FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 214273. March 3, 2021.]
J.O.S. MANAGING BUILDERS, INC., petitioner, vs.WESTMONT BANK (NOW UOBP) and ATTY. RICARDO F. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 3, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 214273 (J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc., Petitioner, v.Westmont Bank (now UOBP) and Atty. Ricardo F. De Guzman, Respondents). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 28 November 2013 and Resolution 3 promulgated on 17 September 2014 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92414. The CA reversed the Decision 4 dated 12 June 2008 of Branch 98, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-99-38701.
Antecedents
Petitioner J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. (petitioner) obtained loan and credit accommodation from respondent Westmont Bank, now known as United Overseas Bank Philippines (respondent Bank), in the amount of Php250,000,000.00 as evidenced by a Term Loan Agreement. 5 As security for the loan, petitioner executed on 03 April 1997 a real estate mortgage over its properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. N-143061, N-146444 and N-146445, which was later amended on 16 June 1998 6 to reflect the total consideration of Php250,000,000.00. 7 The proceeds of the loan was used largely to fund the construction of Aurora Milestone building.
On 07 July 1998, respondent Bank considered petitioner in default for the latter's supposed failure to pay quarterly amortizations. Through several letters dated 29 July 1998, 02 September 1998, 08 September 1998, 12 October 1998, 23 November 1998, and 01 February 1999, respondent Bank repeatedly reminded petitioner of its outstanding obligation. 8
Sometime in November 1998, petitioner informed respondent Bank that the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) had expressed an interest in purchasing 6,000 square meters of office space or at least five (5) stories of Aurora Milestone. Subsequently, petitioner notified respondent Bank of its negotiation with PHIC. 9
Due to petitioner's failure to pay despite demand, on 22 March 1999 respondent Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The foreclosure was done through Atty. Ricardo F. De Guzman (respondent De Guzman), a Notary Public, who accordingly caused the posting of a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale in Quezon City on 22 February 1999. Said Notice was also published in the The New Record on 27 February 1999, 06 March and 13 March, 1999, as stated in the Affidavit of Publication of its publisher. 10 Consequently, an auction sale was conducted by respondent De Guzman on 22 March 1999 at the Main Entrance Lobby of the Quezon City Hall of Justice, Quezon City. Thereafter, on 02 June 1999, respondent Bank notified petitioner of the Completion of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and that a Certificate of Sale was registered on the corresponding TCTs on 27 April 1999. 11 CAIHTE
Thus, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition to Annul Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale by Notary Public 12 praying, among others, that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties be declared null and void, and that the Certificate of Sale and the Writ of Possession be cancelled. In particular, the petition pleaded three (3) causes of action. First, petitioner was about to close the deal with PHIC when respondent Bank hastily foreclosed the mortgaged properties on 22 March 1999. As such, the planned sale to PHIC did not proceed and petitioner lost a deal which could have generated Php338,879,280.00. Consequently, respondent Bank should pay petitioner Php20,000,000.00 representing actual damages. Second, since the extrajudicial foreclosure was tainted with irregularities, respondent Bank and respondent De Guzman should pay petitioner exemplary damages in the amount of Php10,000,000.00. Third, due to the hasty foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, petitioner was constrained to hire the services of counsel. Hence, respondents should jointly and severally pay petitioner Php1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees. 13
Ruling of the RTC
On 12 June 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered, viz.:
1. Nullifying and invalidating ab initio the subject Extra-judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage, the Public Auction Sale conducted, the Certificate of Sale, and the Writ of Possession issued;
2. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P20,000,000.00 as and by way of actual damages;
3. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P5,000,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
4. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P1,000,000.00 in attorney's fees; and
5. Ordering the consolidation of these pecuniary awards for damages to be immediately deducted from the outstanding P250,000,000.00 principal loan obligation of petitioner to respondent Bank (now United Overseas Bank of the Philippines).
SO ORDERED. 14
In its Decision, the RTC explained, among others, that petitioner should not be considered in default since the due date for payment of the principal was on 01 March 2004. Furthermore, petitioner made interest payments in the amount Php49,866,905.00 from July 1996 up to June 1998. 15
Respondent Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. On the other hand, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the award for exemplary damages be increased from Php5,000,000.00 to Php10,000,000.00. In its Order dated 07 November 2008, the RTC granted said Motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 June 2008 is hereby PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED, to read as follows:
1. Nullifying and invalidating ab initio the subject Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, the Public Auction Sale conducted, the Certificate of Sale, and the Writ of Possession issued;
2. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P20,000,000.00 as and by way of actual damages;
3. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P10,000,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
4. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the amount of P1,000,000.00 in attorney's fees;
5. Ordering respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the costs of the suit; and
6. Ordering the consolidation of these pecuniary awards for damages to be immediately deducted from the outstanding P250,000,000.00 principal loan obligation of petitioner to respondent Bank (now United Overseas Bank of the Philippines).
