ADVERTISEMENT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252406. July 27, 2020.]
IKITCHEN, INC., WINGLIP CHANG, and/or DANNY PUMAREGA, petitioners,vs. JEFFREY U. OMAGA and THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 8TH DIVISION), respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated27 July 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252406 (IKitchen, Inc., Winglip Chang, and/or Danny Pumarega v. Jeffrey U. Omaga and the Court of Appeals (Former 8th Division). — After a perusal of the records of the case, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present petition 1 for failure of IKitchen, Inc., Winglip Chang, and/or Danny Pumarega (petitioners) to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the urgent application for the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI).
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. 2
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. Section 3, Rule 58 of the said Rules enumerates the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, to wit:
Section. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 3
Thus, before the preventive writ may be issued, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the above-mentioned requisites are present. In this regard, petitioners failed. Notably, the grounds relied upon by them are merely speculative. The arguments that the surety or cash bond deposit with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) might be released to Jeffrey Omaga (Omaga), and that in case of favorable judgment, restitution may no longer be possible are mere probabilities. There was no clear showing that petitioners have existing right ought to be protected by the issuance of an injunctive relief. Indeed, the CA acted in keeping with these standards and did not gravely abuse its discretion in not extending the temporary relief as prayed for by petitioners.
It is settled that a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable. 4 Here, there is no irreparable injury to speak of. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the injury claimed by petitioners, the implementation of the decision awarding backwages and attorney's fees to Omaga, while the case is pending, can be easily subjected to mathematical computation. Verily, said injury does not fall within the concept of irreparable damage or injury warranting the issuance of an injunctive relief.
Although the Court does not discount the possible monetary loss, in terms of the judgment award, that petitioners may suffer should the merits of their petition be denied with finality, yet it is well to reiterate that they failed to show that they are entitled to a provisional injunctive relief or writ.
As regard petitioners' argument of unjust enrichment, the CA, in its February 12, 2020 Resolution, 5 aptly held that the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case as the August 23, 2018 NLRC Decision 6 had established the monetary right in favor of Omaga. Thus, petitioners have a corresponding obligation to recognize the same until the said decision is reversed.
With the dismissal of the instant petition, petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is necessarily DENIED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. See Petition for Certiorari dated June 29, 2020; rollo, pp. 3-33.
2.Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, 772 Phil. 672, 736 (2015), citing The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. v. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, 685 Phil. 21 (2012).
3.Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, 819 Phil. 447, 458 (2017), citing St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010).
4.The City Government of Baguio v. Masweng, G.R. No. 195905, July 4, 2018.
5. Penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring; rollo, pp. 48-50.
6. Penned by Commissioner Agnes Alexis Lucero-De Grano, with Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra, concurring; id. at 58-86.