SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107729. March 2, 2016.]
GEORGE D. JONES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 4TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY; ABBOTT LABORATORIES (PHILS.), INC., AUBREY BOUT AND ELENITO P. TUAZON, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 02 March 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 107729 (George D. Jones v. National Labor Relations Commission, 4th Division, Cebu City; Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., Aubrey Bout and Elenito P. Tuazon).
For resolution of the Court is the Omnibus Motion, dated October 22, 2015, filed by petitioner George D. Jones (Jones) which seeks reconsideration of the August 17, 2015 Resolution of the Court and referral of the case to the Court En Banc on constitutional grounds.
The Court finds it worthy to mention that this is the fourth resolution issued in this case since the finality of its December 6, 1995 Decision, where Jones was declared to have been illegally dismissed. Below is a summary of these past resolutions, viz.:
1) In its October 24, 2012 Resolution, the Court resolved that the order for the payment of Jones' separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was deemed as improper because no exceptional circumstances exist to warrant the modification of the Decision's fallo. The immediate reinstatement of Jones to his former position in respondent Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. (Abbott), without loss of seniority rights and with backwages and benefits was ordered.
2) In its March 3, 2014 Resolution, the Court resolved various pending incidents relative to Jones' actual reinstatement and amount of reinstatement wages due him. The Court ordered Abbott to immediately effect the actual or payroll reinstatement of Jones without further delay. Likewise, the Court enumerated the items to be included in the re-computation of Jones' reinstatement wages. Labor Arbiter Sullano (LA Sullano) was directed to perform this task. 1
3) In its August 17, 2015 Resolution, the Court ruled that Abbott, which had already fulfilled the categorical reinstatement of Jones was justified in assailing the computation made by LA Sullano before the National Labor Relations Commission-Cebu (NLRC-Cebu) on the ground of his arbitrary action in the conduct of the pre-execution proceedings, and, ultimately, the issuance of an erroneous computation of the amounts due to Jones. The fallo read:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY the petitioner's: 1] MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM, dated December 4, 2014; and 2] MANIFESTATION (That after petitioner Jones was partially paid his reinstatement wages in compliance with the Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Commissioners of NLRC Cebu issued an Order directing Jones to return to Abbott all sums of money received with interest) WITH MOTION TO DISCIPLINE NLRC-CEBU COMMISSIONERS AND RESPONDENTS' LAWYERS (For Intolerable and Abusive Acts in Reversing the Final and Executory Decisions of this Honorable Court) dated May 25, 2015.
Further, Labor Arbiter Jessie Sullano is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the pending motion to quash filed by Respondent Abbott Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., and, thereafter, to cause the re-computation of George D. Jones' reinstatement wages in accordance to this disposition.
Presently, Jones' Omnibus Motion prays for the referral of the case to the Court En Banc on constitutional grounds. He argues that the case is impressed with public interest such as the interpretation of the constitutional protection to labor and its effect on the doctrine laid down in Pfeizer, Inc. v. Velasco (Pfeizer). 2 For Jones, the Court failed to consider the ruling in Pfeizer in its August 17, 2015 Resolution, where it concluded that there has been a categorical reinstatement effected by Abbott per its certification, dated April 21, 2014. In this line, Jones still insists that Abbott continues to refuse his reinstatement as shown in Sheriff's Report, dated February 4, 2013, where it was narrated that inspite of the service of the writ of execution, Abbott declined to issue a certification of reinstatement per advice of its counsel. According to Jones, this report deserved more credence than the later certification issued by Abbot, because it had been issued in the performance of official duty and, thus, impressed with the presumption of regularity.
The Court finds this contention untenable.
