FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 238286. June 27, 2018.]
ROMEO R. IMSON, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 27, 2018which reads as follows: SDHTEC
"G.R. No. 238286 — Romeo R. Imson v. People of the Philippines
This Court resolves to GRANT petitioner's Motion for Extension seeking an additional period of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period on March 17, 2018 within which to file his Petition for Review on Certiorari.
This Court has carefully reviewed the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari and accordingly resolves to DENY the same for: (1) lack of verified statement as to the dates of receipt of the assailed decision and of filing of motion for reconsideration in violation of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; (2) lack of payment of P1,000.00 for Sheriff's Trust Fund per A.M. 17-12-09-SC, the amount remitted being only P3,530.00; (3) raising factual issues; and (4) failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its August 14, 2017 Decision and February 19, 2018 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 37825.
It is worth stressing that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari under Ruled 45. In the present petition, petitioner raises as issues: (1) his conviction based on the testimony of the private complainant which was allegedly full of material inconsistencies and improbabilities; (2) the failure of the courts below to consider his testimony and that of his witnesses as more credible and consistent with human experience; and (3) the failure of the courts below to consider in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. These issues are basically factual in nature since they will require this Court to review and assess the evidence extant on record. It is not, however, the duty of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below. This Court is not a trier of facts and while there are recognized exceptions which warrant a review of the factual findings of the court below, none exists in this case. There is therefore no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the CA. HESIcT
In any case, petitioner has failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. The prosecution was able to prove the presence of the following elements of frustrated homicide: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, was present. 1
Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations which refer to acts and conduct of the offender at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. 2 In this case, criminal intent was reasonably inferred from petitioner's possession of a knife and his using the same in an unprovoked assault upon the private complainant. Moreover, the wound sustained by the private complainant from the attack of petitioner with his knife was serious since it cut his suprarenal vessel and caused profuse bleeding. The doctor who attended to the private complainant testified that said wound was sufficient to result in the latter's death were it not for the timely medical intervention he received. In the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide or infanticide, the crime committed by petitioner was frustrated homicide.
The private complainant's eyewitness account and his positive identification of petitioner as his assailant, without any showing of evil intent, prevailed over the latter's mere denial. There is no doubt that it was petitioner who stabbed private complainant from behind. Private complainant saw petitioner as the only person standing near him holding a knife before the stabbing incident occurred. While there may be inconsistencies in the testimony of the private complainant, they were too trivial and inconsequential to merit a reversal of petitioner's conviction. The fact remains that he consistently identified petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime and testified on the manner he (petitioner) committed the same.
Petitioner's claim that private complainant's group stayed for another hour in the bar to make it appear that there was no sufficient provocation on their part and thus deprived him of the justifying circumstance of self-defense was also unworthy of credence. Said defense was not substantiated by evidence.
This Court therefore does not see any reason to overturn the assessment of the CA as regards the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings were tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error. Considering that petitioner failed to show any of these circumstances on the findings of the trial court and the CA, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 3
Petitioner's contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation fails to sway. The passional obfuscation must be proximate to the commission of the crime to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason and self-restraint. 4 Here, there was considerable lapse of time of about an hour for petitioner to regain his composure and temper. It should be recalled that petitioner was accidentally hit by sheets of tissue paper that were thrown by private complainant's brother at the person with whom petitioner was having a conversation. Petitioner retaliated by punching private complainant's brother and leaving immediately. Private complainant's group then resumed their drinking session and after about an hour, petitioner returned and stabbed the private complainant. caITAC
Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for frustrated homicide is prision mayor since it is next lower to reclusion temporal, which is the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the RPC. 5 In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, which ranges from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed. This is the penalty of prision correccional which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 2 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper. 6
The award of actual damages in the amount of P36,302.75 is likewise proper since it was based on expenses covered by receipts. 7 The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amounts of P30,000.00 each are also proper. 8 The interest at the rate of 6% per annum imposed on all awards of damages from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid is likewise correct.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to AFFIRM the Decision dated August 14, 2017 and Resolution dated February 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 37825.
SO ORDERED."Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2562 dated June 20, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.De Guzman, Jr. v. People, 748 Phil. 452, 458 (2014).
2.Id. at 459.
3.People v. Bontuyan, 742 Phil. 788, 798 (2014).
4.People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 502 (2002).
5.De Guzman, Jr. v. People, 748 Phil. 452, 460-461 (2014).
6. The penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 2 days of prision correccional is within the range of its maximum period, but for exactness, this penalty should be 4 years, 2 months and 1 day. However, the penalty imposed on petitioner is still proper since under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is within the full range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional.
7.People v. Magalona, 454 Phil. 303, 322-323 (2003).
8.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 852 (2016).