assignment. 15 Respondent denied going on AWOL, and explained that he was, in fact, waiting for a driving assignment. When he went to KAPCO, he was asked to sign a document where he assumes full responsibility if a truck malfunctions or requires repairs yet, he was still not assigned any truck to drive. 16 In July 2015, one of KAPCO's drivers fell sick and asked respondent to temporarily drive in his place. The latter readily agreed. However, when he reported to the KAPCO office, he found that there was already a notice that he had resigned. He then promptly filed a case for constructive dismissal, negating petitioner's charge of abandonment. 17
Having been illegally dismissed from employment, respondent is, therefore, entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. 18
The CA ordered KAPCO to reinstate respondent to his position as a trailer truck driver without loss of seniority rights. However, it appears that relations between petitioners and respondent have become strained, making reinstatement infeasible. Thus, the award of backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is proper in this case. However, a re-computation of the backwages and separation pay is in order considering that backwages and separation pay must be computed until the finality of the decision ordering the payment of separation pay. 19
This Court also finds the award of attorney's fees proper. We already upheld the award of attorney's fees in favor of an employee who had been illegally dismissed and impelled to litigate to protect his interests. Finally, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the total monetary award from the finality of the resolution until full payment. 20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 07 July 2020 and Resolution dated 26 May 2021 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioner Kaunlaran Agricultural Producer Cooperative is ordered to pay respondent Roderick M. Verdera:
1. Full backwages computed from the date of his constructive dismissal on 28 April 2015 until the finality of this Resolution;
2. Separation pay computed from the date respondent Roderick M. Verdera commenced employment until the finality of this Resolution at the rate of one (1) month's salary for every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year; and
3. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award.
The total monetary award shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation of the award in accordance with this Resolution. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 14-50.
2.Id. at 52-66; penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Carlito B. Calpatura of the Twelfth (12th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 68-69; penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez and concurred in by Associate Justices Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. and Carlito B. Calpatura of the Special Former Twelfth (12th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 148-156; penned by Presiding Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and concurred in by Commissioners Erlinda T. Agus and Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. of the Second (2nd) Division, National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.
5.Id. at 162-163.
6.Id. at 127-130; penned by Labor Arbiter Edgar B. Bisana.
7.Id. at 130.
8.Teletech Customer Care Management Philippines, Inc. v. Gerona, Jr., G.R. No. 219166, 10 November 2021, citing Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., 760 Phil. 779, 790 (2015); Legend Hotel v. Realuyo, 691 Phil. 226, 237 (2012).
9.Supra.
10.Divine Word College of Laoag v. Mina, 784 Phil. 546 (2016), citing Dimagan v. Dacworks United, Inc. and/or Cancino, 677 Phil. 472, 481 (2011).
11.Rollo, pp. 62-63.
12.Id. at 53.
13.Id. at 56.
14.Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. v. Loque, G.R. No. 230005, 22 January 2020, citing Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 441, 445 (2000).
15.Rollo, pp. 53-54.
16.Id. at 54.
17. See JS Unitrade Merchandise, Inc. v. Samson, Jr., G.R. No. 200405, 26 February 2020.
18. See Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. v. Loque, supra note 14.
19.Supra.
20.Supra.