THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246558. October 11, 2021.]
ENGR. FELICIANO L. JOYA, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, ANTIPOLO CITY, AND DURAWOOD CONSTRUCTION AND LUMBER SUPPLY, INC., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 11, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 246558 (Engr. Feliciano L. Joya v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, and Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc.). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated September 18, 2017 and Resolution 3 dated March 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93083. The CA Decision modified the Decision 4 dated September 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 71 by ordering Engr. Feliciano L. Joya (Joya) to pay Durawood Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. (Durawood) the amount of P12,493,734.91 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from August 18, 1997 until June 30, 2013, and the prevailing legal interest rate of 6% per annum from June 30, 2013 until full payment; the amount of P50,000.00 for each item of moral and exemplary damages; and the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and costs.
On September 28, 1994, Joya, as landowner, and Ricardo Soriano (Soriano), as developer, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for the development of Joya's property in Tanza, Cavite into a residential subdivision to be known as Christine Village IV. 5
Consequently, Soriano obtained a credit accommodation from Durawood for the supply of construction materials and cash advances for the development of the housing project to the extent of P12,493,734.91. 6
On January 7, 1997, Joya executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Soriano during which occasion Joya took over the development of the project from Soriano. Later, Joya executed another MOA with Soriano, Durawood and other creditors, for Joya's assumption of Soriano's obligations with assignment of the take-out proceeds of the 77 titles of housing units to Durawood and other creditors. Subsequently, the parties executed a Supplementary Agreement whereby Soriano and Joya authorized the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), commonly known as the Pag-IBIG Fund (Pag-IBIG), to pay the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation 30% of the take-out proceeds of the 77 housing units, while the remaining 70% thereof should be delivered to Orlando S. Bongat (Bongat), President of Durawood. The agreement further provided that Bongat should pay the other creditors out of the 70% proceeds assigned to him. 7
Unable to secure collection of the take-out loan proceeds from the Pag-IBIG, banks or other financial institutions on loans secured by the 77 housing units, Durawood demanded the payment of the outstanding loan amounting to P12,493,734.91 from Joya. However, Joya failed to comply which prompted Durawood to file a complaint for specific performance with damages against Joya. 8
In a Decision 9 dated September 25, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of Durawood. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff:
1. The amount of P12,493,734.91 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from August 18, 1997 until fully paid;
2. The amount of P300,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages;
3. The amount of P200,000.00 attorney's fees; and costs.
Defendant's counter-claim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 10
Aggrieved, Joya filed an appeal before the CA. He argued that in view of the dacionenpago, per the Supplementary Agreement dated July 11, 1997, the loan obligation was extinguished upon assignment of the 77 housing units in favor of Durawood, mindful of what a witness for Durawood and a representative of the HDMF declared on the witness stand which oral declarations were construed by Joya to be in his favor. He likewise questioned the imposition of interest sans stipulation and the award of damages. 11 CAIHTE
In the assailed Decision 12 dated September 18, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications. The dispositive portion reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 25, 2002 in Civil Case No. 98-4742 is MODIFIED by ordering the defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee:
1. the amount of P12,493,734.91 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from August 18, 1997 until June 30, 2013, and the prevailing legal interest rate of 6% per annum from June 30, 2013 until full payment;
2. the amount of P50,000.00 for each item of moral and exemplary damages; and
3. the amount of P50,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees; and costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Thereafter, Joya filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 which was denied in the assailed Resolution 15 dated March 12, 2019.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari where Joya argues that 1) Durawood's cause of action for specific performance was not appropriate; 2) Durawood should no longer be allowed to collect the adjudged sums of money because it already benefited from the assigned 77 parcels of land; 3) Durawood's collection of the adjudged sums of money is tantamount to unjust enrichment; and 4) Durawood, being a corporation, is not entitled to the award of damages. 16
In its Comment/Opposition, 17 Durawood maintains that the petition is improper and should be dismissed outright considering that it is disguised as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when in truth and in fact, the same should have been filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the grounds relied upon by the petition is clearly without any legal nor factual leg to stand on. 18
In his Reply, 19 Joya argues that he has not raised questions of law but rather, he posits that the CA has rendered its Decision with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He pleads for the reassessment of the findings simply because such verdict would result in manifest injustice. He likewise pleads that the petition not be dismissed outright in the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court that when stringent application of the rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed with the appeal. 20 Lastly, he reiterates that Durawood would be unjustly enriched if the Decision of the CA is sustained and that as a corporation, it is not entitled to an award of damages. 21
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Decision when it ordered Joya to pay the amount of P12,493,734.91 plus interests as well as to pay damages and attorney's fees.
We deny the petition.
At the outset, we note that while the petition filed before this Court was denominated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari, it seems to have been filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 22 The petition also alleges that the RTC and CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 23 However, a perusal of the allegations raised therein shows that Joya had intended to appeal the CA Decision instead of seeking the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari provided under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. DETACa
Based on the allegations in the petition, the same should have been brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
On this ground alone, the petition merits outright dismissal for having availed an improper remedy. Time and again, the Supreme Court has ruled that a party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. 24 In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that —
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, the instant petition shall be treated as an ordinary appeal. Petitioner Joya, through counsel, received a copy of the assailed CA Resolution on April 24, 2019. 27 From receipt, he had a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file an appeal before this Court. 28 However, the petition was filed only on June 25, 2019. Hence, the CA Decision had already attained finality due to Joya's failure to timely appeal the same. The said Decision had already attained finality and thus, no longer capable of appeal.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. 29
In Torres v. Aruego, 30 this Court ruled that —
Asking this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to enable a party, in this instance the Petitioners, to present evidence after a decision has long-attained finality is no different from praying that an already executory decision be reviewed. More certainly, such strat[e]gem cannot be allowed as it will contravene the doctrine of finality of judgments. Instructive on this point is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Milan, viz[.]:
A judgment becomes 'final and executory' by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has [become] final.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. x x x
x x x Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. x x x 31
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision 32 dated September 18, 2017 and Resolution 33 dated March 12, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93083 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., on wellness leave; Dimaampao, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2839 dated September 16, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 14-36.
2. Id. at 37-45. The CA Decision was penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired Member of the Court) and Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of the Court).
3. Id. at 46-47.
4. Id. at 14-15, and 44.
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id. at 37-38.
7. Id. at 38.
8. Id.
9. No copy was attached to the petition.
10. Id. at 39. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision is quoted from the CA Decision.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 37-45.
13. Id. at 44.
14. Id. at 48-56.
15. Id. at 46-47.
16. Id. at 16-17.
17. Id. at 64-75.
18. Id. at 65.
19. Id. at 82-86.
20. Id. at 83.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 16. The petition states that "a party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration and [i]n this case Petitioner has until June 23, 2019 within which to file an appeal therefrom via a Petition for Review on Certiorari."
23. Id. at 15.
24. See Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 805 Phil. 964, 971 (2017).
25. 805 Phil. 964 (2017).
26. Id. at 971, citing Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., 677 Phil. 13, 51 (2011).
27. Rollo, p. 16.
28. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Section 2, as amended. See 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC).
29. Heirs of Tuballa v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 179104, February 29, 2008 (unrep.), citing Collantes v. Court of Appeals, 546 Phil. 391, 394 (2008).
30. 818 Phil. 524 (2017).
31. Id. at 538.
32. Rollo, pp. 37-45.
33. Id. at 46-47.