Inkote Philippines, Inc. v. Quijada

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 228105. April 10, 2019.]

INKOTE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND/OR MELISSA R. MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs.HERMOGENES R. QUIJADA, LORENO R. PORRAS, ELMER G. GOÑA, CELSO H. PANAPANAAN, EFREN S. VALENZUELA, SILVERIO C. JUMAWID, RAFAEL F. FURIO, JR. AND HENRY S. BELLESA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated April 10, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 228105 (Inkote Philippines, Inc. and/or Melissa R. Macapagal vs. Hermogenes R. Quijada, Loreno R. Porras, Elmer G. Goña, Celso H. Panapanaan, Efren S. Valenzuela, Silverio C. Jumawid, Rafael F. Furio, Jr. and Henry S. Bellesa). — Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, filed by Inkote Philippines, Inc. (Inkote) and/or Melissa Macapagal (Macapagal) (petitioners) from the Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144543 promulgated on June 20, 2016.

The Facts

Inkote is a corporation duly registered and incorporated under Philippine laws. It is engaged in the manufacture and sale of ink and coating products. Some of the products are contained in steel drums and sold to customers on the condition that the customers return the empty steel drums. Macapagal is the corporate secretary of Inkote.

Hermogenes Quijada (Quijada), Loreno Porras (Porras), Elmer Goña (Goña), Celso Panapanaan (Panapanaan), Efren Valenzuela (Valenzuela), Silverio Jumawid (Jumawid), Efren Furio, Jr. (Furio) and Henry Bellesa (Bellesa) (respondents, collectively) were employees of Inkote. Their employment records indicate the following data: aScITE

 

NAME/S	POSITION	DATE EMPLOYED	DATE DISMISSED	LENGTH OF SERVICE	SALARY
Hermogenes R. Quijada	Driver/Dispatcher	01/22/88	12/01/08	20 years	P16,500.00/month
Loreno R. Porras	Driver	10/29/90	12/01/08	18 years	P14,500.00/month
Elmer G. Goña	Delivery Helper	10/01/90	12/01/08	18 years	P14,200.00/month
Celso H. Panapanaan	Delivery Helper	08/29/94	12/01/08	14 years	P12,500.00/month
Efren S. Valenzuela	Driver	08/29/94	12/01/08	14 years	P12,500.00/month
Silverio C. Jumawid	Warehouseman	06/01/01	12/01/08	7 years	P12,000.00/month
Rafael F. Furio, Jr.	Warehouseman	10/07/02	12/01/08	6 years	P10,500.00/month
Henry S. Bellesa	Driver	June 1990	11/30/08	18 years	P10,500.00/month

 

Roy Punzalan (Punzalan), the company's Internal Auditor conducted an audit of empty steel drums including those which have been previously returned by their customers. In the course of the audit, it was found that, in the months of January to August 2008, out of the 589 steel drums returned by Rowell Lithography, 164 drums valued at P196,800.00 were missing. The 589 drums were returned by Rowell Lithography to the company through Quijada, Panapanaan, Valenzuela, Goña and Bellesa. 3

The two audit reports were submitted to Inkote's company president. After investigation, Inkote sent individual copies of a Memorandum dated October 30, 2008 to the respondents, directing them to submit their written explanation within 48 hours from notice. They were also informed that pending investigation, they would be placed under preventive suspension. 4

Respondents promptly requested immediate reinstatement through their counsel. On November 20, 2008, Administrative Officer Maritess Angeles (AO Angeles) instructed them, by Memorandum, to attend an administrative hearing set on November 24, 2008. On said date, the respondents, through their counsel, pointed out that they were not previously instructed to bring their own counsel, thus, prompting them to request for resetting. 5

After their preventive suspension ended on November 30, 2008, the respondents reported back for work on December 2, 2008. Since they were barred from entering company premises, they wrote a letter to AO Angeles, requesting that they be allowed to work or reinstated in the payroll. 6

In a Memorandum dated November 27, 2008, the respondents received information that they had been dismissed for serious misconduct. 7

In January 2009, the respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a consolidated complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries/wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday and rest day premiums, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, ECOLA and damages. After the parties submitted their respective position papers and other pleadings, the case was submitted for decision. 8

In a Decision 9 dated September 30, 2009, the LA ruled that the petitioners failed to establish the culpability of the respondents with regard to the missing drums. The LA, likewise, explained that the petitioners failed to observe due process when the latter proceeded with the investigation notwithstanding absence of notice to the respondents of their right to be represented by counsel. As such, the LA ruled that the petitioners were guilty of illegal dismissal. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring respondents guilty of illegal dismissal and are hereby directed to reinstate complainants to their former jobs without loss of seniority rights and diminution of wages, and to pay the following: HEITAD

