SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219657. February 1, 2017.]
ROBERTO M. JUSTADO, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated01 February 2017which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 219657 — Roberto M. Justado v. People of the Philippines
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the May 11, 2015 Decision 1 and the August 3, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 36864, which affirmed the May 6, 2014 Decision 3 and the August 5, 2014 Resolution 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 363657-58. The RTC sustained with modification the July 10, 2013 Decision 5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City (MeTC), by finding petitioner Roberto M. Justado (Justado) guilty of the crime of Other Light Threats, but acquitting him of Malicious Mischief.
Justado was charged before the MeTC with Malicious Mischief and Other Light Threats committed against private complainant Maria Belen M. Justado (Belen). When arraigned, he pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial ensued.
Justado's Version
Justado lived with his sisters Belen, Ma. Rosa M. Justado (Rosa) and Ana Justado-Campo (Ana) on the same property located in Makati City. He and his family lived on the upper floor of the house with an extension on the ground floor, while Belen, Rosa and Ana lived on the ground floor. Inside Justado's property was a courtyard/pathway used as a common area for washing and cooking by his sisters and as a storage space by him and his family. They had their own gate leading to the extension of his house. Sometime in December 2009, Justado noticed that steel posts were being built on the side of the pathway blocking his driveway. So, he requested his sisters to remove them, but his pleas remained unheeded. 6
On February 22, 2010, Justado saw wooden posts anchored on the walls of his house to be used for the roof over the portion of the courtyard used by his sisters as their washing and cooking area. He requested Rosa, who was at the courtyard at that time, to remove the posts because a roof would prevent air to flow from the narrow courtyard to his house. During that time, Belen came to the courtyard and Justado repeated the same request to her. Because nothing was made of his appeals, he detached the wooden posts himself in their presence. While he was removing the wooden posts, Belen took pictures of him, insulted and threatened him. Justado did not retaliate, instead he replied in jest to the insults and threats uttered against him. Belen even brandished a wooden stick against him. 7
Belen's Version
Belen refuted Justado's narration of what transpired on that day. She claimed that at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, she heard Justado and Rosa quarreling in the courtyard. So she went to the courtyard and quickly intervened when she saw Justado about to hurt Rosa. This agitated Justado, who hurled invectives at her, venting, "Putang ina mo, lumayas ka dito, at pagbabarilin ko kayo." He then approached Belen and pointed at her forehead while uttering "Dito, dito kita babarilin!" which really scared her because she knew he had a gun and he was capable of doing it. Justado proceeded in dismantling the wooden posts while he continued to utter tirades saying, "Wala akong pakialam kung matamaan kayo, putang ina ninyo, kapal mga mukha ninyo!" Belen was even hit on the head by one of the posts being removed. 8
As a result of the untoward incident, Belen filed a complaint, dated March 29, 2010, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP) for grave threats, physical injuries and malicious mischief against Justado. In its September 17, 2010 Resolution, the OCP dismissed the complaint for physical injuries, but found probable cause for malicious mischief and modified the charge of grave threats to other light threats. On September 22, 2010, two Informations were filed before the MeTC — one for Malicious Mischief and another for Other Light Threats. 9
The MeTC Ruling
In its July 10, 2013 Decision, the MeTC found Justado guilty of both charges. It gave credence to the testimonies of Justado's sisters. The MeTC reasoned that Justado's act of destroying the wooden posts constructed by Belen constituted Malicious Mischief. Moreover, Justado exhibited hostile attitude towards Belen in hurling invectives and pointing at her forehead, showing her where he would shoot her. This constituted intimidation but which would only fall under Other Light Threats. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 363657, the court finds accused Roberto Justado y Mayandia guilty of Malicious Mischief penalized under Art. 329 of the Revised Penal Code and accused is hereby sentenced to TWO MONTHS imprisonment. Accused is likewise ordered to pay Ma. Belen J. Mendoza the amount of P8,140.00 representing the damage on the wash area, and
2. In Criminal Case No. 363658, the court finds accused Roberto Justado y Mayandia guilty of Other Light Threats and accused is hereby sentenced to TEN DAYS imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.10
Aggrieved, Justado appealed to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In its May 6, 2014 Decision, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision convicting Justado of Other Light Threats, but reversed its finding he was guilty of Malicious Mischief. It sustained the MeTC's appreciation of the testimonies given by Belen and her witnesses insofar as they established the crime of Other Light Threats. As to the crime of Malicious Mischief, the RTC ruled that it should be set aside because the wash area was situated on Justado's property, and, as the owner, he had all the right to its management, administration and disposition. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
PREMISES GIVEN, the Court orders the following:
Anent Criminal Case No. 13-2055 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF, the DECISION, dated July 10, 2013, in the Metropolitan Trial Court, NCJR, Makati City, Branch 65 in which the Accused ROBERTO M. JUSTADO was found GUILTY, is hereby REVERSED. The criminal case for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF against Accused ROBERTO M. JUSTADO is DISMISSED.
