THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190647. January 17, 2018.]
ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. JUAN PACULBA, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 17, 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 190647 (Iligan Cement Corporation vs. Juan Paculba, et al.). — For resolution of the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59605-MIN, dated May 19, 2008, 1 denying the appeal on the ground of laches. Also assailed is the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 12, 2009 which denied herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Iligan Cement Corporation (ICC) is the registered owner of a 99,074 square-meter parcel of land located in Kiwalan, Iligan City, covered by TCT No. T-39, 061 (a.f.), and previously identified as Cad Lot No. 3622. It was originally registered in 1955, under OCT No. RP-9 (41), pursuant to a homestead patent granted to Leon Daguisonan. 2 The homestead patent was originally filed in 1933, and was officially registered in 1955. The property was later transferred to ICC, through a contract of sale executed in 1992. Adjacent to the land owned by ICC is a parcel of land previously identified as Cad Lot No. 3621, and presently covered by OCT No. P-561 in the name of respondents Juan Paculba, Toribia P. Pagaling, Serapia Lucero, and Julian Paculba. The respondents inherited the property from their father, Geronimo Paculba.
The present controversy originated when on October 16, 1995, ICC filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City an amended complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, and damages against respondents, on the ground that they have encroached on a portion of the property of ICC, particularly a 2,138 square-meter portion located on the Northeastern portion.
In their Answer, the respondents denied that there has been any encroachment on the property of petitioner. They claimed that the sketch plan upon which the claim of petitioner is based was fraudulently obtained, and that an easement or right-of-way had been previously executed by the parties.
Considering that the controversy involved a boundary dispute, the RTC, upon the motion of the counsels for both petitioner and respondents, appointed Engr. Odon Gomera (Engr. Gomera) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Iligan City, as commissioner, and tasked him to conduct the necessary relocation survey on the subject property, in relation to the titles held by the petitioner and the respondents. The RTC also ordered him to submit the result of the survey, indicating the metes and bounds of the respective properties of the parties. 3
In compliance with the order of the RTC, Engr. Gomera submitted his report on April 8, 1996. Part of the report reads:
Based on the actual projection of the titles involved, it appears that:
1. There is no common line between TCT No. T-39,061 (a.f.) and the other title, OCT No. P-561;
2. The Technical description of TCT No. T-39,061 (a.f.) in the name of [petitioner] is erroneous as computed and projected on the plan, runs N. 32 deg. 44' E, 1,575.10 (more or less) from corner 1 of OCT No. P-561 of the [respondents], the disputed area;
3. Further research on the technical discrepancies of TCT No. T-39,061 (a.f.) shall be made by the [petitioner].
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It is therefore recommended that a relocation survey be held in abeyance since the issue is not a boundary conflict. Furthermore, said relocation once effected would create another conflict with third parties affected by the new site. 4
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision promulgated on January 22, 1998, the RTC found preponderant evidence in favor of the respondents, and thus dismissed the complaint by petitioner. The RTC ruled:
The defendants Paculbas have presented persuasive evidence of ownership of the land in question. Evidence was presented that herein defendants Juan Paculba, Julian Paculba, Toribia Paculba except Serapia Paculba, are the absolute co-owners in fee simple of an agricultural land including the property in litigation. In fact, the area and extent of the land in dispute have been sufficiently established by the combined testimonies of the witnesses Marciano Paculba and defendant Toribia Paculba herself, attesting that their predecessor-in-interest including that of the defendants themselves, have been in the possession of the disputed land, openly, adversely, publicly, continuously, and peacefully for more than 30 years already, as defendants Paculbas were the ones benefitting from the produce of coco trees, mango and jackfruits planted thereon. While it may be true that their testimonies comes from a polluted source, still this Court can safely rely on the testimonies of said witnesses, after considering that both of them are residents of the place and in fact witness Marciano Paculba was a long time working in both land of the Paculbas and Leon Gauisonan, the predecessor-in-interest of ICC.
