THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201500. June 18, 2014.]
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK [NOW UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES], petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 18, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 201500 (International Corporate Bank [now Union Bank of the Philippines] v. Philippine National Bank). — Before the Court is a motion of reconsideration of the Court's July 9, 2012 Resolution 1 denying the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 26, 2011 Decision 2 and the April 2, 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 104818.
On March 4, 1992, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) issued a check, bearing No. DB390232, in the amount of P21,663.15 in favor of Gil R. Dulay drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB). On April 21, 1992, the check was deposited with the International Corporate Bank (Interbank) Davao branch which sent the check for clearing on the same day. The following day, or on April 22, 1992, the check was received by PNB. On July 20, 1992, PNB returned the check to Interbank because the indorsement of the payee was forged. Interbank refused to accept the return of the check and to reimburse PNB despite demand. Hence, on June 17, 1993, PNB filed a complaint for reimbursement with the Arbitration Committee of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (AC-PCHC).
Interbank moved to dismiss PNB's complaint on the ground that PNB had not suffered any damage because there was no allegation that PNB had reimbursed GSIS the face value of the check. Realizing its mistake, PNB amended its complaint on October 20, 1993, alleging that it had reimbursed GSIS the face value of the check amounting to P21,663.15. Despite Interbank's objection, the AC-PCHC admitted the amended complaint.
After due proceedings, the AC-PCHC rendered its May 3, 1994 decision in favor of PNB. It ordered Interbank to pay PNB the amount of P21,663.15 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum until full payment; and to reimburse PNB the filing fee it paid in the amount of P500.00.
Dissatisfied, Interbank filed a petition for review with the Regional. Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City (RTC). Interbank argued that the AC-PCHC erred in admitting the amended complaint and not demanding the presentation of the required quantum of evidence to prove forgery. In its Decision, dated April 4, 2008, the RTC dismissed Interbank's appeal. It held that the AC-PCHC is not bound by technical rules governing the courts of law and its factual findings are deemed final and conclusive upon the parties in an arbitration dispute pursuant to Section 13 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations (CHRR). 4EcDSTI
On appeal, the CA, in its August 26, 2011 Decision, affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that PNB had a cause of action at the time it filed its complaint against Interbank on June 17, 1993. The CA stated that PNB's failure to state that it credited the amount of the check back to the account of GSIS was merely a failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, which was not a jurisdictional defect and was curable by an amendment, as a matter of right, before the filing of a responsive pleading. As the motion to dismiss filed by Interbank was not a responsive pleading, the AC-PCHC was without fault in allowing PNB to amend its complaint.
On the issue of PNB's negligent delay (almost 3 months) in returning the check to Interbank, the CA ruled that Section 21 5 (formerly Section 23) of the CHRR authorized the drawee bank to return a check with a forged indorsement within the period fixed or provided by law for filing of a legal action by the returning bank. On the issue of PNB's estoppel to claim the face value of the check by clearing the check upon Interbank's presentment for payment, the CA stressed that the doctrine of estoppel was not applicable. It stated that PNB, in clearing a check, only verifies that the drawer's signature is genuine and makes no warranty on the genuineness of the indorsement. Hence, Interbank must suffer the loss for the forged indorsement.
Interbank moved for reconsideration but to no avail.
Thereafter, Interbank filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. On July 9, 2012, the Court denied the petition in a resolution for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution of the CA.
Hence, Interbank filed the subject motion for reconsideration.
Interbank argues that the CA erred in admitting PNB's amended complaint because its lack of a cause of action at the time of the filing of the complaint was fatal and could not be cured by a mere amendment. Interbank further insists that the required quantum of evidence to prove the forged indorsement was not met.
The Court finds no cogent reason to modify or deviate from its July 9, 2012 Resolution.
Well-settled is the rule that in petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are generally conclusive on this Court. 6
In Diamond Taxi v. Llamas, Jr., 7 the Court held that a question of law arises when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts. In contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the truth or falsehood of facts.