It must be noted that the subject argument is a mere rehash of those already submitted to the Court in Jones' past motions and manifestations. The subject Sheriff's Report had, in fact, been considered by the Court in Jones' favor in its March 3, 2014, Resolution where the Court found Abbott's compliance to the standing orders as unsatisfactory. Hence, in 2014, the Court pronounced that Abbott had no choice but to effect Jones' reinstatement without further delay —
As much as the issuance of a certificate of reinstatement is not a requirement to prove the same, Abbott's refusal to do so perplexes the Court into doubting its intention to satisfy the 1995 Decision's fallo. What could have impelled the lawyers of Abbott to decline the issuance of the certificate if the company was allegedly prepared to reinstate Jones on the same day? What harm could the certification have caused considering that it could be issued without prejudice to Abbott's then pending motion for reconsideration? What triggered Abbott's refusal to even receive subsequent demand letters from Jones and Sheriff Paredes?
The answers to these questions are unknown except to Abbott. This is precisely the reason why the Court cannot accept Abbott's arguments, lock, stock and barrel. No iota of proof of Jones' actual reinstatement was ever offered by Abbott except for its manifestations, such that the truth of which remains disputed. To readily accept Abbott's manifestations as proof of Jones' reinstatement would dangerously oversimplify the matter, and opening the execution of a reinstatement order to potential abuse, diminishing the very relief granted to an illegally-dismissed employee. Verily, mere manifestation will not suffice. Moreover, Abbott should not have brushed aside the demands for the details of the reinstatement had Jones been actually reinstated as early as January 28, 2013. The latter's questions as to his duties, responsibilities and rights as a reinstated employee were fair and justifiable. The answers to these questions would have been readily available had Abbott actually intended to comply with the directive in good faith, contrary to its obstinate handling of the situation.
Nonetheless, there was a significant change in circumstances in the August 17, 2015 Resolution. The records bear no refutation of Jones' receipt of the certificate of reinstatement issued by Abbott on April 21, 2014. Jones was made aware of Abbott's decision to effect his actual reinstatement by May 2, 2014. Abbott's categorical action and the personal manifestation by Jones that he would report for work were both taken into account by the Court in this wise —
To the Court's mind, however, this intention was long exhibited when he was served the certification of reinstatement. As much as the issuance of a certificate of reinstatement is still not a requirement to prove the same, this time, the Court thinks that there was a categorical fulfillment of the Court's Orders. To bolster this position, the Court considers the execution conference which transpired on July 3, 2014, where Jones himself manifested that he would return to work on July 8, 2014. On the said date, the parties agreed that Jones would be notified of his duties and responsibilities, and current salary and benefits as a District Sales Manager. He would likewise be furnished a copy of Abbot's employee manual.
This time, Jones' non-attendance on the set date for his return to work nags the Court. After his promised appearance at the workplace, Jones instead reneged on his promise allegedly due to his doubts on Abbot's sincerity. This should not be the case, after the Court had sealed his entitlement to reinstatement. That Jones was actually informed of the return to work order (to which he expressed his agreement), coupled with no showing that he was prohibited from reporting to work, are sufficient tell-tale signs of Abbot's compliance. This does not say however, that Jones had effectively abandoned his work, as this is an independent issue demanding the presentation of evidence proving the elements thereof. Just the same, this leads the Court to deduce a flippant attitude on Jones' part. While Jones and his counsels are rigorous in protest of Abbot's availment of a remedy with the NLRC-Cebu, they seem to have discounted the importance of explaining why, up to the present, Jones had failed to perform his part of the bargain. Despite having agreed to render his physical presence, Jones instead delved into baffling derisiveness, the reasons for which, no one has yet sufficiently explained. Jones' consistent rejection of the Abbot's compliance to Court orders may not be tolerated when the same had become unsupported by ample legal basis.
Needless to state, the basic issues as to the implementation of Jones' reinstatement had already been passed upon and the subject motion provides no cogent reason to warrant modification of the August 17, 2015 Resolution. The Court need not belabor the issue of regularity in the issuance of the Sheriff's Report considering that the very records of the case bear: (1) the subsequent certification of reinstatement issued by Abbott; (2) the undisputed receipt thereof by Jones; and (3) his silence with respect to his promise to appear at the workplace. Verily, the issue of reinstatement had to come to a close with the Court's determination in the assailed resolution.
