THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233370. August 28, 2019.]
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ARCADIO TORRES AND ROBERTA ALEJANDRIA, NAMELY: BELEN SIMON-LIWANAG, RODOLFO SIMON, ERNESTO M. SIMON, ERNESTO L. SIMON, VICTORIA SIMON-SESE AND PRISCILLA SIMON, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, BELEN SIMON-LIWANAG, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES LUZVIMINDA GODUCO-MENDOZA AND SENANDO MENDOZA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 28, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233370 (Heirs of Spouses Arcadio Torres and Roberta Alejandria, namely: Belen Simon-Liwanag, Rodolfo Simon, Ernesto M. Simon, Ernesto L. Simon, Victoria Simon-Sese and Priscilla Simon, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Belen Simon-Liwanagv. Spouses Luzviminda Goduco-Mendoza and Senando Mendoza). — Considering the allegations, arguments and issues presented in the parties' pleadings, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in the assailed Decision 1 dated February 15, 2017 and Resolution 2 dated August 2, 2017 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 134226.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to reviewing errors of law, not of fact, unless there was misapprehension of facts or the factual findings were devoid of any evidence on record. 3 A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain set of facts, while a question of fact involves a doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 4 In the case at bench, the resolution of the issue, as to who between the petitioners and the respondents have the better right of possession, will necessarily entail a review of the evidence already presented in the lower courts, which is beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Nevertheless, after carefully examining the Petition, 5 Comment, 6 and the pleadings/annexes thereto, the Court finds that the CA did not commit any error that would warrant a reversal of its assailed decision.
In CeciliaT. Javelosa, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Ma. DianaJ.Jimenez v. Ezequiel Tapus, Mario Madriaga, Danny M. Tapuz, Juanita Tapus and Aurora Madriaga, 7 the Court highlighted that the complainant in an action for unlawful detainer has the burden of proving his allegations in his complaint, thus:
In the case at bar, the petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the subject property, elected to file an action for unlawful detainer. In making this choice, she bore the correlative burden to sufficiently allege, and thereafter prove by a preponderance of evidence all the jurisdictional facts in the said type of action. Specifically, the petitioner was charged with proving the following jurisdictional facts, to wit:
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(iv) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In their Complaint, 8 the petitioners alleged: (1) that the respondents merely occupied the subject lot by mere tolerance; (2) that petitioners sent a demand letter to the respondents which was on October 19, 1995; (3) that despite the demand, the respondents continue to reside in the contested lot; and (4) that because of the stubborn refusal of the respondents to leave the subject property, the petitioners lodged a complaint for unlawful detainer within one year from demand.
As correctly held by the CA, the petitioners failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' possession of the subject land was effected by mere tolerance. Simply stated, the petitioners failed to prove their allegations in the complaint. The instant petition is bereft of any documentary evidence pointing to the fact that indeed the respondents were merely tolerated by the petitioners. Not a single document or affidavit of a witness who had personal knowledge of this fact was presented by the petitioners to support their allegations that the respondents possessed the property by mere tolerance. There is nothing more settled than the basic principle that a mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent of proof. The term tolerance carries with it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction. The petitioners must prove that they actually permitted the respondents to occupy the subject lot for them to make out a case of unlawful detainer based on tolerance. Otherwise, a complaint for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy.
Finally, it is worthy to stress the Regional Trial Court's finding and conclusion in its October 29, 2013 Decision 9 that the issue of ownership has been raised by the respondents as early as 1990 when they filed a criminal complaint against Romeo Simon involving the subject property. The respondents alleged that they bought the subject lot from some of the compulsory heirs of Arcadio Torres and Roberta Alejandria and thus, raising the issue on ownership. This means that even before the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer by the petitioners, the ownership of the land has been disputed by the parties. 10 Thus, by instituting the complaint for unlawful detainer, the petitioners attempt to cut short the processes by summarily removing the respondents from the subject lot. Considering that the ownership of the disputed lot seems to be the core issue, the appropriate remedy available to the petitioners is an accionreinvindicatoria and not an ejectment case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on leave)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 35-48; penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now a Member of this Court) and Mario V. Lopez.
2.Id. at 50-51.
3. See Mario Diesta Bajaro v. Metro Stonerich Corp. and/or Ibrahim M. Nuño, G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018.
4. See E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco, et al., 794 Phil. 97, 148 (2016).
5.Rollo, pp. 11-29.
6.Id. at 298-302.
7. G.R. No. 204361, July 4, 2018.
8.Rollo, pp. 74-80.
9.Id. at 226-235.
10.Id. at 234.