Anent Criminal Case No. 13-2056 for OTHER LIGHT THREATS, the DECISION, dated July 10, 2013, in the Metropolitan Trial Court, NCJR, Makati City, Branch 65 in which the Accused ROBERTO M. JUSTADO was found GUILTY, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
Justado filed his motion for reconsideration Criminal Case No. 13-2056, but it was denied by the RTC in its August 5, 2014 Resolution.
Undaunted, Justado elevated the case to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its May 11, 2015 Decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of Justado for Other Light Threats. It gave no credence to his defense of denial in light of the positive testimonies of the witnesses. They clearly established that Justado uttered the words, "Putang ina mo, lumayas ka dito, at pagbabarilin ko kayo" and "Dito, dito kita babarilin," threatening Belen, in the heat of anger, with some harm constituting a crime. The CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisition, the extant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the May 6, 2014 Decision and the August 5, 2014 Resolution of the court a quo are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Justado moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its August 3, 2015 Resolution.
Hence, this present petition raising the following:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER JUSTADO SHOULD BE ACQUITTED OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION; AND
II
WHETHER JUSTADO'S CONVICTION OF OTHER LIGHT THREATS IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Justado insists that the testimonies of his sisters deserve scant consideration because they were tainted with inconsistencies. Further, he argues, for the first time on appeal, that the crime had actually prescribed because the information was only filed on September 22, 2010, after the lapse of the two (2)-month prescriptive period for Other Light Threats. Justado posits that only the filing of an information in court, and not the mere filing of the complaint before the OCP, tolls the running of the prescriptive period because the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
In its Comment, 13 dated March 29, 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that Justado was estopped from belatedly raising the issue of prescription because he never raised the same during the proceedings in the courts a quo. It, nevertheless, stated that even if the issue of prescription could be validly raised, such defense would still fail to impress.
The OSG agreed with Justado that the prescriptive period of Other Light Threats under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was two (2) months. It noted, however, that the filing of the complaint before the OCP was within the two-month period and it tolled the running of the prescriptive period. It posited that in case of conflict between the Rules of Summary Procedure and the RPC, the latter should prevail. Lastly, the OSG reiterated that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of the crime of Other Light Threats, and added that the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses did not impair their credibility.
In his Reply, 14 dated September 13, 2016, Justado asserted that prescription could be raised on appeal as it was not deemed waived even if it was not pleaded as a defense. He stressed that the present case was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure; thus, the mere filing of a complaint before the OCP did not stall the running of the prescriptive period because under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the prescriptive period was interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court. He argued that in case of doubt in the law on prescription of crimes, the interpretation, which was more favorable to the accused, should be adopted.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Filing of the complaint
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the crime of Other Light Threats, as a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months pursuant to Article 90 of the RPC. The running or interruption of the period, however, is contested.