 

1. Hermogenes R. Quijada
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P16,500 x 9.97 =		P164,505.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P164,505.00) =		13,708.75
		––––––––––––
		P178,213.75
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P16,500 x 10.97/12 =		15,083.75
		––––––––––––
		P193,297.50
2. Loreno R. Porras
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P14,500 x 9.97 =		P144,565.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P144,565.00) =		12,047.08
		––––––––––––
		P156,612.08
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P14,500 x 10.97/12 =		13,255.42
		––––––––––––
		P169,867.50
3. Elmer G. Goña
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P14,200 x 9.97 =		P164,505.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P141,574.00) =		11,797.83
		––––––––––––
		P153,371.83
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P14,200 x 10.97/12 =		12,981.17
		––––––––––––
		P166,353.00
4. Celso H. Panapanaan
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P12,500 x 9.97 =		P124,625.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P124,695.00) =		10,385.42
		––––––––––––
		P135,010.42
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P12,500 x 10.97/12 =		11,427.08
		––––––––––––
		P146,437.50
5. Efren S. Valenzuela
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P12,500 x 9.97 =		P124,625.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P124,695.00) =		10,385.42
		––––––––––––
		P135,010.42
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P12,500 x 10.97/12 =		11,427.08
		––––––––––––
		P146,437.50
6. Silverio C. Jumawid
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P12,000 x 9.97 =		P119,640.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P119,640.00) =		9,970.00
		––––––––––––
		P129,610.00
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P12,000 x 10.97/12 =		10,970.00
		––––––––––––
		P140,580.00
7. Rafael F. Furio, Jr.
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P10,500 x 9.97 =		P104,685.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P104,685.00) =		8,723.75
		––––––––––––
		P113,408.75
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P10,500 x 10.97/12 =		9,598.75
		––––––––––––
		P123,007.50
8. Henry S. Bellesa
a) Backwages
12/1/08-9/30/09 = 9.97 mos.
P10,500 x 9.97 =		P104,685.00
13th month pay (1/12 of P104,685.00) =		8,723.75
		––––––––––––
		P113,408.75
b) 13th month pay
1/1/08-11/30/08 = 10.97 mos.
P10,500 x 10.97/12 =		9,598.75
		––––––––––––
		P123,007.50
		––––––––––––
	TOTAL	P1,208,988.00
	10% Attorney's Fees	20,898.80
		––––––––––––
	GRAND TOTAL	P1,329,886.80
		===========

 

All other claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 10

On January 21, 2010, the petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondents, on the other hand, filed a Motion 11 for execution as to the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision. Petitioners opposed 12 the said motion.

On March 11, 2010, the petitioners moved for the withdrawal of opposition, the pertinent portion of which reads:

2. Respondents manifest that they are withdrawing their Opposition to Complainants' Motion for Execution As to Reinstatement Aspect only. Further to this, the Respondents are requiring the Complainants to report back to work immediately in compliance with the appealed decision, Otherwise, under the "no work no pay rule" Complainants should not be entitled to any salary/wages if they refuse to report for work." 13

On June 1, 2010, the petitioners filed a Manifestation 14 informing the NLRC that the respondents had not yet reported for work.

On October 15, 2010, the NLRC rendered Judgment 15 which reversed the LA's decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision below. Complainants-appellees' complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 16

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 17 dated December 21, 2010.

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA in a case entitled "Hermogenes Quijada, et al. v. NLRC, et al.," but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution 18 dated May 26, 2011. The dismissal was no longer appealed by the respondents.

After two years, or on July 8, 2013, the respondents filed an Omnibus Motion 19 to Resolve Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution on Accrued Backwages for the period September 20, 2009 up to October 15, 2010 and to re-raffle the case to another LA. Petitioners filed an Opposition 20 thereto and asserted that the LA's decision which ordered said execution was reversed with finality by the NLRC.

In an Order 21 dated September 1, 2015, the LA explained that the petitioners' failure to reinstate the respondents, despite receipt of the LA decision ordering them to do so, is in clear violation of Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, which states that a decision of the LA reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The pertinent portion of the Order reads: ATICcS

As the record show, the respondents failed to reinstate the complainants despite receipt of the decision ordering them to do so in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, entitling the complainants of their reinstatement backwages. However, the reckoning period for the computation of the reinstatement backwages should be from January 11, 2010, the date the decision was received by respondents up to October 15, 2010, when the appealed decision was reversed.

