Javier v. Javier

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251243. October 6, 2021.]

MICHAEL C. JAVIER, petitioner, vs.JOSE N. JAVIER, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 251243 (Michael C. Javier vs. Jose N. Javier) — Assailed in this petition are the February 26, 2019 Decision 1 and November 14, 2019 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 11468. In fine, the CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique in Civil Case No. 2017-07-110, which affirmed the ruling of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tobias Fornier-Anini-y-Hamtic in favor of petitioner Michael C. Javier (Michael) in a forcible entry case.

Michael contended that he was in prior physical possession of the property and it was Jose N. Javier (Jose) who employed stealth and strategy to encroach on the property. Michael claimed that Jose influenced and directed Alejandro Jumagbas (Alejandro) to cultivate the property under his control and direction. 3 Jose, on the other hand, filed his comment on the petition and maintained that the CA correctly held that Michael failed to show the acts of possession required in a forcible entry case. 4

We find no merit in the petition.

Foremost, we emphasize that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 because the Court is not a trier of facts. 5 Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, 6 such as in this case where there are conflicting findings of the CA on one hand, and the RTC and MCTC on the other. Thus, we deem it appropriate to take a second look for the proper dispensation of justice.

An action for forcible entry is governed by Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor or vendee or other person, against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or person unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied.)

Forcible entry is the act of depriving a person of the material or actual possession of a land or building or of taking possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, against the will or without the consent of the possessor. 7 For the complaint to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he had prior physical possession of the land and that the defendant unlawfully deprived him of such possession through any of the means listed in Section 1 of Rule 70. 8 Indeed, a party who can prove prior possession can recover the property even against the owner himself. So long as he has in his favor prior possession in time, whatever may be the character of this possession, he is entitled to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. 9 Courts need only to determine who had prior actual possession of the property. 10

In this case, we find that Michael failed to establish his prior physical possession of the property. He failed to prove that Jose's act of cultivating the land was done through stealth and strategy and thus disturbed his prior physical possession.

In forcible entry cases, stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property. 11 Here, Michael posited that Jose, through stealth and strategy, deprived him of his material and physical possession of the property by directing Alejandro to cultivate the property. However, Michael failed to present evidence to substantiate this claim. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that Jose employed stealth and strategy under the circumstances.

On the contrary, record shows that Jose has long been in actual possession of the property and he never ceased to be in possession. For one, Michael admitted that Vicente had long been occupying the property as Jose's tenant. This means that Michael did not have prior possession because Vicente was occupying the property on behalf of Jose who was his lessor. Notably, Michael anchored his possession on his act of cultivating the land through Alejandro after it was turned over to him by Vicente. Yet, at the same time, Michael insisted that he was subsequently deprived of possession by Jose, through his caretaker, who is also Alejandro. This contradicts and discredits Michael's claim that he had prior possession as correctly observed by the CA:

The allegation in respondent's amended complaint states that Vicente Orfelia, who was in possession of the subject lot, turned it over to him on June 3, 2015. He alleged that he took possession of the land and caused its cultivation. He claims that petitioner ousted him of his possession when the latter directed Alejandro Jumagbas to sow rice seeds on the field on July 17, 2015 and from then on work the land. However, in the preliminary conference, he stated that he had Alejandro Jumagbas plow the land on June 4, 2015. The two assertions taken together — (1) that Alejandro cultivated the land for respondent on June 4, 2015 and (2) that Alejandro was directed by petitioner to sow and work on the land on July 17, 2015, causing his ouster from the land — are contradictory. Respondent was ousted from the land by the act of Alejandro in sowing the land, but he based his possession of the land by Alejandro's act of cultivating the land. It is clear that respondent was not able to subject the property to the action of his will. He was unable to show the acts of possession that the law requires for a forcible entry suit to prosper. Hence, the complaint for forcible entry should have been dismissed.

The words strategy and stealth, as means of forcible entry, are used by respondent in paragraph 7 of his amended complaint. It refers to petitioner's alleged act of directing Alexander Jumagbas to sow rice seeds on the field and working on the land. Assuming this to be true, those acts hardly constitute either strategy or stealth as a means of forcible entry. 'Strategy' in this regard could only mean machination or artifice. 'Stealth,' on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. Here, the allegations in paragraph 7 of the amended complaint that petitioner employed 'strategy' and 'stealth' are conclusions which are not supported by the material operative facts averred in the amended complaint. x x x. 12

Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will, 13 like in this case where Jose exercised possession through his lessee Vicente. Also, there is no showing that Jose ceased to be in possession of the property. After Vicente left the premises, Jose continuously exercised physical possession through his caretaker Alejandro, who was also staying in the same property. There was no ouster or dispossession involved because Jose had physical possession way ahead of Michael.

Another thing, Michael claims that Jose's predecessors sold the property to him in 1985 but this was refuted by Jose on the ground that his father's signature in the Extrajudicial Adjudication with Sale of Property was forged. On this score, the Court clarifies that the issue on who is the rightful owner is out of context in an action for forcible entry. For even if we are to assume that Jose is the rightful owner of the lot, who has the right to exercise the attributes of ownership, still, he cannot wrest possession of the property from another through a complaint for forcible entry. As the Court held in Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, 14 the owner cannot simply oust the actual occupant through the summary procedures of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. An ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property because the only relevant question is: who is entitled to the physical possession or possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. 15

To stress, possession flowing from ownership is not the issue in summary ejectment proceedings. What is indispensable is for the plaintiff to prove prior physical possession. 16 Having failed in this regard, Michael's complaint for forcible entry was properly dismissed by the CA.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The February 26, 2019 Decision and November 14, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 11468 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo at 43-54. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Emily R. Aliño-Geluz.

2.Id. at 29-30.

3.Id.

4.Id. at 158-160.

5.Anzures v. Spouses Ventanilla, 835 Phil. 946 (2018).

6.Sabellina v. Buray, 768 Phil. 224-239 (2015), enumerates the exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

7.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp., G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66296>.

8.Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 130-140 (2008).

9.Rivera-Calingasan v. Rivera, 709 Phil. 583-595 (2013).

10.Spouses Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil. 1001-1012 (1992).

11.Spouses Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., 666 Phil. 410-425 (2011).

12. CA Decision, pp. 10-11.

13.Quizon v. Juan, 577 Phil. 470-483 (2008).

14. 679 Phil. 352-368 (2012), citing Carbonilla v. Abiera, 639 Phil. 473 (2010).

15.Id.

16.Spouses Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, Phil. 1001-1012 (1992).