Besides, if the plaintiff is really the owner of the disputed portion consisting of 2,318 square meters, more or less, that was allegedly being encroached by defendants and that of their predecessor-in-interest, there could have been a boundary dispute a long time before. x x x Assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff have a right over the disputed portion, the same was already barred by extinctive prescription and ownership accrued in favor of the [respondents] by acquisitive prescription. 5
In fine, the RTC ruled that the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession is already barred by extinctive prescription, following Article 1116 6 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 10 of Act 190. To the RTC, the positive acts that the respondents have been exercising over the land are indubitably acts of dominion, and thus, the petitioner should have filed the action earlier. However, the petitioner only filed the complaint on October 3, 1995, after a lapse of about 41 years from the date the alleged cause of action has accrued. This is clearly not in consonance with the provision in Section 10 of Act 190 that actions for recovery of title, or possession of right of real property or interest therein can be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrued. Moreover, Section 41 of Act 190 provided that ten years of actual, adverse, uninterrupted possession of any person claiming to be the owner of the land or interest in the land, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest full and complete title in every actual occupant or possessor of such land. 7
As to the sketch plan presented by petitioner, which was allegedly based on a survey made prior to the Cadastral survey of Iligan City, the RTC pointed out that the petitioner failed to show that the geodetic engineers who conducted that survey notified the respondents or any of their representatives, of the date that they were going to do the relocation survey. Hence, the respondents could not possibly have been present to agree with the geodetic engineers on their common boundaries.
Finally, the RTC pointed out that by filing the complaint, the petitioner admits that it had been dispossessed, and that respondents are the actual physical possessors. Thus, according to the RTC, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that it had the better right to possess the property. This burden, the RTC pointed out, the petitioner failed to overcome. 8 The RTC then dismissed the complaint in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with costs.
The counterclaim of defendants [is] likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis. 9
Undaunted, petitioner appealed the matter to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its now assailed Decision dated May 19, 2008, the CA denied petitioner's appeal. 10 Initially, the CA first pointed out that the arguments of petitioner, that a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious possession, and that lands registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription, are well-taken. However, the CA also pointed out that this guarantee may, in appropriate cases, yield to the equitable principle of laches. The CA then ruled and dismissed the appeal thus:
The inaction and neglect of the original patentee, Leon Daguisonan, [appellant's predecessor-in-interest], for a long period of 36 years has converted the present action into a stale demand. It is to be noted that the above complications never would have been occasioned had the original patentee and his successors-in-interest not slept on their rights. (citations omitted) 11
xxx xxx xxx
Ergo, the sketch plan presented and identified by Engr. Pedro Balquera and Dr. Anselmo Almazan, Exhibit A-14 and I, respectively, showed the boundaries based on the old survey and the cadastral survey of Iligan City. Based on these Exhibits, numerous boundary lines, belonging to third parties, would be affected and need to be relocated in order to plot and establish the boundaries based on the old survey. Should the stale demand of appellant's claim of enforcing the old survey plan HA-97722 vis-à-vis the cadastral survey of Iligan City, like a domino effect, would create countless boundary dispute[s], wreaking havoc on the cadastral [plan].
This, in all good conscience, we cannot sanction. In effect, the principle is one of [estoppel] because it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his successors-in-interest. Since the plaintiffs-appellants are barred from recovery, their divestiture of all elements of ownership in the land is complete. The court a quo was justified in ordering the dismissal of the complaint. 12
Issue
The issue for resolution by the Court, as set forth in the petition, is whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling: (1) that the respondents have acquired ownership of the disputed area by acquisitive prescription; and (2) that the petitioner's right to recover the subject property is barred by extinctive prescription.
Petitioner's Arguments
In the instant petition, petitioner invokes this Court's ruling in Umbay, et al. v. Alecha, et al., where this Court ruled that the action to recover a portion of registered land does not prescribe, and cannot be barred by laches. There, the Court also had the opportunity to say that the right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership. 13
Petitioner argues that the case at bar, being one for cancellation of title over a portion of land which overlaps with the title issued earlier, must adhere to the foregoing rules. Considering that there is no dispute that its title was issued much earlier than respondents', petitioner claims that the overlap must be resolved in its favor.
Moreover, petitioner posits that the CA should not have applied the doctrine of laches in the present case. It argues:
Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, which could not be established by mere allegations or even presumed. In fact, it must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. At the very least, therefore, there should be evidence on record during trial to prove laches before it can be applied against any party. 14
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit. Hence, it must be dismissed.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by observance of due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 15 The application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. 16
In order to constitute laches, the following must be present: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
As applied in cases for recovery of title, the equitable doctrine of laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect. This neglect bars the action for recovery, for being inequitable and unjust to the defendant. When it comes to land covered by the Torrens system, the Court had this to say in Heirs of Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan: 17
In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to recover land covered by the Torrens system may not be barred by laches. Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. Laches, which is a principle based on equity, may not prevail against a specific provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as justice outside legality, is applied in the absence of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure.
