FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217498. June 18, 2018.]
HEIRS OF CORAZON PURISIMA, LEELIN PURISIMA AND BERNARDITA PURISIMA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF ROSALIO PURISIMA, NAMELY: FEDERICO G. PURISIMA, VIRGINIA P. DELA CRUZ, FLORESPINA P. ALBERTO, EDUARDO G. PURISIMA AND MAXIBEL G. PURISIMA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 18, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 217498 — Heirs of Corazon Purisima, Leelin Purisima and Bernardita Purisima vs. Heirs of Rosalio Purisima, namely: Federico G. Purisima, Virginia P. Dela Cruz, Florespina P. Alberto, Eduardo G. Purisima and Maxibel G. Purisima
The Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners Heirs of Corazon Purisima namely: Leelin Purisima (Leelin) and Bernardita Purisima (Bernardita) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated March 10, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76992. The appellate court affirmed the Decision 4 dated April 29, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 4038-17 for Recovery of Ownership.
Factual Antecedents
Cirilo Purisima (Cirilo) married Pastora Pulido Pasol (Pastora) who, at the time of their marriage, was the mother of a love-child named Ursula Pasol (Ursula). During their marriage, they had four children named Gualberto Purisima, Felipe Purisima (Felipe), Alejandra Purisima, and Rosalio Purisima (Rosalio). 5
It appears, however, that Cirilo also begot with his step-daughter Ursula six (6) children named Paquita, Severino, Mercedes, Bernardo, Porfirio, and Salustiano all surnamed Purisima. Salustiano is the husband of Corazon Purisima (Corazon) and likewise the father and father-in-law of Leelin and Bernardita, respectively. 6
Later, Cirilo and Pastora bought from a certain Mamerto Pobre a parcel of land consisting of 326 square meters, located at Barangay 9, San Pedro, Paoay, Ilocos Norte. 7
On May 15, 1996, Rosalio filed a verified complaint for recovery of ownership against Corazon, Leelin, and Bernardita before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte. 8
Rosalio alleged that the northern part of the parcel of land consisting of 202 sq. m. was sold to Elias Corpus (Elias) in two transactions. The proceeds thereof were applied as payment for their loan to Elias which was incurred to defray the expenses for the burial of Ursula. According to Rosalio, the remaining 124 sq. m. (subject property) is now being occupied by Corazon, Leelin, and Bernardita only by mere tolerance. 9
For her defense, Corazon argued that the parcel of land consisting of 306 sq. m. was given to her by Pastora as a "dowry" in consideration of her marriage to Salustiano, who is an illegitimate grandson of the former. She further averred that she paid the taxes thereof in 1971. 10
During the pendency of the proceedings, Rosalio died and was substituted by his heirs, namely: Federico G. Purisima, Virginia P. Dela Cruz, Florespina P. Alberto, Eduardo G. Purisima, and Maxbel G. Purisima 11 (collectively, the respondents). 12
Ruling of the MCTC
On March 6, 2002, the MCTC rendered its Decision, 13 wherein respondents were declared as the owner of the subject property. Accordingly, petitioners were ordered to peacefully vacate and reconvey the subject property to respondents.
Dismayed, petitioners appealed to the RTC.
Ruling of the RTC
On April 29, 2003, the RTC issued its Decision, 14 wherein it dismissed the appeal of petitioners and accordingly affirmed the decision rendered by the MCTC.
The RTC held that evidence on record clearly showed that petitioners' stay in the subject property was only by mere tolerance. As such, they are bound by the implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand. 15
Not satisfied, petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On February 13, 2014, the CA rendered its Decision, 16 wherein it denied the petition filed by petitioners for lack of merit.
In denying the petition, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that petitioners' possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance of Rosalio's brother, Felipe Purisima, who in turn was then occupying the subject property. Consequently, petitioners' possession, no matter how long it continued, did not start the running of any period of prescription in their favor. 17
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in a Resolution 18 dated March 10, 2015.
Hence, this Petition, wherein petitioners argued that the MCTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Alternatively, the petitioners argued that the lower courts likewise erred in the appreciation of evidence presented by the parties and argued that they acquired the subject property by prescription.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
"The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings." 19 Estoppel, however, sets in when a party actively takes part in all stages of a case before questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court. A party cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to obtain affirmative relief against the opposing party or after failing to secure such relief. 20
In Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., 21 the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by a party-surety almost 15 years later and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Before this, the party-surety invoked the jurisdictions of both the trial and appellate courts in order to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted the case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only after the CA had rendered an adverse decision that the party-surety raised the question of jurisdiction. Thus, it was held that it is iniquitous to void the trial court's decision considering that it was raised only after 15 years of tedious litigation.
In the present case, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are present which would justify the application of estoppel by laches against the petitioners. Records show that the complaint for recovery of ownership was filed on May 15, 1996. Petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction up until the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, 19 years, more or less, after the filing of the complaint. Clearly, the petitioners had every opportunity to raise the issue of jurisdiction before the MCTC, RTC, and CA, but they, instead, failed to do so.
"The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse." 22
Anent the issue of the lower court's appreciation of evidence, it is long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, will not be disturbed by the Court. Indeed, "such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on the Court when supported by the evidence on record." 23
Clearly, petitioners' claim of ownership based on prescription, wherein they alleged that Corazon occupied the same, in the concept of an owner, way back in 1957 or more than 30 years prior to the filing of the present case, deserves scant consideration.
In Pabalan, et al. v. The Heirs of Simeon A.B. Maamo, Sr., 24 the Court held that "acts of a possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription, petitioners cannot claim to have acquired ownership of the property by virtue of their possession thereof since 1935." Thus, in the present case, the possession of the subject property by the petitioners by mere tolerance could not ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated February 13, 2014 and Resolution dated March 10, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76992 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." Leonardo-de Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 15-34.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Leoncia R. Dimagiba; id. at 36-46.
3.Id. at 48-49.
4. Rendered by Acting Presiding Judge Perla B. Querubin; id. at 50-57.
5.Id. at 37.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 37-38.
10.Id. at 38.
11. Also referred to as Maxibel Purisima in the present petition.
12.Id. at 38-39.
13. Rendered by Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Enrique M. Pascua; id. at 58-75.
14.Id. at 50-57.
15.Id. at 56.
16.Id. at 36-46.
17.Id. at 42.
18.Id. at 48-49.
19.Rep. of the Phils. v. Bantigue Point Dev't. Corp., 684 Phil. 192, 199 (2012).
20.Bernardo v. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, 629 Phil. 450, 459 (2010).
21. 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
22.Bernardo v. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, supra at 459.
23.Oropesa v. Oropesa, 686 Phil. 877, 887-888 (2012).
24. 707 Phil. 52 (2013).