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the CA
The CA set aside the Decision and the Order of RTC, thus:
We SET ASIDE the assailed Decision, and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City, in Civil Case Number Q-99-38701, and instead, DISMISS the Petition to Annul Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale by Notary Public.
IT IS SO ORDERED.17
According to the CA, the RTC cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner was in default because it was not raised in the pleadings. Petitioner never alleged that it had not defaulted in the payment of its loans. Instead, petitioner merely questioned the validity of the procedure employed during the extra-judicial foreclosure. Consistent with its position, petitioner did not present any proof on the issue of default during its presentation of evidence-in-chief. However, at rebuttal, and over the objections of respondent Bank, petitioner belatedly attempted to show proof that it was not in default. Hence, the CA explained that the RTC did not have authority to rule on the matter of default since petitioner failed to allege it as an issue. 18
Moreover, the CA found no legal basis to declare the extrajudicial foreclosure void. Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is borne by the petitioner. 19 However, petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence of the alleged irregularities in the foreclosure. 20 DETACa
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 21 of the aforementioned decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution 22 dated 17 September 2014. Hence, the instant Petition.
In the present Petition, petitioner contends the CA erred: in ruling that the RTC had no authority to rule on the issue of default; in not sustaining the RTC's findings that petitioner was not in default; and, in finding no irregularities in the extrajudicial foreclosure. 23
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact. 24 This Court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. 25
Nonetheless, the rule limiting the appeal by petition for review on certiorari to the consideration and resolution of legal questions admits of several exceptions, namely: (1) when the factual findings of the CA and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when the inference made by the CA from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the CA, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) when the CA fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. 26
While the RTC and the CA differed in their factual findings, the merits of petitioner's case still fails to convince. Upon judicious review of the records, We find no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure. As will be discussed below, the ruling of the CA is well in accord with established jurisprudence and the evidence presented during trial.
Cause of action belatedly
As correctly observed by the CA, the petition to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale pleaded three (3) causes of action, to wit: (i) that the arbitrary foreclosure of the mortgage resulted in the abortion of the sale of petitioner's building to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; (ii) that the foreclosure of the mortgage is highly irregular and anomalous; and (iii) that due to the hasty foreclosure of the mortgage, petitioner was constrained to hire the services of counsel. Accordingly, petitioner prayed for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and the cancellation of the Certificate of Sale and the Writ of Possession. 27
Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 which was prevailing at the time the petition was filed in the RTC, provides that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 29 Likewise, if the evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the admission of such evidence would not prejudice the objecting party in maintaining his action or defense upon the merit. 30
Succinctly, when there is an objection on the evidence presented because it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, an amendment must be made before accepting such evidence. If no amendment is made, the evidence objected to cannot be considered. 31
In this case, petitioner's causes of action were predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Nowhere in the petition, however, was the issue of whether petitioner defaulted on its loans raised in the pleadings. Neither was it presented nor testified to by petitioner's witness during the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. It was only during the submission of rebuttal evidence, that the same was introduced by the petitioner, to which the respondent Bank timely raised its objection. 32 This notwithstanding, petitioner did not initiate the amendment of its pleadings. The RTC likewise failed to order the amendment of the petition despite the continuing objections interposed by the respondent Bank.
