SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 245347. July 3, 2019.]
HEIRS OF MAURO MEJOS, NAMELY: FELIX T. MEJOS, PEDRO T. MEJOS, PRAXEDES M. LARCIA, NEMESIA M. ANDOY, ALBERT T. MEJOS, AND CONCEPCION M. ALCAREZ, REPRESENTED BY LEO ANGELO LARCIA, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES OLIMPIO ORAIS AND MAURILLA MEJOS-ORAIS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated03 July 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 245347 — Heirs of Mauro Mejos, namely: Felix T. Mejos, Pedro T. Mejos, Praxedes M. Larcia, Nemesia M. Andoy, Albert T. Mejos, and Concepcion M. Alcarez, represented by Leo Angelo Larcia v. Spouses Olimpio Orais and Maurilla Mejos-Orais.
This concerns the Petition 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the September 24, 2018 and February 12, 2019 Resolutions 2 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 04974-MIN. Via the said resolutions, the CA dismissed the appeal filed by the heirs of Mauro Mejos, namely: Felix T. Mejos, Pedro T. Mejos, Praxedes M. Larcia, Nemesia M. Andoy, Albert T. Mejos, and Concepcion M. Alcarez, represented by Leo Angelo Larcia (collectively, petitioners), for failure to file the required appellants' brief within the extended period granted them.
Records disclose that after trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental, Branch 32, rendered judgment 3 on January 31, 2018 favorable to the spouses Olimpio Orais and Maurilla Mejos-Orais (respondents), who were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 165-04 for Declaration of Nullity or Annulment of Deed of Sale, Recovery of Possession, Accounting and Damages, with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The fallo of the said RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE[,] the Deed of Sale dated October 31, 1984 of Lot 2, Psd.-11-006369 with an area of 22,664 square meters[,] covered by TCT No. [T-7455] 4 located in Poblacion, Banay-banay, Davao Oriental registered in the name of Maurilla Mejos married to Olimpio Orais[,] in favor of Mauro Mejos is DECLARED Null and Void and defendants are ORDERED as follows:
1. Immediately vacate and turn over possession of Lot 2, Psd.-11-006369 with an area of 22,664 square meters[,] covered by TCT No. [T-7455] located in Poblacion, Banay-banay to Maurilla Mejos Orais (Olimpio is reported to have died);
2. Immediately turn over possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. [T-7455] to Maurilla Mejos-Orais;
3. After an accounting, turn over to plaintiffs income of the land for the period 1985 to the present[,] less mortgage cost and loan to Rural Bank of Lupon; [and]
4. Jointly and severally pay plaintiff the following damages:
a) Php100,000.00 as moral damages
b) Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages
c) Php50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners timely appealed. 6 Consequently, on May 31, 2018, the CA directed 7 the petitioners to file their appeal brief within 45 days from notice, which petitioners received on June 13, 2018. 8 However, on July 30, 2018, petitioners moved for an extension of 40 days within which to file their appeal brief. 9
In a Resolution 10 dated August 31, 2018, the CA granted the motion, thus, allowing petitioners to file their appellants' brief until September 12, 2018, with a warning against further extension. This Resolution was allegedly received by petitioners on September 20, 2018. 11
Meanwhile, on September 5, 2018, petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Appeal Brief 12 seeking an additional 45 days, or until November 16, 2018, to file the required brief. The Appellants' Brief 13 was eventually filed on October 12, 2018. However, on the same day, petitioners also received notice of the CA's Resolution 14 dated September 24, 2018 denying petitioners' second motion for extension of time and dismissing petitioners' appeal.
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of their appeal. 15 Petitioners' counsel averred that he only received the August 31, 2018 Resolution, granting his first motion and warning against further extension, on September 20, 2018. By then, he had already timely filed his second motion for extension, and had no notice yet of the warning against further extension. Arguing that the CA's Resolution was overtaken by his second motion, and reasoning that he is a solo practitioner in an area with too few practicing lawyers, petitioners' counsel pleaded for leniency.
Unpersuaded, the CA noted without action 16 the Appellants' Brief and, through a Resolution 17 dated February 12, 2019, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners now seek the reinstatement of their lost appeal, claiming that their case is entitled to the court's liberality. 18
We deny the petition.
According to petitioners, it was necessary to seek a second extension of 45 days, in addition to the first extension of 40 days already granted, because counsel for petitioners transferred his office from the second floor to the ground floor of his office building. Counsel avers that moving his furniture, equipment, and documents, as well as the renovations and reorganization of his office, are compelling circumstances beyond his control. Petitioners argued that in a long line of cases, this Court held that dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds are frowned upon and rules of procedure are intended to help secure not override substantial justice.
The reasons given by petitioners' counsel are, not only unsubstantiated, but also do not by themselves count as compelling reasons. It is, furthermore, presumptuous to take for granted that motions for extension of time will be granted by courts as a matter of course. On top of the 40-day extension granted by the CA is the original 45 days from receipt of notice within which an appellant should file its appeal brief. In all, petitioners were already given 85 days. Notably, the same counsel who represented petitioners at the trial stage was the same one who also filed their notice of appeal and the motions for extension. Counsel is, thus, already familiar with the case at the inception of the appeal.
To remind:
[P]rocedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. It has been jurisprudentially held that, while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. 19
Moreover, although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege. 20 In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. 21
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners' implication that the dismissal of their appeal amounts to denial of due process. They were ably represented during trial and had fair opportunity to present evidence in their defense. Nonetheless, we also find no reversible error in the trial court's conclusion that the execution of the October 11, 1984 22 Deed of Absolute Sale, 23 subject of the case, and the handwritten receipt dated October 12, 1984, for P45,000.00 was attended with fraud; therefore, a nullity. Respondents' contention that they were illiterate and had signed the Deed of Sale and the receipt, both written in the English language which they do not understand, in the belief that it contained their true agreement of mortgage, remained unrebutted. 24 We find the RTC's conclusions to be supported by testimonies narrated in its decision, as well as the inscriptions found on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7455, 25 registered in the name of respondents.
Respondents' allegation that they did not sign the assailed Deed of Sale before Judge Francisco Lopez also holds sway, considering that the RTC had judicial notice 26 that the Municipality of Lupon does not lack notaries public, coupled with the lack of the requisite certification (of such lack of practicing lawyers or notaries public) that would have vested Judge Lopez the authority to notarize. 27 The RTC had sufficient basis to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, or the notarization of the assailed Deed of Sale in this case.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the present petition is hereby DENIED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-40.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, with Associate Justices Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon and Walter S. Ong, concurring; id. at 107 and 125-127, respectively.
3. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Angelita A. Alfonso-Tumanda; id. at 73-77.
4. Also referred to as "TCT No. T-7475" in the RTC Decision.
5.Rollo, pp. 77-77-A.
6.Id. at 78.
7.Id. at 81.
8.Id. at 85.
9.Id. at 83-84.
10.Supra note 8.
11.Id. at 12 and 110.
12.Id. at 87-88.
13.Id. at 89-106.
14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. at 110-113.
16. Id. at 114.
17. Id. at 126-127.
18. Id. at 39.
19. Mejillano v. Lucillo, 607 Phil. 660, 668-669 (2009).
20. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 789 Phil. 577, 583 (2016).
21. Spouses Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, 688 Phil. 170, 185 (2012) citing Enriquez v. Court of Appeals, 444 Phil. 419, 429 (2003).
22. Also referred to as "October 31, 1984" Deed of Sale in some parts of the RTC Decision.
23. Rollo, p. 57.
24. Id. at 76.
25. Id. at 51 and 67.
26. Supra note 24.
27. Id.