Justado argues that on the basis of Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and Section 20 of the Department of Justice-National Prosecutors Service Manual (DOJ Manual), only the filing of the information before the court suspends the running of the prescriptive period. He claims that because the crime of Other Light Threats is a light offense with a prescriptive period of two (2) months, 15 an information should have been filed before the court within two months from February 22, 2010 or the date the incident occurred, otherwise the crime would have prescribed. The information for Other Light Threats, however, was only filed on September 22, 2010, or seven (7) months from the date of the incident. Justado asserts that the prescription for the offense was not tolled with the filing of the complaint with the OCP on March 29, 2010.
On the other hand, the OSG contends that, under the RPC, the filing of the complaint before the OCP stalled the running of the prescriptive period. Under Article 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription of offenses shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
Justado is mistaken as the complaint filed before the OCP effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period of the offense. 16 Article 91 of the RPC is clear and categorical that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The Rules on Summary Procedure cannot supplant what is provided under the RPC regarding the prescription of offenses. In Reodica v. CA (Reodica), 17 the Court explained that the RPC did not distinguish whether the complaint or information was filed for preliminary investigation or for an action on the merits.
Further, the Court in Reodica stressed that the Rules on Summary Procedure could not prevail over the rules on prescription set forth in the RPC, to wit:
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. [Emphases supplied]
To strengthen his cause, Justado cites Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Judge Lidua Sr. (Jadewell)18 as basis that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an information before the courts can stop the running of the prescriptive period. A review of the pronouncements in Jadewell, however, reveals that the Court here in fact recognized that the provisions of the RPC trumped those set in the Rules of Summary Procedure, viz.:
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
xxx xxx xxx
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.19 [Emphases supplied]
From the abovementioned case, it is clear that in case of conflict between the rules of procedure and a statute, the latter governs. Particularly in this case, the running or stalling of the prescriptive period is governed by the RPC, and not by the Summary Rules of Procedure. In addition, it is noteworthy that in Jadewell, the offense was a violation of an ordinance, whereas the present case deals with a felony punishable by the RPC. Thus, the crime charged against Justado had not prescribed because the filing of the complaint before the OCP within the two-month period stalled the running of the prescriptive period.
Having resolved the issue on prescription, the Court has no other conclusion but to sustain Justado's conviction for Other Light Threats. In Almojuela v. People, 20 the Court reiterated the general rule that the findings of facts of the courts a quo are given great weight and are only overturned if there has been a mistake in its appreciation, to wit:
As a final note, the general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect.
These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless these are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. We have carefully scrutinized the records and we find no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA's findings. We see no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed — overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, we defer to the trial court on the findings of facts as it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties. 21
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court finds that Justado was correctly convicted of the crime of Other Light Threats. Under Article 285 (2) of the RPC, a person who, in the heat of anger, orally threatens another with some harm constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat, is guilty of Other Light Threats. 22 In the case at bench, it was clearly established that Justado, after quarreling with his siblings over a dispute involving their property, threatened to shoot Belen without actually pushing through with the threat. Nevertheless, such threat alone makes Justado liable for Other Light Threats punished under Article 285 (2) of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla with Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, concurring; rollo, pp. 48-60.
2.Id. at 76-77.
3. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes; id. at 87-93.
4.Id. at 94-96.
5. Penned by Presiding Judge Henry F. Laron; id. at 97-103.
6.Id. at 20-21.
7.Id. at 22.
8.Id. at 125-126.
9.Id. at 15-16.
10. Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy. Missing Footnote Text.
11.Id. at 92.
12.Id. at 59.
13.Id. at 422-439.
14.Id. at 443-451.
15. Article 90, paragraph 5 of the RPC.
16.People v. Bautista, 550 Phil. 835, 839 (2007).
17. 354 Phil. 90 (1998).
18. 719 Phil. 1 (2013).
19.Id. at 15-16.
20. G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 293.
21. Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy. Missing Footnote Text.
22. Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy. Missing Footnote Text.