SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 211124. March 10, 2014.]
VIRGINIA B. INOCENCIO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO MARANGA AND JUANA PATALINHUG MARANGA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 10 March 2014which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 211124 (Virginia B. Inocencio, petitioner, v. Spouses Apolonio Maranga and Juana Patalinhug Maranga, respondents)
This Petition for Review on Certiorari arose out of an action for Damages with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by the Spouses Faith and Eusebio Fu (Spouses Fu) against herein Spouses Apolonio Maranga and Juana Patalinhug Maranga (respondent-spouses). The Spouses Fu sued respondent-spouses for unlawful interference of a parcel of land which was the subject of an application for foreshore lease with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed by Felicidad Patalinhug (Felicidad). During the lifetime of Felicidad, she leased the lot in issue to Faith Fu. When Felicidad died, respondent Juana Patalinhug Maranga, claiming to be a niece of Felicidad, entered into possession of the lot, thereby interfering with the possession of the Spouses Fu. Hence, the complaint against herein respondent-spouses. TcIHDa
In the course of the proceedings of the case, a survey of the lot was conducted which allegedly resulted in the erroneous inclusion of a portion of the land occupied by Virginia B. Inocencio (petitioner). She was, thus, compelled to file a complaint-in-intervention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City which was, however, denied. Petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing the denial of her complaint-in-intervention was dismissed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition.
The issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
We deny the petition.
In dismissing the petition for review, the CA held 1 that pursuant to the Rules of Court: SHEIDC
The requisites for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding [Section 1, Rule 19, Rules of Court]. With respect to the first requisite, it has been explained that the interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose, by direct legal operation and effect, by virtue of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. . . . The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover. 2
Here, the [c]ourt notes that the action below was for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Thus, the core of the controversy in the civil action is whether the defendants therein can be held liable for damages by the plaintiffs for their unlawful occupation of the lot. The mere assertion of [petitioner] that a substantial part of the property that she is occupying has been erroneously included in the survey . . . falls short of the requirement for proper intervention. This is all the more true since [petitioner's] prayer for delineation of the exact boundaries on the adjoining lots subject of this case, and the exclusion of the property that she is occupying, effectively expanded the issues for resolution and thus changed the very nature of the cause of action in the civil case. This should not be permitted, since she is asserting rights that contravene the rights that the Spouses Fu are asserting.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. 3 It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown. The procedure to secure the right to intervene is, to a great extent, fixed by the statute or rule, and intervention can, as a rule, be secured only in accordance with the terms of the applicable provision. 4
Based on the foregoing findings, the CA declared that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the complaint-in-intervention.
We see no reason to disturb the foregoing findings and conclusions of the CA, supported as they are by both law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 February 2013 and its Resolution dated 18 December 2013 are AFFIRMED. AEaSTC
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 100-102.
2. Id. at 100-101 citing Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 748 (1989).
3. Id. citing Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010, 613 SCRA 385.
4. Id. at 102 citing Alfelor v. Halasan, 520 Phil. 982 (2006).