Hereunder is our computation:

January 12, 2010 to October 15, 2010 (9.17 mos.)

 

		Rate/mo.	No. of mos.	Total Salaries	*13th mo.	TOTAL REINST. WAGES
1	Hermogenes R. Quijada	P16,500.00	9.17	P151,305.00	P12,608.75	P163,913.75
2	[Loreno] R. Porras	P14,500.00	9.17	P132,965.00	P11,080.42	P144,045.42
3	Elmer G. Goña	P14,200.00	9.17	P130,214.00	P10,851.17	P141,065.17
4	Celso H. Panapanaan	P12,500.00	9.17	P114,625.00	P9,552.08	P124,177.08
5	Efren S. Valenzuela	P12,500.00	9.17	P114,625.00	P9,552.08	P124,177.08
6	Silverio C. Jumawid	P12,000.00	9.17	P110,040.00	P9,170.00	P119,210.00
7	Rafael F. Furio, Jr.	P10,500.00	9.17	P96,285.00	P8,023.75	P104,308.75
8	Henry S. [Bellesa]	P10,500.00	9.17	P96,285.00	P8,023.75	P104,308.75
OVERALL TOTAL	P1,025,206.00
* Total salaries divided by 12 months

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the reinstatement wages of the complainants is hereby approved. Let the corresponding Writ of Execution be issued for the enforcement of complainants' accrued/reinstatement wages.

SO ORDERED. 22

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed a verified petition with the NLRC assailing the order from the LA. The NLRC then directed the LA to elevate the case record.

In a Resolution 23 dated November 27, 2015, the NLRC affirmed the LA's Order and dismissed the verified petition filed by the petitioners.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 24 dated January 20, 2016.

Petitioners filed a certiorari petition with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 144543, assailing the decision of the NLRC and imputing grave abuse of discretion on the latter.

Ruling of the CA

In a Resolution 25 dated June 20, 2016, the CA denied said petition. Citing Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, Section 18, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure and Section 9, Rule IX of the same Rules, the CA ratiocinated that the LA's Order of reinstatement is immediately executory and that the employer, pending appeal, must either (1) re-admit the employees to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or (2) reinstate them in the payroll. The CA opined that the respondents became rightfully entitled to their reinstatement salaries when the LA rendered its Decision on September 30, 2009. Said order of reinstatement, therefore, was effective from January 12, 2010 until October 15, 2010, or until it was reversed by the NLRC in the latter's Decision dated October 15, 2010. The appellate court, likewise, opined that the petitioners failed to show that the LA and the NLRC capriciously favored the respondents, to wit:

Here, petitioners failed to show that the [LA] and the NLRC capriciously favored private respondents. In truth, their conclusions were based on substantial evidence, which is such amount of relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Besides, well-settled is the rule that judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials' findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the [LA] and the NLRC conform, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. Too, factual findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even accorded finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)

Hence, this petition. TIADCc

Ruling of the Court

Petitioners' main contention is that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it failed to recognize the petitioners' Withdrawal of Opposition dated March 12, 2010 and its Manifestation dated June 2, 2010 as akin to a valid form of a Return to Work Order. Petitioners insist that this Withdrawal and Manifestation signified their compliance with the LA's Order of Reinstatement dated September 30, 2009.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

No abuse of discretion on the part of

In a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, the Court limits its review of the CA's decision (in a labor case) to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the NLRC and not on the basis of whether the latter's decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct. Applying this to the present case, the sole issue that the CA had to resolve was whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it held the petitioners liable for the respondents' reinstatement wages.

A review of the factual findings of the CA would reveal that there was no abuse of discretion. As held in the case of Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes: 27

In Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Serna, this court elaborated on its role to determine whether the [CA] was correct in either granting or dismissing the petition for certiorari:

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.

Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.

Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the findings of fact by the [CA]. The [CA] can conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the [NLRC] has committed grave abuse of discretion. "In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the [CA] are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again."

