THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168935. March 13, 2013.]
HEIRS OF GORGONIO SACRO ORITO, petitioner, vs. EMILIA MONTESCLAROS, JUANITA MONTESCLAROS, GIL MONTESCLAROS, GREGG MONTESCLAROS, ROY MONTESCLAROS, NONASITO MONTESCLAROS, CECILE MONTESCLAROS, EDGAR MONTESCLAROS, LIBBY MONTESCLAROS, NIEL MONTESCLAROS, ROBERTO MONTESCLAROS, LIZA MONTESCLAROS, LEONOR GO AND EMILIANA Y. TSE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 13, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 168935 (Heirs of Gorgonio Sacro Orito v. Emilia Montesclaros, Juanita Montesclaros, Gil Montesclaros, Gregg Montesclaros, Roy Montesclaros, Nonasito Montesclaros, Cecile Montesclaros, Edgar Montesclaros, Libby Montesclaros, Niel Montesclaros, Roberto Montesclaros, Liza Montesclaros, Leonor Go and Emiliana Y. Tse). — This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 29, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 67835, which affirmed the Orders, 2 dated February 28, 2000 and June 6, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte (RTC), dismissing Civil Case No. R-2947, an action for annulment of sales and reconveyance.
The Facts
This controversy involves two (2) parcels of land owned by the decedent, Gorgonio Sacro Orito (Gregorio Sacro), and claimed by his direct descendants, represented by Gorgonio Adobas Orito (Gorgonio Adobas), to be their inheritance. The properties are: (1) a parcel of land situated in Laboon, Maasin, Southern Leyte, known and described as Lot 2, Plan Psu-200137, L.R. Case No. N-99, LRC Record N-27782 with an area of 1.7814 square meters (Laboon property); and (2) a parcel of land situated in Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte, with an area of 328.60 square meters (Abgao property). AaEDcS
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA in its assailed decision, are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellant Gorgonio Adobas Orito is a direct descendant of his namesake Gorgonio Sacro Orito. The latter, during his lifetime, purportedly acquired the aforesaid lands and declared them in his name for taxation purposes as shown in Tax Declaration No. 7933 issued in the year 1920 and Tax Declaration No. 3640 issued in 1948. Gorgonio Sacro Orito supposedly placed the subject properties under the administration of his brother-in-law, Leoncio Montesclaros, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants-appellees.
Sometime in 1909, Grogonio Sacro Orito left the Philippines and his whereabouts were never known ever since. Plaintiffs-appellants claimed that their family did not right away know that Gorgonio Sacro Orito left properties in Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, in 1938, Wenceslao Orito, the son of Gorgonio Sacro Orito executed an affidavit of transfer covering the Laboon property in favor of Leoncio Montesclaros. The plaintiffs-appellants contended that the said affidavit was a fraudulent document, executed through the sub rosa efforts of Leoncio Montesclaros because Wenceslao Orito was a poor and landless man, thus, it was unlikely for him to voluntarily donate the disputed property. In 1962, the same property was transferred through purported succession to Vicente Montesclaros, the son of Leoncio Montesclaros. Later, on April 20, 1980, the children of Vicente Montesclaros, defendants-appellees Vicente Montesclaros, Jr. and Emilia Montesclaros, sold the Abgao property to defendant-appellee, Leonor Go who subsequently sold it, in turn, to defendant-appellee Emiliana Tse.
