THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212435. November 6, 2017.]
INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE-TOBACCO, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT SECRETARIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION AND PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, petitioners,vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC., JT INTERNATIONAL (PHILIPPINES), INC., TELENGTAN BROTHERS AND SONS, INC., doing business under the name of LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, AND MIGHTY CORPORATION TOBACCO COMPANY, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 6, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 212435(INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE-TOBACCO, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT SECRETARIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION AND PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE TOBACCO INSTITUTE, Petitioners, v. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC., JT INTERNATIONAL (PHILIPPINES), INC., TELENGTAN BROTHERS AND SONS, INC., doing business under the name of LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, AND MIGHTY CORPORATION TOBACCO COMPANY, Respondents.) — Under review are the decision 1 and resolution 2 respectively promulgated on January 30, 2013 and April 29, 2014, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the order issued on February 14, 2008 3 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Marikina in SCA Case No. 2007-688-MK.
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents, viz.:
On June 23, 2003, Congress of the Philippines enacted R.A. No. 9211 which was mainly intended, among other matters, to regulate the use, sale and advertisement of tobacco products.
Per Section 37 of R.A. No. 9211, principal appellant Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-T), an intergovernmental agency created by virtue of Section 29 of the TRA, involving the executive heads of the Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Health, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, Department of Science and Technology, Department of Finance, Department of Education, Philippine Tobacco Institute, and Framework Convention Alliance Philippines, vested with exclusive power to administer and implement provisions of R.A. No. 9211, promulgated IAC Memorandum Circular No. 1 Series of 2004 on February 26, 2004.
On June 29, 2007, appellee Fortune Tobacco Corporation (FTC), a local cigarette manufacturer, filed the subject Petition for Declaratory Relief for judicial interpretation of Section 22 and the extent of a manufacturer's liability for violations with respect to advertising under Section 32 of the basic law.
It was opposed by the IAC-T based on the argument that the special civil action of declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was not the proper remedy in this case as the ban on outdoor advertisement mandated by Section 22 of R.A. No. 9211 was plain.
Appellee was joined by petitioners-intervenors Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Incorporated, JT International (Philippines), La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Telengten Brothers and Sons, Incorporated, and Mighty Corporation Tobacco Company whose respective petitions-in-intervention were duly admitted by the lower court in its Order dated September 7, 2007.
On November 12, 2007, the Petition for Declaratory Relief was set for hearing to clarify matters and during which occasion, the parties agreed to submit their respective Memorandum.
On February 14, 2008, the court a quo issued the assailed Order, the pertinent excerpt of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the instant petition for declaratory relief, declaring and confirming that:
a. the term premises shall be construed as defined by law under Section 1.18 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation of the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003;
b. advertising materials are permissible for as long as the same are disseminated within the premises of the point of sale establishments; and
c. determination of criminal responsibility for violation of the provisions of the Tobacco Regulation Act and the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be for the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an Order dated May 29, 2008. 4
The petitioner appealed to the CA to challenge the judicial construction by the RTC of Section 22 of the Tobacco Regulation Act, positing the lone assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON THE DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE 'PREMISES OF POINT OF SALE' IN PARAGRAPH 1.18, SECTION 1, RULE III OF THE INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE-TOBACCO IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS IN RELATION TO SECTION 22 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9211 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE BAN ON OUTDOOR ADVERTISEMENT MANDATED UNDER SECTION 22 OF R.A. NO. 9211 IS PLAIN, CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 5
As stated, the CA dismissed the appeal because the issue being raised by the petitioner was a purely legal one that was outside the competence of an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
The CA later on denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this recourse, wherein the petitioner insists that the CA erred in dismissing the appeal based solely on technicalities; that the strict application of the rules of procedure would lead to the contravention of the general policy of courts that each case should be decided based on the merits; that the ends of justice would be better served if the Court reviewed the allegedly erroneous judicial construction by the RTC; and that to dismiss the case would be to perpetuate the erroneous construction of the RTC that would contradict the clear mandate of Section 22 of R.A. No. 9211.
The respondents counter that the dismissal of the appeal was proper because Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court mandated the dismissal of an erroneous appeal.
The issue is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
At the onset, we stress that appeal is a statutory right to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 6 It is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, 7 but is merely a statutory privilege in relation to which the party must comply with all the requirements provided by law. Any failure to comply with the requirements often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 8
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court classifies the following modes of appeal, viz.:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. — (a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45. (n)
The petitioner assails the validity of the judicial construction of the phrase premises of point of sale found in Section 22 of R.A. No. 9211 in relation to paragraph 1.18, Section 1, Rule III of the IRR of the Inter-agency Committee-Tobacco. Inasmuch as the question involves a question of law, the decision of the CA should be appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court considering that the petition requires only the examination of what the law is in a particular factual background.
That the petition involves a legal question is borne by the records of this case. 9 This was even conceded by the petitioner before the CA. 10 It must be remembered that the determination made by the CA of whether or not a petition raises purely legal question is respected by this Court unless the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in making such determination. 11 Here, the assignment of error in the appellant's brief, the allegations made by the petitioner as reflected in the RTC's order dated February 14, 2008 as well as the succeeding concession that the appeal brought before the CA involves legal questions guided the CA in thusly concluding. As such, the determination by the CA that the appeal involves a purely legal question is bereft of any whimsical, arbitrary, despotic or capricious manifestation and must be respected.
Following Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner's erroneous appeal warranted the dismissal of the appeal.
The petitioner invites the Court to re-examine the case in the interest of meting substantial justice. It insists that the construction made by the RTC on what the term premises of point of sale covered contravened the mandate of the law and was patently unacceptable.
It is true that rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure for persuasive and weighty reasons. This liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure imposes a correlative obligation on the party urging the relaxation of the rules to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules in the first place. 12 Here, however, the failure to comply with the rules of procedure was brought about by the improper turnover of the case from one lawyer to another. The petitioner could have avoided the consequences it now faces by the simple but prudent practice of case monitoring and management. Accordingly, the Court considers the explanation of the petitioner unacceptable; doing otherwise would reward the petitioner for its neglect.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
(J. Leonen, J., inhibited for being a former counsel of a party; Peralta, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated September 25, 2017)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 62-72; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (retired) and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
2.Id. at 75-77.
3.Id. at 172-175; penned by Judge Alice C. Gutierrez.
4.Id. at 63-66.
5.Id. at 193-194.
6.Republic v. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 140, 148.
7.Polintan v. People, G.R. No. 161827, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 111, 116.
8.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, G.R. No. 167606, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 96, 105.
9.Rollo, p. 173.
10.Id. at 213.
11.Escoto v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 192679, October 17, 2016.
12.Lee v. People, G.R. No. 192274, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 618, 624.