Applying the above provision, since no amendment was made in the petition to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure, the evidence objected to by the respondent cannot be considered. 33 It is equally important to stress that petitioner was supposed to present its rebuttal evidence plainly to refute the evidence submitted by the respondent Bank. The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence of the adverse party. 34 It is also defined as evidence in denial of some affirmative fact which the adverse party has attempted to prove. 35 As it turned out, petitioner introduced another cause of action raising the issue that it did not default on its loans by reason of overpayments of interests, which was evidently not raised in its petition. Hence, We rule that the CA did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and finding that the issue of default was belatedly raised as a cause of action. aDSIHc
Petitioner defaulted in the
Even assuming that petitioner validly raised the issue of default, the Court still finds petitioner to have defaulted for failure to pay its loan obligation. Notably, petitioner judicially admitted having been in default since 07 July 1998. In its Answer, respondent Bank specifically alleged:
16.4. The petitioner failed to pay any of the quarterly amortization of any of its loans, and has thus, since July 7, 1998, been considered in default. 36
Conversely, petitioner's Reply contained the following admission:
3. Petitioner admits the allegation in paragraph 16.4, subject to justifying defenses to be proven during trial. 37
Here, petitioner made a judicial admission of its default. Clearly, petitioner did not question the fact of default but merely claimed that such non-payment was justified. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, 38 petitioner may not contradict this judicial admission unless it is able to show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Hence, petitioner's subsequent claims of payment during presentation of rebuttal evidence is a direct contradiction of its judicial admission in the Reply. However, petitioner failed to prove that such admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Thus, petitioner cannot contradict the same. 39
Petitioner's claimed interest
Furthermore, the evidence presented during rebuttal, even if considered, failed to establish that there was no default on the part of petitioner.
To recall, petitioner claimed to have made interest payments amounting to Php49,866,905.00 from July 1996 until 24 June 1998. Further, petitioner insisted that the actual due date for payment of the entire principal would only fall on 01 March 2004, which is still a few years away from the extrajudicial foreclosure in 1999. 40
Upon review of the stipulations of their loan agreement, however, the foregoing claims fail to excuse petitioner's non-payment. The promissory notes uniformly provide that an acceleration of payment covering the entire loan will occur in the event petitioner fails to pay any quarterly amortization or interest when it becomes due. Further, the said acceleration clause provides:
Upon the happening of any of the following events to any of us, the whole sum remaining under this Note shall, at the Bank's option, become immediately due and payable without need of demand or notice:
xxx xxx xxx
6. failure to pay any installment or interest on the due date thereof; 41
It has long been settled that an acceleration clause is valid and produces legal effects. 42 An acceleration clause is a provision in a contract wherein, should the debtor default, the entire obligation shall become due and demandable. 43
In this case, the petitioner's claimed interest payments were made until 24 June 1998 only. Thereafter, when no further payments were made, respondent Bank was constrained to consider petitioner in default as of 07 July 1998. Under the acceleration clause, petitioner's failure to pay after 24 June 1998 granted respondent Bank the option to immediately declare the entire loan obligation due. In fact, respondent Bank's demand letters dated 29 July 1998, 02 September 1998, 8 September 1998, 12 October 1998, 23 November 1998, and 01 February 1999 44 were all issued after 24 June 1998. Ultimately, respondent Bank acted within its legal rights when it proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure on 22 March 1999.
Petitioner failed to prove that
It has long been settled that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. 45 In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 46 The Court has likewise ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of regularity and the mortgagor who alleges the absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact. 47
Petitioner insists that the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 and Administrative Order No. 3 of 1984 are not applicable in the instant case. However, We are not convinced. ETHIDa
In RPRP Ventures Management & Development Corporation v. Guadiz, Jr., 48 the Court held that Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0, which prescribes the rules in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and requires the payment of filing fees and the raffling of all notices of public auction in all extrajudicial foreclosures of mortgage, was issued on 14 December 1999 and took effect on 15 January 2000.
Similarly, in Ravago v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 49 the Court explained that upon effectivity of the amendatory provisions of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 on 15 January 2000, applications for extrajudicial foreclosures under the direction of a notary public are already required to be filed with the Executive Judge. Hence, it is clear that prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, applications for notarial foreclosures which are conducted by a notary public were not required to be filed with the court.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that respondent Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage through respondent De Guzman, a notary public, on 22 March 1999. Clearly, when the said foreclosure proceeding was conducted, it was not yet governed by the provisions of the said administrative matter and thus, not applicable to the subject foreclosure proceedings.
It has been settled that a petition for foreclosure with the notary public is not within the contemplation of the Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 of 1984 as the same is not filed with the court. 50 Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the said directive does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure conducted by a notary public. 51
Furthermore, petitioner insists that the CA erred when it ruled that there was prima facie evidence that the newspaper, The New Record, was a newspaper in general circulation. It maintains that the publication of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in The New Record was not valid on the ground that the said newspaper does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation since it could not secure copies of the issues of said newspaper where the notice was printed.
It has been settled that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite of publication in the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage has the burden of proving their allegations. 52 However, the records herein are bereft of any evidence to support the petitioner's allegations.
On the contrary, We agree with the CA that The New Record was a newspaper of general circulation for purposes of publication of notices of extrajudicial foreclosure sale since it was enough that it was published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals. 53
In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Eugenio Peñafiel, 54 the Court ruled —
x x x Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like the "Manila Bulletin," the "Philippine Daily Inquirer," or "The Philippine Star" which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended.