Gorgonio Adobas Orito came to know about his grandfather's supposed properties only in 1993 when his cousin visited him in Mindanao and showed him documents that indicate that his late grandfather left real properties in Maasin, Leyte, purportedly managed and administered by Leoncio Montesclaros. 3
On January 1, 1997, the heirs of Gorgonio Sacro (petitioners), represented by Gorgonio Adobas, filed an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale, with prayer for accounting and damages, against respondents, the Montesclaros, Leonor Go (Go) and Emiliana Tse (Tse) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. R-2947. Petitioners, however, failed to allege in the complaint the current market value of the disputed properties but attached instead the old tax declarations showing that the disputed properties had a total assessed value below twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). 4
The respondents, upon being served with summons, filed their respective answers, all raising affirmative defenses and moving for the dismissal of the complaint. acTDCI
The Montesclaros asserted: "a) that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the case; b) that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and c) that the action has already prescribed"; Tse argued: "a) that the case states no cause of action; b) that the claim or demand set forth in the complaint has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; c) that the action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and d) there was failure on the part of the plaintiff-appellant to avail of the barangay conciliation process"; and Go raised "a) prescription; and b) laches." 5
On January 7, 1999 Gorgonio Adobas died and his heirs filed a motion for leave of court to amend the complaint for them to be substituted as party-plaintiffs in Civil Case R-2947. The motion was favorably granted by the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (a) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because there was no allegation that the assessed value exceeded P20,000.00; (b) by reason of extraordinary acquisitive prescription, the action has already prescribed; and (c) with respect to Tse, for failure of petitioners to comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Thus, the dispositive portion of the said order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, motion to dismiss is hereby granted for lack of jurisdiction, prescription, and as far as Emiliana Y. Tse is concerned, for failure to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
SO ORDERED. 6
On May 29, 2000, petitioners filed a manifestation attaching two (2) tax declarations showing that the two properties involved in the case had an assessed value of P23,000.00, thereby placing it within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
They also filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC, in its Order, 7 dated June 6, 2000, denied said motion for their failure to introduce new substantial matters for its consideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a notice of appeal on June 14, 2000, which was given due course by the CA. In said appeal, they contended that the RTC committed a reversible error when it dismissed their complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, prescription and non-compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. cAaDHT
The CA Ruling
On June 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the appeal and held that: First, the RTC was correct when it ruled that in an action involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein, the assessed value determined which court had jurisdiction over the subject matter in line with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. Applying this rule, there was no question that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the alleged value of the disputed properties was less than P20,000.00 as reflected in Annexes "A," "B" and "D," which were old tax declarations of said properties. 8
Second, the RTC correctly ruled that, in accordance with Articles 1141, 1134 and 1137 of the New Civil Code, extraordinary acquisitive prescription had already set in. The CA made this observation:
In the case at bench, as early as 1939, the possession of the disputed lands by Leoncio Montesclaros had become adverse and in the concept of owner when the Laboon property was transferred to him by virtue of an affidavit of transfer executed by Wenceslao Orito in his favor. Assuming arguendo that the execution of the affidavit of transfer was attended with fraud, or voidly donated to the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellees, it may still be the basis for the acquisition of the donee of said property by extraordinary prescription. The ownership and possession of defendants-appellees of the Laboon property, tacked in with that of their predecessors-in-interest, had been for a period of fifty-eight years before the plaintiffs-appellants filed the present action for reconveyance of the disputed property in Civil Case No. R-2947. Moreover, their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Montesclaros, Sr., had registered the title to the property in his name under OCT No. 58 in 1967 through an application for land registration proceedings. It is well settled that claims not ventilated during the land registration proceedings are deemed shut off by the issuance of a decree.
With regard to the Agbao property, the defendants-appellees had presented evidence that the land was declared under the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Montesclaros, since 1962 as shown in Tax Declaration No. 14700. Thus, reckoned from such date, acquisition of ownership by prescription has run in favor of defendants-appellees. . . . 9
Third, the RTC was also correct in holding that petitioners prematurely filed the case against Tse when they did, without attaching a certificate to file action officially issued by the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Agbao in their complaint, a clear violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. 10
Thus, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the Orders dated February 28, 2000 and June 6, 2000 issued by the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-2947.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioners now present before the Court the following: STcADa
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PRESENT CASE.
II.WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DEEDS OF SALE, WITH PRAYER FOR ACCOUNTING AND DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
III.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO EMILIANA TSE, ON ACCOUNT OF PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO ATTACH A CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION ISSUED BY THE LUPONG TAGAPAMAYAPA OF ABGAO.