In recent cases, however, the Court held that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, et al., 18 which also involves an action for quieting of title and reconveyance, the action was filed 28 years after the plaintiff obtained title to the property. The Court ruled that the doctrine of laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, but their elements must be proved positively.
In the case now before the Court, the CA correctly ruled that laches had set in, considering the very long period of time that it took petitioner to file the case for recovery of title. We quote with affirmation the following findings of the CA:
In this case, all four elements are present. The conduct of the appellees is the alleged encroachment. Appellant had all the opportunity to sue, especially when they entered into the contracts of easement when it was able to come face to face with the title of the appellees, but it took it at least seventeen (17) years to file a complaint.
Appellees definitely did not have knowledge that the appellant would pursue its claim since they had no boundary dispute when they entered into the easement contracts. There will definitely be injury to the appellees if relief will be given to the appellant. 19
Petitioner wrongfully argues that the CA only belatedly made the case for laches, in order to justify its ruling. Petitioner even claims that the CA "tried in vain to stretch the facts in this case in order to apply the doctrine of laches." 20 The petitioner conveniently omits that RTC, in its Decision, had already made factual findings sufficient to conclude that the doctrine of laches had already set in the present case.
First, the RTC already noted that the respondents have been in open, adverse, public, continuous, and peaceful possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years. 21 This is undisputed, and not even the petitioner contests this finding of fact by the RTC. This foregoing fact sufficiently establishes the first requisite of laches.
Second, the RTC already observed the delay in the filing of the complaint. The RTC noted that the action for recovery of ownership and possession was only commenced on October 3, 1995, after a lapse of about 41 years from the date the alleged cause of action of the plaintiff has accrued. 22 This satisfies the second requisite.
Third, the RTC already found that no dispute had ever arisen between the parties before, as the possession of the late Geronimo Paculba was peaceful, as well as the possession of his heirs. This was only broken by the filing of the action in October 1995. 23 Hence, it can reasonably be concluded that the respondents had no knowledge or notice that the petitioner would file the present action against them. This is sufficient to establish the third requisite of laches.
Fourth, the RTC took note that respondents have been benefitting from the land. It took particular note of the income gained by the respondents from the produce of the coconut, mango, and jackfruit trees planted in the disputed property. If the Court were to sanction the relief prayed for by the petitioner, the respondents will undoubtedly be prejudiced not just because they will be physically dispossessed of the property, but more importantly, they will also be deprived of the benefits that they are reaping from their possession of the property. This, to the Court, is sufficient to establish the fourth requisite of laches.
Considering the equitable circumstances mentioned above, the Court is constrained to concur with the finding of the CA that laches had set in here. The foregoing factual findings of the RTC are sufficient to establish the requisites for the application of the doctrine of laches. In the interest of equity, it must be applied in the case at bar. Otherwise, this Court would be complicit in allowing the petitioner to benefit from its own neglect in not filing the appropriate complaint even if it had the chance to do so for a very long period of time. For its failure to file a complaint during all those times, the petitioner had no one else to blame but itself.
The CA, therefore, did not commit reversible error in ruling that the doctrine of laches is applicable in the case at bar. It was also correct in affirming the Decision of the RTC, finding for the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59605-MIN of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
2.Rollo, pp. 13-14.
3.Id. at 59.
4.Id. at 60.
5.Id. at 139-140.
6. Art. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required.
7.Rollo, p. 140.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 66.
10.Id. at 72.
11.Id. at 71.
12.Id. at 71-72.
13. No. L-67281, March 18, 1985.
14.Rollo, p. 47.
15.Republic v. Marjens Investment Corporation and Patrocino Villanueva, G.R. No 156205, November 12, 2014.
16.Department of Education v. Celso Oate, G.R. No. 161758, June 8, 2007.
17. G.R. No. 150654, December 13, 2007.
18. G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003.
19.Rollo, p. 86.
20.Id. at 47.
21.Id. at 139.
22.Id. at 140.
23.Id.