Coincidentally, the Court held that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding publication of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale in The New Record, as evidenced by the affidavit of publication executed by its publisher. 55 Thus, We see no such reason to deviate from the findings of the CA that the affidavit of publication constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication. 56
All told, We find no error on the part of the CA in upholding the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. From the totality of circumstances and the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioner failed to discharge its burden. Absent any irregularity in the conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, We accord to it the presumption of regularity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 28 November 2013 and Resolution dated 17 September 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92414 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."Caguioa, J., took no part; Rosario, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated 23 February 2021. cSEDTC
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 48-112.
2.Id. at 119-142, penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 144-145.
4.Id. at 226-266.
5.Id. at 181-184.
6.Id. at 210.
7.Id. at 50-51.
8.Id. at 14.
9.Id. at 165-166.
10.Id. at 76; 166-167.
11.Id. at 167-168.
12.Id. at 163-176.
13.Id. at 12-13.
14.Id. at 265-266.
15.Id. at 99.
16.Id. at 128.
17.Id. at 141.
18.Id. at 27.
19.Id. at 28.
20.Id. at 32.
21.Id. at 146-151; 152-159 (Motion to Admit Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration).
22.Id. at 144-145.
23.Id. at 88-90.
24.Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, 711 Phil. 576-591 (2013); G.R. No. 184116, 19 June 2013 [Per J. Brion].
25.Philippine Trust Co. v. Gabinete, 808 Phil. 297-317 (2017); G.R. No. 216120, 29 March 2017 [Per J. Peralta].
26.Shangri-La Properties, Inc. v. BF Corp., G.R. Nos. 187552-53 & 187608-09, 15 October 2019 [Per C.J. Bersamin].
27.Rollo, pp. 121-122.
28. Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
29.Allied Banking Corporation (now Philippine National Bank) v. Eduardo De Guzman, Sr., G.R. No. 225199, 09 July 2018 [Per J. Peralta].
30.Cagungun v. Planters Development Bank, 510 Phil. 51-69 (2005); G.R. No. 158674, 17 October 2005 [Per J. Chico-Nazario].
31.Id.
32.Rollo, p. 136.
33.Supra at note 30.
34.People v. Padero, G.R. No. 106274, 28 September 1993 [Per J. Davide, Jr.].
35.People v. Santos, 397 Phil. 564-574 (2000); G.R. No. 127846, 18 October 2000 [Per J. Bellosillo].
36.Rollo, p. 468.
37.Id. at 469.
38. Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
39.See Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 674 Phil. 358-370 (2011); G.R. No. 159328, 05 October 2011 [Per J. Peralta].
40.Rollo, p. 98.
41.Id. at 470.
42.KT Construction Supply, Inc. v. Philippine Savings Bank, 811 Phil. 626-635 (2017); G.R. No. 228435, 21 June 2017 [Per J. Mendoza].
43.Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 212262, 26 August 2020 [Per J. Leonen].
44.Rollo, p. 14.
45.Heirs of Villanueva v. Heirs of Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172-186 (2017); G.R. No. 209132, 05 June 2017 [Per J. Peralta].
46.Id.
47.Spouses Jonsay v. Solid Bank Corporation [now Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company], 784 Phil. 78-113 (2016); G.R. No. 206459, 06 April 2016 [Per J. Reyes].
48. 640 Phil. 98-108 (2010); G.R. No. 152236, 28 July 2010 [Per J. Peralta].
49. G.R. No. 188739, 05 August 2015 [Per J. Peralta].
50.China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 158-175 (1996); G.R. No. 121158, 05 December 1996 [Per J. Francisco].
51.Philippine National Bank v. Timbol, 491 Phil. 352-369 (2005); G.R. No. 157535, 11 February 2005 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
52.Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 193228, 27 November 2017 [Per J. Bersamin].
53.Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854 (1996); G.R. No. 115068, 28 November 1996 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.] citing Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals, 210 Phil. 100-113 (1983); G.R. No. L-49101, 24 October 1983 [Per J. Guerrero].
54. 599 Phil. 511-522 (2009); G.R. No. 173976, 27 February 2009 [Per J. Nachura] citing Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854 (1996); G.R. No. 115068, 28 November 1996 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.].
55.Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, 332 Phil. 844-854 (1996); G.R. No. 115068, 28 November 1996 [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr.].
56.Rollo, p. 140.