SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225870. October 5, 2016.]
JALLEN ROOF INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. RAMON BEDUYA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 05 October 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 225870 — Jallen Roof Industries, Inc. vs. Ramon Beduya.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2016 1 and July 20, 2016 2 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144362.
The case stemmed from the Request for Assistance under the Single Entry Approach Program (SENA) for underpayment of salary, non-payment of 13th month pay, non-coverage of SSS, Philhealth, and Pag-IBIG filed by respondent Ramon Beduya (Beduya) against petitioner Jallen Roof Industries, Inc. (JRII) and/or Alfredo Aguas (Aguas) before the National Capital Region Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE-NCR). Beduya claimed that he was employed by JRII as a driver since 1998.
In his defense, Aguas, a corporate officer of JRII, countered that he personally engaged the services of Beduya to be his personal driver and not of JRII. In addition, JRII asserted that Beduya was not its company driver because he was an on-call driver of Aguas. To bolster its claim, JRII attached the affidavits of Ronald Bondoc (Bondoc), Aguas' former personal driver; and Francia Balbin (Balbin), Aguas' household helper.
Bondoc averred that Beduya was employed as his replacement when he resigned to take on another job. Meanwhile, Balbin claimed that she seldom saw Beduya at the house of Aguas, who called him only when needed. She occasionally saw Beduya wash Aguas' car or sweep the floor.
Conciliation-mediation proceedings were conducted but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, the case was referred for inspection. ITAaHc
On February 10, 2012, an inspection was conducted at JRII's premises. Per the Notice of Inspection Report, 3 no employment records were presented by JRII. Subsequently, in its August 15, 2012 Order 4 the DOLE-NCR ordered JRII and Aguas to pay Beduya the amount of P71,184.17 representing the underpayment of wages, non-payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA) and the 13th month pay. JRII moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the DOLE-NCR in its November 26, 2012 Resolution. 5
Aggrieved, JRII and Aguas appealed the DOLE-NCR ruling before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Central Office. In its March 16, 2015 Resolution, 6 the DOLE affirmed the DOLE-NCR ruling with modification that the name of Aguas be dropped as a party-respondent. JRII's moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the DOLE in its December 9, 2015 Resolution. 7
Meanwhile, in his Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 8 dated January 19, 2016, Beduya prayed that a writ of execution be issued to implement the March 16, 2015 ruling of the DOLE. JRII opposed the said motion.
At the Court of Appeals
On February 26, 2016, JRII duly filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days (or until March 12, 2016) to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. It paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing of the motion for extension. On March 10, 2016, JRII eventually filed its petition for certiorari before the CA.
In its March 16, 2016 Resolution, 9 the CA denied outright JRII's motion for extension of time to file a petition and consequently expunged the case from its active dockets. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Caalam (Laguna Metts), 10 the CA stated that the removal of the paragraph under Rule 65 providing for the authority of courts to grant extensions meant that extensions could no longer be granted. Thus, the appellate court held that, as the rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be strictly filed within 60 days from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA added that "heavy pressure of work, preparation of other equally important pleadings and other professional commitments of JRII's counsel did not warrant the relaxation of the rules. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, We DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and the Petition for Certiorari subsequently filed is MERELY NOTED without action.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their plea was denied by the CA in its July 20, 2016 Resolution. CHTAIc
Hence, this petition raising this
Sole Issue
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DISMISSING THE PRESENT PETITION AS WELL AS IN DENYING THE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FAILED TO UNDERSCORE THE FACT THAT ITS MERITORIOUS NATURE CALLS, IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, FOR THE LIBERAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC . . . .11
JRII pleads that it be accorded leniency and liberality on the basis of the facts obtaining in the case and in the interest of substantial justice. It insists that its petition is anchored on valid and meritorious ground considering that the DOLE failed to squarely pass upon the issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
In Republic of the Philippines v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc., 12 the Court had the opportunity to elucidate the application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provided:
'Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.'
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. EATCcI
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, 13 held that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.'
Nevertheless, in Domdom, 14 the Court stated:
On the People's argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days." DHITCc
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
xxx xxx xxx
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court's sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.'
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court's sound discretion.
Labao v. Flores15 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule, viz.:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
xxx xxx xxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. (Emphasis and Underscoring in the original) cEaSHC
To recapitulate, petitions for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The same, however, may be relaxed subject to the court's sound discretion in furtherance of substantial justice.
It is well settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable deficiency, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6. 16
In sum, it would have been more prudent if the CA acted on the substantive merits of JRII's petition for certiorari rather than dismissing the same outright due to a technicality, albeit not completely and properly applied. Considering that first, it raised a vital issue on the existence of employer-employee relationship that was not directly addressed or passed upon by the DOLE; second, it paid the required docket fees immediately upon filing of its motion for extension; and finally, that no undue prejudice or delay would be caused to either of the parties in admitting the petition.
WHEREFORE, the March 16, 2016 Resolution and July 20, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 144362, are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is hereby ordered to act on the substantive merits of the petition for certiorari with dispatch.
SO ORDERED. (Brion, J., on leave)"
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 37-39. Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Florito S. Macalino concurring.
2. Id. at 40-41.
3. Id. at 78.
4. Id. at 79-84. Penned by Atty. Alan M. Macaraya, CEO III, Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR.
5. Id. at 106-109.
6. Id. at 68-75. Penned by Undersecretary Rebecca C. Chato by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
7. Id. at 74-75.
8. Id. at 167-169.
9. Id. at 37-39. Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Florito S. Macalino concurring.
10. 611 Phil. 530 (2009).
11. Rollo, p. 21.
12. 693 Phil. 145 (2012).
13. Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
14. Domdom v. The Hon. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341 (2010).
15. 649 Phil. 213 (2010).
16. Pagadora v. Ilao, 678 Phil. 208 (2011).