III

There are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals, as affirmed by the [CA], are binding on this court. In Medina v. Asistio, Jr.:

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the [CA]. The rule, however, is not without exception. Thus, findings of fact by the [CA] may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances, none of which obtain in the instant petition:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.);** (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]);** (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). 28 (Citations omitted and emphases and italics in the original)

Reinstatement issued by the LA is

Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, instructs: AIDSTE

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis Ours)

If there is a finding of illegal dismissal and reinstatement is specifically ordered by the LA, the same shall be immediately executory notwithstanding pendency of an appeal. Article 223 of the Labor Code elaborates on this, viz.:

Art. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (Emphasis Ours)

Section 9, Rule IX of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, likewise, reiterates the "immediately executory" character of the order of reinstatement even pending appeal of the LA's decision, viz.:

SEC. 9. EXECUTION OF REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL. — In case the decision includes an order of reinstatement, and the employer disobeys the directive under the second paragraph of Section 18 of Rule V or refuses to reinstate the dismissed employee, the Labor Arbiter shall immediately issue a writ of execution, even pending appeal, directing the employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee either physically or in the payroll, and to pay the accrued salaries as a consequence of such non-reinstatement in the amount specified in the decision.

Here, the LA rendered its Decision on September 30, 2009. According to the LA, the respondents have been illegally dismissed, and as such are entitled to reinstatement, among others. Petitioners appealed to the NLRC on January 21, 2010.

It must be borne in mind that applying the foregoing provisions of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure, the Decision of the LA is immediately executory with respect to the reinstatement aspect even if the petitioners herein subsequently appealed to the NLRC. The Court's ruling in Bergonio, Jr., et al. v. South East Asian Airlines, et al.29 is instructive, to wit:

In any event, the decision of the [LA] reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

Under paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code, the LA's order for the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is immediately executory even during pendency of the employer's appeal from the decision. Under this provision, the employer must reinstate the employee — either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, and paying his wages; or, at the employer's option, merely reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher court. Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by exercising the options in the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employee's salaries.

Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless the appellate tribunal issues a restraining order, the LA is duty bound to implement the order of reinstatement and the employer has no option but to comply with it.

Moreover, and equally worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of execution to trigger the employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed employee. 30 (Emphasis and Underlining Ours) AaCTcI

Moreover, when the LA decides that reinstatement is proper, a "return to work" order is necessary. This serves as formal notice to the dismissed or separated employee to immediately report to work pending appeal or in the interim that issues are being threshed out in court proceedings. The employer has the obligation to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee pending appeal, until the Decision of the LA is reversed by a higher court or tribunal. In the event of a reversal, the employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This has been settled in the case of Manila Doctors College, et al. v. Olores, 31viz.:

Under Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code, "the decision of the [LA] reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement x x x." Verily, the employer is duty-bound to reinstate the employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employee's salary.

However, in the event that the LA's decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is no longer obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LA's decision. Notwithstanding the reversal of the finding of illegal dismissal, an employer, who, despite the LA's order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time of the reversal. By way of exception, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. 32 (Emphases and underlining Ours)

Although there is no hard-and-fast rule with regard to the proper form of a return to work order, the Court agrees with the labor tribunals and the CA that the petitioners defied the LA's Decision dated September 30, 2009. The subsequent actuations of the petitioner, i.e., withdrawal of their Opposition to the Order of Reinstatement, cannot be considered as compliance and is not to be interpreted nor understood as akin to a return to work order. There must be an express notice or directive from the employer addressed directly to the employee/s concerned, informing the latter that he or she can report back to work.

Clearly, the petitioners disregarded the "immediately executory" character of the reinstatement order when they failed to furnish notice to the respondents to return to work for the period of September 30, 2009 to October 2010.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated June 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144543 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for proper execution of the Order to pay wages of herein respondents covering the period of September 30, 2009 to October 15, 2010.

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.) EcTCAD

Very truly yours,

WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-27.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza (now Presiding Justice) and Melchor Q. Sadang concurring; id. at 33-52.

3.Id. at 37.

4.Id. at 38.

5.Id. at 35-36.

6.Id. at 36.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 57-61.

9. Rendered by LA Jaime M. Reyno; id. at 178-189.

10.Id. at 187-189.

11.Id. at 190-191.

12.Id. at 193-196.

13.Id. at 198.

14.Id. at 209-210.

15. Rendered by Presiding Commissioner Benedicto R. Palacol; id. at 213-225.

16. Id. at 225.

17.Id. at 233-235.

18.Id. at 237-239.

19.Id. at 241-242.

20.Id. at 243-245.

21.Id. at 247-250.

22.Id. at 249-250.

23.Id. at 290-296.

24.Id. at 314-315.

25.Id. at 33-52.

26.Id. at 51-52.

27. 753 Phil. 482 (2015).

28.Id. at 503-504.

29. 733 Phil. 347 (2014).

30.Id. at 357-359.

31. 796 Phil. 274 (2016).

32.Id. at 284.