SECOND DIVISION
[UDK-15800. October 12, 2020.]
ALFRED JAVIER INGALLS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 12 October 2020 which reads as follows:
"UDK-15800 (Alfred Javier Ingalls v. People of the Philippines). — This petition for review 1 filed by petitioner Alfred Javier Ingalls (Ingalls) assails the Decision 2 dated September 21, 2016 and the Resolution dated March 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02571, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated June 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Oslob, Cebu, Branch 62 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. OS-11-719 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.'
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information 5 filed before the RTC, charging Ingalls with the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution alleged that at around 9:00 in the morning of November 18, 2011, while on duty at the livestock market in Barangay San Roque, Ginatilan, Cebu, Police Officer (PO) 2 Ruben Catubig (PO2 Catubig), with the assistance of his back-up, PO1 Robert Dialemas, apprehended Ingalls, in flagrante delicto, in possession of two (2) sachets of suspected shabu. Through a valid warrantless arrest, Ingalls was arrested and then brought to the police station where a body search was conducted on him, yielding the following items: a cellphone, calculator, P1,040.00 cash money, and a disposable lighter. Marking, photography, and inventory were then conducted in the presence of Ingalls and Barangay Councilors Jude John Cadungog (Cadungog) and Winefredo Ondoy (Ondoy). Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory where they were confirmed to contain 0.12 gram 6 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 7
In his defense, Ingalls interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up, and claimed that PO2 Catubig was already holding a sachet of shabu when the latter approached and handcuffed him. He added that when he was brought to the police station, PO2 Catubig suddenly disappeared, and that it was a certain 'Police Officer Neil Mansueto' who investigated him. Subsequently, the police officers took his pictures and placed him inside the detention cell. 8
In a Decision 9 dated June 25, 2015, the RTC found Ingalls guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) month of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00. 10 It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of the crime charged, and that Ingalls was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the illegal drugs. 11 It further ruled that there was an unbroken link in the chain of custody, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti were preserved. The RTC likewise ruled that Ingalls failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his allegations of denial and frame-up, as there was likewise no proof that PO2 Catubig was actuated by ill-motive to testify falsely against Ingalls. 12
In a Decision 13 dated September 21, 2016, the CA affirmed the conviction of Ingalls for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, and consequently, ordered the cancellation of his bail bond; the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him; and his immediate commitment to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. 14 It held, among others, that the warrantless arrest of Ingalls was valid, considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of two (2) plastic sachets of shabu. Moreover, it ruled that all the elements of the crime charged were present. 15
Unperturbed, Ingalls sought reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution 16 dated March 9, 2017; hence, this petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In cases of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, 17 it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. 18 Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal. 19
To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 20 As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that "marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team." 21 Hence, the failure to immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in evidence nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody. 22
The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, 23 'a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official'; 24 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, 'an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media.' 25 The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily 'to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.' 26
As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded 'not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law.' 27 This is because the law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. 28
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the chain of custody procedure may not always be possible. 29 As such, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 30 The foregoing is based on the saving clause found in Section 21 (a), 31 Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which was later adopted into the text of RA 10640. 32 It should, however, be emphasized that for the saving clause to apply, the prosecution must duly explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, 33 and that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 34
Anent the witness requirement, non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. 35 Thus, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. 36 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. 37
Notably, the Court, in People v. Miranda, 38 issued a definitive reminder to prosecutors when dealing with drugs cases. It implored that '[since] the [procedural] requirements are clearly set forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review.' 39
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ingalls. Records reveal that while the requisite inventory of the seized drugs was conducted in the presence of Ingalls and two (2) elected public officials, the same was not done in the presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ. During the Direct Examination of PO2 Catubig, he testified that:
FISCAL TAPANGAN: (To the witness)
Q: Mr. Witness, let's go back to the time when you made the inventory, who were present during that time?
A: Two (2) Barangay Councilors.
Q: Aside from them?
A: Myself and SPO1 Rome Carcedo. 40 (Underscoring supplied)
In an attempt to justify their failure to secure the presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ, PO2 Catubig simply asserted that it was their "practice" to obtain the presence of the barangay councilors and the Public Information Officer (PIO) of their municipality, considering that they were the ones "readily available," to wit:
Q: Was there a representative from the DOJ or from the Media?
A: The PIO of the municipality of Ginatilan was present and took pictures.
COURT: (To the witness)
You answer directly to the question.
WITNESS PO2 CATUBIG:
A: No, ma'am, it was only the PIO of the municipality of Ginatilan, Cebu.
FISCAL TAPANGAN: (To the witness)
Q: Why they were not present during the inventory. Mr. Witness?