Interbank contends that PNB, at the time it filed its complaint for reimbursement before the AC-PCHC, did not suffer any damage because it had yet to reimburse the GSIS the face value of the check. According to Interbank, the action PNB prematurely brought was a groundless suit and could not be cured by an amendment of its complaint. Interbank again argues that the required quantum of evidence to prove the forged indorsement was not met.
The arguments of Interbank, while ostensibly legal, would inevitably require this Court to make findings of fact which is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari, save certain exceptions. The Court finds none of them in this case. TEaADS
It is worth emphasizing that the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to prove forgery is clearly a question of fact. The conclusion that there was a forged indorsement was one resolved by the AC-PCHC, as sustained by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, as a question of fact. The said conclusion is binding and conclusive upon this Court as it involves the truth or falsity of an alleged fact, which is a matter improper for this Court to resolve. Considering that the AC-PCHC, the RTC and the CA are one in holding the existence of forgery, it behooves this Court to adopt the same.
As to the propriety of admitting PNB's amended complaint, the Court cannot sustain Interbank's argument. The Court is of the view that the presence or absence of the allegation of reimbursement of the face value of the check by PNB to GSIS is immaterial and of no moment. In Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan, 8 it was held that a collecting bank which indorses a check bearing a forged indorsement and presents it to the drawee bank guarantees all prior indorsements, including the forged indorsement itself, and ultimately should be held liable for it. Based on Section 66 9 in relation to Section 65 10 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), the applicable law on the matter, Interbank's liability attaches by virtue of its capacity as general indorser, being the collecting bank and last indorser of the subject check. Thus, being the party ultimately liable for the payment of the check, PNB's cause of action accrued and, in effect, was completed upon its discovery of the forged indorsement and claim for the return of its payment to Interbank. All told, PNB's cause of action for the recovery of the value of the check against Interbank is not affected by, or dependent upon, the former's reimbursement of the value of the check, belated or otherwise, to GSIS.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. (Villarama, Jr., J., designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special Order No. 1691, dated May 22, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 53B.
2. Id. at 39-51. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.
3. Id. at 52-53A.
4. Sec. 13. The findings of facts of the decision or award rendered by the Arbitration Committee or by the sole Arbitrator as the case may be shall be final and conclusive upon all the parties in said arbitration dispute. The decision or award of the Arbitration Committee or of the Sole Arbitrator or of the Board of Directors, as the case may be, shall be appealable only on questions of law to any of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Region where the Head Office of any of the parties is located. The appellant shall perfect his appeal by filing a notice of appeal to the Arbitration Secretariat and filing a Petition with the Regions Trial Court of the National Capital Region for the review of the decision or award of the committee or sole arbitrator or of the Board of Directors, as the case may be, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from and after its receipt of the order denying or granting said motion for reconsideration or new trial had been filed, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from and after its receipt of the order denying or granting said motion for reconsideration or of the decision rendered after the new trial if one had been granted.
5. SEC. 21 SPECIAL RETURN ITEMS BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY CLEARING PERIOD. —
21.1. Items which have been the subject of a material alteration or items bearing a forged endorsement and/or lack of endorsement . . . shall be returned by direct presentation or demand to the Presenting Bank and not through the regular clearing house facilities within five (5) years from date of presentation in clearing.
6. Heirs of Pabaus v. Heirs of Yutiamco, G.R. No. 164356, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 521, 531-532.
7. G.R. No. 190724, March 12, 2014.
8. 573 Phil. 89 (2008). Underscoring supplied.
9. Section 66. Liability of general indorser. — Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course;
a) The matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of the next preceding section; and
b) That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting;
xxx xxx xxx.
10. Section 65. Warranty where negotiation by delivery, so forth. — Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:
a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;
b) That he has a good title of it;
c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract;
xxx xxx xxx.