The RTC did not acquire
Petitioners opine that the CA gravely erred when it based its questioned ruling on the old tax declarations covering the subject properties. Such basis, according to petitioners, is legally questionable and erroneous since the assessed value stated therein are pre-war figures. R.A. No. 7691, speaks of assessed value as the most recent assessment at the time of the filing of the complaint. Petitioners, in fact, filed a manifestation with the RTC stating that the Laboon property in 1993, which was covered by Tax Declaration No. 00296 in the name of Vicente Montesclaros (Vicente), had an assessed value of P11,210.00 while the Abgao property, which was covered by Tax Declaration No. 00698 in the name of respondent Emiliana Tse, had an assessed value of P12,110.00. All in all, the total assessed value amounted to P23,320.00 bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the RTC contrary to the ruling of the CA. Besides, Tse, in her Appellee's Brief, appended, as her Annex 5, the Tax declaration covering the subject Abgao property in the year 1991, now reclassified as both residential and commercial, with an assessed value of P415,440.00.
The Court is not persuaded.
In the case at bench, there is no question that what is involved is a real action, one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, an action affecting title to, or recovery of possession of, real property. 12 The fact that the action also involves the annulment of a certain deed of sale and an action for accounting which are incapable of pecuniary estimation, a closer scrutiny would reveal that the ultimate purpose of the action is for the declaration of petitioners as owners of said properties as part of their inheritance and that the same be reconveyed to them. In the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III, 13 it was held that while it is true that petitioner did not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the building in question, his action, however, for the annulment of sale and his claim for damages were closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the recovery of which was petitioner's primary objective. An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property did not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which was to recover said real property. 14 Thus, the case in point is a real action. AcISTE
That being settled, the next question is which court has jurisdiction when it comes to real actions? Since R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect when petitioners filed their amended complaint, dated January 15, 1997, Section 33 (3) of the said law is applicable. Section 33 (3) reads:
Sec. 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 19 (2) of the same law likewise provides:
Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. — The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Applying the above-mentioned rule to the present controversy, the CA was correct in ruling that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. The fact that petitioners failed to allege the assessed value of the subject properties in their complaint is fatal to its cause because this requirement is jurisdictional. It has been held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. 15 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not, said party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. It does not depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration. 16 IDAEHT
Thus, the fact that petitioners filed a manifestation 17 declaring that the assessed value of said properties exceeded P20,000.00, as shown by the attached new tax declarations, does not cure the defect. The rule is clear that what determines as to whether a court has jurisdiction over a case are the allegations contained in the complaint. To reiterate jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. 18 Besides, said manifestation was only filed after their complaint was dismissed by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction, prescription, and for violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The RTC correctly dismissed
Finally, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the decision of the CA in dismissing petitioners' complaint, particularly against Tse, for their failure to comply with the provisions of Book III, Title I, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), of R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991).
The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7160, making conciliation a precondition to the filing of complaints in court, read:
SEC. 412.Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b)Where parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1)Where the accused is under detention;
(2)Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings; CTacSE
(3)Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and
(4)Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
(c)Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. — The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.
SEC. 408.Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Therein. — The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a)Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b)Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c)Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d)Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e)Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f)Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g)Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
As mentioned above, the compulsory process of arbitration is a precondition for the filing of the complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it was one of excepted cases, or (b) did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed. 19 Because petitioners, in their amended complaint, did not state that it was one of the excepted cases, the dismissal of the complaint was proper. TaSEHC
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the June 29, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67835 is AFFIRMED. (Velasco, Jr., J., on leave; Leonardo-de Castro, J., designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1430 dated March 12, 2013; Peralta, J., Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 1429 dated March 12, 2013)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 25-34. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.
2.CA rollo, pp. 75-79, 86-87. Penned by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.
3.Rollo, pp. 26-27.
4.Id. at 27.
5.Id. at 28.
6.Id. at 79. (Emphasis in the original)
7.Id. at 86-87.
8.Id. at 30-31.
9.Id. at 32-33.
10.Id. at 38.
11.Id. (Emphasis in the original)
12.Serrano v. Delica, 503 Phil. 71, 77 (2005).
13.G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 283.
14.Id. at 302-303.
15.Quinarongan v. CA, G.R. No. 155179, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 104, 113.
16.Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134, 141-142.
17.Records, pp. 220-221.
18.Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 120.
19.Agbayani v. CA, G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012.