A: It was usually our practice to utilize only the presence of the councilors and the Public Information Officer because they were the ones readily available.41
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Given the above, it appears that the police officers did not only fail to comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, but they likewise did not proffer a plausible explanation therefor. Meanwhile, the justification provided by PO2 Catubig was insufficient for the saving clause to apply, as the practice of obtaining only the presence of the councilors and the PIO out of convenience and easy access — particularly without any showing that the police officers attempted to contact and secure the other required witnesses — is not only unsound but also unacceptable. To reiterate, RA 9165 mandates the presence of all the required witnesses to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence, and non-compliance thereto is only justified under exigent circumstances — such as a threat to the police officers' safety and security, as well as the time and distance which the other witnesses would have had to consider 42 — which the police officers utterly failed to show in this case.
Without a doubt, the procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Ingalls, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. 43 The procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 44 As such, since the prosecution in this case failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the acquittal of Ingalls is perforce in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 21, 2016 and the Resolution dated March 9, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02571 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alfred Javier Ingalls is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to: (a) cause Ingalls' immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason; and (b) inform the Court of the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Let entry of judgment be made immediately.
SO ORDERED. (Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.)"
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 7-11.
2.Id. at 14-25. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap with Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, concurring.
3. CA rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Presiding Judge James Stewart Ramon E. Himalaloan.
4. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
5. Dated November 21, 2011; records, p. 1.
6. .06 gram each sachet (see CA rollo, p. 38).
7.Rollo, pp. 16-17. See also CA rollo, pp. 34-36.
8.Rollo, pp. 16- 17. See also CA rollo, p. 36.
9. CA rollo, pp. 34-39.
10. CA rollo, p. 39.
11.Id. at 37-38.
12.Id. at 38.
13.Rollo, pp. 14-25.
14.Id. at 25.
15.Id. at 21-22.
16.Id. at 28-31.
17. The elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. (See People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 356, 369; People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 231383, March 7, 2018, 858 SCRA 94, 104; People v. Magsano, G.R. No. 231050, February 28, 2018, 857 SCRA 142, 152; People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018, 856 SCRA 359, 369-370; People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018, 854 SCRA 42, 52; and People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, 853 SCRA 303, 312-313; all cases citing People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 348 [2015] and People v. Bio, 753 Phil. 730, 736 [2015].)
18. See People v. Crispo, id.; People v. Sanchez, id.; People v. Magsano, id.; People v. Manansala, id.; People v. Miranda, id.; and People v. Mamangon, id. See also People v. Viterbo, 739 Phil. 593, 601 (2014).
19. See People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 233702, June 20, 2018, citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1039-1040 (2012).
20. See People v. Año, G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018; People v. Crispo, supra note 17; People v. Sanchez, supra note 17; People v. Magsano, supra note 17; People v. Manansala, supra note 17; People v. Miranda, supra note 17; and People v. Mamangon, supra note 17. See also People v. Viterbo, supra note 18.
21.People v. Mamalumpon, 767 Phil. 845, 855 (2015), citing Imson v. People, 669 Phil. 262, 270-271 (2011). See also People v. Ocfemia, 718 Phil. 330, 348 (2013), citing People v. Resurreccion, 618 Phil. 520, 532 (2009).
22. See People v. Tumulak, 791 Phil. 148, 160-161 (2016); and People v. Rollo, 757 Phil. 346, 357 (2015).
23. Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" approved on July 15, 2014. As the Court noted in People v. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018), RA 10640, which was approved on July 15, 2014, states that it shall "take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation." Verily, a copy of the law was published on July 23, 2014 in the respective issues of "The Philippine Star" (Vol. XXVIII, No. 359, Philippine Star Metro section, p. 21) and the "Manila Bulletin" (Vol. 499, No. 23; World News section, p. 6); hence, RA 10640 became effective on August 7, 2014.
24. Section 21 (1) and (2), Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
25. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
26. See People v. Miranda, supra note 17. See also People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 764 (2014).
27. See People v. Miranda, id. See also People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, 820 SCRA 204, 215, citing People v. Umipang, supra note 19, at 1038.
28. See People v. Segundo, G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017, citing People v. Umipang, id.
29. See People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008).
30. See People v. Almorfe, 631 Phil. 51, 60 (2010).
31. Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 pertinently states: "Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."
32. Section 1 of RA 10640 pertinently states: "Provided, finally, That non-compliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."
33.People v. Almorfe, supra note 30.
34.People v. De Guzman, 630 Phil. 637, 649 (2010).
35. See People v. Manansala, supra note 17.
36. See People v. Gamboa, supra note 19, citing People v. Umipang, supra note 19, at 1053.
37. See People v. Crispo, supra note 17.
38.Supra note 17.
39. See id.
40. TSN, October 3, 2013, p. 2.
41.Id. at 2-3.
42. See People v. Ceralde, 815 Phil. 711-723 (2017).
43. See People v. Sumili, supra note 17, at 352.
44. See People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1038 (2012).