The foregoing reasons likewise serve to overcome Jones' insistence that the doctrine laid down in Pfizer has been disregarded by the Court. It is clear that back in the March 3, 2014 Resolution, Pfizer was actually used as a basis to favor Jones' entitlement to reinstatement —
To uphold Abbott's view that it was Jones who unjustifiably refused to work when Abbott itself did not reinstate him to his former position in the first place, is to allow a subtle circumvention of the purpose of reinstatement. As explained by the Court in the case of Pfizer, Inc. v. Geraldine Velasco, 3 . . . an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable reinstatement order of the LA by crafting return-to-work directives that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim liability for backwages due to non-reinstatement by capitalizing on the employee's purported refusal to work. In Pfizer, the employer was faulted for its cunning strategy of issuing a return-to-work order with ambiguous terms which was eventually unheeded by the employee. The Court disallowed Pfizer's attempt to capitalize on the employee's purported refusal to work because the same was rooted, in the first place, on Pfizer's failure to categorically reinstate the employee. Although of slightly different factual milieu, the Court's observation in Pfizer finds application in this case. The written manifestations of Abbott spoke differently from its actions. Its failure to categorically reinstate Jones could not be imputed to his failure to report for work, as his failure to do so was precisely due to Abbott's unenthusiastic, if not, indifferent treatment of the Writ of Execution.
While the general policy of labor law is to discourage interference with management prerogatives, particularly as to the manner of reinstating a dismissed employee, the condition that the exercise of this prerogative should be done in good faith and without abuse of discretion still stands. As discussed, the circumstances of this case clearly show that Abbott did not substantially comply with the LA Sullano's Order and the Court's October 24, 2012 Resolution.
Suffice it to say, Jones' plea for an En Banc deliberation on this case has no leg to stand on. His resolute persistence in denying the fact of his reinstatement does not convince the Court, especially so, when he presents no justification of his actuations during and after the execution conference with Abbott last July 3, 2014. Jones' invocation of constitutional protection to labor cannot be allowed to prosper when its basis rests on unfounded assertions.
The following reasons likewise dissuade the Court from referring the case to the En Banc:
First. The August 17, 2015 Resolution of the Court has been unanimously adopted by Second Division. The rectification of any error should be left to the sound judgment of the members of said division which had deliberated and thereafter issued the resolution.
Second. The Court En Banc is not an appellate court to which a decision or resolution may be appealed. It is apparent in Art. VIII, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution 4 that decisions or resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is not an inferior body to the Court En Banc as it sits veritably as the Court En Banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered En Banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting En Banc.
Third. The Court En Banc should be shielded from litigants who perceive themselves aggrieved by a decision of a division of the court and resort to the convenience of an appeal to the court En Banc on the plea that its case is "of sufficient importance to merit its attention." The prerogative to take out a case from the division without the concurrence of a majority of its members, should, if at all, be used only for clearly compelling reasons, otherwise, the decision of the Court En Banc to take cognizance of the matter itself would be suspect of irregularity and the precedent would be difficult to justify before litigants who may be similarly situated.
As observed by the Court in its previous resolutions, the counsels of the parties have displayed remarkable persistence in invoking the Court's power to nullify issuances which did not suit their legal positions. While the past years may have blurred the recollection of lawyers involved in this case, the Court does find it appropriate to remind them that this case had stemmed from a simple illegal dismissal case which had long been decided upon with finality. The Court has continually accommodated the burgeoning issues during the execution stage, only for the purpose of settling the controversy and rendering justice where it is due. This accommodating stance, however, should end after the Court has fully addressed the objections and grievances of the parties. Unfortunately, the parties and their counsels have continued to engage in a protracted litigation marred by circumvention of procedural rules in the guise of legal strategy. This manner of approaching the Court had already taken its toll. This present resolution is the last issuance of the Court in this case, without prejudice to any other remedy which the parties may avail of, within the parameters allowed by the law and rules of procedure. The respective counsels of the parties are expected to abide by this dictum.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY WITH FINALITY the petitioner's OMNIBUS MOTION, dated October 22, 2015. No further pleadings shall be allowed. (Brion, J., on leave)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2159-2170.
2. 660 Phil. 434 (2011).
3. Id.
4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.