EN BANC
[A.C. No. 8108. November 24, 2015.]
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioners, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., respondent.
[A.C. No. 10299. November 24, 2015.]
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedNOVEMBER 24, 2015, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 8108 (Dante La Jimenez & Lauro G. Vizconde v. Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr.) and A.C. No. 10299 (Atty. Oliver O. Lozano v. Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr.). — By his own admission, respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano drafted the release order for his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson, better known as the "Alabang Boys," and gave it to then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez for the latter's approval and signature. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found this practice of "feeding" a draft order to the Secretary to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official in the performance of official duties. The Commission found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar action. 1 The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board), in its Resolution No. XX-2013-460, 2 adopted the findings and recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
In a Resolution 3 dated 15 July 2014, the Court found respondent guilty of violation of Rules 1.02 and 15.07 in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Respondent questions the Resolution in the following motions:
(1) Motion for Reconsideration 4 dated 13 August 2014;
(2) Motion to Set Case for Hearing 5 dated 17 November 2014; and
(3) Manifestation with Omnibus Motion 6 dated 2 February 2015.
Also before the Court are (1) Motion to Lift Suspension 7 dated 3 July 2015, and (2) Urgent Motion to Resolve 8 dated 9 July 2015.
Having denied the Motion to Set Case for Hearing in a Resolution 9 dated 25 August 2015, the Court now resolves the remaining motions.
Motion for Reconsideration
At the outset, respondent expresses his sincerest apologies and deepest regrets for his actions adjudged to be unbecoming an officer of the court. He asserts that his only fault is that he got "too carried away" by his dedication to his profession and to the cause of his clients. 10 He maintains that his act of drafting the release order was not a highly irregular and unethical conduct. He, however, questions this Court's jurisdiction over the case. He emphasizes that the IBP Board found that his actions warranted only a warning not to repeat the same inappropriate action, and that complainant did not file any petition with the Supreme Court questioning the Resolution within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. He contends that his case should be considered terminated, since the IBP Board's Decision has already attained finality.
In his Motion to Set Case for Hearing, respondent reiterates his position that the Court does not have jurisdiction to overturn a decision of the IBP Board if no petition has been filed. 11
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent's argument that the IBP Resolution has already attained finality was rendered unavailing by the amendment of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to B.M. No. 1645, which took effect on 7 November 2015, 12 the recommendation of the IBP Board cannot attain finality regardless of the disciplinary sanction. The entire subsection 12 (c) 13 has been deleted, and in its stead is a new clause mandating that the Resolution, together with the entire records and all the evidence presented, be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Section 12 of Rule 139-B now reads: SaCIDT
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors. —
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent.
The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, and clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from the issuance of the resolution.
d) Notice of the resolution of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.
The Constitution gives this Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law. 14 Inherent therein is the power to discipline and remove from the practice of law lawyers who have transgressed their oath and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. 15 The IBP cannot be allowed to exercise these constitutionally vested powers.
As regards the applicability of the amended rules, well-settled is the principle that remedial rules have retroactive application. 16 The reason for upholding this principle is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws. 17
Having addressed the procedural matter, the Court proceeds to affirm the Court's Resolution dated 15 July 2014, there being no substantial matter raised to warrant its reversal.
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion,
On 2 February 2015, respondent filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, in which he alleged that he had already complied with his six-month suspension. He manifested that while he had faithfully complied with the order, he was not abandoning his Motion for Reconsideration. 18 He prayed that an order be issued reinstating him in the courts and in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and that his Motion for Reconsideration be immediately resolved. 19
On 6 July 2015, he filed a Motion to Lift Suspension considering that the six-month period had ended on 30 January 2015. 20
On 10 July 2015, he filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve citing an Order 21 of the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 200, requiring him to present an order of the Supreme Court reinstating him to the practice of law in accordance with OCA Circular No. 44-2014. In his Urgent Motion to Resolve, respondent posits that since he already complied with his six-month suspension, the lifting of the order is warranted. He denounces OCA Circular No. 44-2014 — which requires lawyers who have been suspended to present an order from the Supreme Court lifting the suspension before they can resume the practice of their profession — to be "grossly unconstitutional" as it not only deprives him of his "right to practice" his profession without due process, but also imposes a longer period of suspension than what has been adjudged in the Resolution. 22
The Court reminds respondent that the practice of law is not a right, but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 23 The Court also finds that the circular was issued pursuant to its Resolution dated 12 July 2000 in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera 24 and De Vera v. Encanto. 25 The Court held in those cases that the lifting of suspension from the practice of law is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in its decision, and that an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable the suspended lawyer to resume the legal practice.
In Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, the Court issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory; cHECAS
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
To date, respondent has yet to submit a sworn statement in accordance with Maniago. As a considerable length of time has elapsed since the expiration of the six-month suspension period, we follow our disposition in Reyes v. Vitan, 26 in which we granted the Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon the suspended lawyer's submission to the Court of the required sworn statement. Likewise in this case, the Court grants respondent's prayer for reinstatement conditioned upon his fulfillment of the requirements enumerated in Maniago.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, Motion to Lift Suspension, and Urgent Motion to Resolve are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Respondent's reinstatement as a member of the bar shall be effective upon his compliance with the guidelines set forth in Maniago.
Respondent is directed to FILE a sworn statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his suspension. He is further directed to FURNISH copies of the sworn statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and executive judges of the courts where cases handled by him are pending, and/or where he has appeared as counsel. The sworn statement shall be considered as proof of his compliance with the order of suspension.
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by respondent under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted." Carpio, J., on official leave. Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave. Jardeleza, J., on official leave. (adv9) aTHCSE
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FELIPA B. ANAMAClerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo (A.C. No. 8108), pp. 201-203.
2. Id. at 200.
3. Id. at 207-213.
4. Id. at 219-232.
5. Id. at 253-261.
6. Id. at 262-269.
7. Id. at 283-290.
8. Id. at 291-295.
9. Id. at 302-303.
10. Id. at 220.
11. Id. at 253-254.
12. B.M. No. 1645 provides that amendments shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation. It was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Business Section, page B3-4 on 23 October 2015.
13. Section 12. c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
14. CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5).
15. B.M. No. 1645, second Whereas clause.
16. Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 607-617 (1999).
17. Cheng v. Spouses Sy, 609 Phil. 617, 626 (2009), citing Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 559 (2002).
18. Rollo (A.C. No. 8108), p. 263.
19. Id. at 264.
20. Id. at 284.
21. Id. at 296.
22. Id. at 292.
23. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, 497 Phil. 535-544 (2005) cited in Maniago v. de Dios, 631 Phil. 139 (2010).
24. A.C. No. 3066.
25. A.C. No. 4438.
26. 642 Phil. 1 (2010).