I-Popefrancis v. Department of Budget and Management

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 206689. August 24, 2016.]

I-POPEFRANCIS, DANTE LA JIMENEZ, EDUARDO R. MENESES, JR., GREGORIO T. FABROS, JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ, MELCHOR GRUELA MAGDAMO, WENDELL ANACAY UNLAYAO, petitioners (individuals), CAPITOL CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP, VACC, petitioners (groups), vs. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 24, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 206689 — I-POPEFRANCIS, DANTE LA JIMENEZ, EDUARDO R. MENESES, JR., GREGORIO T. FABROS, JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ, MELCHOR GRUELA MAGDAMO, WENDELL ANACAY UNLAYAO, Petitioners (Individuals), CAPITOL CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP, VACC, Petitioners (Groups), v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

This is a Petition seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent to publish through its website and the Official Gazette the list of emoluments it released, including the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) or Pork Barrel, and the full names of the recipients of the same, i.e., with the middle names for determination of familial relationship. The ultimate objective of the Petition is to prevent the possible circumvention of Sections 10 and 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution by members of the same family through nepotism and political dynasties.

A writ of mandamus does not lie in this case for the following reasons:

Petitioners lack legal standing.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In public suits, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." To be accorded standing to sue, the following requirements must be met: (a) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; and (b) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early. 1 Mere allegations by petitioners that they are either "taxpayers" or "concerned citizens" or a public interest group are not sufficient to accord them legal standing, especially in this case, in which the purported illegal disbursement of public funds or issue of transcendental importance is rooted in a mere "hypothetical situation." HSAcaE

Petitioners have no clear legal right to the writ.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. The right to information may be compelled by writ of mandamus, provided the following requisites concur: firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public interest; and, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. 2 It is not disputed that PDAF disbursements and the recipients of the same constitute a matter of public concern or public interest, which are not exempt from the operation of the constitutional guarantee of the right to information.

Nevertheless, it is not proper to issue a writ of mandamus in the present case.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

The writ of mandamus shall only issue to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it, unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office, to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedy of mandamus, then, is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. In contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done. 3

In this case, petitioners fail to establish that respondent actually neglected or refused to provide the information they requested. While respondent has the duty to give the public access to the information, it has the discretion to ascertain the best way to disseminate, publish, or otherwise make available the said information. As respondent points out, the information petitioners seek are already posted on its website, except that petitioners are unsatisfied because the names of the recipients of the PDAF disbursements do not include their middle names, making it more difficult to determine familial relations for petitioners' purposes. It bears to stress that petitioners are not able to present any law that specifically prescribes the medium by which respondent shall make such information available to the public (i.e., through its website) and the form or content of the same (i.e., to include middle names of the recipients). There is also no clear legal mandate for respondent to identify familial relations and/or determine nepotism or political dynasties among the recipients of the PDAF disbursements. In fact, as of yet, there is even no law that particularly defines and governs political dynasty. HESIcT

Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 4

Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Petitioners contend that respondent failed to act on their letter dated November 12, 2012. Said letter, though, is not attached to the Petition. Petitioners merely allege that the letter explained to respondent the principle behind I-POPEFRANCIS. 5 There is no way for the Court to determine the actual contents of said letter to judge whether or not respondent actually failed to properly act on the same, especially considering the assertion by respondent that the information petitioners seek are already posted on its website. There is also no showing that petitioners, being unsatisfied with the information posted on the website of respondent, requested respondent to provide additional information but respondent did not do so. Neither do petitioners allege seeking recourse from the Office of the President, which exercises control and supervision over respondent, over the purported inaction by respondent on petitioners' request for information.

The settled rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded it. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer or agency concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his/its jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative officer or agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. 6

 

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant Petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.  David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755-756 (2006).

2.  Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), G.R. No. 175210, February 1, 2016.

3.  Franco v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 194402, April 5, 2016.

4.  Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015, 751 SCRA 469, 512-513.

5.  1 Pork Only Per Fourth Degree Relatives Against Nepotistic Concentration of Internal Revenue Share.

6.  The Iloilo City Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals v. Gegato-Abecia Funeral Homes, Inc., 462 Phil. 803, 811-812 (2003).